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CONSTRUCTION LAW: ITS HISTORICAL
ORIGINS AND ITS TWENTIETH CENTURY
EMERGENCE AS A MAJOR FIELD OF
MODERN AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL PRACTICE
Philip L. Bruner*
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONSTRUCTION LAW
“Construction Law” is a rapidly emerging “capstone” legal
field that over the past century has subsumed principles from
many traditional fields of law and has contextually created new
implied rights and obligations unknown to such traditional fields.
Construction law’s emergence has been driven by the
extraordinary modern growth in global construction activity,
which in 2020 accounted for 13% (US$10.7 trillion) of the global
gross domestic product and which by 2030 is expected to grow
by another 42%.1 This growth in construction activities engages
* Philip L. Bruner is an international arbitrator and mediator of disputes arising out of
the construction, engineering, energy, infrastructure and their related fields, and is the
Director of the JAMS Global Engineering and Construction Panel of Neutrals. He joined
JAMS after 40 years of private practice as a litigator of construction disputes. He is a Fellow
and Chartered Arbitrator of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, Fellow of the College of
Commercial Arbitrators, Member of Britain’s Society of Construction Arbitrators, Fellow
and Past-President of The American College of Construction Lawyers, Honourary Fellow of
the Canadian College of Construction Lawyers, Fellow of the International Academy of
Construction Lawyers, and Fellow of the American Bar Foundation. He created and taught
the first construction law courses offered by the University of Minnesota Law School (20032007) and Mitchell Hamline Law School (2006-2008). He is the co-author with Patrick J.
O’Connor, Jr. of Bruner & O’Connor on Construction Law (2002, supplemented annually),
the 12-volume, 11,000 page American legal treatise. His CV may be found at
www.jamsadr.com under “Neutrals”.
1. See Graham Robinson et al., Future of Construction, CONSTR. L. LETTER, Jan.-Feb.
2022 at 1, 1 (the authors, members of Oxford Economics of London, opine that “a cumulative
total of US$135 trillion in construction output is forecast [globally] in the decade to 2030”
and that the US is expected to contribute 11.1% or approximately US$14.9 trillion of that
global sum).
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millions of firms and persons and has increased considerably the
technical complexity and rapidity of changes in construction
design, materials, methods, and dispute resolution.2 In recent
years, the judiciary has begun to recognize construction law as a
“separate breed of animal”.3
II. CONSTRUCTION: HALLMARK OF HUMAN
CIVILIZATION4
Construction and construction law both have an ancient
heritage. For more than 4500 years construction has been a
hallmark of the advancement of human civilization, from
primitive Mesopotamian fire-brick and Egyptian cut-stone
construction to the extraordinary structures of the modern built

2. Philip L. Bruner, The Historical Emergence of Construction Law, 34 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 9, 11-12 (2007) [hereinafter Bruner, The Historical Emergence of
Construction Law]. Today, even homebuilding is viewed as complex. See Erlich v.
Menezes, 981 P.2d 978, 987 (Cal. 1999) (“The [owners] may have hoped to build their dream
home and live happily ever after, but there is a reason that tag line belongs only in fairy tales.
Building a house may turn out to be a stress-free project; it is much more likely to be the
stuff of urban legends—the cause of bankruptcy, marital dissolution, hypertension and
fleeting fantasies ranging from homicide to suicide. As Justice Yegan noted below, ‘[n]o
reasonable homeowner can embark on a building project with certainty that the project will
be completed to perfection. Indeed, errors are so likely to occur that few if any homeowners
would be justified in resting their peace of mind on [its] timely or correct completion . . . .’
The connection between the service sought and the aggravation and distress resulting from
incompetence may be somewhat less tenuous than in a malpractice case, but the emotional
suffering still derives from an inherently economic concern.”).
3. See Paul Hardeman, Inc. v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 380 F. Supp. 298, 317 (E.D.
Ark. 1974) (“[C]onstruction contracts are a separate breed of animal; and, even if not
completely sui generis, still . . . [the] law must be stated in principles reflecting underlying
economic and industry realities. Therefore, it is not safe to broadly generalize. True, general
principles of contract law are applied to construction contracts, but they are applied under
different operative conditions. Care must be taken, then, not to rely too uncritically on such
cases as those arising from the sale of real or personal property. And even within the larger
rubric of ‘construction contracts’ it is manifest that the law, if sensitive to the underlying
realities, will carefully discriminate between, say, a contract to construct a home and a
contract to construct a fifty-story office building; between a contract to build a private
driveway and a contract to construct an interchange on an interstate highway. This is what
one would expect a priori; this is, generally, what one finds when he reviews the actual
development of the law.”).
4. Footnotes 5-17 and accompanying text are partially excerpted from Bruner, The
Historical Emergence of Construction Law, supra note 2, at 1-4.
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environment.5
Construction encouraged broad human
socialization by causing people to work together to build projects
and ultimately by making cities livable.6 Mankind’s oldest
surviving epic poem, written in cuneiform script on clay tablets
by an unknown author, described the hallmarks of Uruk’s
construction advancements by about 2750 BC:
This is the wall of Uruk, which no city on earth can equal.
See how its ramparts gleam like copper in the sun. Climb
the stone staircase, more ancient than the mind can imagine,
approach the Eanna Temple, sacred to Ishtar, a temple that
no king has equaled in size or beauty, walk on the wall of
Uruk, follow its course around the city, inspect its mighty
foundations, examine its brickwork, how masterfully it is
built, observe the land it encloses: the palm trees, the
gardens, the orchards, the glorious palaces and temples, the
shops and marketplaces, the houses, the public squares.7

Mankind’s socialization led to the promulgation of
rudimentary principles of law to regulate human rights and
obligations arising out of societal interaction, and principles of
law were promulgated to govern the built environment and the
construction process.
The earliest known principles of
construction law were primitive and punitive. The Code of
Hammurabi is said to have been created about 1792-1750 B.C.E.
5. 1 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 1:1 (2021) (reviewing the historical changes in law and industry
practices that have enhanced construction’s complexity).
6. Id.; see also PLUTARCH, PERICLES (John Dryden trans., Internet Classics Archive
1994-2000) (75 A.C.E.), [https://perma.cc/7UTR-AZLB] (“That which gave most pleasure
and ornament to the city of Athens, and the greatest admiration and even astonishment to all
strangers, and that which now is Greece’s only evidence that the power she boasts of and
her ancient wealth are no romance or idle story, was [Pericles’s] construction of the public
and sacred buildings.”).
7. See STEPHEN MITCHELL, GILGAMESH: A NEW ENGLISH VERSION 198-99 (2004);
see also Looted Gilgamesh Tablet, One of World’s Oldest Surviving Works of Literature,
Returns to Iraq, PBS NEWSHOUR (Dec. 8, 2021), [https://perma.cc/5ZPU-XC7W].
Twentieth-century archaeological excavations and modern non-invasive exploratory
techniques confirm that Uruk, the ruins of which lie in the Middle East’s “fertile crescent”
near Basra in modern Iraq, was first settled about 7,000 years ago and went on to become
the largest city on earth around 3,000 years ago. See Andrew Lawler, The Everlasting City,
ARCHAEOLOGY, Sept./Oct. 2013, at 26, 26; The Epic of Gilgamesh: Map & Timeline,
ANNENBERG LEARNER, [https://perma.cc/N2VH-SZXZ] (last visited Mar. 16, 2022). “At
Uruk’s peak, in about 2900 B.C., more than 50,000 people crowded into almost two-and-ahalf square miles.” Lawler, supra note 7, at 28.
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and to be based upon even older collections of Sumerian and
Akkadian laws.8 Under its “eye for an eye” system of justice,
Hammurabi’s Code dictated that builders be punished for injuries
to others caused by collapse of their buildings.9 The code
provisions pertinent to construction state:
(229) If a builder build [sic] a house for some one, and does
not construct it properly, and the house which he built fall
[sic] in and kill [sic] its owner, then that builder shall be put
to death.
(230) If it kill [sic] the son of the owner the son of that
builder shall be put to death.
(231) If it kill [sic] a slave of the owner, then he shall pay
slave for slave to the owner of the house.
(232) If it ruin [sic] goods, he shall make compensation for
all that has been ruined, and inasmuch as he did not construct
properly this house which he built and it fell, he shall re-erect
the house from his own means.
(233) If a builder build [sic] a house for some one, even
though he has not yet completed it; if then the walls seem
toppling, the builder must make the walls solid from his own
means.10

As classical antiquity gradually civilized the built
environment, so too did it refine the law governing the built
environment. By the reign of Rome’s Caesar Augustus,11
construction risks inherent in building upon unsuitable soils12 or
8. Code of Hammurabi: Babylonian Laws, BRITANNICA, [https://perma.cc/ZM6F66VA] (last visited Mar. 14, 2022).
9. See The Code of Hammurabi, AVALON PROJECT §§ 229–33,
[https://perma.cc/68N9-D5VJ] (last visited Mar. 15, 2022).
10. Id.; see generally Martha T. Roth, Mesopotamian Legal Traditions and the Laws
of Hammurabi, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13 (1995). Hammurabi (circa 1810-1750 B.C.) was
the sixth king of Babylonia and conquered and absorbed most of the middle east into the
Babylonian Empire. See Johannes M. Renger, Hammurabi: King of Babylonia,
BRITANNICA, [https://perma.cc/Y4MY-SYKM] (last visited Mar. 6, 2022).
11. Gaius Julius Caesar Octavianus (63 B.C.–14 A.D.), great nephew of Julius Caesar,
became Rome’s first emperor and took the name Augustus by the Roman Senate. See COLIN
WELLS, THE ROMAN EMPIRE 11-12, 14 (2d ed. 1992); Michael Grant, Augustus,
BRITANNICA, [https://perma.cc/CB96-FQZH] (last visited Mar. 16, 2022).
12. Jesus of Nazareth, who is said to have practiced carpentry as a boy, employed
widely understood metaphors in his sermons and concluded His Sermon on the Mount (circa
30 A.D.) in Matthew 7:24-27 (New Revised Standard Version) with this admonition:
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in providing incompetent management and cost control13 were
widely recognized. Good construction practice under Roman law
favored careful contractual articulation of the scope of work and
allocation of construction risks.14 Roman builders had good
Everyone then who hears these words of mine and acts on them will be like a
wise man who built his house on a rock. The rain fell, the floods came, and
the winds blew and beat on that house, but it did not fall, because it had been
founded on rock. And everyone who hears these words of mine and does not
act on them will be like a foolish man who built his house on sand. The rain
fell, and the floods came, and the winds blew and beat against that house, and
it fell—and great was its fall!
Matthew 7:24-27 (New Revised Standard Version) (emphasis added); see Jaroslav Jan
Pelikan, Jesus, BRITANNICA, [https://perma.cc/VQ3S-WZMQ] (last visited Mar. 16, 2022);
THE ONE YEAR CHRONOLOGICAL BIBLE: NEW LIVING TRANSLATION (Tyndale House
Publishers, Inc. ed., 2d ed. 2013).
13. See MARCUS VITRUVIUS POLLIO, VITRUVIUS: THE TEN BOOKS ON
ARCHITECTURE 282 (Morris Hicky Morgan trans., 1960) (1914) (c. 20 B.C.). Known to
history as “Vitruvius,” he was chief engineer to Julius Caesar and Emperor Augustus. John
H. Lienhard, Engines of Our Ingenuity: No. 580: Vitruvius, UNIV. OF HOUSTON, at 00:28,
[https://perma.cc/VQP7-D9RW] (last visited Mar. 20, 2022) (University of Houston College
of Engineering radio broadcast). Thus, in his time, he was the “chief engineer of the civilized
world.” Id. Vitruvius wrote a ten-volume treatise for Augustus on Roman construction
practices, which survived the ravages of time to influence the architecture of the European
Renaissance. Id. at 00:45. Among other things, Vitruvius proposed to Augustus that Rome
resurrect an ancient ancestral law of the Greek City of Ephesus:
1. In the famous and important Greek City of Ephesus there is said to be an
ancient ancestral law, the terms of which are severe, but its justice is not
inequitable. When an architect accepts the charge of a public work, he has to
promise what the cost of it will be. His estimate is handed to the magistrate,
and his property is pledged as security until the work is done. When it is
finished, if the outlay agrees with his statement, he is complimented by decrees
and marks of honour. If no more than a fourth has to be added to his estimate,
it is furnished by the treasury and no penalty is inflicted. But when more than
one fourth has to be spent in addition on the work, the money required to finish
it is taken from his property.
2. Would to God that this were also a law of the Roman people, not merely for
public, but also for private buildings. For the ignorant would no longer run
riot with impunity, but men who are well qualified by an exact scientific
training would unquestionably adopt the profession of architecture.
Gentlemen would not be misled into limitless and prodigal expenditure, even
to ejectments from their estates, and the architects themselves could be forced,
by fear of the penalty, to be more careful in calculating and stating the limit of
expense, so that gentlemen would procure their buildings for that which they
had expected, or by adding only a little more.
Id.
14. VITRUVIUS, supra note 13, at 10 (“[P]rinciples of law . . . should be known to
architects, so that, before they begin upon buildings, they may be careful not to leave
disputed points for the householders to settle after the works are finished, and so that in
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reason to exercise care in contracting because the Roman legal
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda (“contracts must be honored”)
imposed strict contractual liability unless non-performance was
excused under the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus (“provided the
circumstances remain unchanged”).15 These ancient principles
undergird the modern law of contract and its legal doctrines of
sanctity of contract, force majeure, and impracticability.16
For 1900 years following the advent of Augustus’s Imperial
Rome—through Europe’s Dark Ages, Renaissance, and
Industrial Revolution—construction law was subsumed by
broader and more generalized fields of law and by perceptions of
construction as local and parochial, invoking primarily the “law
of the shop” rather than the “law of the courts.”17 Then, in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, public demand for new
construction increased exponentially and construction became the
largest segment of the production sector of the global economy.18
“Building upon primitive construction techniques limited to
wood, stone and masonry materials, the 19th and 20th centuries
witnessed a veritable explosion in construction knowledge: new
techniques, materials technologies, geotechnical exploration
methods, soils classification and environmental monitoring
facilities theretofore unknown.”19 This explosion of knowledge
led to the demise of the “master builder” of old and to the creation
drawing up contracts the interests of both employer and contractor may be wisely safeguarded. For if a contract is skillfully drawn, each may obtain a release from the other
without disadvantage.”).
15. 5 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 15:22 (2021).
16. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. ch. 11 intro. note (AM. L.
INST. 1981) (“Contract liability is strict liability. It is an accepted maxim that pacta sunt
servanda, contracts are to be kept.”). These ancient Roman laws undergird the more recent
common law principle of Sanctity of Contract. See Dermott v. Jones, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 1, 7
(1864) (“It is a well-settled rule of law, that if a party by his contract charge himself with an
obligation possible to be performed, he must make it good, unless its performance is rendered
impossible by the act of God, the law, or the other party. Unforeseen difficulties, however
great, will not excuse him.”).
17. See generally HENRY OF BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND
(Samuel E. Thorne trans., c. 1230), [https://perma.cc/U4S5-9TU7]; 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, [https://perma.cc/6SQ5-VUZG].
18. See 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 5, at § 1:1; Bruner, The Historical
Emergence of Construction Law, supra note 2, at 11.
19. 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 5, at § 1:1.

1 BRUNER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

6/2/22 11:45 AM

ITS HISTORICAL ORIGINS

213

in its place of a host of specialized architectural, engineering, and
project management disciplines and:
construction trades to design, manufacture and build [our]
modern [built environment]—geotechnical exploration,
high-strength steel, reinforced concrete, heating and
ventilating, plumbing, electricity, lighting, telephones, fiber
optic cables, deep caissons, elevators and escalators, fire
retardation, building controls, curtainwall, roofing, and
sealants, and to manufacture modern materials, such as highstrength steel, glass, plastics, and aluminum.20

“Advances in construction knowledge also could be
observed in new types of construction projects: hundred-story
office towers, interstate highways with cloverleaf interchanges,
massive dams and power plants, airports and street lighting, and
subways and tunnels,” as well as 3D printed bridges and homes.21
“One consequence of the increased size and complexity of
construction projects by the early 20th century was a heightened
concern for public safety that in turn lead to governmental
regulation of construction industry practices through legislative
imposition of minimum qualifications” and standards enforced
through designer and contractor licensing laws, building code
permitting requirements, and construction-safety laws and
regulations, and resulted in management of the complex
construction process by distinct governmentally licensed
architectural and engineering specialties—civil, structural,
mechanical, electrical, geotechnical, acoustical and others—as
well as a host of licensed specialty trade contractors and
tradesmen to perform the work.22 Today, construction is the
largest single segment of the production sector of the global
economy,23 and its economic importance and technical
complexity continue to grow.
20. Bruner, The Historical Emergence of Construction Law, supra note 2, at 4-5; 1
BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 5, at § 1:1.
21. 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 5, § 1:1; Mikahila L., The Most
Impressive 3D-Printed Bridges Projects, 3D NATIVES (Nov. 5, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/BBV6-5T6E].
22. 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 5, at § 1:1; Bruner, The Historical
Emergence of Construction Law, supra note 2, at 4.
23. Maria João Ribeirinho et al., The Next Normal in Construction: How Disruption is
Reshaping the World’s Largest Ecosystem, MCKINSEY & CO., June 2020, at 1, 4.
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Such extraordinary technical and managerial advances
fundamentally changed the industry. New inventions led to
electrification, indoor plumbing, space heating at controlled
temperatures, new building materials and machinery, better
structural and curtainwall systems, increased knowledge of soils
characteristics, and advances in geotechnical and structural
engineering and in a host of other disciplines.24 The complexity
of the construction process and numbers of participants in the
construction process required greater overall project management
skills and more careful communication among project
participants.25 A major challenge on every project has been the
accurate communication of technically complex information to
the myriad parties involved in the construction process, and the
management of known and unknown uncertainties.26
Construction’s technological complexity was amplified by the
invariably unique conditions under which projects usually are
performed—most every project is unique, built to a unique
design, on a unique site, by a unique aggregation of companies,
operating without economies of scale in an uncontrolled
environment, where productivity is affected by weather, geology,
local labor skills and availability, local building codes, and site
accessibility.

24. Bruner, The Historical Emergence of Construction Law, supra note 2, at 1.
25. Id. at 11, 13.
26. John W. Hinchey, Visions for the Next Millennium, in 1 CONSTRUCTION LAW
HANDBOOK 31, 32 (1999) (“Construction is an inherently complex business. Even casual
observers of the construction process are struck by the enormous amount of information
required to construct a project. Hundreds, even thousands, of detailed drawings are required.
Hundreds of thousands of technical specifications, requests for information, and other
documents are needed. Complex calculations are used to produce the design. For years, this
complexity dictated a labor-intensive, highly redundant methodology for doing the work.
Projects were fragmented and broken into many parts. Different entities undertook different
parts of a project, both for design and construction. Therefore, the construction industry
became exceptionally fragmented. On a project of even average complexity, there may have
been from 5 to 15 firms involved in design. From 40 to 100 companies may have been
engaged in construction. Many more companies supplied materials, professional services,
and other elements necessary for completion of the project. It was effectively impossible to
convey the sum of knowledge necessary to construct a facility in a set of plans and
specifications. Stated another way, the information technology traditionally used for
construction is inadequate.”).
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III. “CONSTRUCTION LAW”—WHAT IS IT?
Prior to the twentieth century no such subject as
“construction law” was recognized by courts or law schools
anywhere in the world. Contracts were construed strictly in
accordance with their textual terms under the Doctrine of Sanctity
of Contract.27 Disputes arising in the construction field were
deemed to be subsumed by the ancient legal fields of contract law,
tort law, equity law, surety law, and such statutory law as was
applicable.28 Even as little as fifty years ago those lawyers who
represented parties in the construction field would joke that the
“construction law” practice included everything except the
practice of dentistry.
“Construction Law” owes its modern recognition as a
separate field of law to the judiciary’s acceptance of the Doctrine
of Contextual Contract.29
As construction’s increasing
technological and managerial complexity came to be recognized,
some common law courts turned away from strict interpretation
of language within the four corners of a contract and moved
toward recognizing a more liberal interpretation based on the
construction industry’s own experience, customs, practices,
implied conditions and duties, and the factual context underlying

27. See Dermott v. Jones, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 1, 2, 7-8 (1864) (finding that this covenant
was to complete the building “ready for use and occupation . . . . [I]t was [the contractor’s]
duty to fulfil, and he was bound to do whatever was necessary to its performance. Against
the hardship of the case he might have guarded by provision in the contract. Not having
done so, it is not in the power of this court to relieve him . . . . The principle . . . rests upon
a solid foundation of reason and justice. It regards the sanctity of contracts.”); see also
Stephen A. Hess, The Sanctity of Construction Contracts, 1 AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J. 1,
1 (2021).
28. 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 5, at § 1:3.
29. See id. at §§ 3.1, 3.2; United States v. Lennox Metal Mfg. Co., 225 F.2d 302, 310
(2d Cir. 1955) (“Even if a word in a written agreement is not ambiguous on its face, the better
authorities hold that its context, its ‘environment,’ must be taken into account in deciding
what the parties mutually had in mind when they used that verbal symbol.”); see also CARL
J. CIRCO, CONTRACT LAW IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CONTEXT 61-62 (2020); Karen
Eggleston et al., The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95
N.W. U. L. REV. 91, 93 (2000) (“[L]awyers, judges, and legislatures cannot evaluate contract
rules without understanding the contracts that these rules are supposed to regulate. Yet the
law review literature on contracts is almost completely devoid of the positive analysis of
contracts.”).
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the meaning of the contract.30 Courts thus began to journey along
the road leading from “text” to “context”.31
The late 1800s and early 1900s:
witnessed the emergence of a primary judicial vehicle for
development of construction law principles: the modern
theory of “contextual contract,” which elastically allowed the
judiciary to add contractual terms, conditions, and warranties
implied by the transaction’s surrounding circumstances and
complexity, and to interpret express contractual language in
conformance with industry usage, custom, and practice.32

Today, common law jurisdictions and some civil law
jurisdictions recognize construction contracts as including a host
of duties and conditions implied in the contract as a matter of law,
such as: (1) the parties’ mutual implied duty of good faith and
30. See Carl J. Circo, The Construction Industry in the U.S. Supreme Court: Part 1,
Contract Law, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 2021, at 6, 6 [hereinafter Circo, The Construction
Industry in the U.S. Supreme Court: Part 1]; Bruner, Historical Emergence of Construction
Law, supra note 2, at 7, 13.
31. See Circo, The Construction Industry in the U.S. Supreme Court: Part 1, supra
note 30, at 6; Carl J. Circo, The Construction Industry in the U.S. Supreme Court: Part 2,
Beyond Contract Law, 41 CONSTR. LAW., no. 3, 2021, at 5, 7-12 [hereinafter Circo, The
Construction Industry in the U.S. Supreme Court: Part 2] (reviewing the nineteenth and early
twentieth century construction cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court that move from text
to context).
32. Bruner, Historical Emergence of Construction Law, supra note 2, at 7. Oliver
Wendell Holmes, one of America’s most influential Justices of the United States Supreme
Court in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, reminded the legal profession that:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in
determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies
the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot be
dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of
mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been, and
what it tends to become.
O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881); see also O. W. Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897) (“You always can imply a condition in a contract.
But why do you imply it? It is because of some belief as to the practice of the community
or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some attitude
of yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative measurement, and therefore not
capable of founding exact logical conclusions. Such matters really are battle grounds . . .
where the decision can do no more than embody the preference of a given body in a given
time and place. We do not realize how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration
upon a slight change in the habit of the public mind.”).
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fair dealing; (2) the parties’ mutual duty of cooperation and nonhindrance; (3) the employer’s implied duties of detailed design,
document adequacy, and full disclosure of facts critical to
construction; and (4) the contractor’s implied duty of inquiry.33
Thus, the content of the complex construction contract extends
beyond its express written terms and conditions, plans and
specifications, and related documents that are incorporated
therein by reference.34
Those who believe that a full
understanding of the parties’ rights and obligations can be gained
merely by reading the four corners of the express contract are
mistaken. Reading the express contract is only the beginning, and
not an end, of gaining full comprehension of the parties’ legally
enforceable contractual rights and obligations.
“Rarely can even well-drafted construction contracts be said
to be ‘complete’ in all respects, because contracts often fail to
include provisions covering all conceivable contingencies and
routinely are construed to include judicially implied terms arising
from the contract’s ‘context’ interpreted in accordance with
special trade customs and practices.”35 “‘Context’ is the judicial
‘gloss’ applied to express contracts to determine intent and judge
compliance.”36
Such
contextual
“gloss”
arises
out
of
(1)
judicial interpretation of contract terms in accordance with
accepted rules of interpretation and industry customs and
33. See 1A BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION
LAW § 3.4; CARL J. CIRCO, CONTRACT LAW IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CONTEXT
45-46 (2020).
34. See Carl J. Circo, The Evolving Role of Relational Contract in Construction Law,
CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2012, at 16, 16-17 (“[R]elational principles mean, for example, that
construction lawyers should take note of behavior that reflects certain norms characteristic
of contractual or exchange relationships, such as customs and expectations, reciprocity, and
a commitment to harmonize conflict and to preserve relationships, even when those values
require some sacrifice of individualistic interests. And they suggest that we should ask
relational questions: To what extent are the relationships founded on past experiences and
the prospects for ongoing or future dealings? . . . Broadly speaking, a relational approach
counsels litigants, courts, arbitrators, and mediators to look past formal legal rules to explore
and grapple with the relational context of a construction dispute. For example, when
contrasted with traditional contract law, relational contract is more committed to the duties
of good faith and fair dealing, the significance of industry customs, and the availability of
detrimental reliance remedies.”).
35. 1A BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 33, at § 3.2.
36. Id.
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usages; and (2) judicial imposition as a matter of law
of implied rights and obligations, conditions and warranties
that assure fairness within the context of the parties’
expressly contracted responsibilities.37

“Construction law today is a primordial soup in the ‘melting
pot’ of the law—a thick broth consisting of centuries-old legal
theories fortified by statutory law and seasoned by contextual
legal innovations reflecting the broad factual ‘realities’ of the
modern construction process.”38
It is the “contextual”
environment of construction that gives the construction contract
uniqueness among the wide world of contracts.39 Given their
unique transactional contexts, construction contracts are
recognized by the world of contract law as a “separate breed of
animal”.40 Moreover, jurisdictions such as the states of Florida,
Texas, and Arizona and the Province of Ontario, Canada,
recognize “Construction Law” as a sufficiently complex and
unique legal specialty that is worthy of specialized professional
bar certification.41
37. Id.
38. Bruner, The Historical Emergence of Construction Law, supra note 2, at 13-14.
39. See Thomas Stipanowich, Restructuring Construction Law: Reality and Reform in
a Transactional System, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 463, 480–81 (1998) (“The concept of a law of
construction contracts, separate and apart from the mainstream [] contract, gained acceptance
only in recent decades with the emergence of large national and international engineering
and construction companies, a corps of practitioners specializing in construction contract
matters, and the beginning of a body of pertinent scholarship. Reinforcing these historical
realities may be the traditional robust individualism of construction contractors. More
significant may be the construction industry’s heavy reliance upon internal sources of norms,
embodied chiefly in the standardized contract and adherence to private ‘governance
mechanisms’ such as arbitration and mediation that acknowledge and serve relational
interests and concerns.”).
40. Paul Hardeman, Inc. v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 380 F. Supp. 298, 317 (E.D. Ark.
1974).
41. See Construction Defect Law Specialization, STATE BAR OF ARIZ.,
[https://perma.cc/EE24-6KNL] (last visited Mar. 11, 2022); Construction Law, TEX. BD. OF
LEGAL SPECIALIZATION, [https://perma.cc/3W65-77RR] (last visited Mar. 11, 2022); see
also Amend. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 875 So. 2d 448, 540-41 (2004) (mem.),
which establishes standards by which a Florida lawyer may become a “Board Certified
Construction Lawyer” and which defines “Construction Law” as follows:
“Construction law” is the practice of law dealing with matters relating to the
design and construction of improvements on private and public projects
including, but not limited to, construction dispute resolution, contract
negotiation, preparation, award and administration, lobbying in governmental
hearings, oversight and document review, construction lending and insurance,
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Under the weight of a century of contextual experience,
“construction law” has become:
a “capstone” subject, a towering legal edifice built out of
modern statutes, “contextual” common law principles of and
foundational legal concepts sustaining and binding the
multitude of parties—architects, engineers, contractors,
subcontractors, material suppliers, material manufacturers,
sureties, insurers, code officials, and tradesmen—typically
engaged in varying degrees on construction projects.42

The types of unique legal relationships in the construction
industry include:
(1) express and implied contractual relationships among
multiple parties engaged on the same project;
(2) tort relationships, rights, and obligations where
contractual privity does not exist or professional or public
duties supersede;
(3) suretyship relationships invoking equitable principles
governing rights and duties under construction bonds and
bonded construction contracts;
(4) insurance relationships invoking principles applicable to
products insuring construction and design risks, such as
builders’ risk policies;
(5) agency principles applicable to construction industry
participants and their representatives;
(6) design professional rights and liabilities created by
common law and statutory duties;

construction licensing, and the analysis and litigation of problems arising out
of the Florida Construction Lien Law, section 255.05, Florida Statutes, and the
federal Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270.
See also THE L. SOC’Y OF ONT., STANDARDS FOR CERTIFICATION CONSTRUCTION LAW 1
(2018), [https://perma.cc/Z46B-FKUV], which defines the “Construction Law Specialty” as
follows:
The practice of construction law encompasses the representation of
participants in the construction industry and includes the negotiation and
formation of contracts, provision of legal advice on construction and
infrastructure matters, representation with regards to tenders or proposals,
preparation of documents, representation in proceedings and the resolution of
disputes including, alternative dispute resolution and litigation.
42. Bruner, The Historical Emergence of Construction Law, supra note 2, at 14.
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(7) construction lender-borrower relationships and liabilities
pertaining to project financing;
(8) special rights and obligations created by statutes
governing mechanic’s liens, public contractor bonds, and
award of public contracts by bidding or negotiation;
(9) special rights and obligations arising under the Uniform
Commercial Code governing relationships for the purchase
of construction materials and equipment; [and]
(10) special public duties created by building codes,
licensing laws, and health and safety laws[.]43

“Some academicians view ‘construction law’ incorrectly as
mere ‘advanced contract law’—a misunderstanding that arises
from viewing ‘construction law’ through the prism of a
historically narrow academic discipline rather than through the
kaleidoscope of complex legal and factual issues inherent in the
construction process itself.”44 Construction contracts necessarily
must be construed in transactional context, because they address
a host of complex issues unique to construction, such as:
(1) Originality of each construction project as to siting,
design objectives, construction requirements, design and
construction professionals, and ownership;
(2) Novelty of construction risks such as unforeseen site
conditions, scheduling and coordination of numerous
subcontractors and material suppliers, frequent changes in
project design, deviations in construction work and
specialized payment security afforded by surety bond and
mechanics lien laws;
(3) Rapid technological advances in building materials,
systems, techniques and equipment;
(4) Statutory mandates promoting competition and various
social objectives in the award of public contracts;
(5) Use of multiple project delivery methods, such as
competitive sealed bidding, which invokes legal principles
of “firm bid” and promissory estoppel in unique
applications, or other more collaborative project delivery
43. Id. at 15 (reproduced with permission of the author and the William Mitchell Law
Review. Quotations within the list are omitted for readability).
44. Id. at 14.
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methods unique to construction such as teaming, partnering,
alliancing and design-build and its variants, which may add
responsibilities and risks for financing, operation and
maintenance obligations, cost reimbursement with or
without a guaranteed maximum price, and contract
negotiation;
(6) Different design standards, building codes and licensing
requirements applicable in different jurisdictions and types
of projects;
(7) Unusual varieties of construction contract pricing
arrangements, such as fixed price, force account, time and
material, cost reimbursement with or without a guaranteed
maximum price, unit prices based on estimated quantities,
and contract clauses authorizing price adjustments for extra
work or other compensable events, all of which can be paid
either in partial payments as work progresses or in a single
lump sum upon completion;
(8) Special construction cost principles and job cost
accounting procedures;
(9) Complex “critical path” concepts for measuring
construction time, scheduling the work, and determining
causation and compensability of delay and entitlement to
additional time;
(10) Legal principles unique to construction damage
measurement, such as substantial performance, betterment,
economic waste, accepted formulas for extended home
office overhead and extended usage of contractor-owned
equipment, and unsegregated damage approaches that
recognize construction’s imperfect world;
(11) Legal “fault lines” between common-law legal theories
of contract, tort, and equity, as applied to the same claims;
(12) Legal “fault lines” dividing common-law and statutory
principles applicable to different aspects of construction
contracting, such as between general common-law principles
governing design and construction, and the Uniform
Commercial Code governing the purchase of construction
equipment and materials;
(13) Judicial or legislative public policy prohibitions in some
jurisdictions against the use of certain stringent clauses such
as those addressing “no damage for delay,” indemnification,
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“pay if paid” clauses and other provisions invoking penalties
or forfeitures;
(14) Multitude of parties involved in the construction
process, each with its own written or oral contract;
(15) Use of massive contract documents typically involving
hundreds of pages of specifications and blueprints to
describe the work to be performed;
(16) Customs and practices unique to the construction
industry;
(17) Construction contract formation necessarily is
dependent upon and must be preceded by selection of a
project delivery method aimed ultimately at achieving the
owner’s fundamental objectives of price, quality, and time
amid the uncertainties and complexities of the construction
process; and
(18) If ambiguous, the contract will be interpreted under
long-standing “contextual” trade customs and practices;
(19) The extraordinary variety of “implied conditions” and
“implied warranties” that are found in construction
contracts;45
(20) technical issues of scope of work, changes, and proof of
causation of delay and of loss; and
(21) issues unique to dispute resolution by arbitration,
mediation, adjudication, dispute review boards, structured
negotiation, and other dispute resolution methods.

IV. IMPACT OF MULTIPLE HUMAN MINDSETS THAT
ADD TO CONSTRUCTION’S COMPLEXITY46
Modern construction’s factual and legal complexity and
contextual considerations require broad industry education
among all participating members of such complexity to avoid
communication problems among the different segments of the
construction industry. One extraordinary non-legal characteristic
of the construction industry that differentiates it from other fields
45. 1A BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 33, at § 3:2 (reproduced with the
author’s permission. Quotations within the list are omitted for readability).
46. Part IV is excerpted from 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 5, at § 1:2.
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of human endeavor and adds complexity to the construction
process has been the marked differences among its participants in
mindset, training, and approach to construction problems—
psychological and cultural considerations that have contributed
significantly to the construction industry’s litigiousness in the
twentieth century. Contractors characteristically are practical,
independent, and hard-headed personalities who enjoy “getting
their hands dirty.” Architects, more often than not, are perceived
as ethereal “right brain” visionaries in search of aesthetic beauty
in architectural design, uncomfortable with the “hurly-burly” of
the construction process and willing, in the face of modern
complexities and risks of liability, to abdicate their ancient role as
“master builder.” In contrast to architects, engineers typically are
perceived as viewing the world from the “left brain,” thinking of
problem-solving as a mathematical exercise, and having a
perceived literal outlook. Owners usually are less experienced
with the construction process than the other participants, and can
be inflexible, assertive, and demanding because they bear
substantial risks in financing the project, look to design
professionals and construction managers to protect their interests,
and expect completion of the project strictly conforming to their
requirements.
In contrast to these mindsets, lawyers and judges rarely view
disputes as all black or all white, inevitably identify different
shades of gray in their search for fairness and equity, and ponder
amid the shifting sands of construction industry practices and
mores whether circumstances warrant enforcement of or excuse
from contractual obligations willingly assumed. To construction
parties, desirous of clarity and even literalism in their legal
relationships, the uncertainty created by such shades of gray has
raised to mythical status, the celebrated “one-armed lawyer”, a
lawyer who gives straightforward advice without saying “on the
one hand . . . but on the other hand . . . .” The fundamental
differences in mindsets, outlooks and approaches to contract
interpretation between construction industry participants and
lawyers were highlighted by Max E. Greenberg, one of the midtwentieth century “deans” of the American Construction Bar, in a
classic construction law lecture entitled “It Ain’t Necessarily So”:
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There is a basic difference in the training and thinking
of lawyers and engineers. It is a difference which you must
understand, if you want to comprehend how and why
lawyers—which includes judges—arrive at conclusions
which may appear to you to be entirely contrary to the clear
and express provisions of a contract.
Engineers deal basically, with the immutable laws of
nature. You are taught to look a fact in the face and to accept
it without equivocation. Steel has certain qualities. It has
certain defined stresses and strains, and while you may
devise means to employ its qualities to your purpose, you
can’t change it. You accept it for what it is. It is a fact.
Wood has certain qualities which you employ, but can’t
change. It’s a fact. The varying types of soil have definite
qualities. You may employ them within the limitations of
those qualities. You cannot change it. It’s a fact.
Lawyers, however, deal with vagaries of the human
mind. We seek an indefinable, elusive something, called
Justice. Justice depends merely on our sense of fairness. It
may mean different things in different ages, or different
things in the same age under different circumstances; it may
mean different things to different people in the same age and
circumstances.
In a situation where transportation may mean survival
and the sole means of transportation is a horse, the stealing
of a horse may have serious consequences and hanging may
be considered just. However, in a society depending
primarily on automobiles, tractors and power equipment, the
same act of stealing a horse, does not have serious
consequences; hanging would not be considered just. In a
community where its economic life depends on the ready
transferability of title to lumber, it may be considered just
that the title to stolen lumber conveyed to an innocent
purchaser be deemed valid, although in another community,
in which lumber does not form the basis of its economic life,
the transfer of title to stolen lumber may not be deemed
valid.47

47. Max E. Greenberg, It Ain’t Necessarily So, 40 MUN. ENG’RS. J. 50, 50-51 (1954)
(a speech presented on April 28, 1954 to the municipal engineers of the City of New York).
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Using as one of many examples a contractual “no damage
for delay” clause, Greenberg observed:
Now when you, as engineers, read a contract which in
plain understandable English states the [owner] shall not be
liable for damages for delays, resulting from any cause
whatsoever and that the sole remedy of the contractor shall
be an extension of time, that, to you, with your type of
background and training is a fact; it means what it says. But
to us, as lawyers “It ain’t necessarily so.” Our sense of
fairness may impose limitations on the effectiveness of that
clearly expressed provision.
[T]he effectiveness of a contract provision excusing the
owner from liability for damage for delays . . . must yield
when it conflicts with a basic, though perhaps not expressed,
rule of law which implies that the owner will do its share
toward getting the contract completed within the time
specified. Every contract imposes obligations on both sides.
The [owner], when it requires a contractor to perform within
a set period, by that fact alone, itself assumes the obligation
to give the contractor the site on time to approve drawings or
samples within the time one ought normally expect them to
be approved, to let its other independent contracts in such
time and to require the performance thereof in such periods
as will enable all the coordinated contracts to be completed
within the time specified; to have adequate funds available
to proceed with the work.
In other words, we as lawyers, do not consider it fair,
that simply because it is provided that the owner shall not be
liable for delays, that it can thereby take an unfair advantage
of the situation and thereby impose expense on the contractor
due to the owners failure to diligently and fairly maintain its
share of the bargain.48

Those people in the construction industry who look for
certainty within the four corners of the contract, without focusing
on the factual complexities of the construction process or the legal
complexities and context imposed by judicially created implied
contractual conditions outside the four corners of the written
contract often have been sources of, rather than solutions to,
48. Id. at 51-52.
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problems. Thus, differences in perspective, outlook, training and
objectives of the parties simply exacerbate an already
technologically complex construction process.
V. CONSTRUCTION LAW AND THE NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION BAR
For much of the 20th century, lawyer specialization in
construction law was self-taught under the necessity of
providing adequate legal representation to construction
industry clients. The extent of specialization depended upon
the number of such clients and the frequency of their legal
matters.
Lawyers representing contractors, design
professionals, owners and sureties typically learned
“construction law” from the unique perspectives of the
clients they served.49

For more than 100 years, the impact of construction’s
complexity upon courtroom trial of construction disputes has
been well recognized. Both lawyers and judges inexperienced in
construction50 acknowledge frustration in dealing with
49. 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra, note 5, at § 1:5.
50. See E. C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 387 F. Supp. 1001, 1006 (S.D. Ala.
1974), aff’d in part, vacated in part, in which a federal judge offered parties before him at a
pretrial conference this sage advice:
Being trained in this field [of construction], you are in a far better position to
adjust your differences than those untrained in [its] related fields. As an
illustration, I, who have had no training whatsoever in engineering, had to
determine whether or not the emergency generator system proposed to be
furnished . . . met the specifications, when experts couldn’t agree. That is a
strange bit of logic. . . . The object of litigation is to do substantial justice
between the parties litigant, but the parties litigant should realize that, in most
situations, they are by their particular training better able to accomplish this
among themselves.
See also Blake Constr. Co. v. C. J. Coakley Co., 431 A.2d 569, 575 (D.C. App. 1981)
(“[E]xcept in the middle of a battlefield, nowhere must men coordinate the movement of
other men and all materials in the midst of such chaos and with such limited certainty of
present facts and future occurrences as in a huge construction project such as the building of
this 100 million dollar hospital. Even the most painstaking planning frequently turns out to
be mere conjecture and accommodation to changes must necessarily be of the rough, quick
and ad hoc sort, analogous to ever-changing commands on the battlefield. Further, it is a
difficult task for a court to be able to examine testimony and evidence in the quiet of a
courtroom several years later concerning such confusion and then extract from them a
determination of precisely when the disorder and constant readjustment, which is to be
expected by any subcontractor on a job site, bec[a]me so extreme, so debilitating and so
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construction’s complexities.51 The messiness and complexity of
construction disputes are legendary.52 Prior to the mid-twentieth
century, the organized bar played no role in the development of
construction law.53 “The American Bar Association, which was
organized in the 19th century, offered no committee focusing
unreasonable as to constitute a breach of contract between a contractor and a subcontractor.
This was the formidable undertaking faced by the trial judge in the instant case . . . .”).
51. See Kiewit-Atkinson-Kenny v. Mass. Water Res. Auth., No. 011920BLS, 2002
WL 31187691, at *12 (Mass. Sept. 3, 2002), in which the court expressed its frustration at
the parties’ request for the court to interpret technical contract language:
The contract language . . . is sprawled over hundreds of pages and contained
in several documents, not all speaking consistently with one another; and the
“record” is massive, covering literally thousands of pages. The burden placed
upon this Court is immense, and, it fears, after all of its attempts to give fair
attention and correct rulings to the various issues, whichever side does not
prevail will first seek reconsideration and thereafter will ultimately appeal, and
may well argue that material facts remain in dispute. In short, this
memorandum and the orders it produces may turn out to be an exercise in
futility driven by a hugely over-litigated case. . . . Here, a single judge—not a
panel of experts in the subject of tunnel construction—is asked to resolve the
issues because the parties themselves refuse to accept the decisions of their
contractually assembled team of experts.
52. See Decker & Co. v. West, 76 F.3d 1573,1575 (Fed. Cir. 1996), in which the court
noted the messiness common to construction disputes:
This is one of those messy government [construction] dispute cases in which,
during the performance of the contract, neither of the parties acquitted
themselves with pure grace. Working through the detailed record of such a
case causes one to understand better the ancient curse of a plague o’ both their
houses.
53. See Stipanowich, supra note 39, at 490–91 (opining at great lengths on this issue
and providing the following: “Early in the history of the Republic, commercial lawyers came
to dominate the ranks of the American bar. The alliance of the bar with mercantile interests
had an immediate, profound impact on procedures for trying commercial cases, including a
dramatic curtailment of the use of juries and a clear identification of commercial law with
the universal law of nations. Bar organizations and prominent practitioners played pivotal
roles in the evolution of the UCC; roles that have continued to the present day. By way of
contrast, the organized bar played no significant role in the historic development of
construction contract law for the simple reason that a national construction bar did not
coalesce until the period following World War II. Prior to this time, it appears, there were
relatively few lawyers specializing in construction. In the post-war era the expanding
volume of public and private construction, the development of new technologies, and
changes in the law (such as reforms to third-party practice and limitations on privity
defenses) dramatically increased the volume of construction-related litigation. The effect of
these trends was exacerbated by increasing competition, which often caused bidders to take
projects at unreasonably low prices, as well as economic downturns such as the energy crisis
of the early 1970s. Finally, the development of the interstate highway system permitted
many contractors to perform more work in strange communities, where there were fewer
personal and professional relationships encouraging informal solutions to job problems.”).
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specifically upon construction law until the mid-20th century,
when” a small group of surety counsel and lawyers in the Tort
and Insurance Practice Section organized the Fidelity and Surety
Law Committee “for the purpose of meeting annually to review
developments in the law of suretyship, a subject sufficiently broad
to encompass construction bonds, fidelity bonds and other surety
instruments.”54 “In 1965, the American Bar Association
organized a new section, the Public Contract Law Section, to
focus on issues of federal and state procurement” through
committees addressing procurement of construction, supplies,
military hardware and other objects of public procurement55
“Taking its cue from the Public Contract Law Section[’s]”
organization of a Construction Committee, “the American Bar
Association’s Litigation Section thereafter organized a
Construction Litigation Committee.”56 By the mid-1970s,
lawyers in the Fidelity and Surety Law Committee, the Public
Contract Law Section and the Construction Litigation Committee
all recognized that the American Bar Association needed an
organization that focused upon all issues and aspects of
“construction law,” not just public contracts, surety bonds or
construction litigation.”57 “In February 1976 . . . the American
Bar Association formed the Forum Committee on the
Construction Industry58 (now called Forum on Construction
Law).”59 “From its original 1976 membership of 168 lawyers, the
Forum’s membership comprised about 6,000 as of 2015.”60
Many state bar associations have also formed construction law
sections or committees.61 The total membership of the American
54. 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 5, at § 1:5.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Ralph Kaskell, Jr., The Genesis of the ABA Forum Committee on the
Construction Industry, CONSTR. LAW., Jan. 1988, at 15, 15.
59. 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR JR., supra note 5, at §1.5.
60. Id.
61. Construction law sections or committees have been formally organized by state bar
associations in more than half of the states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa (Construction Law Section, IOWA STATE BAR
ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/FDB2-XMS7] (last visited Mar. 12, 2022)), Kentucky, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee (Construction Law Section, TENN. BAR ASS’N,
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construction law bar as of 2015 appears to exceed 35,000
lawyers.62
The formation in 1989 of The American College of
Construction Lawyers illustrated the development of construction
law as a recognized area of legal specialization.63 Fifty-six
preeminent American construction lawyers founded the College
to recognize those “who have demonstrated skill, experience and
high standards of professional and ethical conduct in the practice,
or in the teaching, of construction law, and who are dedicated to
excellence in the specialized practice of construction law.”64
Internationally, “construction law” also has become recognized
as a global legal specialty, as evidenced by the formation in 2014
of the International Academy of Construction Lawyers,65 a
professional group comprised of distinguished lawyers and
[https://perma.cc/SYL6-2QYM] (last visited Mar. 12, 2022)), Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin, see 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR JR., supra note 5, at §1.5); and by
various county and local bar associations (e.g., Atlanta, Austin, Boston, Chicago
(Construction Law & Mechanics Lien Subcommittee, CHI. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 7, 2022),
[https://perma.cc/2XLP-M7E2]), Columbus (Construction Law Committee, COLUMBUS
BAR ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/4N9M-6U82] (last visited Mar. 6, 2022)), Dallas, Houston,
Jacksonville (Construction Law, JACKSONVILLE BAR ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/YH2V62L8] (last visited Mar. 12, 2022)), Kansas City, Philadelphia (Construction Law Committee,
PHILA. BAR ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/98DL-Y25U] (last visited Mar. 12, 2022)); San Diego,
San Francisco, Allegheny County, Los Angeles County (Teresa Hillery, Real Property
Section, L.A. CNTY. BAR ASS’N., [https://perma.cc/U27T-BEKA] (last visited Mar. 12,
2022)), New York City (Construction Law Committee, N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N,
[https://perma.cc/V539-ZR25] (last visited Mar. 12, 2022)), Maricopa County, Marin
County (Section: Construction Law, MARIN CNTY. BAR ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/EPS4LCMT] (last visited Mar. 12, 2022)), Nassau County (NCBA Committees, NASSAU CNTY.
BAR ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/PY6B-8WDR] (last visited Mar. 12, 2022)), Orange County
(Construction Committee, ORANGE CNTY. BAR ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/L836-5KEA] (last
visited Mar. 12, 2022)), Palm Beach County (Construction Law Committee, PALM BEACH
CNTY. BAR ASS’N., [https://perma.cc/Z7RX-XB27] (last visited Mar. 12, 2022)),
Westchester County (Construction Law Committee, WESTCHESTER CNTY. BAR ASS’N,
[https://perma.cc/7MZ6-SY5K] (last visited Mar. 12, 2022)), see 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR,
JR., supra note 5, at §1.5).
62. Thousands upon thousands of American lawyers hold themselves out as practicing
“construction law,” as evidenced by a search for “construction lawyers” on FindLaw or
Martindale, or for “construction law” or “construction lawyers” on search engines such as
Google, Yahoo, or MSN. 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 5, at §1.5.
63. See History/Mission, AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS., [https://perma.cc/Z3UC-UT3A]
(last visited Mar. 12, 2022).
64. Welcome, AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS., [https://perma.cc/6ZJN-ZU7L] (last visited
Mar. 12, 2022).
65. INT’L ACAD. OF CONSTR. LAWS., [https://perma.cc/8KYC-A94C] (last visited
Mar. 13, 2022).
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judges from around the world. Moreover, construction lawyers
in various countries have formed professional construction law
associations, such as The Canadian College of Construction
Lawyers,66 Society of Construction Law of the United
Kingdom,67 Society of Construction Law (Gulf),68 Society of
Construction Law Singapore,69 Society of Construction Law
Australia,70 Society of Construction Law Hong Kong,71 and the
European Society of Construction Law.72
National bar
associations have organized construction law committees (e.g.,
Canadian Bar Association, International Bar Association);73 and,
international law associations have formed construction
committees (e.g., International Bar Association, Inter-Pacific Bar
Association).74 With the rise of such professional colleges,
associations, and committees, lawyer listing organizations have
recognized “construction law” as a specialty for ranking law firms
and lawyers.75 The beginnings of “construction law” as a
recognized field of legal practice and study, and the development
66. THE CANADIAN COLL. OF CONSTR. LAWS., [https://perma.cc/PY6L-DY37] (last
visited Mar. 13, 2022).
67. SOC’Y OF CONSTR. L., [https://perma.cc/4YNB-D9TK] (last visited Mar. 13,
2022).
68. SOC’Y OF CONSTR. L. (GULF), [https://perma.cc/3DMC-2D4X] (last visited
Mar.13, 2022).
69. SOC’Y OF CONSTR. L. SING., [https://perma.cc/UUH6-REAY] (last visited Mar. 13,
2022).
70. SOC’Y OF CONSTR. L. AUSTL., [https://perma.cc/BPG6-YGR4] (last visited Mar.
13, 2022).
71. SOC’Y OF CONSTR. L. H.K., [https://perma.cc/2248-PPVS] (last visited Mar. 13,
2022).
72. EUR. SOC’Y OF CONSTR. L., [https://perma.cc/6AKH-YMYK] (last visited Mar.
13, 2022).
73. Construction and Infrastructure Law, THE CANADIAN BAR ASS’N,
[https://perma.cc/R34V-53JM] (last visited Mar. 13, 2022); International Construction
Projects Committee, INT’L BAR ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/CCN2-BJBC] (last visited Mar. 13,
2022).
74. International Construction Projects Committee, supra note 73; International
Construction Projects, INTER-PACIFIC BAR ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/8K5B-5W32] (last
visited Mar. 13, 2022).
75. Best Lawyers for Construction Law in America, BEST LAWS.,
[https://perma.cc/S43K-C4BZ] (last visited Mar. 14, 2022); USA—Nationwide Construction
Legal Rankings, CHAMBERS & PARTNERS, [https://perma.cc/67KL-6QA8] (last visited Mar.
14, 2022); Construction Litigation Law Super Lawyers Related Attorneys, SUPER LAWS.,
[https://perma.cc/8WT3-9ZJK] (last visited Mar. 14, 2022); Construction 2020—Legal
Marketplace Analysis, WHO’S WHO LEGAL (Apr. 3, 2020), [https://perma.cc/QK77-A9Q8].
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of an American “construction law bar” thus properly can be
identified with the last half of the twentieth century. From these
beginnings, the construction law bar has steadily developed.
A major reason for construction law specialization is that
construction’s factual complexity has caused difficulty for
lawyers and many judges not skilled in the field to understand the
factual and legal underpinnings of construction disputes, a
perception that has led the construction industry to resolve
disputes by arbitration, mediation, and other forms of Alternate
Dispute Resolution (“ADR”).76 Arbitration has been and
continues to be the dominant dispute resolution forum for
construction disputes in international construction and in many
local controversies.77 In 1985, United States Supreme Court
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger reaffirmed judicial support for
arbitration in this sage advice given to the American legal
profession:
The obligation of the legal profession is, or has long
been thought to be, to serve as healers of human conflicts.
To fulfill that traditional obligation means that there should
be mechanisms that can produce an acceptable result in the
shortest possible time, with the least possible expense and
with a minimum of stress on the participants. That is what
justice is all about. . . . My overview of the work of the
courts from a dozen years on the [D.C.] Court of Appeals
and now 16 in my present position, added to 20 years of
private practice, has given me some new perspectives on the
problems of arbitration. One thing an appellate judge learns
very quickly is that a large part of all the litigation in the
courts is an exercise in futility and frustration. A large
proportion of civil disputes in the courts could be disposed
of more satisfactorily in some other way. . . . My own
experience persuades me that in terms of cost, time, and
human wear and tear, arbitration is vastly better than
conventional litigation for many kinds of cases.78

76. Philip L. Bruner, Rapid Resolution ADR, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 2011, at 6, 6-7
[hereinafter Bruner, Rapid Resolution ADR].
77. Id. at 13.
78. Warren E. Burger, Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice, 40 ARB. J. 3, 3-4, 6 (1985)
(remarks before the American Arbitration Association and the Minnesota State Bar
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Since Chief Justice Burger’s clarion call, use of arbitration
and other forms of ADR have expanded considerably.79
VI. CONSTRUCTION LAW AND ACADEMIA
Not until the twentieth century did a few legal academicians
take note of “construction law” as a field distinct from “contract
law” and urge more significant study of its issues.80 For much of
the twentieth century, most academic works touching on
construction law were prepared for instruction of design or
engineering professionals rather than for the education of
lawyers.81 Although popular contract case books and the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts contained references to
numerous cases involving construction contracts and
disputes, the cases were considered only from the general
perspective of “contract law.”82 The decades-old call for more
significant academic study of the construction industry continues
to be voiced in the present:
Legal and economic scholars have devoted little
attention to an industry—construction—that seems to offer
valuable lessons about the organization of economic activity.
Major construction projects are generally initiated, and
Association on August 21, 1985). One of those many kinds of cases surely is Construction
Law.
79. Bruner, Rapid Resolution ADR, supra note 76, at 8-9.
80. For example, in 1931, Professor Edwin W. Patterson of Columbia Law School
noted the need for construction law scholarship because of “[t]he economic importance of
the building industry, the frequency of litigation involving this type of contract, and the
inadequacy of judicial analyses of the complex problems of [construction] damages . . . .”
See Edwin W. Patterson, Builder’s Measure of Recovery for Breach of Contract, 31 COL. L.
REV. 1286, 1287 (1931).
81. See generally Justin Sweet, A View from the Tower, CONSTR. LAW., July 1999, at
41 (1999) [hereinafter Sweet, A View from the Tower]. Justin Sweet, Professor Emeritus of
the Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California-Berkeley, was one of the early
pioneers in gaining recognition of construction law as a distinct legal subject. He authored
JUSTIN SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION LAW (1997) and co-authored with Mark
Schneier, JUSTIN SWEET & MARC M. SCHNEIER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE,
ENGINEERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS (9th ed. 2013). When he first began to
take an interest in construction law, Professor Sweet was struck by the dearth of legal
scholarship and legal treatises, and the absence of law course offerings on Construction Law.
82. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 347 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (citing
Limbach Co.v. Ten Hoeve Bros., 126 F.Supp.3d 105 (D.D.C. 2015)); id. (citing
Marchesseault v. Jackson, 611 A.2d 95 (Me. 1992)).

1 BRUNER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

6/2/22 11:45 AM

ITS HISTORICAL ORIGINS

233

proceed, without governmental central planning, without
organized, formal markets for the exchange of services, and
without hierarchical top-down control within a single firm.
Many of the characteristics that have long been associated
with the construction industry are now increasingly observed
in outsourcing by traditional firms and, by the extension of
that process, in the virtual firm. Construction projects reflect
a system of economic organization involving a high degree
of contracting, both formal and informal, rather than formal
integration.
This contracting may take place under
conditions of high uncertainty; conditions may be constantly
changing and ex ante specification of rights and obligations
is often difficult at best. Construction projects also provide
insights into the role of teams of individuals from different
firms; into the networks of relationships that produce such
teams; into a “culture of collaboration” that seems vital to
successful teamwork; into trust, reputation, and other such
informal, nonlegal mechanisms that affect collaboration;
and, in a minor way in this study, into the role of written
contracts.83

Academia’s benign neglect of the study of construction
law has been attributed variously to:
(1) The perceived uniqueness and local nature of the
construction industry;
(2) The industry’s trade customs and practices that require
consideration of contextual issues, specialized knowledge
and legally implied rights and duties;
(3) The perception that construction’s technical disputes
involve the “law of the shop” rather than the “law of the
courts,” to be settled either by architects as quasi-judges or
by arbitrators;
(4) The variations in applicable “construction law” legal
principles between and among different jurisdictions;
(5) The construction industry’s historic preference for
mandatory arbitration or other non-judicial dispute

83. William A. Klein & Mitu Gulati, Economic Organization in the Construction
Industry: A Case Study of Collaborative Production Under High Uncertainty, 1 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 137, 138-39 (2004).
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resolution methods involving peer experience and
expertise;84 and
(6) The unwillingness of legal academicians to master the
factual complexities of construction and the legal
complexities created by its numerous disjointed contractual
and legal relationships.85

“[A]cademic scholars in the early 21st century still play an
insignificant role in the development of construction
law.”86 Some universities outside the United States, such as
Kings College London, University of Strathclyde, and University
of Melbourne Law School, offer graduate degree programs in
construction law, and some foreign law schools offer an
undergraduate course on construction law.87

84. 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 5, at § 1:4 (reproduced with the author’s
permission. Quotations within the list are omitted for readability).
85. Id.; see also Justin Sweet, Standard Construction Contracts: Academic Orphan,
CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2011, at 38, 41 (“Much of this lack of scholarly interest is traceable
to the methods law schools use to gather a staff. Young teachers, particularly at the national
and top-ranked state schools, are recruited from the Ivy League schools. These recruits
increasingly have advanced degrees and, as a rule, have been clerks to outstanding judges.
Most have not had any practical law firm experience. They are not likely to have any
experience in construction law planning or disputes. You will have to look far and wide to
find a full-time law professor who devotes his research to construction law. Most
construction law courses at law schools are taught by practitioners as adjuncts or lecturers.”).
86. 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 5, at § 1:4; see also Paula Gerber, The
Teaching of Construction Law and the Practice of Construction Law: Never the Twain Shall
Meet?, 20 LEG. EDUC. REV. 59, 59-60 (2010) (“The overwhelming majority of major law
firms in the United States and Australia promote construction law as one of their areas of
expertise. However, the overwhelming majority of law schools in these two jurisdictions do
not offer construction law as a subject in their JD or LLB programs. How can it be that an
area of law, that is so widely practised, is not widely taught? The dearth of construction law
courses in law schools is in stark contrast with the plethora of construction law offerings in
the engineering, architecture and building facilities. It appears that universities are producing
construction professionals who have an understanding of the law regulating their industry,
but not lawyers who have the knowledge to advise and represent clients on constructionrelated issues.”).
87. See Matthew Bell & Paula Gerber, Passing on the Torch of Learning in the
‘Primordial Soup’ of Construction Law: Reflections from the Construction Law Academic
Forum, 2012, CONSTR. L. INT’L, Oct. 2012, at 26, 27-28 (summarizing an academic forum
on construction law and the growth in construction law teaching and scholarship around the
globe); see also SCL International Construction Law Courses Worldwide, SOC’Y OF
CONSTR. L., [https://perma.cc/U5T2-QK82] (last visited Mar. 16, 2022) (listing colleges
outside the United States offering construction law); LL.M. in Construction Law,
LLMGUIDE, [https://perma.cc/5PAT-D9HV] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022).
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“As for the teaching of construction law in American law
schools, as of 2010 only about 26 out of 233 law schools
accredited by the American Association of Law Schools offer any
course on construction law.”88 At those twenty-six schools, it
appears that only two United States law schools offer construction
law courses taught by full-time faculty,89 and the remainder are
taught as third-year electives by adjunct professors. The adjunct
professors universally are legal practitioners who have
specialized in construction law during their careers.90 The
complexities of construction law and the construction process
have generally been viewed by all but a handful of full-time legal
scholars as a morass to be avoided. Pepperdine University Law
School Professor Thomas Stipanowich, who along with Professor
Justin Sweet of the University of California Berkeley, have been
among the few full-time academics to tread into the complexities
of construction law. Professor Stipanowich has aptly observed:
Th[e] scholarly and pedagogical obliviousness [of
academia], while not confined to construction contracts,
cannot be explained on the basis that such transactions are
unimportant—the construction industry has for some time
been the largest single production activity in the United
States—or less academically rich than other commercial
fields. Unless the explanation is a perverse form of
intellectual snobbery, it must be a pervading ignorance of the
practical significance of and academic challenge presented
by the field of construction law—or a reflection of the
inherent complexity (real and perceived) of principle and
practice in this arena. Although today’s attorneys and

88. 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 5, at § 1:4; see also Gerber, supra note
86, at 61.
89. University of Arkansas, Recently Offered Courses, UNIV. OF ARK. SCH. OF L.,
[https://perma.cc/R5FL-HA2L] (last visited Mar. 16, 2022); University of Detroit Mercy,
Troy Harris, UNIV. OF DETROIT MERCY, [https://perma.cc/VG4X-L3ZK] (last visited Mar.
16, 2022).
90. See John W. Ralls, Teaching Construction Law, CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2009, at
3, 3; Allen L. Overcash, The Case for Construction Law Education, CONSTR. LAW., Summer
2009, at 5, 5; Lawrence C. Melton, What We Teach When We Teach Construction Law,
CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2009, at 8, 8. All three authors were practicing lawyers serving as
adjunct professors, and their articles were published in a special edition of the ABA Forum
on Construction Law publication, The Construction Lawyer, to address the subject of
teaching by Forum lawyers serving as adjunct professors.
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industry actors have much greater access to treatments of
pertinent legal subjects than their predecessors, much more
can be done to enhance the level of scholarly treatment and
interdisciplinary discussion of legal rules.91

“Construction law is ideally suited to be taught as a
‘capstone’ or a ‘transition’ course to third year law students
because of its [broad] focus on problems cutting across numerous
principles of common law and statutory law well beyond” merely
“contract law.”92 Legal academicians are beginning to call for a
restructuring of the entire approach to legal education by
requiring law students in their third year to take “capstone” or
“transition” courses, such as construction law, that compels
students to address complex issues in discrete fields of law just as
they will in the actual practice of law.93 In recent years, American
law schools have begun to recognize the importance of
broadening law school curricula to stay current with society’s
development. From the perspective of the Academy, law schools
are expected to stay current in educating students about major
newly developing fields of law. As Elena Kagan, now Associate
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, said when she became the new
Dean of Harvard Law School and presented her “State of the
School” Address on September 17, 2003:
[T]he world is changing, and in response to those changes,
the law is changing and becoming ever more specialized and
complex. We need to expand the faculty because the world
91. See Stipanowich, supra note 39, at 496-97.
92. 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 5, at § 1:4; see generally Bruner, The
Historical Emergence of Construction Law, supra note 2.
93. See Troy Harris, Training International Construction Lawyers: A Proposal,
CONSTR. L. INT’L, Mar. 2012, at 41, 41-43; Jon Sonsteng et. al., A Legal Education
Renaissance: A Practical Approach for the Twenty-First Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 303, 450-51 (2007) (proposing that third year law students should be required to take
twenty-eight credits of “Transition Courses,” which will add “substantial value to [their first
and second year] experience by requiring students to be responsible professionals, address
complex and real-world challenges, and produce substantial, concrete manifestations of their
learning. [The transition course will provide] the finishing touch to the law school
experience.”); Jeffrey E. Lewis, “Advanced” Legal Education in the Twenty-First Century:
A Prediction of Change, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 655, 658-59 (2000) (“Students [in transition
courses] will develop an expertise as a result of a systematic and progressively sophisticated
study of a discrete area of practice, and what better opportunity for the development of the
fundamental skill of ‘thinking like a lawyer!’ Substance and method can be taught and
learned in a thoroughly harmonious and complimentary fashion.”).
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of law is expanding and we need to cover everything
important that is happening in it.94

VII. CONSTRUCTION LAW’S TRENDS TOWARD
GLOBAL HARMONIZATION95
The exponential growth of international commerce in the
worldwide free market economy over the last half of the twentieth
century has highlighted the need for a harmonized set of legal
principles governing the relationships of parties involved in the
design and construction of projects located anywhere in the
world.96 The search for this “holy grail” of harmonization is
following eight principal paths:
94. Kagan Delivers ‘State of the School’ Address, HARV. L. TODAY, Jan. 2004, at 4, 4.
Justice Kagan left Harvard in 2009 to become U.S. Solicitor General under President Obama
and became an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in 2010. See Associate Justice of the
U.S. Supreme Court—Elena Kagan, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, [https://perma.cc/SQC9AY86] (last visited Mar. 18, 2022). Harvard has yet to offer courses related to Construction
Law. Harvard Law School Course Catalog: 2021-2022 Academic Year, HARV. L. SCH.,
[https://perma.cc/PSM8-TC6K] (last visited Mar. 20, 2022).
95. Part VII is partially excerpted from 6 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR,
JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 20:3 (2021).
96. See James D. Wilets, A Unified Theory of International Law, the State, and the
Individual: Transnational Legal Harmonization in the Context of Economic and Legal
Globalization, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 753, 755-56 (2010) (proposing a “unified theory of
international law” that recognizes linkages between the law of international institutions and
private commercial law in order to harmonize legal rules and norms for both sovereign
entities and individuals); Matthew Bell & Jeremy Coggins, Beyond the Nutcracker Suite:
International Harmonisation of Construction Industry Payment Legislation, 32 INT’L
CONSTR. L. REV. 186, 187 (2015); Donald Charrett, “A Common Law of Construction
Contracts”—Or Vive La Différence?, 29 INT’L CONSTR. L. REV. 72, 72 (2012); John S.
Vento & Carina Y. Ohara, Practical Considerations and Risks for U.S. Companies
Contracting Across Borders, in INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION LAW: A GUIDE FOR
CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS AND LEGAL DISPUTES 13, 13-38 (2009) (examining from
the United States’ perspective key issues and legal concepts applicable to international
construction contracts); Louis F. Del Duca, Developing Global Transnational
Harmonization Procedures for the Twenty-First Century: The Accelerating Pace of Common
and Civil Law Convergence, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 625, 627-33 (2007) (discussing transnational
harmonization trends in and among different legal systems as the result of UNIDROIT,
UNCITRAL, the International Chamber of Commerce, the Council of Europe, the European
Union, the Hague Conference, and others); Michael Douglas, The Lex Mercatoria and the
Culture of Transnational Industry, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 367, 383-85, 38992 (2006); MOHAMED A.M. ISMAIL, GLOBALIZATION AND NEW INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
WORKS AGREEMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AN ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE (2011)
(discussing the impact of globalization of project delivery methods, primarily in civil law
jurisdictions governing construction services in the Middle East).
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(1) compilation of comparative studies to assure
understanding of the similarities and differences of legal
concepts originating in different regions and countries and
publication of such comparative studies in scholarly
journals, such as The International Construction Law
Review;97
(2) development by international organizations of model
legislation for adoption by individual nations;98
(3) development of standard international construction
contract forms by private international organizations such as
FIDIC [(“Fédération Internationale Des IngénieursConseils” or “International Federation of Consulting

97. Numerous comparative law articles on issues important to international
construction have been published in The International Construction Law Review, which was
founded by Humphrey J. Lloyd, former Judge of England’s Technology and Construction
Court. See His Honour Humphrey Lloyd QC, ATKIN CHAMBERS, [https://perma.cc/8JYWE4NK] (last visited Mar. 18, 2022). Other important journals include The International
Lawyer, (About The International Lawyer, INT’L L. REV. ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/JHS7T7FD] (last visited Mar. 18, 2022)); The International Journal of Legal Information
(International Journal of Legal Information, CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS,
[https://perma.cc/V9H6-PD2U] (last visited Mar. 18, 2022)); Construction Law
International (Construction Law International, INT’L BAR ASS’N, [https://perma.cc/E6TTSBN5] (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (published by the IBA International Construction Projects
Committee)); and a host of other international law journals published in the United States
and around the world. Other publications abound. See INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
LAW: A GUIDE FOR CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS AND LEGAL DISPUTES (Wendy
Kennedy Venoit et al., eds. 2009) (a 400-page compendium addressing the major issues in
cross-border transactions arising in the construction field).
98. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., UNCITRAL Model Law on Public
Procurement (2014), [https://perma.cc/4DPK-5LQN] [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law
on Public Procurement]; U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., UNCITRAL Model Legislation
Provisions on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects (2004), [https://perma.cc/PU4VV2ZG] [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Legislation Provisions]; U.N. Comm’n on Int’l
Trade L., UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services
with Guide to Enactment (1994), [https://perma.cc/G85Q-YPGU] [hereinafter UNCITRAL
Model Law on Procurement of Goods]; U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., UNCITRAL Model
Law on Procurement of Goods and Construction (1993), [https://perma.cc/JHX8-QBGB]
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods and Construction] (offering
a model procurement code). See also International Construction Measurement Standards:
Global Consistency in Presenting Construction Costs, INT’L CONSTR. MEASUREMENT
STANDARDS COAL. (July 2017), [https://perma.cc/32C3-AK2X].
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Engineers”)],99 ENAA,100 and ICE101 and by private national
organizations whose forms are used internationally, such as
JCT,102 AIA,103 EIC
[(“European
International

99. As an organization comprised of consulting engineers from over seventy countries,
the FIDIC documents are the most widely accepted in the world. These documents include
among others the (1) Client/Consultant Model Services Agreement 5th Ed (2017 White
Book), INT’L FED’N OF CONSULTING ENG’RS, [https://perma.cc/XUB4-TY9E] (last visited
Mar. 18, 2022); (2) Construction Contract MDB Harmonised Ed (Version 3: June 2010
Harmonised Red Book), INT’L FED’N OF CONSULTING ENG’RS, [https://perma.cc/7XBESUBX] (last visited Mar. 18, 2022); (3) Works of Civil Engineering Construction 4th Ed
1987 Red Book, INT’L FED’N OF CONSULTING ENG’RS, [https://perma.cc/3EF3-S99Y] (last
visited Mar. 18, 2022) (the “Red Book”); (4) Electrical and Mechanical Works, INT’L FED’N
OF CONSULTING ENG’RS, [https://perma.cc/AD2G-GJY4] (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (the
“Yellow Book”); (5) Design-Build and Turnkey 1st Ed (1995 Orange Book), INT’L FED’N
OF CONSULTING ENG’RS, [https://perma.cc/YD84-JC7Q] (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (the
“Orange Book”); (6) EPC/Turnkey Contract 2nd Ed (2017 Silver Book), INT’L FED’N OF
CONSULTING ENG’RS, [https://perma.cc/NN6U-WQ9F] (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (the
“Silver Book”); (7) Works of Civil Engineering (1987 Red Book) Subcontract 1st Ed (1994),
INT’L FED’N OF CONSULTING ENG’RS, [https://perma.cc/3XP8-BYZ9] (last visited Mar. 18,
2022); and (8) DBO Contract 1st Ed (2008 Gold Book), INT’L FED’N OF CONSULTING
ENG’RS, [https://perma.cc/7ZT9-QGCZ] (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (the “Gold Book”).
100. The Engineering Advancement Association of Japan, Toranomon, Takagi
Building 7-2, Inshi-shinbashi T-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo 105, Japan. Engineering
Advancement Association of Japan, ENNA (Mar. 18, 2019), [https://perma.cc/2D47-9XN7].
ENAA [annually] publishes its International Contract for Process Plant Construction and
International Contract for Power Plant Construction. See generally A R (Tony) Marshall,
Process Plant Construction: The ENAA Model Form of Contract (2010 Edition)—Comments
and Comparisons, 28 INT’L. CONSTR. L. REV. 138 (2011).
101. The Institute of Civil Engineers. Institution of Civil Engineers, INST. OF CIV.
ENG’RS, [https://perma.cc/G9VC-9B8Q] (last visited Mar. 18, 2022). ICE publishes the
Engineering & Construction Contract, also known as the “New Engineering Contract,”
which includes (1) an engineering and construction contract between the project owner and
prime contractor, (2) an engineering and construction subcontract, (3) a professional services
contract between the project client and all design professionals, and (4) an adjudicators
contract under which an adjudicator is retained to decide disputes arising under the other
contracts. See Mathias Fabich et al., The NEC4 Contract—Fit for Purpose for International
Use?, 35 INT’L CONSTR. L. REV. 28 (2018) (discussing the NEC4 contracts from the
perspective of European International Contractors (“EIC”)); NEC Contracts, INST. OF CIV.
ENG’RS, [https://perma.cc/QF8J-HZYM] (last visited Mar. 18, 2022).
102. Joint Contracts Tribunal, comprised of the Royal Institute of British Architects,
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, Association of District Councils, and Association
of Consulting Engineers in the United Kingdom. About JCT, JOINT CONTS. TRIBUNAL,
[https://perma.cc/WT9V-J43G] (last visited Mar. 18, 2022). JCT Documents, promulgated
for use in the United Kingdom, have influence elsewhere. See id.
103. American Institute of Architects, 1735 New York Avenue, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20006-5292. AIA contract documents are the most widely used private building
contract documents in the United States. See About AIA, AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS,
[https://perma.cc/DE4N-HGUR] (last visited Mar. 18, 2022); see also Industry Forms of
Agreement, DLA PIPER, [https://perma.cc/QU6H-LZD5] (Apr. 1, 2021).
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Contractors”)]104 and MBA [(“Master Builders of
Australia”)],105 and ICC [(“International Chamber of
Commerce”)];106
(4) promulgation of financing requirements, which mandate
the use of specified standard international construction
contract forms, by international financing organizations such
as the World Bank107 and its regional development banks for
Europe, Asia, Inter-America and Africa;
(5) publication of contracting guidelines by international
organizations, such as UNCITRAL [(“United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law”)]108 and OECD
[(“Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development”)];109

104. Contract Conditions, EUR. INT’L CONTRACTORS, [https://perma.cc/8FTQ-7R9V]
(last visited Mar. 18, 2022).
105. ABIC Suite, MASTER BUILDERS OF AUSTL., [https://perma.cc/F78X-KKSH] (last
visited Mar. 18, 2022) (in conjunction with the Australian Institute of Architects).
106. See Volker Mahnken & Martin Kurtze, Plant Construction and the ICC
Consortium Agreement, CONSTR. L. INT’L, Mar. 2018, at 25, 26 (discussing the recent ICC
Model Contract Consortium Agreement published by the International Chamber of
Commerce in 2016).
107. What We Do, THE WORLD BANK, [https://perma.cc/NS3C-UYWM] (last visited
Mar. 18, 2022). The World Bank’s financing requirements mandate that all projects financed
through the World Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or the
International Development Association be governed by the World Bank’s standard bidding
documents for works. See Standard Procurement Documents: An Overview for
Practitioners, THE WORLD BANK (Nov. 1, 2016), [https://perma.cc/A27P-R7Z5].
108. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., [https://perma.cc/7ZT8-KU9S] (last visited
Mar. 18, 2022). UNCITRAL has been in the forefront of the development of international
trade law and, pertinent to construction law. See UNCITRAL Model Law on Public
Procurement, supra note 98; UNCITRAL Model Legislative Provisions, supra note 98;
UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, supra note 98; UNCITRAL Model Law
on Procurement of Goods and Construction, supra note 98 (offering a model procurement
code); U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL LEGAL GUIDE ON DRAWING UP
INT’L CONTS. FOR THE CONSTR. OF INDUS. WORKS, U.N. Sales No. E.87.V.10 (1987).
109. Who We Are, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., [https://perma.cc/MTC2NME7] (last visited Mar. 19, 2022).
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(6) standardization of legal rights and obligations by
international treaty, such as CIGS,110 IGSLC,111 and the New
York Convention;112
(7) creation of international “restatements” of contract law,
such as the UNIDROIT principles of international
commercial contracts113 and the CECL Principles of
European Contract Law,114 which are intended to provide
guidance to legislative and judicial bodies for enactment of
contract law or for the interpretation of contracts;115 and
(8) “Transjudicialism” among jurisdictions.116

110. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(1980) which, although applying only to the sale of goods and not to construction contracts,
has established basic legal principles accepted by many of the world’s major trading nations.
U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., U.N. CONVENTION ON CONTS. FOR THE INT’L SALE OF
GOODS, U.N. Sales No. E.10.V.14 (2010); see also United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980) (CISG), U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE
L., [https://perma.cc/ESE9-LWY3] (last visited Mar. 19, 2022). The convention is one of
the crowning achievements of UNCITRAL.
111. United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and stand-by letters of
credit, which has focused on differences between the European approach to direct bank
guarantees and the American approach to stand-by letters of credit. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L
TRADE L., U.N. Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-By Letters of Credit
(1996), [https://perma.cc/LX9R-96K6].
112. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., U. N. Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958), [https://perma.cc/G9JV-75ZW].
113. The UNIDROIT Principles are available on the worldwide web at INT’L INST.
FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIV. L., UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2016), [https://perma.cc/44JT-QMRW]; see also
Donald Charrett, The Use of Unidroit Principles in International Construction Contracts, 30
INT’L CONSTR. L. REV. 507, 507 (2013).
114. COMM’N ON EURO. CONT. L., PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW PARTS
I AND II 2 (2000). Principles of European contract law may be found at EURO. UNION, THE
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 2002 (PARTS I, II, AND III) 1 (2002),
[https://perma.cc/84UN-BNVC].
115. 6 BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW, supra note 95, at § 20:3.
116. “Transjudicialism”—consideration of law from foreign jurisdictions in deciding
local disputes—is of increasing interest to the world’s national judiciaries and administrative
regulators. See ANN MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 75-78 (2004). Networks
of national government regulators and lawyers are beginning to develop “transnational
networks” with respect to various areas of law. See id. at 1-4; Symposium, The Rise of
Transnational Networks, 43 INT’L LAW. 137, 137, 175-76, 205 (2009); see also Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address, 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 348, 350-51 (2002)
(“Although international law and the law of other nations are rarely binding upon our
decisions in U.S. courts, conclusions reached by other countries and by the international
community should at times constitute persuasive authority in American courts. This is
sometimes called ‘transjudicialism.’ . . . While ultimately we must bear responsibility for
interpreting our own laws, there is much to learn from other distinguished jurists who have
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The collective influence of these eight paths on the
development of principles of international construction law is far
larger than the sum of its parts, as they all are converging on a
common goal of a harmonious global construction law. Although
much work remains to be done, the end is not in doubt:
[T]he construction industry is becoming increasingly
international in scope. As it does, its focus is shifting
towards large infrastructure projects in developing countries.
As a general practice, the law applicable to construction
contracts has tended to be that of the place of performance,
that is, the law of the country where the construction project
is located. . . . The lack of a well-developed body of
construction law in [developing] countries capable of
handling the kinds of disputes that arise in large international
projects makes it more desirable that the governing law of
international construction contracts be a body of law
common to, and understood by, the international
construction community—a sort of lex constructionis.
Having such a body of law operate within the international
construction community would ameliorate the uncertainty
that results from subjecting the parties to inadequate national
construction law. In turn, greater certainty and predictability
would facilitate more participation in international
construction projects.117

VIII. LEGAL TREATISES ON CONSTRUCTION
LAW118
To bring a semblance of understanding and harmony to the
great mass of construction law precedent and statutes is the
function of a legal treatise, which can be of significant value to
judges, academicians and practicing lawyers in getting to the
heart of relevant legal principles and issues. A “treatise” has a

given thought to the same difficult issues that we face here [in the United States]. . . . The
fact is that international and foreign law are being raised in our courts more often and in
more areas than our courts have the knowledge and experience to deal with. There is a great
need for expanded knowledge in the field, and the need is now.”).
117. Douglas, supra note 96, at 383-84.
118. Footnotes 118-28 and accompanying text are excerpted from 1 BRUNER &
O’CONNOR, JR., supra note 5, at § 1:7.
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dictionary meaning of a “systematic, usually extensive written
discourse on a subject.”119
Legal treatises have played a vital role in the development of
the common law for more than eight centuries. Of the origins and
purposes of treatises, Sir Winston S. Churchill, in his
distinguished work, The Birth of Britain, reminds us:
About the year 1250 a Judge of Assize named Henry of
Bracton produced a book of nearly nine hundred pages
entitled A Tract on the Laws and Customs of England.
Nothing like it was achieved for several hundred years, but
Bracton’s method set an example, since followed throughout
the English-speaking world, not so much of stating the
Common Law as of explaining and commenting on it, and
thus encouraging and helping later lawyers and judges to
develop and expand it. Digests and codes imposed in the
Roman manner by an omnipotent state on a subject people
were alien to the spirit and tradition of England. The law
was already there, in the customs of the land, and it was only
a matter of discovering it by diligent study and comparison
of recorded decisions in earlier cases, and applying it to the
particular dispute before the court.120

Bracton’s treatise121 was followed centuries later by those of
Coke, Blackstone,122 and other legal luminaries whose early
works laid a general foundation upon which were built the
specialized edifices we know today. None of the early treatises
over a 500-year span, however, made any mention of legal
principles of construction law. In Blackstone’s case the omission
is particularly telling, because he was trained as an architect prior
to going into law and frequently used architectural metaphors in
his legal writings.123
Over the centuries construction law appears to have been
viewed as a local and parochial branch of contract and real estate
law, with disputes resolved informally consistent with a “law of
119. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1906
(3d ed. 1992).
120. SIR WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE BIRTH OF BRITAIN 224 (10th prtg. 1966).
121. See HENRY OF BRACTON, supra note 17.
122. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, supra note 17.
123. See Wilfrid Prest, Blackstone as Architect: Constructing the Commentaries, 15
YALE J. L. & HUMANS. 103, 123-24 (2003).
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the shop” rather than under a recognized “law of the courts.”
Without the benefit of treatises or of codifying statutes, the law
has tended to evolve somewhat haphazardly because of the
judicial tendency to grasp at any legal principle—not always the
most appropriate principle—likely to produce a fair result under
the circumstances and within the time available. Over 100 years
ago in a time of few statutes and fewer treatises, American
philosopher William James observed:
Law courts, indeed, have to decide on the best evidence
attainable for the moment, because a judge’s duty is to make
law as well as to ascertain it, and (as a learned judge once
said to me) few cases are worth spending much time over:
the great thing is to have them decided on any acceptable
principle, and got out of the way.124

Not until the nineteenth century did commercial law become
sufficiently specialized to encourage authors to write treatises
about the law of different fields of commerce having
contextualized
norms
for
specialized
types
of
transactions. Construction was one such specialized commercial
field of endeavor, and authors responded in the late nineteenth
century. The first nineteenth century American treatise to address
construction was written by Augustus Parlett Lloyd, who
published in 1888 a 480-page work entitled, A Treatise on the
Law of Building and Buildings, of which about half was devoted
to building contracts and what might be considered “construction
law” in today’s parlance while the balance addressed leases,
easements and other real estate matters. Lloyd noted the dearth
of scholarly writing on the subject of building in observing:
Possibly the most remarkable omission in the literature of
law in this country is the absence of any work upon
buildings, building contracts, and leases. The subject is one
of great importance, not only to the legal profession, but to
fully three fourths of the general population, who are
interested in building operations, whether as purchasers,
architects, artificers, or contractors. Numerous books have
124. William James, The Will to Believe, in THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND OTHER
ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY 20 (1897). Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is suspected of
being the “learned judge.”
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appeared from time to time containing theoretical, historical,
and artistical views of architecture and the art of building,
but no American writer has yet compiled the building laws
of our country to any practical extent.125

Lloyd’s treatise was followed shortly thereafter by T. M.
Clark’s treatise, Architect, Owner and Builder Before the
Law (1894). Clark was a Fellow of the American Institute of
Architects and also had earned a law degree. In 1894, he authored
a 400-page treatise on the law applicable to building contracts, the
preface of which begins with this acknowledgement of the factual
and legal complexities of construction disputes and of the
unsuitability of courtroom litigation generally as a method for
resolving such disputes:
It seems to be agreed among lawyers that no controversies,
as a rule, are tried before courts with so little satisfaction to
the litigants and their counsel as building cases. The lawyer
finds them usually so technical as to require an amount of
special study on his part quite disproportionate to their
importance; while the parties to the controversy often suffer,
or think they suffer, as much through what they regard as
their counsel’s inability to understand building matters as
through what their counsel, with more reason, considers their
own inexcusable ignorance and neglect of the legal
principles relating to their business. These difficulties are,
obviously, such as can be relieved, to a considerable extent,
by means of a book presenting the most important decisions
of the courts in building cases, with the principles on which
the decisions are based.126

In England, the earliest construction treatise was Hudson’s
Building and Engineering Contracts (1891),127 an 800-page work
125. A. PARLETT LLOYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BUILDING AND BUILDINGS iii
(1888).
126. T.M. CLARK, ARCHITECT, OWNER AND BUILDER BEFORE THE LAW iii (1894).
127. See Philip L. Bruner, Book Review: Hudson’s Building and Engineering
Contracts, 12th Edition, 28 INT’L CONSTR. L. REV. 379 (2011) (book review). An 1891
review note of Hudson’s in London’s The Law Journal offered this observation:
This book is an attempt to treat exhaustively a highly complicated and
technical subject, but, owing to the double training which the author has
undergone, first as architect, and, secondly, in his present profession [as a
lawyer], he is perhaps the only writer who could have treated it so successfully.
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written by an author who was both an architect and lawyer. The
treatise presented some legal principles we recognize today as
within the field of “construction law”—the over-arching field of
jurisprudence encompassing the law governing the rights and
obligations of participants engaged in the building and
construction process: employers, contractors, subcontractors,
sureties, architects, engineers, material and equipment suppliers,
code officials, insurers, and others—and the conditions under
which they worked. Hudson’s is now in its fourteenth edition.128
Another highly authoritative English construction law treatise
is Keating on Construction Contracts (11th ed., 2020), which is
edited and co-authored by Sir Vivian Ramsey, the distinguished
former barrister and Queen’s Counsel, and former Chief Judge of
England’s Technology and Construction Court, together with his
former colleagues at Keating Chambers in London.129 A third
recent English treatise is Construction Law (3d ed. 2020) by
Julian Bailey, a recognized English barrister in the construction
law field.130 Other nations also are producing treatises. India is
the recent beneficiary of Kachwaha and Rautray, The
International Comparative Legal Guide to: Construction &
Engineering Law (2019), which addresses construction and
engineering laws and regulations in thirty-two jurisdictions, as
well as commentary about commonly-used contract forms and the
Hudson on Building Contracts, L.J. (London), May 9, 1891, at 311, 317 (book review).
Perhaps evidencing Academia’s early disinterest in construction law was the brief 1891
review given Hudson’s in London’s Law Quarterly Review, a publication edited by Sir
Frederick Pollock, Oxford’s Professor of Jurisprudence and the distinguished author of the
treatise Principles of Contract (1876):
The subject of this portly volume is too technical to admit of more than
summary notice here. It appears to contain everything that persons who have
to do with building contracts can reasonably want to know, and such a work
well executed (as this appears to be) may save much trouble even to a lawyer
trained in the use of the ordinary indexes and digests.
The Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and of the Duties and Liabilities of
Engineers, Architects, Surveyors, and Valuers, July 1891, L. Q. REV., at 199, 288 (book
review).
128. ATKIN CHAMBERS, HUDSON’S BUILDING AND ENGINEERING CONTRACTS (14th
ed. 2019).
129. KEATING ON CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS (Stephen Furst, QC & Sir Vivian
Ramsey, QC eds., 11th ed. 2020).
130. JULIAN BAILEY, CONSTRUCTION LAW (3d ed., 2020).
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Indian Law of Contracts as codified in the Indian Contract Act of
1872.131
Notwithstanding some United States recognition of
construction law in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth
century as a fertile field for American writing and scholarship,
construction law scholarship languished in the United States for
the first three quarters of the twentieth century.132 After the
formation of the Forum on Construction Law in 1976,
practitioners began to author and publish articles on aspects of
construction law. In 1983, a group of construction lawyers wrote
individual chapters edited by Steven G. M. Stein of Chicago,
which was published in loose-leaf binders under the title
of Construction Law. In 1992, Professor Justin Sweet, The John
H. Boalt Professor Emeritus of Law at the University of
California, Berkeley, and one of a handful of eminent American
legal academicians to devote a career to the study and teaching of
construction law in the last half of the twentieth century, looked
forward to the twenty-first century and called for:
[A] treatise which systematically collected the leading cases,
stated their holdings accurately, summarized the case law
correctly, evaluated basic legal principles with wisdom, and
131. Sumeet Kachwaha & Dharmendra Rautray, India, in THE INTERNATIONAL
COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: CONSTRUCTION & ENGINEERING LAW 2019 106, 106 (6th
ed. 2019), [https://perma.cc/5TMG-TZ3F].
132. See Sweet, A View From the Tower, supra note 81, at 41 (“[In 1967] there were,
to my knowledge, no law courses called construction law. I don’t recall a law faculty
meeting where a professor asked ‘Where can we get a construction law teacher?’ as we often
did for established academic fields. In the library stacks (for you younger readers, those
were shelves in the library where we kept ‘hard cover’) at Berkeley there were perhaps ten
dusty books that covered the space of a century.”); see also Philip L. Bruner, Construction
Law: The Historical Perspective, in CONSTRUCTION LAW (William Allensworth et. al., eds.
2009) (quoting Justin Sweet, Construction Law: The Need for Empirical Research, 23
CONSTR. LITIG. REP. 3, 5 (2002)) (“The best and often only empirical work comes out of the
law schools. Law teachers can involve statisticians and sociologists in their studies. . . . Yet
you can count on one hand the number of full-time teachers of Construction Law, maybe not
even that many. Law teachers come out of certain schools, clerk for important judges, and
are interested mainly in Public Law. This pool does not produce many teachers who want
to spend their time in Construction Law.”); Justin Sweet, Standard Construction Contracts:
Academic Orphan, CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2011, at 38, 41 (“Much of this lack of scholarly
interest is traceable to the methods law schools use to gather a staff. Young teachers . . . are
not likely to have any experience in construction law planning or disputes. You will have to
look far and wide to find a full-time law professor who devotes his research to construction
law.”).
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described the functions of legal rules and contracting
practices that relate to construction law . . . could become
such an authoritative treatise. It would be invaluable to the
legal profession and the construction industry, similar to
Prosser on Torts or Corbin on Contracts.133

For the remainder of the twentieth century, practitioners and
scholars wrote of the need for more academic scholarship in the
field134 and contributed scholarly articles on construction law and
dispute resolution.
In 2002 the American treatise, Bruner and O’Connor on
Construction Law (2002, updated annually)135 was first published
as seven volumes and now is twelve volumes and 11,000 pages.
It endeavors to address comprehensively the major issues of
modern American construction law, to illuminate those issues in
relevant factual and historical context, and to offer a brief “road
map” to international construction law, a subject worthy of its
own multi-volume treatment. Illumination of issues in relevant
factual and historical context is helpful because construction law
has derived much of its uniqueness from factual blends of
industry experience, customs, practices, and perceptions of
foreseeable risk that have shaped evolving principles of the
common law and statutory law. Since its publication in 2002, the
treatise has been cited by more than 500 published opinions of the
133. Justin Sweet, Blueprint for an Authoritative Treatise on American Construction
Law, CONSTR. LAW., Apr. 1992, at 11, 11.
134. See Stipanowich, supra note 39, at 496–97 (“This scholarly and pedagogical
obliviousness [of academia], while not confined to construction contracts, cannot be
explained on the basis that such transactions are unimportant—the construction industry has
for some time been the largest single production activity in the United States—or less
academically rich than other commercial fields. Unless the explanation is a perverse form
of intellectual snobbery, it must be a pervading ignorance of the practical significance of and
academic challenge presented by the field of construction law—or a reflection of the inherent
complexity (real and perceived) of principle and practice in this arena. Although today’s
attorneys and industry actors have much greater access to treatments of pertinent legal
subjects than their predecessors, much more can be done to enhance the level of scholarly
treatment and interdisciplinary discussion of legal rules.”).
135. Reviews of the treatise upon its publication in 2002 include James F. Nagle,
Bruner and O’Connor on Construction Law, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2002, at 46 (book review);
Donald G. Gavin, Have Bruner and O’Connor Done for Construction Law What Prosser
Did for Torts?, 32 PUB. CONT. L. J. 925 (2003) (book review); James P. Groton, An
Encyclopedia of Construction, Dispute Prevention and Dispute Resolution Wisdom,
DISPUTE RESOL. J., Aug.–Oct. 2003, at 87 (book review); Construction Law Builds a
Treatise, L. QUADRANGLE NOTES, Fall/Winter 2003, at 54 (book review).
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United States Circuit Courts of Appeal, Federal District Courts,
Federal and State Courts of Claims, State Supreme, Appellate and
Trial Courts, and U.S. Commonwealth and Territorial Courts.
IX. THE PASSAGE OF “CONSTRUCTION LAW”
LEARNING TO FUTURE GENERATIONS
“Construction Law” clearly has become a “separate breed of
animal” that is recognized as addressing complex legal issues
arising in one of the global economy’s major fields of
endeavor.136 The subject surely will continue to develop rapidly
under the impetus of our expanding world economy and its rapid
technological advances.
Construction law does deserve much greater attention across
Academia. From the perspective of Academia, law schools do
need to stay up to date about newly developing major fields of
law. As Justice Elena Kagan reminded the legal academy in 2003
upon her becoming the new Dean of Harvard Law School: “[T]he
world of law is expanding and we need to cover everything
important that is happening in it.”137 Construction law should be
included in law school curricula as a third-year “capstone” course
to acquaint students with analyses of complex legal issues that
they are likely to confront in the practice of law.
From the perspective of the legal profession, construction
lawyers for generations have “given-back” their knowledge to the
profession, to academia and to the construction industry: (1) by
accepting adjunct professor positions to teach construction law
courses at law schools; (2) by participating in and lecturing on
construction law at legal education conferences and other
professional and business meetings; (3) by writing scholarly
articles for publication in widely-read, juried journals; (4) by
136. Paul Hardeman, Inc. v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 380 F. Supp. 298, 317 (E.D. Ark.
1974).
137. Kagan Delivers ‘State of the School’ Address, supra note 94, at 4. Justice Kagan
left Harvard in 2009 to become U.S. Solicitor General under President Obama, and became
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in 2010. About the Court: Current Members, U.S.
SUP. CT., [https://perma.cc/G4GQ-RRQG] (last visited Mar. 20, 2022). Harvard has yet to
offer a course on Construction Law. Harvard Law School Course Catalog: 2021-2022
Academic Year, supra note 94.
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promoting legislation where needed to assure fairness in the
construction process; and (5) by serving as arbitrators or
becoming judges available to hear and decide complex
construction cases and to write decisions to provide legal
precedent for those later seeking to apply the law and understand
the construction process and contracts’ contextual and implied
provisions.
May the contributions of Academia, the judiciary, and the
legal profession, through their writings and teaching, continue to
provide the foundational building blocks upon which to continue
building construction law. In passing down wisdom to present
and future generations through their writings and teaching, legal
scholars, judges and lawyers give meaning to the observation
expressed by Roman Engineer Vitruvius, the “chief engineer” of
the civilized world, to Emperor Augustus over 2000 years ago:
It was a wise and useful provision of the ancients to transmit
their thoughts to posterity by recording them . . . so that they
should not be lost, but, being developed in succeeding
generations through publication in books, should gradually
attain in later times, to the highest refinement of learning.
And so the ancients deserve no ordinary, but unending
thanks, because they did not pass on in envious silence, but
took care that their ideas of every kind should be transmitted
to the future in their writings.138

138. VITRUVIUS, supra note 13, at 195. Known to history as “Vitruvius,” he was chief
engineer to Julius Caesar and Emperor Augustus Caesar. Lienhard, supra note 13, at 00:28.
Thus, in his time, he rightfully could be called at the height of Rome the “chief engineer of
the civilized world.” Id. Vitruvius was a historian as well as an architect and engineer. Id.
Vitruvius wrote his ten volume treatise for Augustus on Roman construction practices. Id.
at 00:45. His treatise survived the ravages of time to influence the architecture of the
European Renaissance 1400 years later. His writings offer an illuminating window through
which to observe practical design and construction of the Roman civilization in the first
century Anno Domini.
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CONSTRUCTION LAW: THE ENGLISH ROUTE
TO MODERN CONSTRUCTION LAW
Sir Vivian Ramsey*
I. INTRODUCTION: CONSTRUCTION LAW
“Construction Law” is not, in itself, a body of law which
applies only to the construction industry. Instead, it derives from
other areas of general law, particularly the law of contract and of
torts and has been at the forefront of many of the developments
in general law. It also takes in many other aspects of law,
including insurance law, land law, landlord and tenant law,
employment law, intellectual property law and public
procurement law as well as regulatory law in the fields such as
building regulations, environmental and health and safety law.
Whilst it started as a field of law where the main endeavour
related to buildings, it is now applied to every form of
construction process and finds close parallels in the IT industry
where the principles are now applied.
In this Article, I will look at the way that construction law
has developed in the English common law1 world from its roots
in the law of England and Wales.2 Whilst common law traditions
*
Sir Vivian Ramsey studied engineering science and economics at Oxford before
working and qualifying as a chartered civil engineer. He is now a Fellow of the Royal
Academy of Engineering. He studied law at the City University and commenced practice as
a barrister in 1981. He became a QC in 1992 and was head of Keating Chambers, London.
He was appointed as a English High Court judge in 2005 and was judge in charge of the UK
Technology and Construction Court in London. He was appointed as an International Judge
in Singapore in 2015 and acts as an arbitrator and mediator worldwide. He is a Visiting
Professor at King’s College, London and edits Keating on Construction Contracts, now in
its 11th Edition. He was awarded an honorary DSc degree by the University of Westminster
in 2021.
1. Named because it was “common” to all the king’s courts across England—
originated in the practices of the courts of the English kings in the centuries following the
Norman Conquest in 1066. See The Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, ROBBINS
COLLECTION (2010), [https://perma.cc/25E3-UDGQ].
2. English law is correctly the law of England and Wales. The law of Northern Ireland
is similar, but Scottish law is different being in part common law and in part civil law. The
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are now applied to many jurisdictions,3 the number of
jurisdictions in which English precedents are binding is now
small. But, in many common law jurisdictions decisions of the
English courts are still treated as “persuasive.”4 English decisions
in the field of construction law have an extensive reach in terms
of their persuasiveness. First, having a long-established court
system, including a specialist court for 150 years, has meant that
the decisions of the English court have often been the only
decisions on points of principle relating to construction.
Secondly, forms of contract derived from English standard forms
of contract have been and continue to be used worldwide, most
commonly in the FIDIC forms of contract.5 Today, therefore,
contracts derived from these English standard forms are used in
civil law countries, particularly in the Middle East, and questions
of interpretation are very often based on decisions of the English
courts, applied of course in the context of the local law.6
I will next look at some of the particular construction law
concepts which have derived from the English common law.
These include risk allocation in construction, the role of the
common feature of all these jurisdictions is that in the end the final appeal is to the United
Kingdom Supreme Court. See William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil
Law (Codified and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677, 690-91 (2000); UK Parliament, House
of Lords, Practice Directions Applicable to Civil Appeals, U.K. PARLIAMENT,
[https://perma.cc/4Q27-UC2N] (last visited Apr. 19, 2022).
3. Common law jurisdictions or mixed common law systems include:
Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize,
Botswana, Burma, Cameroon, Canada (both the federal system and all
its provinces except Quebec), Cyprus, Dominica, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada,
Guyana, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Malaysia,
Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Namibia, Nauru, New
Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, the United
Kingdom (including its overseas territories such as Gibraltar), the United
States (both the federal system and 49 of its 50 states), and Zimbabwe.
Common Law Countries 2022, WORLD POPULATION REV., [https://perma.cc/FP6X-KHMY]
(last visited Apr. 19, 2022).
4. See D. Hoadley, et al., A Global Community of Courts? Modelling the Use of
Persuasive Authority as a Complex Network, FRONTIERS IN PHYSICS 1, 2 (2021),
[https://perma.cc/TGP8-RZPG].
5. Fédération Internationale Des Ingénieurs-Conseils or International Federation of
Consulting Engineers, based in Geneva. See International Federation of Consulting
Engineers, History, FIDIC, [https://perma.cc/9WRY-BJS2] (last visited Apr. 19, 2022).
6. See Why English Law Governs Most International Commercial Contracts, QLTS
SCH. (Sept. 12, 2016), [https://perma.cc/BK8Z-ECNG].
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Engineer and the applicability of liquidated damages, extensions
of time and prevention by the employer. I have tried to choose
topics where the cases have some historical interest.
By way of conclusion, I will then consider the way in which
dispute resolution has developed over the years to ensure that
disputes are avoided or dealt with efficiently. The most important
development has been the introduction of “adjudication” which
has now spread throughout the common law world and has
changed traditional perceptions on the needs of the construction
industry.
II. ENGLISH COURTS
Whilst many great construction projects have been carried
out in the British Isles from at least 3100 BC,7 little remains of
the history of their construction or any disputes. The Romans,
after their invasions in 55 and 54 BC, and until the end of Roman
Britain in AD 409, were responsible for the construction of much
infrastructure, remains of which can be seen today.8 The best
known are Hadrian’s Wall9 and the Roman baths at Bath.10
The earliest surviving arbitration award in Britain dates from
AD 114,11 and the resolution of disputes by arbitration has a long
7. The stone circle at Stonehenge, Wiltshire, has stones dated from 8000BC but the
current structure of an outer ring of standing stones, topped with lintels and with an inner
circle of bluestones, all orientated to the sunrise on the summer solstice is dated to 3100BC.
See History of Stonehenge, ENGLISH HERITAGE, [https://perma.cc/ET6L-M3KL] (last visited
Apr. 19, 2022).
8. See SIR RUPERT JACKSON, THE ROMAN OCCUPATION OF BRITAIN AND ITS LEGACY
3-6 (2020). Sir Rupert was a distinguished English judge and was judge in charge of the
Technology and Construction Court until 2007. He is now an international arbitrator and
sits in the International Commercial Court in Kazakhstan.
9. The Emperor Hadrian, in about AD 122 ordered the construction of a wall along the
northern frontier of Britain from the North Sea at the East to the Solway Firth at the West.
History of Hadrian’s Wall, ENGLISH HERITAGE, [https://perma.cc/2QEU-P98P] (last visited
Apr. 19, 2022).
10. Peta Stamper, Roman Baths—Bath, HISTORYHIT (May 17, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/QH58-7TM3]. Bath or Aqua Sulis was a shrine to a Celtic god, Sulis, and
the site of a hot spring discharging 250,000 gallons per day. In about AD 60 the Romans
built baths which still function today including a great bath lined with lead sheets and smaller
baths. Id.; Roman Baths at Bath—Virtual Tour, JOY OF MUSEUMS, [https://perma.cc/EHZ2VMPF] (last visited Apr. 19, 2022); Steven Morris, Bath Abbey to be Heated Using Water
from City’s Hot Springs, GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2019), [https://perma.cc/G258-8MBY].
11. See DEREK ROEBUCK, EARLY ENGLISH ARBITRATION at pxviii, 50-51 (2008).
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history. Many of the trade disputes were resolved by the guilds
and livery companies in the City of London.12
Those
organisations, which still exist, regulated various trades including
many in the construction industry.13 The earliest such company
dates from 1155.14 Worshipful Companies associated with the
Construction Industry include, in order of precedence:
Carpenters, Painter-Stainers, Masons, Plumbers, Tylers &
Bricklayers, Joiners & Ceilers, Plaisterers, and Glaziers, with
Carpenters dating from 1271.15
The modern English justice system was started by King
Henry II, who established a jury of twelve local knights to settle
disputes over the ownership of land. In 1178 he set up a court of
two clergy and three lay people, supervised by him, “to hear all
the complaints of the realm and to do right.”16 This was the origin
of the Court of Common Pleas. “Eventually, a new permanent
court, the Court of the King’s Bench, evolved[.]”17 In 1166,
Henry II set in train the system by which new national laws were
made by the judges in Westminster. “These national laws applied
to everyone and so were common to all.”18 This led to the phrase
the “common law.” “A third common law court of justice, the
Court of Exchequer, eventually emerged . . . .”19 On the
restoration of the monarchy in 1660, there were just twelve
judges, “four in each of the common law courts.”20
Whilst the common law system improved on what had gone
before, it was “slow” and “highly technical,” and “those who felt
they had been failed by the common law system could . . . petition

12. Livery Companies, CITY OF LONDON (Aug. 2, 2022), [https://perma.cc/2YV4HXSK].
13. The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Livery Company, BRITANNICA,
[https://perma.cc/85MB-D9AX] (last visited Apr. 19, 2022).
14. Livery Companies, supra note 12.
15. Database of Companies and Guilds, LIVERY COMM., [https://perma.cc/S4ABMWNS] (last visited Apr. 19, 2022); History, CARPENTERS’ COMPANY,
[https://perma.cc/X9U8-8T9T] (last visited Apr. 19, 2022).
16. History of the Judiciary: An Ancient System, CTS. & TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY,
[https://perma.cc/YMT2-EFHU] (last visited Apr. 19, 2022).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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the King with their grievances.”21 Gradually, these cases were
delegated to the Lord Chancellor who began to preside over his
own court, the Court of Chancery. “This dealt only with civil
disputes, for example property and contract cases, and applied the
law of equity—even-handedness or fairness.”22 By the time of
Henry VIII, the Court of Chancery rivaled the common law
courts.23 But, over the years, that court suffered from the same
problems of “expense and delay.”24
Parliament passed the Judicature Act in 1873, “which
merged common law and equity” so that all courts could
administer “both equity and common law.”25 “The same Act
established the High Court and the Court of Appeal and provided
a right of appeal in civil cases to the Court of Appeal.”26
In the course of that history, there have been specialist
courts. The best known were the Fire Courts which were founded
under the Fire of London Disputes Act 1666.27 After the plague
of 1665 there followed the Great Fire of London which destroyed
many properties in London.28 Parliament decided to establish a
special court to settle all differences arising between landlords
and tenants of burnt buildings.29 The disputes involved liability
for restoring buildings, payment of rent and other charges, and
establishing new leases on different terms.30 The courts were
overseen by judges of the King’s Bench, Court of Common
Pleas and Court of Exchequer.31 The courts sought solutions to
21. History of the Judiciary: An Ancient System, supra note 16.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. History of the Judiciary: An Ancient System, supra note 16.
27. See Fire of London Disputes Act 1666, MORR & CO., [https://perma.cc/T2RRF599] (last visited Apr. 17, 2022). It had the long title: “An Act for erecting a Judicature
for Determination of Differences touching Houses burned or demolished by reason of the
late Fire which happened in London.”
28. Becky Little, When London Faced a Pandemic—And a Devastating Fire, HIST.,
(Mar. 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ZSP7-CW4N].
29. Jay Tidmarsh, The English Fire Courts and the American Right to Civil Jury Trial,
83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1893, 1921 (2016).
30. See id. at 1903.
31. John Noorthouck, Book 1, Chapter 15: From the Great Fire in 1666, to the Death
of King Charles II, in A NEW HISTORY OF LONDON INCLUDING WESTMINSTER AND
SOUTHWARK (1773), BRIT. HIST. ONLINE, [https://perma.cc/7L5M-M6D2] (last visited Apr.
25, 2022).
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the intractable disputes caused in the aftermath of the Great Fire.32
The Fire Courts are generally recognized as having helped to
resolve disputes quickly and acceptably, allowing the City of
London and the courts to get back to business within a
surprisingly short time.33
The other specialist court which has its roots in the changes
introduced at the time of the Judicature Act is the Technology and
Construction Court (“TCC”).34 The work of the TCC was
formerly known as Official Referees’ Business, with the office of
Official Referee being created in 1873.35 It was formed “to hear
cases involving technical and detailed issues that could not be
tried satisfactorily by a judge and jury and, by the 1920s, the bulk
of [its] work” was concerned with construction and engineering
disputes.36 “The Official Referees, the majority of whom had
been in practice as King’s or Queen’s Counsel,”37 sat in the High
Court, but more as junior circuit judges rather than High Court
judges.38
By the 1990’s there were eight judges carrying out Official
Referees’ business in London with other judges designated to deal
with Official Referees’ Business in major regional court centres.39
In 2004, it was resolved that substantial cases in the TCC in
London would be heard by High Court judges, with a number of
High Court judges being designated to sit in the TCC in London
and, when needed, at regional centres in England and Wales.40
“These judges also have an important jurisdiction in relation to
arbitration, which is not just limited to the hearing of applications

32. See id.
33. See THE SELDEN SOC’Y & INST. OF CT., The Fire Courts: Successfully Delivering
Justice in a Time of Plague and Fire, YOUTUBE, at 17:13 (Oct. 21, 2020). Video available
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7FdKzoQ9dyo [https://perma.cc/YC6N-YG3P]
(lecture by Professor Jay Tidmarsh of Notre Dame Law School considering the genesis and
impact of the Fire of London Disputes Act 1666).
34. The modern name of the TCC was introduced in October 1998. History, CTS. &
TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, [https://perma.cc/X56W-EZN3] (last visited Apr. 19, 2022).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. History, supra note 34.
40. Id.
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under the Arbitration Act 1996.”41 “As in the Commercial Court,
there is a statutory jurisdiction enabling TCC judges to be
appointed as arbitrators.”42 This cross-over jurisdiction is an
important link to commercial parties involved in construction,
engineering and technology disputes.
The TCC has established a global reputation for dealing with
cases ranging from the usual types of construction disputes to
professional negligence, public procurement, pollution and fire
cases and IT disputes.43 Parties to construction and engineering
contracts from all over the world specify the TCC as the court to
resolve their disputes. Under the English Arbitration Act 1996
there is also a special statutory jurisdiction provision, enabling
TCC judges to be appointed as arbitrators.44
In terms of procedure the TCC have been in the forefront in
pioneering ways in which cases can be dealt with efficiently.
They introduced witness statements in place of evidence-inchief,45 lists of issues in complex cases,46 the need for case
management of cases by the judge who will ultimately try the
case,47 the use of “Scott Schedules” to enable all parties to set out
their cases on multiple claims or issues to be set out in a single
document,48 the process for expert witnesses to meet on a
“without prejudice” basis to discuss their views and seek to agree
matters,49 summarising the extent of their agreement and
disagreement in a joint statement and calling expert witnesses
concurrently and by discipline.50
In addition to trying cases without a jury, TCC judges are
also able to assist parties by carrying out early neutral evaluations
or by acting as mediators under a “Court Settlement Process.”51
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Work, CTS. & TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, [https://perma.cc/6P9S-DNSS] (last visited
Apr. 16, 2022).
44. History, supra note 34.
45. H.M. CTS. & TRIBUNALS SERVICE, THE TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION
COURT Guide §§ 12.1, 12.1.3, 12.2.5 (2nd ed. 2015).
46. Id. § 13.8.1.
47. Id. § 5.1.
48. Id. § 5.6.
49. Id. § 13.5.1.
50. H.M. CTS. & TRIBUNALS SERVICE, supra note 45 §§ 13.6, 13.8.2.
51. Id. § 7.6.
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Since the introduction of adjudication in 1998,52 discussed more
fully below, the TCC judges have had a crucial role in enforcing
decisions of adjudicators by a shortened summary judgment
process, achieving enforcement typically in three to four weeks
of the proceedings’ start.53
III. DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTRUCTION LAW
The development of modern construction law has derived
from the developments of society. This can be seen by the type
of case which came before the courts in the years before the
Industrial Revolution. For example, in 1611, in the Case of
Proclamations, the court had to consider the division between the
role of the monarchy in the context of construction.54 James I
had, by proclamation, prohibited among other things the
construction of new buildings in and around London.55 Coke CJ
resisted this incursion stating that “the King by his proclamation
or other ways cannot change any part of the common law, or
statute law, or the customs of the realm.”56 Those three categories
were exhaustive of English law: “the law of England is divided
into three parts, common law, statute law, and custom; but the
King’s proclamation is none of them.”57 It followed that “the
King cannot create any offence by his prohibition or
proclamation, which was not an offence before, for that was to
change the law.”58
A. The Imposition of Obligations on the Contractor
The expansion of the railway industry in the middle of the
19th century gave rise to a number of decisions in the English
courts relating to risk and payment which can be traced as the
beginning of principles still applied today.
52. Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, c.53 § 108.
53. H.M. CTS. & TRIBUNALS SERVICE, supra note 45 § 9.2.
54. Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co. Rep. 75. Recently cited by Lord Reed in R v.
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 at [165].
55. Case of Proclamations, 12 Co. Rep. 75, 75.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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In Sharpe v. San Paulo Ry., the Engineer was involved in a
scheme to build a railway in Brazil.59 The Emperor of Brazil
authorized the Engineer to form company for the construction of
the railway, and the government of Brazil guaranteed the interest
up to a limit of expenditure, with the company taking the risk on
expenditure over that sum.60 The contract with the contractors
provided that the Engineer’s certificate should be binding and
conclusive.61 A lump sum price (less than the limit of
expenditure) was agreed to under the contract.62 The extent to the
obligation was, as follows:
The contractors will execute and provide not only all the
works and materials mentioned in the specification
comprised in the first schedule to these presents, but also
such other works and materials as in the judgment of the
company’s engineer-in-chief are necessarily or reasonably
implied in and by or inferred from that specification, and the
plans and sections of the railway and works, it being the true
intent and meaning of this contract that the works and
materials to be executed and provided respectively by the
contractors under this contract shall comprise all works,
buildings, materials, operations, and things whatsoever
proper and sufficient in the judgment of the company’s
engineer-in-chief for the perfect execution and completion
of the railway, and all the works and conveniences thereof
and connected therewith, and the maintenances of every
section of the railway for twelve calendar months after the
completion and delivery to the company of each such
section.63

In preparing the tender documents, the Engineer produced a
detailed statement of the nature and quantities of the various
works to be executed and the materials to be provided.64 The
contractors provided fixed prices for the items required.65 The
contract contained a recital stating that the Engineer had made a
“comparative tabular statement of the cost of the several proposed
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

(1872-73) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 597.
Id.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 607.
Id. at 599.
Sharpe, L.R. 8 Ch. App. at 598.
Id.
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sections of the railway, of which an abstract copy was given in
the second schedule to the contract.”66
The contractor had to carry out more work than was set out
in the statement of quantities and contended that it had been
assured that the Engineer had prepared those documents “with
great care, and might be relied upon as entirely accurate” and that
the contractor had “made a tender to the promoters, offering to
form and complete the line of railway, and fixing prices to the
different items of the statement.”67
There had been
supplementary agreements and the contractor alleged that:
[D]uring the progress of the works it became apparent that
the actual quantities of earthwork being done by the
contractors were greatly in excess of the quantities specified
in the schedule. That the contractors objected and protested,
and that [the Engineer], as engineer and agent of the
company, agreed that if it should prove that the total quantity
of earthwork was in excess the contractors should be
compensated by savings in sidings, stations, and other things
which [the Engineer] promised to make.68

The facts show that the allegations in construction claims
have not altered much in the period of 150 years since this case.
The court made some clear findings in rejecting the contractor’s
claim:
(a) that the contractor undertook to make the railway, not to
do certain works; but they undertook to complete the whole
line, with everything that was requisite for the purpose of
completion, from the beginning to the end; and they
undertook to do it for a lump sum;
(b) that the contractor could not, on mere verbal promises by
the engineer, maintain against the company a claim to be
paid sums beyond the sums specified in the contract under
seal;
(c) that, although the amount of the works to be executed
might have been understated in the engineer’s specification,
the contractors could not, under the circumstances, maintain
any claim against the company on that ground;

66. Id. at 598-99.
67. Id. at 598, 602.
68. Id. at 602-03.
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(d) that, in the absence of fraud on the part of the Engineer,
and where the Engineer’s certificate has been made a
condition precedent to payment, that certificate must be
conclusive between the parties. “The very object of leaving
these things to be settled by an engineer is that you are to
have the practical knowledge of the engineer applied to it,
and that he, as an independent man, a surveyor, a valuer, an
engineer, is to say what is the proper sum to be paid under
all the circumstances.”69

Ranger v. Great W. Ry. Co., concerned the construction of
the railway from London to Bristol.70 Again, there was a lump
sum and a schedule of rates for any variations.71 The contractor
ran into financial difficulties, and the railway company took over
and completed the works.72 The Contractor alleged that there had
been a fraudulent representation as to the nature of the soil he
should have to cut into or through being sandstone whereas, in
fact, it was much harder, and more difficult to work than
sandstone.73 The Contractor also alleged that the certificates for
his work had not been duly allowed and that he had been delayed,
by the acts of the railway company.74 The claims were
dismissed.75
The Engineer was impressively called Isambard Kingdom
Brunel and was one of the great civil engineers of the era.76 One
particular allegation concerned his certification of sums due to the
contractor.77 It was said that Mr. Brunel, who was the principal
engineer of the company, was incapacitated from acting in the
discharge of the duties imposed on him, because he was himself
a shareholder in the railway company.78 In dismissing that
ground the court stated that:

69. Sharpe, 8 Ch. App. at 608-09.
70. [1854] 5 Eng. Rep. (HLC) 824, 825.
71. Id. at 825-26.
72. Id. at 827.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Ranger, 5 Eng. Rep. (HLC) at 828.
76. Id. at 831; Isambard Kingdom
[https://perma.cc/7H2F-AYZD].
77. Ranger, 5 Eng. Rep. (HLC) at 827.
78. Id. at 828.

Brunel

(1806-1859),

BBC

(2014)
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It is not necessary to state the duties of the engineer in detail:
he was, in truth, made the absolute judge, during the progress
of the works, of the mode in which the Appellant was
discharging his duties; he was to decide how much of the
contract price . . . from time to time had become payable; and
how much was due for extra works; and from his decision,
so far, there was no appeal. After all the works should have
been completed, the Appellant might call in a referee of his
own as to any question as to the amount (if any) then due
beyond what had been certified.79

It was contended by the contractor that:
[T]he duties thus confided to the principal engineer were of
a judicial nature; that Mr. Brunel was the principal engineer
by whom those duties were to be performed, and that he was
himself a shareholder in the Company; that he was thus made
a judge, or arbitrator, in what was, in effect, his own cause.80

Dismissing that contention, the court stated that, when
matters had to be decided by the engineer appointed by the
railway company, that was in fact a decision by the company and:
[T]here never was any intention of leaving to third persons
the decision of questions arising during the progress of the
works. The Company reserved the decision to itself, acting
however, as from the nature of things it must act, by an agent,
and that agent was, for this purpose, the engineer.81

In those circumstances there could be no complaint that Mr.
Brunel held shares in the railway company.82
The extent of the risks undertaken by the contractor were
considered in the case of Thorn v. The Mayor and Commonalty of
London.83 In 1864 tenders were sought for taking down and
removing the Blackfriars Bridge in London, and erecting a new
bridge, with plans of the new bridge and specification of the
works being provided as part of the tender.84 The specification
included provisions that the contractors were “to take out their
own quantities, no surveyor being authorized to act on the part of
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 831.
Id.
Id.
Ranger, 5 Eng. Rep. (HLC) at 832.
(1876) 1 App. Cas. 120, 124.
Id. at 120-21.
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the corporation;” that drawings of the existing bridge gave all the
information possessed respecting the foundations; and “[t]hese
plans are believed to be correct, but their accuracy is not
guaranteed, and the contractor will not be entitled to charge any
extra should the work to be removed prove more than indicated
on these drawings.”85 For “coffer-dams,” it was stated that “[t]he
contractor must satisfy himself as to the nature of the ground
through which the foundations have to be carried; all the
information given on this subject is believed to be correct, but is
not guaranteed.”86 For “[i]ron caissons,” the specification stated
that the “foundations of the piers will be put in by means of
wrought iron caissons, as shewn on drawing No. 7.”87 And that:
The casing of the lower part of which caissons will be left
permanently in the work. The upper part, which is formed
of buckle plates, is to be removed. The whole of the interior
girder framing must be removed as the building proceeds,
the work being made good close up to the underside of each
girder before removal thereof.88

Finally, it stated that “all risk and responsibility involved in
the sinking of these caissons will rest with the contractor, and he
will be bound to employ divers or other efficient means for
removing and overcoming any obstacles or difficulties that may
arise in the execution of the works.”89 The engineer had the
power to:
[A]t any time or times, during the progress of the works to
vary the dimensions or position of the various parts of the
works to be executed under these presents, without the said
contractors being entitled to any extra charge for such
alteration, provided the total quantity of work be not
increased or diminished thereby.90

After the caissons had been used as directed in the
specifications, it was found that they were no fit for that purpose
and the plan of the work was altered.91 Time was thus lost and
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 121.
Id.
Id.
Thorn, 1 App. Cas. at 121.
Id.
Id. at 122.
Id.
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the labour executing the original design was wasted. The
contractor claimed compensation for loss of time and labour
caused by the attempt to execute the work to the original plans,
alleging that the employer had guaranteed and warranted that
Blackfriars Bridge could be built in accordance with the
employer’s plans and specification, without tide-work, and in a
manner comparatively inexpensive, and that caissons shown on
the said plans would resist the pressure of water during the
construction of the bridge.92
The claim was dismissed on the basis that:
[I]f it were to be held that there is, with regard to the
specification itself, an implied warranty on the part of the
person who invites tenders for the contract, that the work can
be done in the way and under the conditions mentioned in
the specification, so that he is to be liable in damages if it is
found that it cannot be so done, the consequences . . . would
be most alarming.93

Therefore, where plans and a specification are prepared for
the use of tenderers, the person asking for the tenders does not
enter into any implied warranty that the work can be successfully
executed according to those plans and specification and the risk
is therefore on the contractor.94
There was however some respite for contractors. In Roberts
v. Bury Improvement Comm’rs, there was a contract to construct
buildings in accordance with certain plans and drawings, with a
provision for variations.95 There were provisions for extensions
of time and for termination if the contractor did not, “in the
opinion and according to the determination of the architect,
exercise due diligence and make such due progress as would
enable the works to be effectually and efficiently completed at the
time stipulated.”96 “[A]ll differences were to be referred to the
architect, whose decision was to be final, without giving any
reasons.”97
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 122-23.
Thorn, 1 App. Cas. at 128.
Id. at 120.
(1869-70) L.R. 5 C.P. 310, 310.
Id.
Id.
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The employer terminated the contract on the basis that the
contractor failed in the due performance of certain parts of the
work, and did not in the opinion of the architect exercise due
diligence and make such due progress as would have enabled the
works to be efficiently and effectually completed at the time
agreed.98 The contractor contended that the alleged failure and
lack of due diligence were caused by the default of the employer
and the architect in supplying plans and drawings, and in setting
out the land, and defining the roads, and giving information to
enable the contractor to commence the works, and that the
contractor was therefore entitled to an extension of time which
the architect had not granted.99
In the course of giving the majority judgment, the court
considered the implied obligations of the employer and the
contractor, stating:
The contractor also, from the nature of the works, could not
begin his work until the commissioners and their architect
had supplied plans and set out the land and given the
necessary particulars; and therefore, in the absence of any
express stipulation on the subject, there would be implied a
contract on the part of the commissioners to do their part
within a reasonable time; and, if they broke that implied
contract, the contractor would have a cause of action against
them for any damages he might sustain, and the
commissioners would be precluded from taking advantage
of any delay occasioned by their own breach of contract: for,
it is a principle very well established at common law, that no
person can take advantage of the non-fulfilment of a
condition the performance of which has been hindered by
himself; and also that he cannot sue for a breach of contract
occasioned by his own breach of contract, so that any
damages he would otherwise have been entitled to for the
breach of the contract to him would immediately be
recoverable back as damages arising from his own breach of
contract.100

The Court then noted that the contractor contended that its
alleged default had been caused by the wrongful act or default of
98. Id. at 314.
99. Id.
100. Roberts, L.R. 5 C.P. at 325-26 (citations omitted).
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the employer and the employer contended that the default had not,
according to the determination of the architect, been caused by
the employer’s wrongful act or default.101 They concluded that,
the architect having no power under the contract to bind the
contractor by any such determination, the employer could not take
advantage of its own wrong and had consequently no power to
terminate the contract.102
B. The Position of the Engineer or Architect as Certifier
The position of the Engineer or Architect as the certifier
under a construction contract raises questions of the nature of that
person’s engagement. They are an agent of the employer in
giving instructions and ordering changes. However, as was said
in Sutcliffe v. Thackrah:
The building owner and the contractor make their contract
on the understanding that in all such matters the architect will
act in a fair and unbiased manner and it must therefore be
implicit in the owner’s contract with the architect that he
shall not only exercise due care and skill but also reach such
decisions fairly, holding the balance between his client and
the contractor.103

Whilst the need for a certificate could be dispensed with in
cases where the architect had been “disqualified,” as in Hickman
& Co. v. Roberts,104 there was a question whether the court could
intervene to “open up, review and revise” certificates, which was
a phrase commonly included in arbitration clauses.105 After a
period when the Court of Appeal held that the court did not have
that power106 the House of Lords in Beaufort Developments (NI)
Ltd. v. Gilbert-Ash (NI) Ltd., decided that the court did have that

101. Id. at 329-30.
102. Id. at 333.
103. [1974] A.C. 727, 737.
104. [1913] A.C. 229, 232-33 (holding that an architect allowed his judgment to be
influenced by the building owners and improperly delayed issuing his certificates in
accordance with their instructions).
105. N. Reg’l Health Auth. v. Derek Crouch Constr. Co. Ltd. [1984] Q.B. 644 [¶ 30],
[¶ 32].
106. Id. [¶ 51].
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power.107 Lord Hoffmann made these observations on the role of
the architect in giving certificates:
If the certificates are not conclusive, what purpose do
they serve? If one considers the practicalities of the
construction of a building or other works, it seems to me that
parties could reasonably have intended that they should have
what might be called a provisional validity. Construction
contracts may involve substantial work and expenditure over
a lengthy period. It is important to have machinery by which
the rights and duties of the parties at any given moment can
be at least provisionally determined with some precision.
This machinery is provided by architect’s certificates. If
they are not challenged as inconsistent with the contractual
terms which the parties have agreed, they will determine
such matters as when interim payments are due or
completion must take place. This is something which the
parties need to know. No doubt in most cases there will be
no challenge.
On the other hand, to make the certificate conclusive
could easily cause injustice. It may have been given when
the knowledge of the architect about the state of the work or
the effect of external causes was incomplete. Furthermore,
the architect is the agent of the employer. He is a
professional man but can hardly be called independent. One
would not readily assume that the contractor would submit
himself to be bound by his decisions, subject only to a
challenge on the grounds of bad faith or excess of power. It
must be said that there are instances in the 19th century and
the early part of this one in which contracts were construed
as doing precisely this. There are also contracts which
provided that in case of dispute, the architect was to be
arbitrator. But the notion of what amounted to a conflict of
interest was not then as well understood as it is now. And of
course the inclusion of such clauses is a matter for
negotiation between the parties or, in a standard form, the
two sides of the industry, so that what is acceptable will to
some extent depend upon the bargaining strength of one side
or the other. At all events, I think that today one should

107. [1999] 1 A.C. 266.
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require very clear words before construing a contract as
giving an architect such powers.108

However, the Engineer or Architect is not under a duty to
hear both parties before coming to a decision and any conflict may
not disqualify the engineer from acting.109 In AMEC Civ. Eng’g
Ltd v. Sec. of State for Transp., an engineer was required by the
employer to issue a decision on a dispute relating to liability for
failed bridge bearings and to do so in circumstances where the
engineer was also facing a similar claim for liability from the
employer for the failure of the bridge bearings.110 The Court of
Appeals held that the engineer was not obliged to comply with the
rules of natural justice applicable to those who acted judicially,
but was required to act independently, honestly, and fairly, in so
far as what was regarded as fair was flexible and tempered to the
particular facts and occasion.111 It was also held that the fact that
the employer had made an equivalent claim against the engineer
did not disqualify the engineer from giving a valid decision under
clause 66(1), since such a conflict of interest was an unavoidable
potential incidence of the contractual relationship.112
C. Prevention by the Employer113 and its Consequences for
Delay and Liquidated Damages
The use of Condition L6 in Comyns’ Digest was also the
basis for another legal development. An issue which also arose
in many cases was the issue of delay caused by an employer and
the ability to deduct liquidated damages.114 In Holme v. Guppy,
a contract for carpentry work at a brewery stipulated a time for
completion of four and a half months with liquidated damages of
£40 per week.115 The contractor was delayed by four weeks in
108. Id.
109. AMEC Civ. Eng’g Ltd v. Sec. of State for Transp. [2005] EWCA Civ. 291 [¶40],
[¶48].
110. Id. [¶1], [¶5].
111. Id. [¶47].
112. Id. [¶44].
113. Under English and International standard forms the “Owner” is known as the
“Employer.” AISHA NADAR, THE CONTRACT: THE FOUNDATION OF CONSTRUCTION
PROJECTS (3d ed. 2019).
114. Holme v. Guppy, 150 E.R. 1195; (1838) 3 M. & W. 387.
115. Id. at 1196; 3 M. & W. at 388.
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starting the work by not having possession and was then five
weeks late finishing, having been delayed one week by the default
of their own workmen.116 It was held that the employer could not
deduct any liquidated damages in respect of the delay, not even
for one week.
The explanation by Parke B, was as follows:
It is clear, from the terms of the agreement, that the plaintiffs
undertake that they will complete the work in a given four
months and a half; and the particular time is extremely
material, because they probably would not have entered into
the contract unless they had had those four months and a half,
within which they could work a greater number of hours a
day. Then it appears that they were disabled by the act of the
defendants from the performance of that contract; and there
are clear authorities, that if the party be prevented, by the
refusal of the other contracting party, from completing the
contract within the time limited, he is not liable in law for
the default. It is clear, therefore, that the plaintiffs were
excused from performing the agreement contained in the
original contract; and there is nothing to shew that they
entered into a new contract by which to perform the work in
four months and a half, ending at a later period. The
plaintiffs were therefore left at large; and consequently they
are not to forfeit anything for the delay.117

The phrase “left at large” has caused a degree of debate in
English construction law. Does it mean that time is “at large” so
that the contractor is left without a time for completion or merely
that the contractor’s liability for damages is “at large” so that the
contractor is not liable for the agreed liquidated damages. The
statement was made that “the plaintiffs were excused from
performing the agreement contained in the original contract” and
that there was “nothing to shew that they entered into a new
contract by which to perform the work in four months and a half,
ending at a later period.”118
In Russell v. Viscount Sa Da Bandeira, there was a contract
to build a ship for the Portuguese navy.119 One of the provisions
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 1195; 3 M. & W. at 387.
Id. at 1196; 3 M. & W. at 388 (internal citations omitted).
Russell v. Viscount Sa Da Bandeira, 143 E.R. 59 (1862) at 76.
Id. at 59.
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of the contract was that liquidated damages (called a “penalty”)
at a daily rate should be paid:
[F]or each day the vessel should not be delivered finished,
fitted, and completed after the day named: provided that, if
the vessel should not be launched and delivered at the time
appointed, by reason of any cause not under the control of
the plaintiff, the same to be proved to the satisfaction of
Admiral S., and to be certified by him in writing, then the
said penalty should not be enforced for such number of days
or for such a time as the said Admiral S. should in such
certificate name.120

An arbitrator found that extra time was required for the
execution of additional work and caused a delay of about six
weeks in the progress of the shipbuilding.121 Erle, C.J.122 held
that no liquidated damages were recoverable and said as follows:
It turns out that those who were the agents representing the
Portuguese government caused a delay of six weeks in the
finishing of the vessel. Now, the case of Holme v. Guppy,
decides that, where a contractor undertakes, under pain of a
certain penalty or forfeiture, to perform a work within a
given time, and the performance within the time is prevented
by the act of the party with whom he contracts, the contractor
is exonerated from the penalties.123

Byles, J. stated:
The only remaining question is as to the penalties which the
defendant seeks to set off. Holme v. Guppy, is substantially
in point, though here the contract is under seal, and there not.
It is founded upon an old and well-understood rule of law.
The authorities will be found collected in Comyns’s Digest,
Condition (L. 6). Where the condition has become
impossible of performance by the act of the grantee himself,
the grantor is excused. So that Holme v. Guppy is not only
in point, but it is consistent with the antient authorities, and
is founded on the most invincible reason and good sense.
The result is that the plaintiff is . . . that the defendant is not
entitled to any set-off in respect of the penalties, the non-

120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 82.
Russell, 143 E.R. 59 at 82.
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delivery of the vessel by the day stipulated having been in
part caused by delay for which he himself was responsible.124

In Roberts v. Bury Improvement Comm’rs, already discussed
above, the court was divided four to two.125 The majority held
that the failure of the plaintiff to use due diligence and to make
progress was caused by the failure of the defendant-employer and
the architect to supply plans.126 In those circumstances, the
termination provisions in clause 27 did not confer a power upon
the architect to determine and to bind the plaintiff-contractor by
his determination that the defendants had not prevented the
plaintiff from proceeding with the works, although they had in
fact done so. As a result, the rule of law applied, which
exonerates a party “from the performance of a contract, where the
performance of it is prevented or rendered impossible by the
wrongful act of the other contracting party.”127 The dissenting
judges held that the architect was the final judge of the matter and
“his certificate justified the defendants in putting an end to the
contract, under clause 27.”128 In coming to its conclusion, the
majority said:
[T]he commissioners would be precluded from taking
advantage of any delay occasioned by their own breach of
contract: for, it is a principle very well established at
common law, that no person can take advantage of the nonfulfilment of a condition the performance of which has been
hindered by himself; and also that he cannot sue for a breach
of contract occasioned by his own breach of contract, so that
any damages he would otherwise have been entitled to for
the breach of the contract to him would immediately be
recoverable back as damages arising from his own breach of
contract. These principles have been applied to contracts
very analogous to the present, in the cases of Holme v. Guppy
(1), Russell v. Da Bandeira (2) . . . .129

In Dodd v. Churton, the plaintiff, a builder, claimed for the
balance due for extra work under a building contract and the
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 82-83 (internal citations omitted).
(1869-70) L.R. 5 C.P. 310, 329.
Id. at 311.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 326.
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defendant counterclaimed for liquidated damages for noncompletion.130 The court held that:
Additional works to the amount of 22l. 8s. 8d. were ordered
under condition 4, which necessarily involved a delay in the
completion of the works until after the specified date. . . .
The contract provided for the performance by a certain date
of works described in a specification in consideration of the
payment of a fixed sum as the price of the works specified.
It is admitted that extra work was ordered, and that the
necessary result of the builder’s having to do that work was
that it took him more time to complete the works than if he
had only had to do the work originally specified. It was, no
doubt, part of the original contract that the building owner
should have a right to call upon the builder to do that extra
work, and, if he did give an order for it, the builder could not
refuse to do it. The principle is laid down in Comyns’
Digest, Condition L (6.), that, where one party to a contract
is prevented from performing it by the act of the other, he is
not liable in law for that default; and, accordingly, a well
recognised rule has been established in cases of this kind,
beginning with Holme v. Guppy (1), to the effect that, if the
building owner has ordered extra work beyond that specified
by the original contract which has necessarily increased the
time requisite for finishing the work, he is thereby disentitled
to claim the penalties for non-completion provided for by the
contract. The reason for that rule is that otherwise a most
unreasonable burden would be imposed on the contractor.131

There was a line of argument in that case that, by agreeing
to carry out the original work and any additional work, the
contractor had agreed to carry out all of the work by the original
date for completion and, in one case, Jones v. St. John’s Coll., that
argument had succeeded.132 It was rejected in this case as being
limited to the terms of the contract in the Jones case.133
In Wells v. Army & Navy Coop. Soc’y, the contract included
a completion date, a provision enabling the employer to extend
the deadline for completion in specified circumstances, as well as

130.
131.
132.
133.

[1897] 1 Q.B. 562, 562-63.
Id. at 564, 566.
Id. at 564 (citing Jones v. St. John’s Coll., L.R. 6 Q.B. 115).
Id. at 565.
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a liquidated damages clause.134 The contractor was fifteen
months late in completing the contract and the employer
purported to extend the completion date by three months, and then
claimed liquidated damages for the remainder.135 It was held that
the extension clause did not apply, and that since the employer
had contributed to the delay, thereby preventing the contractor
from completing by the contractual completion date, he could not
rely on the liquidated damages clause.136
In Peak Constr. (Liverpool) Ltd. v. McKinney Founds. Ltd.,
contractors agreed to build a block of flats for a local authority
within twenty-four months.137 Under clause 22, the contractors
had to pay liquidated damages in default.138 Under clause 23, the
time for completion might be extended by the architect, if unduly
delayed in consequence of unavoidable circumstances.139 The
employer was responsible for delay by a contractor carrying out
foundation piles, which caused a delay of fifty-eight weeks.140
The Court of Appeal held that “if an employer wishes to recover
liquidated damages for failure by contractors to complete on time
despite the fact that some of the delay was due to the employer’s
own fault, the extension of time clause should provide,” either
“expressly or by necessary inference, for an extension on account
of such a fault or breach on the part of the employer.”141
However, clause 22 only contemplated failure to complete on
time due to the sole fault of the contractor, not where the failure
was due to the fault of the employer as well; thus, the employer
was not entitled to recover liquidated damages and was only
entitled to such damages as he could prove flowed from the
contractor’s breach.142 The Court of Appeal also held that there
was no provision in clause 23 for an extension of time for delay
due to the employer’s own fault, and there was no date under the
134. McAlpine Humberoak Ltd. v. McDermott Int’l Inc. (1992) 58 B.L.R. 1 (citing
Wells v. Army & Navy Coop. Soc’y (1902) 86 L.T. 764).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. (1971) 1 B.L.R. 111.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Peak, 1 B.L.R.
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contract from which liability to pay liquidated damages could run
and liquidated damages could not be recovered.143 The court
stated: “If the employer is in any way responsible for the failure
to achieve the completion date, he can recover no liquidated
damages at all and is left to prove such general damages as he
may have suffered”144 and the employer “is left to his ordinary
remedy, that is to say to recover such damages as he can prove
flow from the contractor’s breach.”145
In Trollope & Colls Ltd v. Nw. Metro. Reg’l Hosp. Bd., a
hospital was to be completed in three phases.146 Phase III was to
commence six months after completion of Phase I, but had a fixed
completion date.147 The House of Lords held that there was no
express or implied ability to extend the completion date for Phase
III if the employer delayed Phase I.148 The Court of Appeal, by a
majority, held that there was an implied term.149 Their reasoning
was that Dodd v. Churton, established that (using (1) and (2)
inserted by the House of Lords):
(1) It is well settled that in building contracts—and in other
contracts too—when there is a stipulation for work to be
done in a limited time, if one party by his conduct—it may
be quite legitimate conduct, such as ordering extra work—
renders it impossible or impracticable for the other party to
do his work within the stipulated time, then the one whose
conduct caused the trouble can no longer insist upon strict
adherence to the time stated. He cannot claim any penalties
or liquidated damages for non-completion in that time.
(2) The time becomes at large. The work must be done
within a reasonable time—that is, as a rule, the stipulated

143. Id.
144. See BRIAN EGGLESTON, LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AND EXTENSIONS OF TIME IN
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 49, 134 (3d ed. 2009).
145. See JB Kim, Concurrent Delay: Unliquidated Damages by Employer and
Disruption Claim by Contractor, INT’L BAR ASS’N (Dec. 2020), [https://perma.cc/6VSP7Q3A]; City Inn Ltd. v. Shepherd Constr. Ltd. [2007] C.S.O.H. 190 [¶11] (quoting Peak
Constr. (Liverpool) Ltd. v. McKinney Founds. Ltd. (1971) 1 B.L.R. 111).
146. [1973] 1 W.L.R. 601, 601.
147. Id. at 601-02.
148. Id. at 602.
149. Id. at 607.
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time plus a reasonable extension for the delay caused by his
conduct.150

The House of Lords said that:
Now Dodd v. Churton does establish the first part of that
passage, which I have marked “(1),” but does not establish,
or afford any support to, the second part of the passage which
I have marked “(2).”151

This authoritative statement by the highest court, now
known as the Supreme Court, makes the position clear: where a
party delays completion, that party can no longer insist upon strict
adherence to the time stated and cannot claim any penalties or
liquidated damages for non-completion in that time.152 This,
however, does not mean that time is “at large” so that the work
must be done within a reasonable time.153
In Rapid Bldg. Grp. Ltd. v. Ealing Fam. Hous. Ass’n Ltd., a
contractor could not be given possession of a significant part of a
site because people were occupying it as squatters.154 The Court
had to decide whether in such a case the employer could recover
damages for delay. They applied Peak v. McKinney, and held that
no liquidated damages were recoverable but the defendants were
not precluded from pursuing unliquidated damages. Lloyd LJ
said:
Like Lord Justice Phillimore in Peak Construction
(Liverpool) v. McKinney Foundations Ltd, at p.127 of the
report, I was somewhat startled to be told in the course of the
argument that if any part of the delay was caused by the
employer, no matter how slight, then the liquidated damages
clause in the contract, clause 22, becomes inoperative.
I can well understand how that must necessarily be so
in a case in which the delay is indivisible and there is a
dispute as to the extent of the employer’s responsibility for
that delay. But where there are, as it were, two separate and
distinct periods of delay with two separate causes, and where
the dispute relates only to one of those two causes, then it
would seem to me just and convenient that the employer
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. (referencing Dodd v. Churton [1897] 1 Q.B. 562).
Trollope, 1 W.L.R. at 607.
Id.
Id.
(1985) 29 B.L.R. 5.
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should be able to claim liquidated damages in relation to the
other period.
In the present case the relevant dispute relates to the
delay, if any, caused by the presence of squatters. At the
most, that could not account for more than the period from
23rd June 1980 to 17th July 1980, a period of some 24 days.
It ought to be possible for the employers to concede that
there is a dispute as to that period, and then deduct the 24
days from the total delay from 22nd September 1982 (when,
according to the architect’s certificate, the work ought to
have been completed) and 23rd July 1983, (that being the
date of practical completion) and claim liquidated damages
for the balance. But it was common ground before us that
that is not a possible view of clause 22 of the contract in the
light of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Peak’s case,
and therefore I say no more about it.155

That case and Peak treated delay by the employer as
disallowing recovery of liquidated damages but preserving a right
to unliquidated damages.156 This would appear to preserve the
original time for completion and allow unliquidated damages for
the part of the delay in achieving completion by the time for
completion. The case also raised, but did not answer, the question
whether, in such circumstances, the employer could recover more
as liquidated damages than as unliquidated damages.157
In McAlpine Humberoak Ltd v. McDermott Int’l Inc, in 1992
it was argued that where delay was caused to sub-contractor
plaintiffs by main contractor defendants so that the plaintiffs were
prevented from completing the work within the time stated in the
contract, as time was of the essence of the contract and since the
defendants had no power to fix a new completion date, time
became “at large.”158 It was also contended that the matters which
caused delay (drawing revisions, VOs, late replies to TQs) gave
rise to a claim for damages for the sum they would have quoted

155. Id.
156. Id.; see also Peak Constr. (Liverpool) Ltd. v. McKinney Founds. Ltd. (1971) 1
B.L.R. 111.
157. Ealing Fam. Hous. Ass’n Ltd., 29 B.L.R. 5.
158. (1992) 58 B.L.R. 1.
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had they known of the delay.159 As it was said in the Court of
Appeal, this was equivalent to contending that:
If, in a contract which provides for a lump sum price and a
firm delivery date, the employer causes the contractor to
miss the delivery date by one day, as he might, for example,
by ordering extra work, both the lump sum and the delivery
date are displaced.160

In support of this proposition, the only authority cited was
Wells v. Army & Navy Coop. Soc’y.161 As the Court of Appeal
said, the principle in that case was not new but came from Holme
v. Guppy, where Parke B used the phrase of the contractor being
“left at large” and had been applied in such cases as Peak v.
McKinney.162 It was said that in all these cases the employer was
claiming liquidated damages and that claim failed “since the
employer could not rely on the original date of completion, nor
on a power to extend the date of completion. In the absence of
such a power, there could be no fixed date from which the
liquidated damages could run.”163 The Court of Appeal pointed
out that “[e]ven if time is ‘at large’ (whatever that may mean)
there is nothing in the quoted line of authorities to suggest that the
price is at large.”164
More recently in 2007, in Multiplex Consts. (UK) Ltd. v.
Honeywell Control Sys. Ltd., the Court had to consider a case
where a sub-contractor had been delayed due to variations,165 but
the extension of time clause did not include “variations” or
“directions” as a cause of delay for which an extension of time
could be granted.166 It did, however, include “delay caused by
any act of prevention or default by the Contractor in performing
its obligations under the Sub-Contract.”167 The sub-contractor
contended that the main contractor by its conduct had put “time
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. McAlpine, 58 B.L.R. 1.
164. Id.
165. [2007] EWHC 447 (TCC).
166. “Variations” are equivalent to “change orders.” See Variation to Work Pertaining
to Construction Contracts, 8 CT. UNCOURT 46, 46 (2021).
167. Id. (emphasis added).
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at large” under the sub-contract, and an adjudicator168 agreed
because revised programmes had been issued by the main
contractor’s direction and the sub-contract conditions “did not
contain any mechanism for extending time in respect of delay
caused by a direction.”169 The main contractor therefore
commenced proceedings in the Technology and Construction
Court claiming that time had not been put at large.170
In summarizing the law, Mr. Justice Jackson (as he then was)
said:
The essence of the prevention principle is that the promisee
cannot insist upon the performance of an obligation which
he has prevented the promisor from performing.
In the field of construction law, one consequence of the
prevention principle is that the employer cannot hold the
contractor to a specified completion date, if the employer has
by act or omission prevented the contractor from completing
by that date. Instead, time becomes at large and the
obligation to complete by the specified date is replaced by
an implied obligation to complete within a reasonable time.
The same principle applies as between main contractor and
sub-contractor.
It is in order to avoid the operation of the prevention
principle that many construction contracts and sub-contracts
include provisions for extension of time. Thus, it can be seen
that extension of time clauses exist for the protection of both
parties to a construction contract or sub-contract.171

Concluding that time was not at large because the direction
was an act of prevention, the judge said, “[t]he fact that such a
direction is permitted by the contract does not prevent it being an
act of prevention.”172
In coming to his conclusion, the judge referred to Trollope
& Colls Limited v. Nw. Metro. Reg’l Hosp. Bd., and said, “[i]n the
House of Lords, Lord Pearson agreed with that section of Lord

168. See below for the statutory right to adjudication in English law. See infra text of
notes 197-98.
169. Multiplex Constrs. (UK) Ltd., EWHC 447 (TCC).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Denning’s judgment.”173 That however was a reference to “(1)”
identified by Lord Pearson and not to “(2)” where he disagreed
with Lord Denning’s statement “[t]he time becomes at large. The
work must be done within a reasonable time.”174
Finally, in Adyard Abu Dhabi v. SD Marine Services,
Hamblen J. (as he then was) had to consider a claim by a shipyard
in Abu Dhabi against a UK Government supplier over the
termination of two shipbuilding contracts.175 Adyard contended
that the prevention principle applied as the contract did not
provide for an extension of time in respect of delay caused by
SDMS.176 The judge said that a convenient summary of the
prevention principle was to be found in the judgment of Mr.
Justice Jackson in Multiplex Constrs. Ltd. v. Honeywell Control
Sys. Ltd., and cited the part included,177 in which Mr. Justice
Jackson said:
In the field of construction law, one consequence of the
prevention principle is that the employer cannot hold the
contractor to a specified completion date, if the employer has
by act or omission prevented the contractor from completing
by that date. Instead, time becomes at large and the
obligation to complete by the specified date is replaced by
an implied obligation to complete within a reasonable
time.178

However, when dealing with the principle Hamblen J. said:
The authorities on the prevention principle show that: . . .
(2) In the event that the Buyer interferes with the work so as
to delay its completion in accordance with the agreed
timetable, this amounts to an act of prevention and the
Builder is no longer bound by the strict requirements of the
contract as to time.179

The position has therefore been reached where, it is
respectfully submitted, the principle derived from Comyns’

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Trollope & Colls Ltd. v. Nw. Metro. Reg’l Hosp. Bd. [1973] 1 W.L.R. 601, 607.
[2011] EWHC 848 (Comm).
Id. [¶ 5].
[2007] EWHC 477 (TCC) [¶48].
Adyard Abu Dhabi, EWHC 848 (Comm) at [¶240.48].
Id. [¶242].
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Digest under “condition” at rule L(6) has been misapplied in a
number of cases. The starting principle is that, if an employer
delays a contractor and there is no ability to extend the completion
date to allow for that delay, then the employer cannot recover
liquidated damages for that period of delay. That is a sensible
principle of law as set out in Comyns’ Digest: one party cannot
both prevent a party from performing and also hold that party to
its performance.180 That principle would equally apply to prevent
an employer from recovering unliquidated damages. The
difference between liquidated damages and unliquidated damages
is that liquidated damages apply under a contractual mechanism
when a contractor fails to complete by the agreed date.181 When
that happens, liquidated damages are automatically due for the
period of delay at the rate specified. To recover unliquidated
damages, the employer would have to prove damages for the
period of delay. In doing so and applying the universal rule that
a party is entitled to damages to put it into the position it would
have been in but for the contractor’s breach of contract in causing
delay,182 the employer would have to show that it suffered loss for
the period of delay. But if the employer caused the delay, then it
would not be able to prove such loss as it would have suffered
that loss because of its prevention.
On that basis the issue is limited to the ability of the
employer to recover liquidated or unliquidated damages for delay.
The reference in Holme v. Guppy, to the contractor being “left at
large” not having to “forfeit anything for the delay” was
interpreted in Dodd v. Churton.183 In that case the court held that
the principle established in cases beginning with Holme v. Guppy
was, if the building owner ordered extra work which increased the
time required to finish the work, the building owner was “thereby
disentitled to claim the penalties for non-completion provided for
by the contract.”184 As Lord Pearson said in Trollope & Colls,
180. 3 SIR JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 116-17 (4th ed.
1793).
181. See Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
182. See, e.g., Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. (1880) 5 App. Cas. 25 CA at 39.
183. Holme v. Guppy, 150 E.R. 1195; (1838) 3 M. & W. 387; Dodd v. Churton [1897]
1 Q.B. 562, 566.
184. Id. (referencing Holme v. Guppy, 150 E.R. 1195; (1838) 3 M. & W. 387 ).
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Dodd v. Churton “does not establish, or afford any support” that
“time becomes at large” so that “the work must be done within a
reasonable time.”185
Therefore, the principle that “time becomes at large” when
there is an act of prevention which prevents the contractor
completing the work and there is no provision for an extension of
time, finds no apparent support from the line of authorities
starting from Holme v. Guppy. Despite that, more recent cases
have supported the “time at large” principle,186 and clarity will
only come when the challenge to that principle is dealt with in a
fully argued case in the Supreme Court.
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN RESOLUTION OF
CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES
The complexity of construction disputes has led to such
cases becoming the most difficult to resolve. Added to this
complexity is the involvement of those whose endeavour on the
project causes attitudes to become polarised and personalised. In
1993 the UK government set up a review of procurement and
contractual arrangements in the construction industry.187 The
government appointed Sir Michael Latham as sole “Reviewer,”
assisted by six assessors.188 His final report was published in July
1994 and included a number of solutions to try to avoid the types
of dispute that have become endemic in the construction
industry.189 It made thirteen recommendations as to provisions
that should be inserted in construction contracts, including
separation of the role of contract administrator, project or lead
manager and adjudicator, periods within which interim payments
must be made, taking all steps to avoid conflict and providing for

185. Trollope & Colls Ltd. v. Nw. Metro. Reg’l Hosp. Bd. [1973] 1 W.L.R. 601, 60708.
186. Id.
187. SIR MICHAEL LATHAM, CONSTRUCTING THE TEAM: JOINT REVIEW OF
PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 1 (1994).
188. Id. at v, 1, 2.
189. Id. at v.
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speedy resolution of disputes by adjudication.190 That report led
to adjudication being introduced by statute.191
There has been an increasing awareness that early
involvement of an independent person or panel may assist the
parties in seeking a solution to those issues. This has led to setting
up an “Independent Dispute Avoidance Panel” or a “Conflict
Avoidance Panel” on large infrastructure projects to help the
parties resolve the disagreements at a stage before they have
matured into disputes requiring a more formal dispute resolution
process.192 Standard forms of contract now include provisions by
which the dispute boards are expressly given a dispute avoidance
role, separate from the adjudication role.193 These processes are
now widely applied and have been shown to be very effective in
projects, including the London Olympics.194
Dispute avoidance can vary from a process where
discussions take place between the person in the dispute
avoidance role and the parties to find a solution to a procedure,
similar to mediation, and even the preparation of a preliminary
view on how the parties resolve matters. Where there is a panel,
then a particular issue may require a solution which requires
engineering, project management, financial, legal or other
specialist input and the panel often includes that expertise, or a
procedure to obtain that expertise.195 The resolution may involve
a solution where the parties share the risks, for instance a change
in the design and in construction methods to save time, with
shared costs.196 Ultimately, the resolution of the issue depends on
the co-operation of the parties, the expertise of the neutral person,
and the flexibility of the process.

190. Id. at 37.
191. Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, c.53 § 108. The Act
applies to “construction contracts” entered into after 1 May 1998.
192. Independent Dispute Avoidance Panel set up to Smooth London 2012
Construction, NEW CIV. ENG’R, [https://perma.cc/XFA7-QDQ5] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
193. These boards are known as Dispute Avoidance and Adjudication Boards or
“DAABs.” CONFLICT AVOIDANCE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONSTR. 6-7 (1st ed.
2012).
194. See Peter H.J. Chapman, The Use of Dispute Boards on Major Infrastructure
Projects, 1 TURKISH COM. L. REV. 219, 228 (2015).
195. See id. at 225.
196. See id. at 227.
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The ability to resolve disputes at an early stage avoids the
situation where the longer a disagreement remains unresolved, the
harder it is to resolve it and the more serious the consequences in
terms of time and cost to the project. Otherwise, the advantages
of the process vary from assisted discussion to something closer
to mediation or conciliation.
Some disputes do require a decision at an early stage. This
led to the concept of adjudication being promoted by the Latham
Report.197 The statutory provision by which adjudication was
introduced was a single section, section 108 of the Housing
Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 (the “Act”).
That provides:
(1) A party to a construction contract has the right to refer a
dispute arising under the contract for adjudication under a
procedure complying with this section. For this purpose
“dispute” includes any difference.198

The following provisions in section 108 state:
(2) The contract shall include provision in writing so as to—
(a) enable a party to give notice at any time of his
intention to refer a dispute to adjudication;
(b) provide a timetable with the object of securing the
appointment of the adjudicator and referral of the dispute to
him within 7 days of such notice;
(c) require the adjudicator to reach a decision within 28
days of referral or such longer period as is agreed by the
parties after the dispute has been referred;
(d) allow the adjudicator to extend the period of 28
days by up to 14 days, with the consent of the party by whom
the dispute was referred;
(e) impose a duty on the adjudicator to act impartially;
and
(f) enable the adjudicator to take the initiative in
ascertaining the facts and the law.
(3) The contract shall provide in writing that the decision of
the adjudicator is binding until the dispute is finally
determined by legal proceedings, by arbitration (if the
197. SIR MICHAEL LATHAM, supra note 186, at 91.
198. Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, c.53 § 108(1).
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contract provides for arbitration or the parties otherwise
agree to arbitration) or by agreement. The parties may agree
to accept the decision of the adjudicator as finally
determining the dispute. . . .
(4) The contract shall also provide in writing that the
adjudicator is not liable for anything done or omitted in the
discharge or purported discharge of his functions as
adjudicator unless the act or omission is in bad faith, and that
any employee or agent of the adjudicator is similarly
protected from liability.
(5) If the contract does not comply with the requirements of
subsections (1) to (4), the adjudication provisions of the
Scheme for Construction Contracts apply.199

How, then, does this apply to a particular contract? First,
there has to be a “Construction contract.” Section 104(1)
provides that a “construction contract” means:
[A]n agreement with a person for any of the following—
(a) the carrying out of construction operations;
(b) arranging for the carrying out of construction operations
by others, whether under sub-contract to him or otherwise;
(c) providing his own labour, or the labour of others, for the
carrying out of construction operations.200

There are provisions as to what agreements are included and
are not included in the definition. There is then a complex set of
provisions in section 105 which defines what “construction
operations” are. They include, for instance, at section 105(1)(b):
[C]onstruction, alteration, repair, maintenance, extension,
demolition or dismantling of any works forming, or to form,
part of the land, including (without prejudice to the
foregoing) walls, roadworks, power-lines, electronic
communications apparatus, aircraft runways, docks and
harbours, railways, inland waterways, pipe-lines, reservoirs,
water-mains, wells, sewers, industrial plant and installations

199. Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, c.53 § 108(2)-(5)
(footnotes omitted).
200. Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, c.53 § 104(1).
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for purposes of land drainage, coast protection or
defence. . . .201

They exclude, for instance, at section 105(2)(c):
[A]ssembly, installation or demolition of plant or machinery,
or erection or demolition of steelwork for the purposes of
supporting or providing access to plant or machinery, on a
site where the primary activity is—(i) nuclear processing,
power generation, or water or effluent treatment. . . .202

Once there is a construction contract, then either the express
terms of that contract comply with the statute and include
adjudication, or the “Scheme for Construction Contracts” applies
as an implied term of the contract.203
Having established the contract is a construction contract
that includes, expressly or impliedly, adjudication, the process
starts with a notice of dispute and, if an adjudicator is not agreed,
then an application to an adjudication nominating body, the
appointment of an adjudicator and the “referral” of the dispute to
him.204 There is then a process leading up to the adjudicator’s
decision, which is typically delivered within twenty-eight days.
Most decisions lead to payment, but as always, if payment is not
made, a party may apply to the courts, even if there is an
arbitration clause.
When the first case came before the courts to enforce an
adjudication decision, Dyson J. said in Macob Civil Eng’g Ltd v.
Morrison Constr. Ltd:
The intention of Parliament in enacting the Act was plain. It
was to introduce a speedy mechanism for settling disputes
and construction contracts on a provisional interim basis, and
requiring the decisions of adjudicators to be enforced
pending the final determination of disputes by arbitration,
litigation or agreement. . . . The timetable for [adjudication]
201. Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, c.53 § 105(1)(b)
(footnote omitted).
202. Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, c.53 § 105(2)(c).
203. Under section 114(4), “Where any provisions of the Scheme for Construction
Contracts apply by virtue of this Part in default of contractual provision agreed by the parties,
they have effect as implied terms of the contract concerned.” Housing Grants, Construction
and Regeneration Act 1996, c.53 § 114(4).
204. Housing Grants, Construction and Regulation Act 1996, c.53, pt. II § 108(1),
(2)(a)-(b).
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is very tight. Many would say unreasonably tight, and likely
to result in injustice. Parliament must be taken to have been
aware of this. . . . It is clear that Parliament intended that the
adjudication should be conducted in a manner which those
familiar with the grinding detail of the traditional approach
to the resolution of construction disputes apparently find
difficult to accept. But Parliament has not abolished
arbitration and litigation of construction disputes. It has
merely introduced an intervening provisional stage in the
dispute resolution process. Crucially, it has made it clear that
decisions of adjudicators are binding and are to be complied
with until the dispute is finally resolved.205

It was necessary to decide whether the adjudicator’s
decision was enforceable and how it was enforceable.206 The
TCC used the summary judgment procedure (“no real prospect of
successfully defending the claim”207) to decide whether to enforce
the claim and give judgment for the sum awarded in the
adjudicator’s decision.208 In doing so, it treated the adjudicator’s
decision as binding on matters of fact and law. The alternative
would have been to treat it as a temporarily binding certificate
which could be challenged on matters of fact and law. This would
have deprived adjudication of any practical benefit. A party can
defend the enforcement of an adjudication decision on a number
of grounds—including arguments that there is no contract or no
“construction contract”;209 there was no “dispute” capable of

205. Macob Civ. Eng’g Ltd. v. Morrison Constr. Ltd. [1999] EWHC 254 (TCC) [¶14].
206. Id. [¶2]-[¶3], [¶12].
207. CPR 24.2(a)(ii).
208. Macob Civ. Eng’g Ltd., EWHC 254 (TCC) [¶15].
209. Housing Grants, Construction and Regulation Act 1996, c.53, pt. II § 108(1). A
detailed definition of “construction contract” is provided in § 104:
(1) In this Part a “construction contract” means an agreement with a person for
any of the following—
(a) the carrying out of construction operations;
(b) arranging for the carrying out of construction operations by others, whether
under sub-contract to him or otherwise;
(c) providing his own labour, or the labour of others, for the carrying out of
construction operations.
(2) References in this Part to a construction contract include an agreement—
(a) to do architectural, design, or surveying work, or
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being referred to adjudication;210 the adjudicator did not have
jurisdiction over an issue or question or has gone outside of their
terms of reference;211 the adjudicator has conducted the
adjudication so as to breach the principles of natural justice so
seriously that the purported decision ought not to be enforced;212
or the adjudicator had not been properly appointed under the
terms of the contract.213 The narrow grounds on which
enforcement can be resisted has meant that the courts have
generally enforced adjudicators’ decisions.
The TCC has been called upon to decide several practical
issues, such as timing of referrals and decisions,214 correcting
mistakes in a decision,215 the effect of the statute of limitation,216
cost recovery,217 and enforcement of decisions.218 In order to do
so, it has also implemented a procedure where a party can start
proceedings and immediately apply for summary judgment with
the normal time limits being abridged.219 This generally leads to
a hearing taking place three to four weeks after court proceedings
have commenced.

(b) to provide advice on building, engineering, interior or exterior decoration
or on the laying-out of landscape, in relation to construction operations.
(3) References in this Part to a construction contract do not include a contract
of employment (within the meaning of the M1Employment Rights Act 1996).
Housing Grants, Construction and Regulation Act 1996, c.53, pt. II § 104(1)-(3).
210. Housing Grants, Construction and Regulation Act 1996, c.53, pt. II § 108(1).
211. H.M. CTS. & TRIBUNALS SERVICE, supra note 45 §§ 9.4, 9.4.1.
212. LexisPSL, Breach of Natural Justice in Adjudication: Practice Notes,
LEXISNEXIS, [https://perma.cc/VH5M-GFRB] (last visited Apr. 21, 2022).
213. Housing Grants, Construction and Regulation Act 1996, c.53, pt. II § 108(2)-(5).
214. See, e.g., Hart Invs. Ltd. v. Fidler [2006] EWHC 2857 (TCC) [¶39]; Aveat
Heating Ltd. v. Jerram Falkus Constr. Ltd. (2007) 113 Con. L.R. 13.
215. Hart Inv. Ltd., EWHC 2857 (TCC) [¶76]-[ ¶77]; Bloor Constr. (UK) Ltd. v.
Bowmer & Kirkland (London) Ltd. [2000] B.L.R. 314; YCMS Ltd. v. Grabiner [2009]
EWHC 127 (TCC).
216. Martlet Homes Ltd. v. Mullaley & Co. Ltd. [2021] EWHC 296 (TCC) [¶ 25][¶27], [¶51], [¶53]; Aspect Contracts (Asbestos) Ltd. v Higgins Constr. Plc [2015] UKSC 38
[¶22], [¶30].
217. Betchel Ltd. v. High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd. [2021] EWHC 640 (TCC) [¶17][¶18], [¶25], [¶46]; N. Dev. (Cumbria) Ltd. v. J & J Nichol [2000] B.L.R. 158.
218. AC Yule & Son Ltd. v. Speedwell Roofing & Cladding Ltd. [2007] EWHC 1360
(TCC) [¶1], [¶3], [¶31].
219. Macob Civ. Eng’g Ltd. v. Morrison Constr. Ltd. [1999] EWHC 254 (TCC) [¶37];
H.M. CTS. & TRIBUNALS SERVICE, supra note 45 § 9.2.
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The TCC, therefore, has developed a single section of the
statute into a robust system by which it can make and enforce
decisions. Most cases (around 90%) lead to an adjudication
decision being the final decision of the dispute, and the TCC has
erred in favour of a “pay now, argue later” policy.220 There is no
costs recovery. The process has shown that the construction
industry needs and will live with quick decisions. Although
adjudication originated in the UK, the statutory process has been
mirrored in many other jurisdictions, including Australia, New
Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Ireland, and more recently in
Ontario.221 It has also been included in standard forms of
contract, including those used in South Africa and Hong Kong
where legislation has been considered but not yet implemented.222
There is now a proposal before UNCITRAL for adjudication to
be given further and wider consideration.223
V. CONCLUSION
The nature of construction is global, and it contributes to a
significant percentage of the GDP in every country.224 As a
human endeavour, construction involves the coordination of
many complex processes and historically has led to the most
complicated and intractable of disputes. The development of
modern English construction law shows that the construction
industry, including those involved as construction lawyers, have
adopted processes to reduce the extent of friction when disputes
arise. The example of the TCC as a dedicated court within a
220. Emily Leonard & Hannah Gardiner, Statutory Adjudication of Construction
Contracts in the UK, WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (Feb. 22, 2017), [https://perma.cc/78SZCTNQ]; see also Macob Civ. Eng’g Ltd., [1999] EWHC 254 (TCC); Bresco Elec. Services
Ltd. v. Michael J Lonsdale [2020] UKSC 25.
221. See Steve Baldini & Hamish Lal, The Rise and Rise of Statutory Adjudication: Is
the U.S. Ready?, 264 N.Y. L.J. 1, 1 (2020); see also Sir Vivian Ramsey, A View from the
Bench, 13 CONSTR. L. INT’L 71, 71 (2018).
222. See Lawrence Davies & Tom Heading, Construction Disputes: Global Markets
Embrace Adjudication, PINSENT MASONS (Jan. 28, 2022), [https://perma.cc/82YQ-GHGY].
223. See Peter E. O’Malley, A New ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Adjudication’: How Beneficial Could It Really Be?, 88 THE INT’L J. OF ARB.,
MEDIATION, AND DISP. MGMT. 34, 34 (2022).
224. See Niyazi Berk & Sabriye Biçen, Causality Between the Construction Sector and
GDP Growth in Emerging Countries: The Case of Turkey, 4 ATHENS J. OF MEDITERRANEAN
STUDS. 19, 19-20 (2018).
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national court system has been followed in other countries such
as Australia and Malaysia and is now being reproduced by the
international reach of International Commercial Courts, including
the Singapore ICC with its TIC List.225 Given the need for a
specialist court to deal with construction disputes and the crossborder nature of international construction projects, there exists
an unresolved question about whether we should attempt to
institute an International Construction Court which provides
international coverage and is served by experienced construction
law judges sitting in multiple jurisdictions. I suggest that this is
the real challenge for the future of construction law.

225. See Jon Gilbert & Gabriel Wang, Singapore’s Technology, Infrastructure and
Construction List—A New Global Forum for the Resolution of Major Project Disputes?,
FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER (Dec. 17, 2021), [https://perma.cc/6YCK-72E8].
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STRUCTURAL PRECARITY AND POTENTIAL
IN CONDOMINIUM GOVERNANCE DESIGN
Andrea J. Boyack*
INTRODUCTION
In the early hours of June 24, 2021, half of Champlain
Towers South Condominium, a thirteen-story multifamily
building located in the Miami suburb of Surfside, collapsed
without warning.1 The Miami Herald called the collapse
“unprecedented” in that one wing “simply caved in––for no
obvious reason.”2 The collapse killed ninety-eight people and
was the deadliest multifamily building engineering failure in US
history.3 After an arduous search and rescue and safely
dismantling the rest of the structure, inquiries sought to determine
why this deadly collapse happened.4 Who was to blame, and what
could have been done differently?
* Norman R. Pozez Chair of Business and Transactional Law and Professor of Law,
Washburn University School of Law. I am grateful to Professor Carl Circo and the staff of
the Arkansas Law Review for organizing a superb symposium and providing helpful edits.
1. See, e.g., Matthew Shaer, The Towers and the Ticking Clock, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28,
2022), [https://perma.cc/X2PP-354L].
2. Sarah Blaskey et al., House of Cards: How Decades of Problems Converged the
Night Champlain Towers Fell, MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 30, 2021), [https://perma.cc/QB5E65TF] [hereinafter Miami Herald Special Report] (“The tower wasn’t particularly old or
under major construction. There was no earthquake, gas explosion or terrorist attack to
blame. After standing for nearly four decades, one wing of the building simply caved in.”).
3. What to Know About the Building Collapse in Surfside Fla., N.Y. TIMES (June 24,
2021), [https://perma.cc/BMS3-BB9H]. See also Anjali Singhvi et al., The Surfside Condo
Was Flawed and Failing. Here’s a Look Inside, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/A8GX-FJ3U]; Arian Campo-Flores & Scott Calvert, Surfside, Fla., Condo
Collapse: From Glimmering Beaches to Ruin, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/FX95-E946].
4. Both the Miami-Dade Country’s State Attorney’s Office and the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration of Surfside investigated the collapse. KATHERINE
FERNANDEZ RUNDLE ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE MIAMI-DADE COUNTY GRAND JURY,
11TH JUD. CIR. OF FLA., at 1 (Spring Term A.D. 2021) [hereinafter GRAND JURY FINAL
REPORT] (examining the “policies, procedures, protocols, systems and practices” to ensure
the safety of buildings and offering specific recommendations). The Miami-Dade police
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Within six months of this tragedy, engineering analyses
pieced together a picture of a building with hidden, fatal
vulnerabilities.5
Engineering experts concluded that the
condominium’s building design was flawed from the start.6 The
project was built by inexperienced developers using an architect
who had his license suspended for “gross incompetence.”7
Dangers created by design vulnerabilities were compounded by
shoddy construction in terms of materials and methods.8
Drainage and waterproofing were completely inadequate.9 A
started a homicide investigation related to the collapse, and the Town of Surfside hired a
forensic investigator to do a thorough analysis of the disaster. Phil Prazan, Surfside Hired
Him to Investigate Condo Collapse. Here’s How He’ll Do It, NBC MIAMI (July 2, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/3FG2-XLB4]. Champlain Towers South unit owners have filed multiple
class-action lawsuits against the condo association. The National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) within the United States Department of Commerce also investigated the
cause of the collapse. NIST Establishes Expert Team to Investigate the Champlain Towers
South Collapse, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. (Aug. 25, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/NSM6-2Q5U].
5. See, e.g., Gina Harkins, What You Need to Know About the Florida Condo Collapse
as the Search for Survivors Continues and Probe Begins, WASH. POST (July 10, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/G6DU-R9LL]; Miami building collapse: What could have caused it?, BBC
NEWS (July 1, 2021), [https://perma.cc/9PYU-RH3Y]; James Glanz et al., Condo Wreckage
Hints at First Signs of Possible Construction Flaw, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/KQ3T-XKKX].
6. Professor Dawn Lehman analyzed building plans and used computer models to
identify structural problems in the building, isolating the causes of the collapse and whether
the collapse was caused by inherent design and structural flaws or due to insufficient
maintenance. Miami Herald Special Report, supra note 2.
7. Engineers reviewing the plans for Champlain Towers South warned of “design
flaws” and “strength differences” between various structural components, as well as building
code violations. Id. “The wing of the tower that survived the collapse was held up by robust
24-by-24-inch columns. Building plans show the rest of the columns in the structure were
less than half that size. Columns in the pool deck were the smallest. And even the slightly
bigger columns under the part of the tower that collapsed were too small to safely
accommodate all of the necessary steel reinforcement, violating building code requirements
at the time.” Id.
8. Sara Blaskey et al., Contractor for Fallen Surfside Condo Later Lost License Amid
Fraud, Negligence Claims, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 25, 2022), [https://perma.cc/V54RMB6R]; Shaer, supra note 1. Their project had many personnel problems: two of the
project’s general contractors resigned mid-build, and the structural engineer overseeing
construction had previously built a parking garage that had immediately collapsed. Miami
Herald Special Report, supra note 2. It also seems that the plans were not adequately carried
out in the Champlain Towers South project. For example, some of the support beams that
were planned for the garage were omitted or spaced farther apart during construction in order
to maximize parking space, and the columns were too narrow. Id.
9. The report by Morabito Consulting in 2018 warned that water had damaged the
concrete slab and the damage urgently needed to be repaired. See infra note 14.
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neighboring development may have weakened the
condominium’s perimeter wall.10 The engineering post mortem
analysis concluded: “This building was so overstressed for so
long it’s amazing it stood as long as it did.”11
The final straw that broke the back of Champlain Towers
South was the failure to make necessary structural repairs. For
decades, the condominium board had opted for superficial
measures that masked the underlying vulnerabilities or even
exacerbated them.12 Members of Champlain Towers South
Condominium learned the extent of their building’s underlying
and worsening structural problems in 2018 when the board
commissioned an engineering study to comply with Miami’s
multifamily recertification requirements.13 The engineering
study identified several critically necessary repairs and warned
that “[f]ailure to replace the waterproofing in the near future will
cause the extent of the concrete deterioration to expand
exponentially.”14
10. Shaer, supra note 1.
11. Miami Herald Special Report, supra note 2.
12. See id. For example, board-authorized repairs of the cracking pool deck, focused
on appearance rather than structural soundness, paving over damage rather than excavating
the vulnerable slab, and each new layer added to the stress on the structure, pressing down
on inadequate supports and putting lateral strain on the structural perimeter wall. Id. The
condominium’s waterproofing and drainage problems had been exacerbated by leaking
planters and invasive plants. The condominium Board ultimately removed eight palm trees
from the pool area after realizing that their roots had been penetrating and weakening both
concrete and drains for two decades. Id.; see also Konrad Putzier et al., Behind the Florida
Condo Collapse: Rampant Corner-Cutting, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2021, 1:36 PM),
[https://perma.cc/86R7-RQRT].
13. Although Florida state law does not require any reinspection of multifamily
buildings, Miami-Dade’s County Code requires that multifamily buildings be reinspected
every forty years and recertified as structurally sound. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY CODE § 811(f)(ii)(1) (2001), [https://perma.cc/X2SS-YN3C] (last visited April 17, 2022); see also
Building Safety Program, BROWARD.ORG, [https://perma.cc/KRT4-JU72] (last visited Apr.
17, 2022) (Broward County building safety program modeled after Miami-Dade County’s).
Champlain Towers South was turning forty in December 2021, and the governing board of
the condominium commissioned an engineering inspection in 2018 and was “in the process
of securing compliance” with the recertification requirement. GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT,
supra note 4, at 2; see also MIAMI-DADE CNTY. DEP’T OF REGUL. & ECON. RES., NOTICE
OF REQUIRED RECERTIFICATION OF 40 YEAR OLD BUILDING(S), [https://perma.cc/FW6VG2Z5] (listing the recertification form required by the Miami-Dade County Code).
14. MORABITO CONSULTANTS, CHAMPLAIN TOWERS SOUTH CONDOMINIUM
STRUCTURAL FIELD SURVEY REPORT 1, 7 (Oct. 8, 2018), [https://perma.cc/QL4F-SEJG]
(hereinafter MORABITO REPORT). Engineers compiling the report examined 68 of the
condominium’s 136 units and the building’s roof, exterior facade, parking garage, pool deck,
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After the 2018 report, the board planned for remediation of
the issues raised, but many members of the condominium balked
when they learned that these repairs would cost over $9 million,
an estimate that later ballooned to $15 million.15 Minutes of
board meetings over the three years prior to the building’s
collapse show that repeated attempts to approve a special
assessment to pay for repairs were stymied by disagreements
about getting the work done and, particularly, paying for it.16 A
vocal contingent of owners resisted the repair effort, and members
of the Board resigned in protest.17 The necessary work was
delayed for months and years until, one night, damaged rebar
inside the concrete structure fractured, thereby destabilizing the
tower and causing it to collapse in on itself “like a folding card
table.”18
Champlain Towers South suffered from design faults that
created structural vulnerabilities as well as insufficient
maintenance that exacerbated them, but the building’s ownership
and governance design may have also contributed to the deadly
effects of its structural failings. Champlain Towers South was a
condominium, a legal ownership construction that theoretically
encourages and enables adequate building construction and
maintenance.19 In addition to asking engineering questions about
the building’s physical structure, an analysis of the tragedy also
requires asking legal questions regarding the condominium’s
governance design. Structuring the building’s ownership as a
and common areas to determine what “structural issues . . . require[d] repair and/or
remediation in the immediate and near future.” It found that “waterproofing is beyond it
[sic] useful life and therefore must . . . be completely removed and replaced.” Id.
15. Shaer, supra note 1; Campo-Flores & Calvert, supra note 3.
16. Russell Lewis, Months Before Florida Condo Collapsed, Residents and the Board
Sparred Over Repairs, NPR (July 2, 2021, 5:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/56ST-BXSF]. An
association PowerPoint presentation to residents from November 2020 “alluded to the
contentious debates among owners” related to paying for necessary repairs: “Complaining
Or Shouting At Each Other Doesn’t Work! . . .” said one side. Id.; Casey Tolan et al., A
2020 Report Found Surfside Condo Lacked Funds for Necessary Repairs. One Expert Called
it a ‘Wake-up Call’, CNN, [https://perma.cc/Y6VW-FAJP] (last updated July 8, 2021, 8:52
PM).
17. Campo-Flores & Calvert, supra note 3; Beth Reinhard et al., Majority of Florida
Condo Board Quit in 2019 as Squabbling Residents Dragged out Plans for Repairs, WASH.
POST (June 30, 2021, 4:57 PM), [https://perma.cc/CSM6-8K5U].
18. Miami Herald Special Report, supra note 2.
19. See infra Part I.A-C.
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condominium ultimately failed to ensure quality construction and
upkeep, and condominium governance may also have inhibited
remediation of the building’s structural vulnerabilities.
This Article examines a condominium’s legal structure in the
context of ensuring construction and upkeep quality in a
multifamily building and explores possible systemic
improvements. Part I considers three latent vulnerabilities
inherent in the condominium governance structure: (1) overprotection of developers; (2) unwillingness of members to ensure
optimal upkeep; and (3) association financial precarity. Part II
critiques some suggested legal responses to the Surfside disaster
and discusses the swift and dramatic impacts on condominium
governance caused by changed underwriting requirements of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Finally, this Article concludes by
calling for more effective stabilization of condominium
governance to remediate its inherent structural weaknesses.
I. PRECARITY OF CONDOMINIUM GOVERNANCE
DESIGN
A condominium is a creature of statute, a legal ownership
structure that enables individuals to hold title to a box of space in
fee simple absolute.20 In a condominium, each owner holds
individual title to their unit, and all owners share ownership of the
common elements as tenants in common.21 Common elements
include everything that cannot be divided up, including the roof,
walls, lobby, halls, elevators, parking, building structures and
systems, fixtures, and all community amenities.22 All unit owners
20. Every state has adopted a condominium-enabling statute. Several such statutes are
modeled on the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (“UCIOA”) which was created
by combining the Uniform Condominium Act (“UCA”) proposed in 1982 and 1977,
respectively, by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Some
states have their own comprehensive statutory regime governing condominiums and other
common interest communities. See, e.g., Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act,
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 4000 et seq. (West 2022).
21. WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE:
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW 105, 121 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing how Boards make and
collect assessments).
22. See Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowner Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1519, 1522-23 (1982) (discussing how community assessments allocate common costs
among all owners).
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are members of the condominium association, which exists to
provide the governance that is essential for joint ownership, but
the association does not own any property.23
The condominium ownership form makes homeownership
more accessible and more affordable, particularly in urban
areas.24 Condominium ownership and governance enables people
to enjoy group amenities that they could not individually afford.25
Generally, resources used and enjoyed in common are subject to
overuse and under-maintenance because of the tendency of
individuals to maximize their internalized gains and externalize
their costs (the so-called “Tragedy of the Commons”).26
Condominium governance is designed to solve the problems of
free-riding and overuse by empowering the association to make
and enforce rules regarding use and maintenance of common
areas. The association funds necessary upkeep by assessing all
owners whose pro rata payment obligations are backed by liens
on their units.27 Collective action problems disincentivize

23. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1, 772 (2007) (discussing the need for some governance regime in the context of common
resource management).
24. Every state adopted a condominium-enabling statute between 1961 and 1967,
leading to a “tremendous condominium boom” in the decades that followed. HYATT, supra
note 21, at 11-12. According to the National Association of Realtors, condominiums are
“one of the most attainable and affordable options for first-time homeowners, minorities, and
older residents.” NAT’L ASS’S OF REALTORS, A Bipartisan Effort to Make Homeownership
More Affordable, (June 2018), [https://perma.cc/MLV4-6HUB]. See also Michael N. Neal
& Laurie Goodman, The Housing Market Needs More Condos. Why Are So Few Being
Built?, URBAN INST. (Jan. 31, 2022), [https://perma.cc/BHJ8-ZY8G] (presenting data
proving that “[c]ondos are more affordable than single-family homes” in every major city
except New York City and Philadelphia).
25. CLIFFORD TREESE ET AL., RESEARCH INST. FOR HOUS. AM., CHANGING
PERSPECTIVES ON COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION MORTGAGE UNDERWRITING AND CREDIT
ANALYSIS 1, 6-7 (Nov. 2001) (discussing how common upkeep allows a community to take
advantage of the cost savings from economies of scale).
26. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
27. HYATT, supra note 21, at 105, 108, 121 (identifying the authority to assess and
collect payments as a defining feature of common interest communities and discussing tools
available to Boards to collect assessments). See also Andrea J. Boyack, Community
Collateral Damage: A Question of Priorities, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 53, 73 (2011) (“The
association provides sufficient governance to solve the tragedy of the commons by
controlling overuse and creating a mechanism for maintenance and shared costs, which in
turn permits communities to avoid the economic downside of public goods, meaning that a
neighborhood can enjoy better amenities at lower prices.”). Condominium associations
typically are authorized to make regular as well as special assessments, and unit owners’
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individuals from acting to remediate problems that cause
widespread harms, including by bringing a lawsuit against a
builder for faulty construction or by repairing building flaws, but
having an association simply facilitates joint action.28
Condominiums have been called “little democratic [subsocieties]” that give members an economic stake and a measure
of control with respect to the multifamily building in which they
live.29
Condominium governance design makes it possible for
residents of a multifamily building to also be its owners.30 When
occupants have an economic stake in the real property they
occupy, there is theoretically an incentive alignment that
optimizes building quality.31 In contrast, landlords owning
multifamily rental buildings may be tempted to skimp on upkeep
to increase their profits because they can externalize the qualityof-life costs of disrepair.32 Condominium governance should, in
theory, produce well-designed, well-constructed, and wellmaintained buildings. In reality, that is not always the case.
There are three aspects of condominium ownership design
that should help avoid tragic engineering failures like the one in
Surfside, but each of these aspects is undermined by hidden
obligation to pay assessments are both personal obligations and in rem covenants that run
with the land. HYATT, supra note 21, at 105-09; Boyack, supra note 27, at 74.
28. Condominium ownership and governance functions as a built-in class action
vehicle for consolidating and litigating common claims. See Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental
Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 70-74 (2003) (discussing how
joint action overcomes collective action problems inhibiting litigation of joint claims).
29. Hidden Harbour Ests., Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
30. Under the common law, real property is owned in a column of space defined with
respect to a two-dimensional real property mapping description that indicates a closed figure
on the face of the earth. Today, every state has passed statutes that enable a threedimensionally defined ownership of space through creation of a condominium. Boyack,
supra note 27, at 74.
31. See Larry L. Dildine & Fred A. Massey, Dynamic Model of Private Incentives to
Housing Maintenance, 40 S. ECON. J. 631, 638 (1974); Marjorie Flavin & Takashi
Yamashita, Owner-Occupied Housing and the Composition of the Household Portfolio, 92
AM. ECON. REV. 345, 345 (2002); Geoff Rose & Richard Harris, The Three Tenures: A Case
of Property Maintenance, URBAN STUD., (July 2021), [https://perma.cc/4FTG-TVEN].
32. Adam Travis, The Organization of Neglect: Limited Liability Companies and
Housing Disinvestment, 84 AM. SOCIO. REV. 142, 145 (2019) (noting studies showing that
under certain market conditions, “the under-maintenance of rental properties represents a
rational, profit-maximizing approach for landlords”).
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weaknesses. First, a condominium creates a vehicle for joint legal
action, facilitating lawsuits for faulty construction, and this
should ensure builder accountability. Second, association
governance solves the Tragedy of the Commons, and this should
encourage the care and upkeep of a multifamily building. Finally,
the ability to collect assessments from all owners expedites costspreading, and this should reduce barriers to funding common
costs.
A. Developer Accountability and Developer Control
Negligent construction of a multifamily building imposes
harm on all owners. A condominium association with authority
to bring legal claims based on construction defects solves the
associated collective action problem and makes it easier and less
expensive for owners to seek legal redress.33 Associations
frequently bring construction lawsuits against developers,
architects, and contractors more frequently than other owners.34
A large number of construction claims could indicate that
condominiums are more motivated and empowered to seek
redress for defects, or it could indicate that condominiums are

33. A typical provision is the Texas Condominium Act which provides that the
association has the power to “institute, defend, intervene in, settle, or compromise litigation
or administrative proceedings in its own name on behalf of itself or two or more unit owners
on matters affecting the condominium.” John W. Raley & Katie McClelland, Dealing with
Multiple Owners—Condominium Construction Defect Litigation, COOPER & SCULLY P.C.
1, 3 (Jan. 26, 2007), [https://perma.cc/N969-MHYZ]. Although in the early years of
condominium development, the question of standing was sometimes contested in court,
decisions have established that the association has broad authority to stand in the place of
unit owners and bring a claim on their behalf. Id. at 3-4. Many state statutory regimes
specifically preclude individual action against a developer for negligent construction in a
condominium. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183(a) §10(b) (2017). In such states, courts
have held that it would frustrate the statutory regime to permit individual lawsuits against
the developer for faulty construction. See, e.g., Cigal v. Leader Dev. Corp., 557 N.E.2d
1119, 1122-23 (Mass. 1990).
34. According to the American Insurance Association, owners in condominium
developments are four times as likely to engage in construction litigation than owners of
single-family homes. Raley & McClelland, supra note 33, at 1. For a discussion of the legal
issues involved in association claims against developers, see E. Richard Kennedy & Ellen
Hirsch de Haan, Litigation Involving the Developer, Homeowners’ Associations, and
Lenders, 39 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 1, 2-21 (2004).
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more likely to engage in opportunistic scapegoating when
something goes wrong in their building.35
Condominium construction litigation typically involves
claims that the developer violated both express and implied
warranties of construction quality as well as claims that the
developer’s board violated fiduciary duties during the period of
developer control.36
Settlements range from developer
remediation to a payout of a couple million dollars.37 Some
construction claims result in much larger payouts. For example,
the developer of a luxury oceanfront condominium in Florida
recently paid $17.5 million to settle a construction lawsuit
brought by the association for flaws relating to pool joints, steam
rooms, and sliding glass doors.38 Construction claims pertaining
to the Millennium Tower in San Francisco resulted in a $100

35. Under most state statutes, construction claims can be brought by a condominium
association any time within ten years of construction, and the risk of a construction claim
being brought during that time by a condominium association is substantial and impacts
developer costs. A recent study in California considered whether laws facilitating
condominium construction claims reduce affordable housing in the state by raising the costs
of condominium development. See Cynthia Kroll et al., The Impact of Construction-Defect
Litigation on Condominium Development, 14 CAL. POL’Y. RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 2002),
[https://perma.cc/CZ2J-7YQC] (considering the merits of complaints by developers and
insurers that “frivolous” construction lawsuits led to higher development costs, slower pace
of condominium development, and higher housing costs in California relative to other states).
36. Many construction claims raise statutory violations as well. See generally, e.g., R.
Douglas Rees, Residential Construction Claims After the Advent of the Texas Residential
Construction Commission, COOPER & SCULLY, P.C. (Jan. 2006), [https://perma.cc/MG7FNB5P] (discussing how construction claims were impacted by three Texas statutes).
Construction claims seem to be particularly common types of litigation brought by
condominiums against developers. See, e.g., Condominiums, LONG & ROBINSON, L.L.C.,
[https://perma.cc/BAK2-SJ33] (last visited Apr. 16, 2022) (explaining that “[i]n
condominiums, defective construction of common elements—including problems such as
water intrusion, deficient roofing and defective windows—can lay a tremendous financial
burden at the feet of the homeowners’ association” and listing their representation in
connection with settlement of several multi-million dollar claims brought by condominium
associations against development companies).
37. A recently settled case provides a typical example. Complaint ¶¶ 16, 18, Westview
Highlands Condo. Ass’n v. Westview of Berlin, L.L.C., HHD-CV18-6110534-S (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2018). Three years after initiating the lawsuit, the condominium and
developer settled their dispute for two million dollars, but only after 20 contractors were
impleaded in the case as third parties. Marianna Wharry, Condo Association Reaches $2M
Settlement Over Construction Defects, LAW.COM (Oct. 28, 2021), [https://perma.cc/CY55QQ7H].
38. Construction Defects Lawsuit Leads to $17.5 Million Settlement for Condo
Association, BURNS & WILCOX (May 26, 2021), [https://perma.cc/D3F3-TNMC].
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million developer remediation funded, in part, by the Transbay
Joint Powers Authority. 39
Statutes, procedural requirements, and governing documents
may limit a board’s ability to seek redress from developers for
faulty construction. For example, in New York, condominiums
are typically developed by a single-purpose entity that divests
itself of all assets by selling the condominium units. Until
November 2020, New York caselaw barred recovery by
condominium associations against the development entity’s
beneficial owners unless the unit owners can prove that a
fiduciary relationship existed between themselves and those
investors.40 This requirement effectively denied condominium
owners legal redress for faulty construction once all units were
sold.41
Statutes commonly require owners (including
condominium associations) to provide developers with the
substance of a complaint and a chance to remedy the problem
before a lawsuit can be filed.42 And, of course, statutes of
limitation and developer bankruptcy can prevent recovery for
negligent construction.
Several condominium statutes permit the developer to
modify default dispute resolution parameters by provisions in
condominium governing documents and/or purchase agreements
in order to limit who can bring what claims in what forum.43 For
39. Jay Barmann, Millennium Tower May Be Sinking Faster Due to Digging That’s
Part of Effort to Stop It Sinking, SFIST (Sept. 1, 2021), [https://perma.cc/K7RC-AULC].
40. Sutton Apartments Corp. v Bradhurst 100 Dev. L.L.C., 968 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485-86
(N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (holding that construction claims against investors holding the
beneficial ownership of a developer would be dismissed as a matter of law unless there was
a fiduciary relationship between the plaintiffs and the investors).
41. A New York court remedied this problem in Bd. of Managers of Be@William
Condo. v. 90 William St. Dev. Grp. LLC, 135 N.Y.S.3d 360, 362 (App. Div. 2020). The
2020 ruling also made it possible for associations with previously dismissed lawsuits to
recommence their actions against the beneficial owners of defunct developer entities. See
Bill Morris, Condo Owners Win Lawsuit Over Construction Defects, HABITAT: BRICKS &
BUCKS (Nov. 11, 2020), [https://perma.cc/A68D-3MTS].
42. See Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Notice and Opportunity to Repair Construction
Defects: An Imperfect Response to the Perfect Storm, 43 REAL PROP., TR & EST. L.J. 729,
748, 779-80 (2009) (discussing the proliferation and impact of NOR statutes and arguing
that a more complex, complete, and uniform approach to construction claims would be a
preferable approach).
43. See Ron Holmes, Stop the Lawsuits: Condominium Construction Defect Litigation,
THE HOLMES FIRM PC (Nov. 26, 2019), [https://perma.cc/9SNL-G7PL], for a discussion of
early neutral evaluation.
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example, purchase agreements can include a buyer’s waiver of
jury trial, or condominium documents can mandate mediation or
arbitration in lieu of construction litigation.44 One strategy that
developers sometimes employ is to require an “early neutral
evaluation” by an impartial expert who will analyze the alleged
defect and determine a proper remedy.45
In addition to limitations on the association’s legal ability to
seek redress for construction defects, initial developer control of
the association creates practical barriers to accountability. In a
condominium, the developer initially holds title to all units and
accordingly controls the association.46
Developer control
typically persists throughout the period of development, until a
supermajority of units is sold..47 During the Developer Control
Period, the developer dominates voting and controls the
association’s board, including its actions on behalf of owners as
well as management decisions regarding budget, maintenance,
and repair. The developer is constrained by fiduciary duties
because the board of the association acts in a fiduciary capacity
for all owners and must operate and manage the condominium in
good faith.48
In retrospect, the condominium ownership structure of
Champlain Tower South does not appear to have adequately
restrained the developer’s temptation to cut corners. This may be
in part because bringing a claim requires awareness of
construction defects, and many of the problems in Champlain
Tower South were latent for decades. When a condominium
association does not resolve building structural problems by
obtaining remediation from the developer, then the responsibility
of mitigating such problems falls to the owners themselves.
44. See Eva Lauer, Arbitration and Mediation in Condominium Law, LAUER LAW,
P.A., [https://perma.cc/ALS2-W48G] (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).
45. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 43; see also Mosaic Residential N. Condo. Ass’ n v.
5925 Almeda N. Tower, L.P., No. 01-16-00414-CV, 2018 WL 5070728, at *8 (Tex. App.
Oct. 18, 2018) (adopting this interpretation).
46. See WAYNE S. HYATT & SUSAN F. FRENCH, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES 607, 622 (2d ed. 2008)
(discussing the developer’s initial control of a common interest community and when and
how control is transferred to unit owners).
47. Id.
48. See HYATT, supra note 21, at 128 (explaining the Business Judgment Rule in
judicial oversight of Board actions).
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B. Practical Barriers to Condominium Upkeep
Some landlords defer required maintenance in multifamily
rental buildings to boost their profits while letting tenants bear the
costs of living in unsafe homes.49 For example, landlord
maintenance cost-cutting has led to fatal fires, as recently as 2021
and 2022 in Chicago, Philadelphia, and New York.50 Historically
and today, tenants frequently complain of uninhabitable
conditions in multifamily rental buildings, particularly those that
charge lower rents.51 Unless a landlord can make money by
increasing rents to offset maintenance costs, landlords have the
economic incentive to delay building repairs and updates.
One of the benefits of owning rather than renting a unit in a
multifamily building is that the unit owner can theoretically
ensure the quality of their home. Owners occupying the unit
directly enjoy the benefits of maintenance and upkeep.52
Maintenance economically benefits all owners (resident or not)
by preserving their equity investment.53 Theoretically, owner
49. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY,
64-79 (2016).
50. See, e.g., Madison Hopkins & Cecilia Reyes, 42 Fires, 61 Deaths: A Story of Failed
City Oversight, BETTER GOV’T ASS’N (Apr. 23, 2021, 6:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/6EPZVTJG]; Sophie Kasakove et al., 18 People, a Deadly Fire: For Some, Crowded Housing Is
Not a Choice, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2022), [https://perma.cc/P4Q9-U92W]; Ashley Southall
et al., 19 Killed in New York City’s Deadliest Fire in Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2022),
[https://perma.cc/9DHG-MCU5].
51. The famous case of Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp. involved uninhabitable
conditions in a large multifamily project in Washington, DC. 428 F.2d 1071, 1072 (1970).
The dangers created by poor landlord maintenance of rental housing contributed to the
creation of judicial and statutory implied warranties of habitability in every state. Paula A.
Franzese et al., The Implied Warranty of Habitability Lives: Making Real the Promise of
Landlord-Tenant Reform, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1, 3, 10, 11 (2016); see also David A.
Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 389,
389 (2011).
52. Compare Rose & Harris, supra note 31, at 2 (“It stands to reason that owneroccupiers would maintain their properties better than absentee landlords . . . .”), with Laurie
S. Goodman & Christopher Mayer, Homeownership and the American Dream, 32 J. OF
ECON. PERSPS. 31, 50 (2018) (“[R]enters are unlikely to maintain a property as well as its
owner would.”).
53. When buildings are more highly leveraged, so that less of an owner’s capital is
invested in the real estate, maintenance levels appear to decline. Lee Seltzer, The Effects of
Leverage on Investments in Maintenance: Evidence from Apartments, in FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS, NO. 1000 1, 1 (Dec. 2021). Owners, particularly
those in high-rise buildings, must fund consistent maintenance in order to preserve the value
of their investment. See Rachelle Alterman, The Maintenance of Residential Towers in
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occupants should be more willing to expend money to maintain
and repair the building in which they live in and represents
perhaps their largest capital asset. On the other hand, lack of
knowledge and buy-in from owners and board members can
obstruct efforts to undertake expensive repairs. Condominium
owners—including those elected to serve on the association’s
board—are rarely sophisticated real estate businesspeople and
may not appreciate the need for and impact of maintenance. Unit
owners accustomed to renting may incorrectly presume that
significant building repair costs are not theirs to pay.54 Even
though associations typically employ expert managers and repair
professionals to perform maintenance, it is up to the board and, in
some cases, the association membership at large, to approve such
expenditures.55 Condominium owner inexperience and lack of
understanding can inhibit necessary repairs.56
Condominium boards are legally required to maintain
common property, with costs allocated among the members.57 In
a condominium, decision-making is by committee. Although
democratic decision-making gives stakeholders a voice, it is
inefficient, complicated, and time-consuming.58 Board members
Condominium Tenure: A Comparative Analysis of Two Extremes - Israel and Florida, in
MULTI-OWNED HOUSING LAW, POWER AND PRACTICE 127, 128, 142 (Sarah Blandy et al.
eds., 2010). Landlords have a similar incentive to maintain to preserve their investment. See
Dean H. Gatzloff et al., Cross-Tenure Differences in Home Maintenance and Appreciation,
74 LAND ECONS. 328, 328, 341 (1998) (finding only weak evidence supporting the
hypothesis that owner-occupied homes appreciate at a faster rate than rented homes).
54. Ross Levin, Levin: People Underestimate the Cost of Owning a Home vs. Renting
One, STAR TRIBUNE (Sep. 11, 2021, 8:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/68MX-Q284]; Arian
Campo-Flores, Florida is Set to Pass Stricter Condo Rules After Surfside Collapse, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2022, 9:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/B4ML-5TSG].
55. HYATT, supra note 21, at 116 (“Often, special assessments require homeowner
approval and greater homeowner involvement than annual assessments.”); see also, e.g.,
Azar v. Old Willow Falls Condo. Ass’n, 593 N.E.2d 583 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (Illinois’
Condominium Act requires two-thirds of the unit owners to approve any special assessment).
56. See, e.g., CMTY. ASS’N RESEARCH FOUND., BREAKING POINT: EXAMINING AGING
INFRASTRUCTURE IN COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS 5 (2020), [https://perma.cc/97TT-Y6DK]
(“Survey respondents found that homeowners and residents were more receptive and
supportive of major infrastructure repairs when they were given the opportunity to learn—
in advance—about the scope and costs of the project from experts, like the engineers and
contractors who had specific knowledge of the damage and how to fix it.”).
57. HYATT, supra note 21, at 43.
58. Jeffrey L. Kerr & Vincent F. Caimano, The Limits of Organizational Democracy,
ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 81, 85, 93 (2004); Li Hao & Wing Suen, Viewpoint: Decision-Making
in Committees, 42 CAN. J. ECON. 359, 384 (2009).

3 BOYACK.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

304

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

6/6/22 7:00 PM

Vol. 75:2

may be unwilling to upset friends and neighbors by mandating
disruptive or expensive repairs. In democratic governance, it is
difficult to accomplish a necessary, but unpopular, measure.
There is a great temptation for board members to kick the
proverbial can down the road rather than promptly attending to
the unpleasant business of significant remediation work on a
building.59 Even when board members do plan for necessary
repairs, they may face resistance from the membership.60 If
governing documents provide for association approval of any
large special assessments or capital improvements (as they often
do), a vocal contingent of unit owners can prevent the assessment
from happening.61
In Champlain Towers South, such
membership resistance proved fatal.62
C. Financial Entanglement and Precarity
Condominiums are authorized by statute and the governing
declaration to collect assessments from unit owners for required
common expenses.63 Assessments generally are based on budgets
proposed by the board and ratified by the members, which means
that significant increases in assessments require that a majority of
the unit owners agree.64 Some governing documents and state
statutes allow minor assessment increases without a majority
59. Procrastinating costly and unpopular repairs is a common condominium
governance program and was a key factor in the Surfside disaster. Mike Baker & Kimiko
de Freytas-Tamura, Infighting and Poor Planning Leave Condo Sites in Disrepair, N.Y.
TIMES (July 3, 2021), [https://perma.cc/L5K3-XAC5].
60. Id. (giving several examples).
61. Id. HYATT, supra note 21, at 115-16.
62. Baker & Freytas-Tamura, supra note 59. Some owners refused to pay for structural
repairs, delaying the project. Id. Their resistance led several members of the Board to resign
in protest, further delaying remediation. Id.; see also supra notes 16-17 and accompanying
text (where a similar situation occurred at another Florida condominium when a
disagreement in paying for repairs resulted in Board members resigning).
63. See UNIF. COMMON INT. OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-107(a) (2008). The precise method
of allocating common costs in a given condominium is set forth in its declaration. UNIF.
COMMON INT. OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-107(b) (2008). Unit owners may split common
expenses evenly among all units or units may have a pro rata contribution share based on
square footage, number of bedrooms, or some other classification. UNIF. COMMON INT.
OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-107 cmt. 2 (2008).
64. See UNIF. COMMON INT. OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-123(a)-(b) (2008). Common
upkeep also allows a community to take advantage of cost savings from economies of scale.
TREESE ET AL., supra note 25, at 6.
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ratification, but large increases almost always require the issue be
put to a vote.65
An owner’s assessment obligation is a personal debt that is
secured by statutory lien on the owner’s unit.66 Because
assessments are secured by a lien, the association can seek
repayment of delinquent amounts both from the unit owner
through a collection lawsuit or from the unit’s value by
foreclosing on the lien.67 It is critically important that an
association be able to collect assessments from each unit owner,
even those who disagree with approved expenses.68 If some
owners do not pay their pro rata share, the association will lack
sufficient funds to maintain common elements and make
necessary repairs.69 In and after 2008, when a significant number
of owners in condominiums located in South Florida and other
foreclosure hotspots were unable to pay their assessments,
compliant owners either had to pay on behalf of their defaulting
neighbors or suffer the ill-effects of poor maintenance.70 In one
65. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 5605(b) (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-4620(b)
(West 2010).
66. HYATT, supra note 21, at 107, 117, 119. Amounts owed and secured by the lien
may also include reasonable attorney’s fees, late fees, fines for violations of community
rules, and interest, although these additional amounts are sometimes capped by statute. See,
e.g., UNIF. COMMON INT. OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116 (amended 2014) (NAT’L CONF. OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2008) (18% cap); CAL. CIV. CODE § 5650 (2014) (12% cap);
and GA. CODE ANN. § 44-3-109 (2008) (10% cap).
67. Associations frequently adopt a written collection policy stating protocols to follow
for collecting delinquent assessments. A few jurisdictions require a written policy. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-33.3-209.5 (2014). Some associations operate without a formal
collection policy, in which case collection occurs as and how the board determines in its
discretion. Foreclosure is an option, but a foreclosed lien is often not the first priority lien,
meaning that the sale may not generate large proceeds, particularly if the property is
underwater with respect to a first mortgage. See Boyack, supra note 27, at 53, 90, 95. Most
states require judicial foreclosure of association liens, but some states that permit nonjudicial foreclosure of mortgage liens also permit non-judicial foreclosure of condominium
assessment liens. UNIF. COMMON INT. OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116 cmt. 5 (amended 2014)
(NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2008). An association that enforces its
requirements unevenly is vulnerable to litigation claiming violation of fiduciary duties and
good faith. See, e.g., Saunders v. Thorn Woode P’ship, L.P., 462 S.E.2d 135, 137 (Ga. 1995);
White Egret Condo., Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 352 (Fla. 1979); Cowling v. Colligan,
312 S.W.2d 943, 945 (Tex. 1958).
68. Liens are critical to the functioning of condominiums and are the community’s
“lifeblood.” See HYATT, supra note 21, at 105, 118, 121.
69. See id. at 121.
70. The financial entanglement of owners in a condominium created issues in the
aftermath of the 2008 Foreclosure Crisis because owners defaulted both on assessments and
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case, a Florida condominium with affordable amenities was left
to sink into disrepair when several unit owners did not pay their
assessments. Soon, “the rats started chewing through the toilet
seats in vacant units and sewage started seeping from the
ceiling.”71 The decline in maintenance drove falling property
values still lower, and the desperate association began foreclosing
on people on a fixed income who could not pay the increased
assessment amounts.72
Unit owners bear the financial responsibility to maintain
their condominium, and this means that “the fiscal fortunes of the
members of a community are intertwined.”73 Although sharing
responsibility spreads the cost of maintenance, the condominium
ownership structure also means that an owner’s ability to
maintain their home is tied to other people who might refuse to
pay their fair share.74 When owners cannot or will not pay their
assessments, the association either must assess willing owners
even more to make up the shortfall or go without the repairs.75
their mortgages, and mortgage liens in most states enjoy complete (or at least partial) priority
over association assessment liens. See generally Boyack, supra note 27, at 77-79. See also
Monica Hatcher, Mediators Foresee Gloom, Doom in Condo Industry, MIAMI HERALD, Jan.
4, 2009, at 1H; Concerned Homeowners Association Members Coalition Forms, PR.COM
(Feb. 18, 2011), [https://perma.cc/FF7H-2C2P].
71. Neighbor vs. Neighbor as Homeowner Fights Get Ugly, GAINESVILLE SUN (July
10, 2011), [https://perma.cc/KNT5-KFVC] (discussing the problems of the Inlet House
condo complex in Fort Pierce, Florida).
72. Id. It is predictable that failure of a condominium to maintain will drive down unit
values. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 581 S.E.2d 201, 206 (Va. 2003)
(Lacy, J., dissenting) (“[P]art of the value of a condominium unit comes from the ability of
the condominium to maintain the common areas of the development . . . . The ability to
maintain these elements is directly related to the association’s ability to secure payment of
assessments from the individual unit owners.”).
73. Boyack, supra note 27, at 76-77; see also Trevor G. Pinkerton, Escaping the Death
Spiral of Dues and Debt: Bankruptcy and Condominium Association Debtors, 26 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 125, 129-30 (2009).
74. HYATT, supra note 21, at 121; Christine Haughney, Collateral Foreclosure
Damage, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2008), [https://perma.cc/U5RH-NVGW] (quoting Sam
Chandan, chief economist at the real estate research firm Reis).
75. The financial strain caused by assessment default during the Foreclosure Crisis was
particularly problematic because some of the deferred maintenance occurred in buildings
that had been constructed or converted during the housing preceding the Foreclosure Crisis.
The high demand for condominium units, particularly in South Florida, incentivized rushed
and sloppy condominium construction and conversion, particularly in projects where
developers could insulate themselves from liability through the condominium documents.
Instead of governance design ensuring high quality construction, governance design may
have created a moral hazard encouraging cutting corners. See Boyack, supra note 27, at 56-
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The Surfside collapse shows that unit owners refusing to pay
necessary assessments can have dire consequences. The
condominium’s 2018 engineering report warned of escalating
degradation of the structure if remediation was not undertaken,
and, in hindsight, this warning is rather damning.76 But the
owners’ resistance to a huge special assessment is also
understandable.77 A $15 million repair bill when divided among
136 unit-owners is still a significant sum: Champlain Towers
South unit owners were assessed between $80,000 and $336,000
for units priced only two or three times that amount.78 This
astronomical assessment was necessary because the association’s
reserve accounts had only 6.9% of the amount that was necessary
for the project.79 Simply mandating that unit owners pay such an
enormous sum does not make the money appear. When unit
owners cannot pay assessments, they will not pay them. This was
true in 2008 and is the stark reality that led to dire consequences
in Surfside, Florida in 2021.80
In response to the functional insolvency of some
condominium associations after 2008, approximately twenty
states passed laws requiring that condominiums maintain a certain
level of reserves or conduct reserve studies to ensure that the
association is not left empty handed should a significant capital
need arise.81 In the wake of the Champlain Towers collapse,
57, 59; Carolyn Gallaher, Are American’s Condos having a Midlife Crisis?, GREATER
GREATER WASH. (Aug. 10, 2021), [https://perma.cc/4PW3-DLW8].
76. See MORABITO REPORT, supra note 14, at 1, 7.
77. An analogy can be drawn to citizens resisting any tax increase in spite of critical
needs to repair and replace national infrastructure.
78. Putzier et al., supra note 12; Association Reserves, Older Condos Part 1 | Lessons
from Champlain Towers, YOUTUBE (Aug. 3, 2021), [https://perma.cc/ZE34-T2VU]
(describing Champlain Towers property values); Campo-Flores & Calvert, supra note 3.
79. Tolan et al., supra note 16.
80. See, e.g., Rachel Lee Coleman, Desperate Condo, Homeowner Associations
Thrown a Lifeline, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 7, 2010, at 1A; Haughney, supra note 74. The
owners in Champlain Towers South similarly lacked the ability to come up with their pro
rata contribution to repair costs. Tolan et al., supra note 16.
81. Nine states (California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Utah,
Virginia, and Washington) currently require that associations do reserve studies. Reserve
Requirements and Funding, CMTY. ASS’NS INST., [https://perma.cc/27D3-WZG3] (last
visited Apr. 10, 2022) [hereinafter Reserve Requirements and Funding]. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac also changed their underwriting requirements in the aftermath of the
Foreclosure Crisis to require that common interest communities allocate 10% of their annual
budgets to fund reserves; although until 2022, a reserve study showing low risk of a high
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Florida is considering imposing a hefty reserve requirement to
ensure that maintenance can still be funded even if owners cannot
pay a large lump sum assessment.82 The presence of adequate
reserves would mitigate the impact of a huge repair bill in a
condominium the same way a “rainy day fund” offsets the need
for an owner of a single-family home to pay to repair a broken hot
water heater or leaky roof. A mandate to fund reserves to a certain
level, however, suffers from the same problem as a mandate to
fund a special assessment: it presumes that people can and will
pay a higher cost for their housing. And unit owners may be
unwilling or unable to do so.
II. CONDOMINIUM STRUCTURE’S POTENTIAL
In the aftermath of the Surfside collapse, multiple lawsuits,
grand juries, and advisory task forces called for changes to laws
governing multifamily buildings and condominiums.83 Experts
examined how building code requirements, inspections, and
occupancy certifications can better ensure the safety and stability
of high-rise structures.84 A grand jury in Miami recommended
that government officials be granted greater oversight and

assessment could be offered in lieu of the mandatory 10% funding. See infra notes 111, 120
and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 87, 109 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2, 8, 11, 16; REPORT OF
THE FLORIDA BAR REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST LAW CONDOMINIUM LAW AND
POLICY LIFE SAFETY ADVISORY TASK FORCE, 2 (Oct. 12, 2021), [https://perma.cc/H7XYJLUS] [hereinafter FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE REPORT]; SURFSIDE WORKING GROUP,
FLORIDA BUILDING PROFESSIONALS RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (Sept. 2021),
[https://perma.cc/X5ZJ-MYZ5].
84. There is great urgency in addressing concerns regarding structural integrity of older
multifamily condominiums in Florida where approximately 3.5 million people live in 1.5
million condominium units, 60% of which are more than thirty years old. GRAND JURY
FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2-3 (calling the Champlain Towers South collapse “a wakeup call for state and local governmental officials”). The Grand Jury Final Report suggested
ten or fifteen years, the bill introduced in the Florida legislature proposed a statewide thirtyyear recertification requirement that is reduced to twenty-five years for coastal structures.
Id. at 6; H.R. Pandemics & Pub. Emergencies Comm., Proposed Comm. B. 22-03 (Fla.
2022), [https://perma.cc/2HYY-D6L2]. Prior to the collapse, only Miami-Dade and
Broward Counties had recertification requirements. GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT, supra
note 4, at 2; see also MIAMI-DADE CNTY. CODE § 8-11(f), supra note 13; Broward County
Board of Rules & Appeals, 40 Year Building Safety Inspection Program, at 5.86 (2015),
[https://perma.cc/W9PH-WH7Q].
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enforcement authority regarding buildings’ structural issues.85
The grand jury also called for more frequent recertification of
buildings in Miami so that structures would be examined more
often than every forty years.86 A proposal that mirrored
recommendations of various task forces convened in the wake of
the Champlain Towers South collapse.87
Changes to
condominium governing law can complement such building code
improvements.88
A. Florida Condominium Law Proposals
Post-Surfside proposals regarding condominium law fall
generally within four categories.
First, condominium
maintenance standards should be established and linked to
mandated reinspection and reserve studies.89 Second, the quality
of improvements in a condominium and the sufficiency of
association reserves should be more transparent, specifically
disclosed to owners, buyers, and regulators. Third, various other
85. GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 1. See also Vanessa Romo, A
Surfside Condo Collapse Grand Jury Calls for Immediate Reforms, NPR (Dec. 15, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/26LB-9LAS].
86. GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 3,6; see also H.R. PCB PPE 22-03,
Pandemics and Public Emergencies Comm. (Fla. 2022), [https://perma.cc/6NAX-4BCB]
[hereinafter Florida House Bill].
87. Task forces advocated for additional and more frequent recertification
requirements for high-rise condominium buildings after transfer of control to unit owners.
FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 15 (calling for reinspection every five
years for buildings over 3 stories tall); SURFSIDE WORKING GROUP, supra note 83, at 2, 4.
88. Although the Florida Bar Task Force Report, Surfside Working Group, and Grand
Jury Final Report focused on necessary changes to state and local laws in Florida, the
Surfside disaster has already spurred changes and proposed changes to building and
condominium laws in other states. For example, the Los Angeles County Board of
Supervisors passed a measure mandating engineering reinspection for 30-year or older
buildings in Los Angeles County. L.A. CNTY. BD. OF SUPERVISORS, MOTION FOR
ASSESSING THE SAFETY OF HIGH-RISE BLDGS. IN L.A. CNTY. (2021),
[https://perma.cc/73LT-L68T]. Similar measures have been proposed in the District of
Columbia, Maryland, Missouri, New York, Ohio, and South Carolina.
89. Proposed legislation in Florida would require condominiums and cooperatives to
conduct reserve studies every 10 years for buildings that are three stories or more and
requires developers to complete reserve studies for every building that is three stories or
more, prior to turning over an association to the unit owners. Florida House Bill, supra note
86. The bill defines “reserve study” as study of the reserve funds required for future major
repairs and replacement of the common elements. Id. at 12. If passed, Florida’s law “would
be one of the strictest in the U.S. regarding condo inspection and reserve-funding
requirements.” Campo-Flores, supra note 54.
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proposals focus on educating board members, bolstering their
authority to make repairs in spite of unit owner objections, and/or
increasing board accountability to owners and government
regulators for repairs not made. Finally, several proposals focus
on establishing a non-waivable required amount for reserves that
a condominium must set aside for structural repairs.
Establishing maintenance and repair standards for high-rise
condominiums would provide needed clarity and cover for boards
with respect to building maintenance.90 Frequent, detailed
inspections would raise awareness of defects and needed
remediation, and it would be particularly helpful if these
requirements led to more robust accountability for developers
who negligently built inherently flawed buildings.91 Associations
require sufficient time and methods to discover and bring suit for
faulty construction, and laws should ensure that condominiums
can obtain funding to remediate harms wrongfully caused by
builders. For example, terms in condominium governing
documents and standard form purchase agreements that purport
to narrow the manner or timing of construction dispute resolution
and terms that insulate developers from liability should be
deemed ineffective.92
Transparency requirements would ensure that new and
existing unit owners are not caught off guard with respect to
forthcoming maintenance needs.93 If condominium buyers know
90. The Florida Condominium Act currently has “no express maintenance, repair or
replacement standards for boards of directors to follow in the Act or in most governing
documents.” FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 9.
91. The Florida Bar Task Force Report suggests the adoption of new inspection
protocols using developer turnover inspection report required by R.S. Ch. 718.301(4)(p) as
a model. FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 14-15. That law lists
thirteen items that must be inspected, including roof, structure, fireproofing, elevator,
plumbing, and electrical systems. Id. at 13-14. The Florida Bar Task Force Report proposes
that waterproofing be added to the list. Id. at 10. The Grand Jury Final Report also
recommends more specific requirements for recertification and condominium maintenance
standards, particularly mentioning waterproofing. GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT, supra note
4, recommendations 4-8, 10, 12, and 25. Lack of waterproofing was a significant source of
the structural problems at Champlain Towers South. Putzier et al., supra note 12.
92. See generally Andrea J. Boyack, Common Interest Community Covenants and the
Freedom of Contract Myth, 22 J. LAW & POL’Y 767 (2014) (explaining why common interest
community governing documents are not contracts that are freely chosen by unit owners).
93. The Florida Bar Task Force proposes that state condominium laws mandate that
developers provide a report with protocols for “required maintenance, useful life, and
replacement costs” of each item, and propose that large condominiums be required to include
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of upcoming maintenance needs, the condominium unit will be
more accurately valued in a sale. Disclosure mandates with
respect to current owners can help educate residents about the
need for structural remediation, and disclosure to governing
bodies can help ensure that dangerous structural issues are
addressed.94 However, disclosing existing problems to current
owners cannot avoid the effects of those owners’ prior mispricing
of units. Many current owners did not expect that their housing
costs would dramatically increase to fund significant structural
remediation in their building.95 Perhaps government programs
can find ways to help protect not only new buyers but also
existing owners who did not have the benefit of such disclosures
when they purchased their units.96
Condominium board members are non-expert volunteer
members of the community.97 As the Florida Bar Task Force
explained, “education of directors, officers and unit owners, as to
their specific obligations, statutory requirements and issues
involved in association and condominium management, operation
and maintenance is imperative.”98 In addition to education
efforts, some proposals call for enhanced board accountability for
maintenance failures,99 but increased accountability may chill
willingness to serve on the condominium board and may lead to
wasteful litigation among condominium members.100 It is
perhaps more effective to focus on enhancing the authority of
and frequently update such information on their website. FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 83, at 13-14.
94. See, e.g., GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, recommendations 21 and 23.
95. Benny L. Kass, Wondering Why Your Condo Assessment Keeps Going Up? Here’s
How to Find Out, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 26, 2017), [https://perma.cc/6LEW-RBHS].
96. The Grand Jury Final Report recommends that condominium boards be required to
report to government entities. GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, recommendation
21. Such reporting requirements could be tied to oversight and enforcement or could be tied
to government assistance and guidance.
97. HYATT, supra note 21, at 81; Marilyn Lincoln, Condo Culture: Volunteer Board
Members Work Toward Everyone’s Good, NAT’L POST (Dec. 19, 2012),
[https://perma.cc/P4XA-DPXW].
98. FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83.
99. FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 33; GRAND JURY FINAL
REPORT, supra note 4, at 6-10.
100. Association and board legal fees are common expenses, and all members of a
condominium are therefore financially responsible for legal costs incurred by boards
defending against litigation from members. See, e.g., Ocean Trail Unit Owners Ass’n v.
Mead, 650 So. 2d 4, 6-7 (Fla. 1994).

3 BOYACK.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

312

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

6/6/22 7:00 PM

Vol. 75:2

board members to make necessary repairs even without unit
owner approval.101 A mandate to make repairs coupled with the
authority to do so may also provide cover for board members who
face unit owner resistance to assessment increases. Changing the
power of condominium boards, however, requires changing the
terms of condominium governing documents because
condominium bylaws are private contracts enforceable as such.
If a condominium’s governing documents mandate that unit
owners must vote to approve assessment increases, then changing
a statute to deny the owners that approval right creates a troubling
conflict with the terms of existing private contracts.102
Enhanced board accountability for structural problems may
increase board members’ focus on and willingness to address
adequate building maintenance. But lack of awareness and
motivation are not the only problems.103 Ensuring developer
responsibility for design and construction errors is also critical
because it is unfair to have unit owners pay for a developer’s
mistakes.104 In addition, simply mandating that condominiums
undertake significant building repairs will be ineffective if the
condominium’s financial resources are insufficient to do so.
The biggest reason that Champlain Towers South failed to
make critical repairs in its building was that it did not have the
money to do so.105 When a condominium has adequate reserves,
it need not resort to a huge special assessment to fund the entire
cost of necessary repairs. State laws vary with respect to
association reserve requirements, and in only a handful of states
is a particular level of reserve funding required by law.106
Furthermore, in some states, including Florida, a majority of unit
owners can waive the statutory reserve funding requirement, a
loophole that is particularly problematic when employed by a
developer-controlled association to defer maintenance funding.107
101. See FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83.
102. HYATT, supra note 21, at 109-111.
103. Supra Sections I.A-C.
104. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
105. See Baker & Freytas-Tamura, supra note 59.
106. Reserve Requirements and Funding, supra note 81 (describing the requirements
of various state laws).
107. Florida’s current law does not require a reserve study but requires a reserve
schedule for repair and replacement of major components, but this statutory requirement is
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New proposals in Florida would raise the condominium reserve
requirement to 50% of replacing each component in the
inspection report “based on the estimated remaining useful life”
and make the requirement un-waivable by unit owners.108
If reserves are better funded, condominiums will be better
financially situated to make major structural improvements, but
reserve mandates risk being a type of magical thinking. Simply
requiring owners to pay higher assessments in order to fund
reserves will not guarantee that owners have the ability do so.109
Housing costs today are higher than ever before, and inflationary
increases outpace income growth, particularly for retirees on
fixed income (such as many residents of South Florida
condominiums).110 Growing reserves require assessments to
increase faster than inflation, which may make housing costs
unaffordable to existing and would-be condominium owners.
Alternate sources of capital might be required in some
condominiums in order to effectively fund necessary repairs.

waivable by a majority vote of the association. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 720.303(6),
718.112(2)(f), 719.106(1)(j) (West 2022); see also Florida House Bill, supra note 86, at 1314 (describing how developers exploit this loophole).
108. FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 21; Florida House Bill,
supra note 86, at 14. The proposed Florida House Bill prohibits members of an association
from waiving the reserve requirement, prohibits developers from waiving collection of
reserve funds, and mandates that reserve funds earmarked for repair be used for those
purposes. Florida House Bill, supra note 86, at 14. Similarly, the Grand Jury Final Report
recommended that “the waiver provision regarding the obligation to fund reserves for
condominium repairs be stricken from the statute,” but states that if the waiver provision
remains, any such waiver should require the vote of at least 70% of the unit owners. GRAND
JURY FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, § 28-29, at 35. The Grand Jury also recommends that
the Florida Condominium Act be amended to prohibit repurposing reserve funds. Id. § 30,
at 35. The Bar Task Force proposed a less drastic change, requiring a supermajority (75%)
vote to waive required reserves. FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 22.
109. One of the reasons that Champlain Towers South did not perform structural
repairs earlier is that the condominium could not obtain financing to commence the project.
Tolan et al., supra note 16. Condominiums do have the power to collect delinquent
assessments from defaulting unit owners, but collection efforts take time and money.
Foreclosing an association lien may be ineffective to obtain delinquent assessment funds
when a first mortgage lien encumbers the property. Boyack, supra note 27, at 75.
110. Nichole Friedman, U.S. Housing Affordability Worsens, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10,
2022), [https://perma.cc/6RUD-G5RT]; Lisa Iannucci, Making Special Assessments Work,
COOPERATOR NEWS (Mar. 2017), [https://perma.cc/2AUG-KBW6]; Nathan Crook et al.,
Florida Building Collapse Hints at Future When Only Rich Can Afford Beach, BLOOMBERG
(July 7, 2021), [https://perma.cc/4WQT-27RN].
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B. Impact of GSE Underwriting Requirements
As legislatures around the country debate changes to
building codes and condominium laws, in a practical sense,
condominium requirements regarding structural stability have
already dramatically changed. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the
two government sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) that dominate
the secondary mortgage market, announced new underwriting
requirements starting in 2022 that require condominiums prove
structural soundness and maintenance adequacy as a prerequisite
to the GSEs acquiring loans secured by units in the building.111
Because the GSEs are the secondary home mortgage market’s
biggest players,112 their underwriting requirements define access
to mortgage capital.113 It is more expensive and more difficult to
obtain a loan secured by units in condominiums that do not
comply with GSE underwriting requirements.
The GSEs will only acquire mortgage loans secured by
condominium units in condominiums that conform to their
underwriting mandates.114
Numerous examples show the
111. Fannie Mae Lender Letter (LL-2021-14) [hereinafter Fannie Lender Letter];
Freddie Mac Bulletin 2021-38 [hereinafter Freddie Bulletin]. The guidelines are framed as
“temporary,” but contain no expiration date. Fannie Mae released two other documents
detailing these changes to its underwriting guidelines: Appraising and Underwriting Condo
and Co-op Projects, FANNIE MAE, [https://perma.cc/58G6-FLBY] (last visited Apr. 25,
2022); Jodi Horne, Protecting Condos as a Sustainable Housing Option, FANNIE MAE:
PERSPECTIVES BLOG (Oct. 13, 2021), [https://perma.cc/MQV7-DRNN].
112. The majority of mortgage loans made today are earmarked for resale to the GSEs.
Andrew Ackerman, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac to Back Home Loans of Nearly $1 Million as
Prices Soar, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2021), [https://perma.cc/7TFM-525B]; see also Ben
Eisen & Nicole Friedman, Surfside Tower Collapse Makes Buying Condos More
Complicated, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 20, 2022), [https://perma.cc/7NNB-QAMK] (noting that the
GSEs “wield enormous power in the housing market” through their dominant role in
purchasing and securitizing home mortgage loans); John S. Prisco, In the Wake of the
Surfside Tragedy Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Issue “Temporary” Requirements for
Condominiums and Cooperatives, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 21, 2022), [https://perma.cc/3TVTQUZJ] (opining that the “new additional requirements could make it harder for unit owners
to refinance or for new buyers to obtain mortgages”).
113. James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward
Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 WIS. L. REV.
1, 58-59 (1989).
114. The Department of Housing and Urban Development maintains a list of approved
condominium projects, and the GSEs only purchase mortgages on units in condominiums on
that list unless there is “spot approval” of a unit in a building that otherwise meets all
underwriting mandates. See id.
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material impact that GSE underwriting requirements have had on
the content of condominium governing documents and
governance decision-making. For example, owner occupancy
requirements led communities to adopt leasing restrictions.115
Prohibition of third-party covenants led developers to stop
including private transfer fee provisions in condominium
documents.116 Further, underwriting valuation constructs based
on the racial composition of a neighborhood led to a proliferation
of community race-based restrictive covenants in the first half of
the 20th century.117
Per their new guidelines, neither GSE will acquire any loan
secured by a condominium that has “significant deferred
maintenance” or is subject to a government agency directive “to
make repairs due to unsafe conditions.”118 Units in any such
condominium are ineligible under the GSE guidelines “until
required repairs have been made.”119 The new guidelines also
suspended any flexibility pertaining to the GSE requirement that
associations make an annual contribution to reserves in the
amount of 10% of the condominium’s budget.120
The impact of the new GSE underwriting requirements is
twofold. First, condominiums now have further incentives to
ensure their building’s structural soundness and upkeep.121 The
115. Andrea J. Boyack, American Dream in Flux: The Endangered Right to Lease a
Home, 49 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. J. 204, 255-59 (2014).
116. Id. at 258 n.302.
117. RICHARD R.W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD:
RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS 3-4, 91 (2013); RICHARD
ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT
SEGREGATED AMERICA 81-83 (1st ed. 2017).
118. Fannie Lender Letter, supra note 111; Freddie Bulletin, supra note 111.
119. Horne, supra note 111.
120. Fannie Lender Letter, supra note 111. Previously, under Fannie Mae’s Selling
Guide, lenders could submit a reserve showing indicating reserve adequacy in lieu of a 10%
annual budgetary contribution. Id. The inflexibility of the new guidelines may pose
problems for condominiums whose governing documents do not permit 10% of each annual
budget to be siphoned into reserves whether or not there is a need to plan for future capital
requirements.
121. The vast majority of surveyed condominium boards throughout the country worry
that these new underwriting guidelines will expose them to liability and impose onerous
requirements to attest to facts that they do not and cannot certainly know. Lew Sichelman
& Andrews McMeel, Surfside Tower Collapse Fallout Could Make Condo Financing a
Challenge. Here’s Why, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 22, 2022, 9:16 AM), [https://perma.cc/3ER75Y2M] (citing a study done by the Community Associations Institute (CAI)).
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new requirements will also make it exponentially more difficult
to sell units in condominiums with maintenance deficiencies
because of the lack of access to GSE-subsidized mortgage capital.
Lower capital availability also makes it harder to refinance a
condominium unit to raise capital for a special assessment.
Cutting off mortgage capital access to units in structurally
perilous buildings maroons the owners in the buildings, which is
ironic and dangerous in the context of structurally unsound
condominiums. Unit owners in such buildings who do not have
the cash to pay a large special assessment may be unable to obtain
financing to do so or even sell their units to someone who can pay
the costs. While it is prudential for lenders to ensure the structural
soundness of their collateral assets, from a public policy
perspective, punishing condominium unit owners for not being
able to fund needed repairs by taking away the ability of the unit
owners to get loans to fund those repairs creates troubling
outcomes.122
Spokespeople for the GSEs have framed the new
underwriting guidelines as a way for Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac to “protect residents from unsafe buildings.”123 But because
the guidelines cut off capital flow to unsafe buildings rather than
facilitate construction funding for repairs, the true impact of the
guidelines is to protect investors, not owners. Of course, the
GSEs should have prudent underwriting guidelines, but the GSEs
exist not just for investors but also to achieve public purposes.124
Protecting GSE investors is a good idea, but there is also a huge
public need to enable the remediation of structurally unsound
buildings.
122. A similar conundrum was created by GSE limits on condominium assessment
delinquency in the aftermath of the 2008 Foreclosure Crisis, because unit owners in buildings
with 30% or more unit owners in assessment default could not access GSE-earmarked
mortgage loans. This left the unit owners without a source of capital to refinance (in order
to continue operating the condominium) and made it virtually impossible for the unit owners
to sell their units other than to a cash buyer. See Boyack, supra note 27, at 104-05. GSE
owner occupancy requirements and condominium leasing restrictions likewise constrained
unit owner flexibility and access to capital. Boyack, supra note 115, at 255.
123. Eisen & Friedman, supra note 112.
124. See Boyack, supra note 115, at 255-58 (describing the public policy mandates of
GSEs); see also History of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac Conservatorship, FED. HOUSING
FIN. AGENCY, [https://perma.cc/T5HK-93KJ] (last visited Apr. 13, 2022) (detailing the
conservatorship the GSEs were put under after the Foreclosure Crisis).
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It would be preferable if GSEs made funds available for
condominium remediation and repair instead of simply cutting off
non-complying condominium owners from an important source
of capital. Perhaps the GSEs can innovate a way to protect
investors while also helping to shore up crumbling condominium
infrastructure. Maybe they could offer special funding to
condominium associations or individual unit owners to help them
pay for critical repairs, with loan amounts disbursed directly to
those performing remediation. The GSEs should examine the
impacts of their underwriting changes on unit owners as well as
investors and find a way to financially facilitate the structural
remediation that these condominiums desperately need—and
likely want—but cannot realistically afford.125
CONCLUSION
Condominium ownership structure needs to be shored up in
a way to help stabilize buildings’ structural flaws, but it is as
important to facilitate necessary repairs as to mandate them. For
condominiums like Champlain Towers South that are facing
hugely expensive but critically important remediation projects,
the owners’ spirit may be willing, but their finances are weak.126
Strengthening building quality mandates without providing
pathways to fund repairs will result in more noncompliant and
functionally insolvent condominiums, not more stable buildings.
In cases where buildings were poorly constructed, laws
should protect owners’ recourse to the developer. If those
responsible for inherent construction flaws cannot provide
remediation, public funding of remediation may be warranted.127
For condominiums with massive maintenance needs and
125. The Florida Bar Task Force agrees: Housing finance and affordable housing
administrative agencies should create programs to assist low-income owners pay for special
assessments needed for structural remediation of their buildings. FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 83, at 10, 28-29.
126. Tolan et al., supra note 16.
127. For example, a public fund could cover developer liabilities that are not
recoverable due to expiration of a statute of limitations or developer bankruptcy. Some states
have established funds to cover construction defects from time to time, although many of
these are limited in scope to buildings under governmental control. See, e.g., KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-3785 (West 2022) (creating a construction defects recovery fund).
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inadequate reserves, government or quasi-government entities
(for example, the GSEs) could provide the requisite capital.
Improvements to laws and policies should help facilitate
structural soundness, not just punish disrepair.
Condominium ownership design holds great promise.
Condominium ownership facilitates homeownership and selfgovernance and can help people build wealth while residing in
safe homes. But condominium ownership design is precarious as
well. Just as democracy is both a good and potentially frustrating
form of government, condominium governance can both benefit
from including stakeholders but also suffer from the inefficiencies
and insufficiencies inherent in decision-making by a committee
of non-experts.128 Unit owners object to assessment increases,
and their elected representatives are tempted to give them what
they want. As in all democracies, voters and leaders both prefer
to procrastinate painful and latent community problems. In
condominiums, the owners’ financial interconnectedness makes
individuals’ financial distress contagious, and unaddressed
structural vulnerabilities imperil everyone, not just those who do
not contribute to repair costs. Design improvements to
condominium law should be calibrated to address issues of owner
ability to fund repairs, not just their desire to do so. Ensuring
building life safety requires fixing the problem, not just assigning
blame. Thoughtful changes to condominium laws and public
policies can reduce not only the risk of building collapse but also
the problems inherent in condominium ownership as a legal
construct.

128. In his November 11, 1947, address to the House of Commons, Winston Churchill
called democracy “the worst form of Government, except for all those other forms that have
been tried from time to time . . . .” CHURCHILL BY HIMSELF: THE DEFINITIVE COLLECTION
OF QUOTATIONS 574 (Richard Langworthy, ed., 2008).
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CONSTRUCTION LAW APOLOGETICS
Carl J. Circo*
The construction industry constitutes one of the most
significant segments of the global economy and presents a
constant stream of legal issues and policy questions.1 A highly
specialized construction bar creatively solves complex
transactional challenges and implements innovative dispute
resolution practices. The legal academy, however, barely allots
construction law a place in the law school curriculum, and legal
scholars all but ignore it as a topic for scholarly attention.2 Many
law professors see construction law, if they acknowledge it at all,
as a narrow practice specialty requiring lawyers and courts to do
little more than apply general legal principles to a commercial
activity.
This Article challenges the legal academy’s perceptions and
offers an alternative assessment of the relationship between the
construction industry and law. Part I reviews practical reasons
for teaching construction law to law students. In brief, Part I first
demonstrates how a construction law course pairs advanced
instruction in several topics introduced in the core curriculum,
*
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Law. I am grateful to my colleague and friend, Professor Will Foster, for reviewing an early
draft of this Article and providing helpful and encouraging comments and suggestions.
Thanks also to Danielle O’Shields, Stephan Harris, and Jacob DuBose, second-year law
students at the University of Arkansas School of Law, for research assistance during the
preparation of this Article.
1. See generally Philip L. Bruner, Construction Law: Its Historical Origins and Its
20th Century Emergence as a Major Field of Modern American and International Legal
Practice, 75 ARK. L. REV. 207 (2022).
2. See id. at 234-36 (estimating only twenty-six accredited law schools offer
construction law courses); Paula Gerber, The Teaching of Construction Law and the Practice
of Construction Law: Never the Twain Shall Meet?, 20 LEGAL ED. REV. 59, 61 (2010) (also
finding twenty-six law schools offer construction law courses in America, which amounts to
only eleven percent of schools); Lawrence C. Melton, What We Teach When We Teach
Construction Law, CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2009, at 8 (noting at least twenty-six Forum
members are teaching construction law in law schools). My own informal surveys comport
with these estimates. Part II of this Article discusses the state of scholarly engagement with
construction law.
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such as contracts, torts, civil procedure, evidence, remedies, and
dispute resolution, with lessons on adapting legal knowledge to
the specialized construction industry practice. Next, it explains
how studying construction law can prepare students to represent
clients in a wide range of complex commercial matters that
require expertise in transactional practice, advocacy, and dispute
resolution. Then, Part II makes the case for greater scholarly
engagement with the legal aspects of the built environment,
exploring some especially promising contract and tort topics in
detail before briefly suggesting other potential research projects.
Part III concludes by proposing an ongoing dialogue between
construction lawyers and the legal academy.
I. REASONS TO TEACH CONSTRUCTION LAW IN
LAW SCHOOLS
The relatively few law schools that regularly offer
construction law courses do so for the same reasons schools teach
many other practice specialty courses in the upper-level
curriculum. These offerings differ from courses primarily
focused on advanced legal doctrine (say First Amendment as a
subset of Constitutional Law), legal theory (such as Jurisprudence
and Law and Economics), or targeted practice skills (such as Trial
Advocacy and Negotiations) because practice specialty courses
immerse students in the legal aspects of an industry or a segment
of the economy. As such, these courses cross doctrinal,
theoretical, and skills boundaries. Courses such as Real Estate
Transactions and Mergers and Acquisitions, among many others,
sometimes approach their subjects primarily as advanced
doctrinal studies and at other times as practice specialty courses.
The same can be said of other upper-level courses, such as Health
Law, Entertainment Law, and Cybersecurity, to name but a few,
that have become popular more recently.
Legal educators and critics of legal education disagree about
whether, or the extent to which, the curriculum should expand
beyond traditional subjects.3 One opinion has it that law schools
3. See generally J. Lyn Entrikin, The Death of Common Law, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 351, 464-87 (2019) (discussing the need to include legislative and administrative law
in legal education and the barriers to innovating the law school curriculum); Michael
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should teach courses that “illuminate the entire law” rather than
ones “suited to dilettantes.”4
From that perspective, a
construction law course might seem to be concerned merely with
law about construction industry activities and disputes rather than
with a legitimately distinct field of law. Advocates for teaching
practice specialty courses, not surprisingly including construction
law teachers, contest such a characterization to one degree or
another.5 For the purposes of this Article, I happily abstain from
the general debate. I simply argue that to the extent practice
specialty courses belong in law schools, and admittedly I believe
they do, construction law stands equal to those that have already
achieved much wider acceptance.
My purpose in this Part is not to review a typical or model
construction law course or to explore the full range of issues and
skills a model course might cover. At least two popular textbooks
offer that kind of guidance for those unfamiliar with construction
law as an academic topic.6 For more comprehensive coverage,
two treatises discuss the relevant principles, cases, legislation,
and regulations in great depth.7 This Part simply advances
reasons for teaching construction law. My advocacy goes well
beyond the claim that law schools should introduce students to
construction law as a major practice specialty. More compelling
than that is how the course can help students begin to understand
what it means to represent clients engaged in a major segment of
the economy, in which multiple participants interact over an
extended duration in complicated and interdependent

Millemann, The Symposium on the Profession and the Academy: Concluding Thoughts, 70
MD. L. REV. 513, 519-24 (2011) (discussing Symposium participants’ proposed changes to
the law school curriculum and teaching methods and differing views about whether such
changes could be integrated).
4. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 207, 207 (1996).
5. See Melton, supra note 2, at 8; Allen L. Overcash, The Case for Construction Law
Education, CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2009, at 5.
6. See CONSTRUCTION LAW (Carol J. Patterson et al. eds., 2d ed. 2019) [hereinafter
FORUM TEXTBOOK]; JUSTIN SWEET & MARC M. SCHNEIER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS (9th ed. 2013). I have
used each of these resources to teach my construction law course at different times.
7. See PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON
CONSTRUCTION LAW, Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2022); STEVEN G.M. STEIN,
CONSTRUCTION LAW (2022), LexisNexis.
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relationships, and for which law is but one of many key factors.
Accordingly, an important purpose of this Part is to explore the
study of construction law as an especially effective vehicle—I
would say the ideal vehicle—for introducing students to a highly
complex commercial practice. First, however, an overview of
substantive elements common to construction law courses will
help define construction law as a distinct subject in the law school
curriculum.
A. Basic Training for Future Construction Lawyers
A construction law course inevitably offers advanced
lessons in several topics. Contracts immediately come to mind.
Few human activities test contract law principles as thoroughly
and intensely as the construction industry does, with its high-risk
environment and complex web of interdependent exchange
relationships. The cases offer classic examples challenging the
boundaries of principles as basic as offer and acceptance,8 privity
of contract,9 and implied warranty.10 Construction cases have
played dominant roles in the development and refinement of
several of the most important contract law doctrines, including
substantial performance,11 reliance as a substitute for
consideration,12 the economic waste limitation on breach of

8. See, e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 759-61 (Cal. 1958).
9. See, e.g., Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185, 186-90, 612 S.W.2d 321, 322-24
(1981).
10. See, e.g., Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 229 S.E.2d 728, 729-31 (S.C. 1976).
11. See, e.g., Clem Martone Constr., LLC v. DePino, 77 A.3d 760, 771-74 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2013); W. E. Erickson Constr., Inc. v. Cong.-Kenilworth Corp., 503 N.E.2d 233, 237 (Ill.
1986); Plante v. Jacobs, 103 N.W.2d 296, 297-99 (Wis. 1960); S. D. & D. L. Cota Plastering
Co. v. Moore, 77 N.W.2d 475, 477-78 (Iowa 1956); Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E.
889, 891-92 (N.Y. 1921); see also 5 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at § 18:12
(providing that “‘[s]ubstantial performance’ of a construction contract is the point at which
the work can be used for its intended purpose, notwithstanding minor remaining
nonconformances or uncorrected deficiencies, and negates materiality of any uncured
breach, and allows the contractors to recover its full contract price less damages for any
uncured breach”).
12. See Drennan, 333 P.2d at 759-60; CARL J. CIRCO, CONTRACT LAW IN THE
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CONTEXT 34-37 (2020) [hereinafter CONTRACT IN INDUSTRY
CONTEXT].
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contract damages,13 unilateral mistake,14 and the demise of the
pre-existing duty rule.15 More broadly, construction industry
cases figured prominently in the transition from the formalism of
classical contract theory to the far more flexible principles of
neoclassical contract and relational contract theory.16 This
influence appears especially in contextual approaches courts
often employ in the interpretive process.17 The trend toward a
more flexible framework manifested as early as the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the judicial willingness
to imply obligations into construction and design contracts based
on customs, usages, and other characteristics specific to the
industry.18 In some of the most influential early cases, courts
imposed implied representations and duties of disclosure on
project owners based on the obligations of good faith and fair
dealing under industry circumstances.19
13. See Legacy Builders, LLC. v. Andrews, 335 P.3d 1063, 1068, 1070 (Wyo. 2014);
Plante, 103 N.W.2d at 299; Jacob & Youngs, Inc., 129 N.E. at 891-92.
14. See King v. Duluth, M & N Ry. Co., 63 N.W. 1105, 1107 (Minn. 1895); see also 1
BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at § 2:138 (discussing the impact of a subcontractor’s
mistake on a prime bid).
15. See Corneill A. Stephens, Abandoning the Pre-Existing Duty Rule: Eliminating the
Unnecessary, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 355, 359-63 (2008); Hazel Glenn Beh, Allocating
the Risk of the Unforeseen, Subsurface and Latent Conditions in Construction Contracts: Is
There Room for the Common Law?, 46 KAN. L. REV. 115, 120-24 (1997). See generally
Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery Co., 15 S.W. 844, 846-47 (Mo. 1891) (discussing the
policy rationale underlying the pre-existing duty rule and a finding against new
consideration).
16. See CONTRACT IN INDUSTRY CONTEXT, supra note 12, at 135-54.
17. See, e.g., W. States Constr. Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 818, 826 (Ct. Cl. 1992)
(holding that a contract specification to wrap metallic pipe did not necessarily apply to a
certain class of metal pipe considering evidence of industry meaning); Jake C. Byers, Inc. v.
J.B.C. Invs., 834 S.W.2d 806, 810-20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (interpreting a contractual
requirement “to fill” a sewage lagoon); see also Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States,
75 Fed. Cl. 696, 705-08 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (contrasting the classical and neoclassical
approaches to contract interpretation).
18. See, e.g., Wells Bros. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1920); Guerini
Stone Co. v. P.J. Carlin Constr. Co., 248 U.S. 334, 344-45 (1919); United States v. A.
Bentley & Sons Co., 293 F. 229, 239-41 (S.D. Ohio 1923); Bates & Rogers Constr. Co. v.
Bd. of Com’rs, 274 F. 659, 661-62 (N.D. Ohio 1920). See generally CONTRACT IN
INDUSTRY CONTEXT, supra note 12, at 44-49 (discussing the history of implied warranties
and obligations generally and in the construction industry).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Atl. Dredging Co., 253 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1920); United
States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 137-38 (1918); MacKnight Flintic Stone Co. v. Mayor of
New York, 54 N.E. 661, 664-65 (N.Y. 1899); Bentley v. State, 41 N.W. 338, 344-45 (Wis.
1889).
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Construction industry cases have also offered courts some of
the best opportunities to refine principles applicable to
subcontract relationships.20
Courts have often resisted
subcontractor assertions of third-party beneficiary status under
contracts between other participants in a construction project.21
The cases have also regularly addressed whether a general
contractor can sponsor a claim against a project owner on behalf
of a subcontractor.22 Another issue especially significant to
construction industry subcontracts involves the interpretation and
legal effect of clauses incorporating into a subcontract
obligations, rights, or other terms from related contracts.23
By studying contract law in action in the construction
industry, in addition to learning advanced contract law as applied
by the courts to the construction industry, students will also
encounter innovative contract terms and structures that show
them how construction lawyers react and adapt to evolving
contract law developments. Section I.B. further explores this
aspect of a construction law course.
Tort principles also present and inform a rich assortment of
industry disputes and practices. Construction activity, of course,
often results in serious personal injury, death, and property
damage, frequently in situations that implicate multiple
defendants.24 Sorting out whether or on what theory tort law
20. See Adrian L. Bastianelli III, Construction Subcontracting: A Comprehensive
Practical and Legal Guide, CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2014, at 47; CONTRACT IN INDUSTRY
CONTEXT, supra note 12, at 65.
21. See, e.g., John V. Burch, P.C., Third-Party Beneficiaries to the Construction
Contract Documents, CONSTR. LAW., Apr. 1988, at 1, 23; see also Benton T. Wheatley &
Jessica Neufeld, The Universal Applicability of Pass-Through Claims to All Parties to a
Construction Project, CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2012, at 12, 12 (discussing pass-through
claims as a way for subcontractors and other participants to overcome privity issues and
recover when not parties to the contract).
22. See 6 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at § 19:25 (discussing the Severin
doctrine as a limit to liquidating [or pass-through] agreements); Allen L. Overcash,
Subcontractors and Suppliers, in FORUM TEXTBOOK, supra note 6, at 283, 307-13 (also
discussing the Severin doctrine and barriers to subcontractor claims); Wheatley & Neufeld,
supra note 21, at 12 (“The overwhelming majority of cases concerning pass-through claims
involve a subcontractor as the damaged party, a general contractor as the intermediary, and
an owner as the responsible party.”).
23. See generally Stanley P. Sklar, A Subcontractor’s View of Construction Contracts,
CONSTR. LAW., Jan. 1988, at 1, 18-19; CONTRACT IN INDUSTRY CONTEXT, supra note 12,
at 66-67.
24. See infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
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should afford remedies in these situations can offer exceptional
opportunities to expand students’ understanding of tort law issues
and policies. Circumstances at a project site can test the limits of
duty and foreseeability under negligence law, as when the
contractual obligations of a project participant are asserted as the
basis for a tort duty of care owed to those not parties to the
contract.25 Interdependent construction industry relationships
also generate novel theories of negligent misrepresentation.26
Design professional services give rise to some intriguing tort
claims based on the foreseeable consequences that the acts and
omissions of designers may have for many other project
participants or on the overarching authority that design
professionals sometimes possess.27 Claims arising from industry
relationships sometimes combine theories of contract liability
with related tort theories, such as misrepresentation, fraud, and
interference with prospective business advantage.28 Damage
claims for harm arising from allegedly defective equipment,
materials, and components incorporated into a construction
project sometimes strain the boundaries of strict liability.29
Circumstances unique to construction activity also lead to
interesting opportunities for punitive damage claims.30 In
25. See, e.g., Thompson v. Gordon, 948 N.E.2d 39, 42-43 (Ill. 2011); Caldwell v.
Bechtel, Inc., 631 F.2d 989, 992, 1002-03 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also infra notes 143-60 and
accompanying text.
26. See Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Anderson LaRocca Anderson, 539 N.E.2d
91, 91-92 (N.Y. 1989).
27. See Shiva S. Hamidinia, The Misadventures of Shared Design Risk in the New
Design-Build World: Managing Design Risk and Responsibility on Federal Design-Build
Projects, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 2018, at 7, 9-10; Carl J. Circo, When Specialty Designs
Cause Building Disasters: Responsibility for Shared Architectural and Engineering
Services, 84 NEB. L. REV. 162, 179-92 (2005); Marc M. Schneier, Tortious Interference with
Contract Claims Against Architects and Engineers, CONSTR. LAW., May 1990, at 3, 3; see
also infra notes 148-62 and accompanying text (providing a more in-depth discussion of the
theories of liability asserted against design professionals).
28. See, e.g., J & S Servs., Inc. v. Tomter, 139 P.3d 544, 546 (Alaska 2006).
29. See, e.g., Com. Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 689 S.W.2d 664, 666-67,
669-70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). See generally JUSTIN SWEET & MARC M. SCHNEIER,
CONSTRUCTION LAW FOR DESIGN PROFESSIONALS, CONSTRUCTION MANAGERS, AND
CONTRACTORS 86-88 (2015); Thomas F. Icard, Jr. & Wm. Cary Wright, Sick Building
Syndrome and Building-Related Illness Claims: Defining the Practical and Legal Issues,
CONSTR. LAW., Oct. 1994, at 1, 29-30; Brian M. Golden, Strict Liability Applied to the
Homebuilder: A Defect in the Law of Defective Products, CONSTR. LAW., Oct. 1994, at 11,
11-12.
30. See 6 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at § 19:4.
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addition, most construction law courses cover the special aspects
of the economic loss rule of tort law in construction industry
cases.31
Construction activity and industry relationships also
frequently present challenging questions of indemnity, insurance
coverage, joint liability, and contribution among tortfeasors.32
Especially complex questions arise with claims implicating the
acts and omissions of multiple project participants.33 Personal
injury, property damage, and other tort claims often present
difficult coverage issues under policies insuring against
commercial general liability,34 property damage,35 and other
risks.36 These situations afford excellent opportunities to explore
these aspects of tort law as part of a more complete picture of
construction law practice. Furthermore, with tort as much as with
contract, a special attribute of a construction law course is, again,
its utility in illustrating for students not only how an area of law
applies to specific circumstances in the construction industry, but
also how industry participants and their legal counsel react and

31. See generally A. Holt Gwyn & Luke J. Farley, Sr., The Economic Loss Rule in
Construction Law, in FORUM TEXTBOOK, supra note 6, at 653.
32. See generally James S. Schenck, IV & Kelli E. Goss, Liability for Construction
Defects That Result from Multiple Causes, 9 AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J. 45, 47 (2015).
33. See id. at 45-46.
34. See, e.g., Joseph A. Cleves Jr. & Richard G. Meyer, CGL Policies in the
Construction Industry: Emerging Consensus and Coping Strategies, CONSTR. LAW., Fall
2015, at 12, 12-13; Steven G.M. Stein & Jean Gallo Wine, The Illusions of Additional
Insured Coverage, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 2014, at 14, 14-15.
35. See generally Amanda Anderson & Charles E. Comiskey, Make Sure You’re
Covered: Insurance for Natural Disasters, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2019, at 16, 20 (discussing
insurance coverage for natural disasters and “[t]he design/construction defect exclusion”);
Daven G. Lowhurst & Daniel D. McMillan, Unshrouding the Mysteries of Builder’s Risk
Insurance, Part 1: The Basics and Beyond, CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2016, at 32, 32-33
(discussing builder’s risk insurance); Mark M. Bell et al., Confronting Conventional Wisdom
on Builders Risk: From Named-Insured Status to Concurrent Causation, CONSTR. LAW.,
Fall 2011, at 15, 15 (distinguishing between builder’s risk insurance and other insurance
policies addressing liability).
36. See, e.g., Wendy E. Scaringe, Cargo Insurance and Construction Delay Risk,
CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2018, at 34, 34; Elizabeth C. Josepfhs, Insurance and Risk Management
in the Construction Industry: The Case for Decennial Liability Insurance, CONSTR. LAW.,
Winter 2014, at 15, 15-22; Stephen D. Palley & Arlan D. Lewis, Subrogation Waivers,
CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2011, at 6, 6; Ava J. Abramowitz, Professional Liability Insurance in
the Design/Build Setting, CONSTR. LAW., Aug. 1995, at 3, 3-4.
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adapt to the law, such as through industry practices concerning
insurance and indemnities as risk management devices.37
Litigation and alternative dispute resolution practices, of
course, represent other key aspects of construction law. In their
first-year courses, as well as in some upper-level core courses,
students learn basic principles concerning claims, defenses, and
appeals in judicial proceedings, and they study many other
fundamental aspects of litigation, such as civil procedure and the
law of evidence. They may also be introduced to alternative
dispute resolution processes.
Those courses provide the
necessary foundation, but because construction projects give rise
to some of the most complex commercial disputes lawyers
handle, future construction lawyers need to understand the nature
of construction industry disputes at a more granular level.
Consequently, construction industry disputes offer particularly
good material for teaching about legal advocacy in the broadest
sense.
In learning about construction industry litigation, students
encounter many advanced problems of civil procedure.38 They
will likely read cases that highlight problems associated with
complex, document-intensive discovery.39
Litigating
construction disputes also regularly gives rise to difficult
challenges of proof and problems under the law of evidence.40
Additionally, establishing liability for and defending against
claims concerning construction and design defects, delays,
unforeseen circumstances, and cost overruns often requires

37. See generally Deborah Griffin, Insurance and Bonds, in FORUM TEXTBOOK, supra
note 6, at 557, 557-68; William R. Allensworth & Matthew C. Ryan, Construction Safety, in
FORUM TEXTBOOK, supra note 6, at 393, 417-23.
38. An industry dispute over a forum-selection clause made its way to the U.S.
Supreme Court relatively recently. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. District Court, 571
U.S. 49, 52-55 (2013).
39. See generally Christopher C. Whitney, “Rediscovering” the Rules of Discovery in
Construction Litigation, 1 AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J. 1, 1-2 (2007); Eric A. O. Ruzicka
& Kate Johnson, Constructing a Successful E-Discovery Strategy: Foundational Principles
and Building Blocks, 12 AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J. 23, 24-25 (2018); Karen A. Denys &
Michael A. Hornreich, Spoliation: Turning the Tide to Your Advantage, CONSTR. LAW.,
Spring 2015, at 5, 5.
40. See generally Stephen A. Hess & Allison T. Mikulecky, Damages, in FORUM
TEXTBOOK, supra note 6, at 717, 728-43; Richard J. Tyler, Defective Construction, in
FORUM TEXTBOOK, supra note 6, at 611, 611-15.
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mastery of technical data and complicated scientific evidence.41
Furthermore, these cases provide an especially close look at how
lawyers use experts; deal with expert reports and dueling experts;
and assess, present, and challenge expert testimony.42
Special industry characteristics have also led courts to adopt
distinct principles governing the measure and proof of damages.43
Appellate decisions in construction industry cases have
contributed to developments in the law of remedies, including
restitution and the right to terminate or reform contracts.44 The
maze of construction lien statutes throughout the country presents
yet another specialized aspect of construction litigation.45
Courses also frequently explore, at least to some extent, the
administrative claims and processes established under federal and
state law governing public projects.46

41. See, e.g., Paul L. Stynchcomb et al., Preparing and Presenting Loss of Labor
Productivity Claims: Analysis of the Methodologies with Two Exemplars, CONSTR. LAW.,
Summer 2020, at 18, 18-19 (2020); Wendy Kennedy Venoit & Kenji Hoshino, Follow the
Money: Interpretation and Evaluation in a Forensic Schedule Analysis, CONSTR. LAW.,
Winter 2019, at 15, 15.
42. See, e.g., Shelly L. Ewald & Julia M. Fox, Introduction of Construction Scheduling
Expert Testimony: An Overview of the Current Standards in Federal and State Courts and
Administrative Boards, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2017, at 26; Venoit & Hoshino, supra note 41,
at 15; Christopher J. Heffernan et al., Defending and Asserting Daubert Challenges in
Construction Disputes, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 2012, at 6; Jeffrey P. Aiken, Construction
Experts and Res Ipsa Loquitor: Bridging the Evidentiary Gap, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2010, at
22.
43. See, e.g., Julian Bailey & Stephen A. Hess, Delay Damages and Site Conditions:
Contrasts in US and English Law, CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2015, at 6, 15 (discussing
differing site conditions clauses, under which contractors may seek relief when performance
of their promise proves to be more difficult or time-consuming than initially anticipated);
John H. Dannecker et al., Recovering and Avoiding Consequential Damages in the Current
Economic Climate, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2010, at 28, 28-31; Hess & Mikulecky, supra note
40, at 717.
44. See generally BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at §§ 18:32-18:50, 19:3519:43.
45. See, e.g., Eileen M. Diepenbrock, Mechanic’s Liens, in FORUM TEXTBOOK, supra
note 6, at 529, 529-34.
46. See generally, e.g., James F. Nagle, Public Construction Contracting, in FORUM
TEXTBOOK, supra note 6, at 759, 804-06; James F. Nagle, A Primer on Prime-Subcontractor
Disputes Under Federal Contracts, CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2009, at 39; Joshua I. Schwartz,
Public Contracts Specialization as a Rationale for the Court of Federal Claims, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 863, 863-64, 874-75 (2003); Jared Cohane & Peter J. Martin, The Modern
Problem of Limitless Liability in Public Contracting Afforded by the Ancient Doctrine of
Nullum Tempus Occurrit Regis, 7 AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J. 65, 66, 73-74 (2013).
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Construction law courses generally devote at least as much
attention to alternative dispute resolution as to litigation because
the construction industry relies so extensively on mediation,
arbitration, and other alternatives for dealing with claims and
other disputes.47 At a minimum, students will learn why so many
construction industry participants and their lawyers prefer
alternative dispute resolution options over litigation.48 They may
explore the advantages and disadvantages of a range of
procedures, including stepped dispute processes that begin with
informal conferences among on-site personnel, then continue as
necessary up through higher management levels and on to
designated third-party neutrals, before moving to a more formal
stage such as nonbinding mediation as a condition precedent to
arbitration or litigation.49 Some courses will cover voluntary
settlement negotiations strategies and techniques.50 Students will
likely study some special characteristics and challenges of
construction industry mediation and arbitration.51 Students will
also learn about contemporary movements toward more efficient
dispute resolution via dispute review boards, as well as more

47. See James P. Groton et al., Dispute Resolution Processes, in FORUM TEXTBOOK,
supra note 6, at 587, 590-91; Don W. Gregory & Peter A. Berg, Construction Lawyer:
Problem or Problem Solver? The Need for Cost-Effective Dispute Resolution in the
Construction Industry, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2013, at 16.
48. See Gregory & Berg, supra note 47, at 16-19; Philip L. Bruner, Rapid Resolution
ADR, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 2011, at 6, 6; Allen L. Overcash, Introducing a Novel ADR
Technique for Handling Construction Disputes: Arbitration, CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2015,
at 22; Thomas J. Stipanowich, Managing Construction Conflict: Unfinished Revolution,
Continuing Evolution, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2014, at 13, 13. But see James P. Wiezel, CostEffective Construction Arbitration, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 2011, at 15, 15-16 (discussing the
benefits of arbitration but noting that it has come under scrutiny even within the construction
industry).
49. See, e.g., Groton et al., supra note 47, at 590-602.
50. See generally Adrian L. Bastianelli III et al., Strategies for Successfully Navigating
Cultural Differences in Construction Negotiation and Mediation, CONSTR. LAW., Spring
2020, at 11.
51. See, e.g., Philip L. Bruner, Streamlining Construction Arbitration: Reducing the
Peril of “Double Jeopardy” in Dual-Track Proceedings, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2018, at 7;
Tamara J. Lindsay, Compelling Arbitration By and Against Nonsignatories, CONSTR. LAW.,
Summer 2016, at 16; Daniel E. Toomey & Susan M. Euteneuer, The Arbitrators Have
Decided the Construction Dispute: What Do I Do Now?, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 2012, at 20;
Richard J. Tyler, Discovery in Arbitration, CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2015, at 5, 11-12, 15-16;
Paul T. Milligan, Who Decides the Arbitrability of Construction Disputes?, CONSTR. LAW.,
Spring 2011, at 23.
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holistic and collaborative approaches such as integrated project
delivery.52
Beyond giving extensive attention to contract and tort law
issues and dispute resolution practices, a construction law course
will generally explore the industry’s intersection with several
other doctrinal topics. Construction projects, of course, figure
prominently in land use regulation, real estate transactions, and
secured financing.53 Many relationships in the industry include
significant intellectual property aspects.54 Construction activity
also implicates environmental law, climate change, and
sustainability.55 Construction lawyers must deal with many
aspects of governmental regulation, some of which involve
potential criminal liability.56 They must also keep up with rapid
advances in industry technology impacting legal relationships and
risks.57 In addition to these topics, the textbook promulgated by
52. See, e.g., Groton et al., supra note 47, at 596; Christopher T. Horner II, Should
Dispute Review Board Recommendations Be Considered in Subsequent Proceedings?,
CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2012, at 17, 17-18; Howard W. Ashcraft, Jr., Negotiating an
Integrated Project Delivery Agreement, CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2011, at 17; Andrew D.
Ness, Neutral Evaluation: Another Tool in the ADR Toolbox, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2020, at
5; Patricia D. Galloway, The Art of Allocating Risk in an EPC Contract to Minimize Disputes,
CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2018, at 26.
53. See Lorence H. Slutzky & Dennis J. Powers, The Owner’s Role, in FORUM
TEXTBOOK, supra note 6, at 35, 38-43, 57-60.
54. See Carol J. Patterson & Timothy F. Hegarty, The Design Team’s Role and
Contracts, in FORUM TEXTBOOK, supra note 6, at 143, 175-80.
55. See Carl J. Circo, Will Green Building Contracts Transform Construction and
Design Law?, 43 URB. LAW. 483, 483-84 (2011); Ujjval K. Vyas & Edward B. Gentilcore,
Growing Demand For Green Construction Requires Legal Evolution, CONSTR. LAW.,
Summer 2010, at 10, 10; Carl J. Circo, Using Mandates and Incentives to Promote
Sustainable Construction and Green Building Projects in the Private Sector: A Call for More
State Land Use Policy Initiatives, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 731, 732-34 (2008); Howard W.
Ashcraft, Jr., CERCLA Arranger Liability: Emerging Risk for Environmental Consultants,
CONSTR. LAW., Jan. 1994, at 42, 42.
56. See, e.g., Gretchen M. Ostroff, The Commercially Useful Function Test and
Penalties for Noncompliance with Project DBE Goals, CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2020, at 25,
25, 28-29; Daniel D. McMillan et al., The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in a Global
Construction Industry: Corruption Risks and Best Practices, CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2018,
at 6, 6; G. Christian Roux & John D. Hanover, Implied False Certification Liability Under
the False Claims Act: How the Materiality Standard Offers Protection After Escobar,
CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2018, at 16, 16; James J. Barriere & Michael L. Koenig, DBE Fraud:
What Contractors Should Be Doing Now to Avoid Criminal and Civil Liability, CONSTR.
LAW., Fall 2015, at 7, 7; Wayne DeFlaminis et al., An Ounce of Prevention: A Guide for
Combating Fraud in Construction, CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2014, at 17, 17-18.
57. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Hurtado, Technological Advances in Construction: Building
Information Modeling (BIM) and Related Tools, in FORUM TEXTBOOK, supra note 6, at 809;
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the American Bar Association’s Forum on Construction Law
includes chapters or substantial sections on safety, labor and
employment law, contract administration, insurance, and
suretyship.58
This overview of subject-matter content confirms that a
construction law course in the upper-level curriculum will
effectively expose students to a range of legal topics at an
advanced level. In that respect, construction law equals or
exceeds other practice specialty courses. Even more important
than that, by studying construction law, students encounter legal
practice in a setting that features not only knowledge of multiple
rules, principles, and procedures first introduced in the legal silos
of foundational law school courses, but also the ability to apply
those rules, principles, and procedures in an environment
liberated from artificial legal categories. Specific to this Article’s
larger purpose, as Section I.B explains, a construction law course
serves as an ideal vehicle for introducing students to complex
commercial practice. In that way, the course offers valuable
training even for students who may never represent clients
engaged in relationships and disputes within the construction
industry.
B. Preparing Students for Complex Commercial Practice
To use a phrase popular among professors who teach
experiential courses, a construction law course teaches
transferrable skills. This is especially so with reference to certain
skills most needed by lawyers who represent clients in complex,
multi-party, extended-duration commercial ventures—what I will
call “complex commercial practice.” Indeed, construction law
arguably stands as one of the best ways to prepare law students
for complex commercial practice. By focusing on what lawyers
do in a complex commercial practice, and not simply what
Sasha Christian et al., Technology in Construction Claims Management, CONSTR. LAW., Fall
2020, at 18, 18; Jessica E. Courtway, Wearables, Augmented and Virtual Reality, Integrated
Project Delivery, and Artificial Intelligence, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2020, at 25, 25; Carl J.
Circo, A Case Study in Collaborative Technology and the Intentionally Relational Contract:
Building Information Modeling and Construction Industry Contracts, 67 ARK. L. REV. 873,
873-74 (2014).
58. See FORUM TEXTBOOK, supra note 6.
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specialty law they know, a construction law course can help
students begin to understand how lawyers engaged in complex
commercial practice fields can add the kind of value their clients
most often seek. When students explore law practice in the
circumstances of a relationship-rich business context such as the
construction industry, they see what it means to think like their
clients and those with whom their clients interact. What is even
more important, they begin to appreciate why that way of thinking
can be more essential in a complex commercial practice than
thinking only like a lawyer. Doctrinal and theoretical courses, as
essential and foundational as they are to a legal education, barely
hint at the advising, structuring, collaborating, problem solving,
and, above all, judgment skills lawyers must develop to
effectively serve clients who engage in the most sophisticated
commercial endeavors.
Construction lawyers, whether involved with transactional
work or dispute resolution, must learn to practice law in the total
circumstances in which their clients operate. Indeed, for these
lawyers, the defining feature of their practice is, in a word,
context. By studying law in a defined context in this sense,
students can progress beyond a mastery of abstract legal
principles and doctrine. They can begin to form a more coherent
understanding of the ways in which the circumstances of a
challenging human endeavor—in this case, designing and
constructing the built environment—can influence the application
and evolution of the general legal principles they have learned in
foundational courses. Just as important, students can see how
skilled lawyers help their clients adapt exchange relationships in
response to the law, and how they manage and resolve legal
conflicts and disputes effectively and efficiently in such settings.
No single course can do all this for every area of practice,
but a construction law course provides an especially effective
introduction to a lawyering process that highlights structuring and
managing complex transactions and resolving the disputes such
transactions generate.
Studying construction law offers
unparalleled advantages for pairing legal theory with practical
skills, for balancing zealous advocacy with efficient risk
management, and for harmonizing client-centered teamwork with
independent legal judgment.
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In particular, the circumstances in which clients plan and
execute construction projects and in which conflicts often arise in
the industry, with its high-risk, low-certainty environment, make
construction law an ideal introduction to complex commercial
practice. The legal aspects of the construction industry, when
explored coherently, place students in a context-rich environment
that gives them the opportunity to grasp, or at least to glimpse,
what it means for a lawyer to bring value to a client team engaged
in such settings. Through a construction law course, students can
begin to appreciate that law must be applied, and lawyering skills
must be practiced in the complete circumstances (the context) in
which their clients operate rather than in the more abstract or
generalized environments they encounter in their core courses.
What construction lawyers know, and what a construction law
course is especially adaptable to teach, is that to be effective in a
complex commercial practice, lawyers must become more than
legal technicians or theorists; they must be trustworthy advisers
who function as part of a client team, and they must become adept
at employing the law both to help clients achieve their objectives
and to manage and resolve conflicts.
A construction law course proves especially useful to
introduce students to these skills essential to a complex
commercial practice:
•
•
•
•
•

structuring legal relations to accommodate the divergent
and often conflicting interests of multiple parties
engaged in a collaborative process;
negotiating contract terms to allocate risks realistically
and efficiently;
coordinating a network of legal relationships in a
transactional environment governed by a series of
interrelated contracts;
managing high-stakes risks under circumstances of
constant change and low certainty;
advising clients as they navigate challenges and conflicts
inherent in complex commercial endeavors and learning
to anticipate and avoid or minimize disputes when
possible and to resolve them realistically when they do
materialize (preferably before they become legal
battles); and
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exercising judgment that balances legal expertise with
the client’s business objectives.

Basic aspects of a construction law practice converge in
ways that facilitate these learning objectives. Pedagogically,
three of the industry’s defining characteristics stand out in this
regard: (1) its project delivery systems and pricing conventions;
(2) its highly developed contractual risk management devices;
and (3) its innovative dispute resolution practices. To illustrate,
the following paragraphs focus on aspects of these characteristics
that receive substantial attention in most construction law
courses. While other course components also bear on the skills
listed above, discussing these selected elements will suffice to
demonstrate the point.
1. Exploring Project Delivery Systems and Pricing Conventions
Teaching about project delivery systems, a topic commonly
introduced early in most construction law courses, can be an
especially effective way to orient law students toward complex
commercial practice. The network of relationships, contracts, and
processes that characterize even a relatively minor construction
project will likely mystify the uninitiated student. When
understood by reference to the distinct objectives, incentives, and
expertise of the participants and the dynamic circumstances of a
typical construction project—that is, when viewed in the industry
context—students learn that success for such a daunting
undertaking requires carefully devised contractual structures,
which the industry knows as “project delivery systems.”59
Beginning with the background of the distinct perspectives
of the key participants in a construction project, students learn to
appreciate the challenge of structuring, negotiating, and
orchestrating the interdependent relationships involved. They can
see that the contracts themselves, along with applicable legal
principles, especially those based on contract and tort law,
constitute merely raw materials for the lawyers to use to help
facilitate client objectives. In dealing with alternative project
59. See generally Ross J. Altman, Project Delivery Systems, in FORUM TEXTBOOK,
supra note 6, at 63.
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delivery systems, construction lawyers must understand not only
their own clients’ business environment and objectives, but they
must also recognize the totality of circumstances that affect the
other project participants and even others, such as governmental
agencies and the public. Students will gradually grasp this lesson
by comparing and contrasting the legal relationships and
incentives established in different ways by the most commonly
recognized project delivery systems (probably along with several
variations): design-bid-build; design-build; multiple prime
contractors; construction management (agency and at-risk);
program management; turnkey; public-private partnerships; and
integrated project delivery.60
The process of learning about project delivery systems may
start by exploring an owner’s core interests in project quality and
functionality in addition to achieving completion on time and
within budget.61 This is, however, only a first step because
students must then come to understand that contractual
arrangements that advance any one of the owner’s key objectives
can compromise the owner’s other interests and can also
implicate the interests of other project participants.62 Design
professionals, general contractors, trade contractors, and
suppliers, while always mindful of the owner’s focus on quality,
cost, and schedule, add other critical considerations to the mix.
Each of these participants must balance the need for contractual
arrangements that clearly define scope of service and scope of
work with suitable compensation and risk management schemes.
Whether working directly or indirectly for the project owner, they
expect to undertake defined risks, but only to the extent they can
control those risks and be compensated accordingly. Each of
these project participants, however, functions within distinct
circumstances.
Architects and engineers typically expect a degree of
independence in performing their design and consulting roles, but
they also want to minimize the liability risks associated with the
60. Id. at 65-96 (featuring comparative assessments of project delivery systems based
on selection factors and risk factors relevant to each).
61. See id. at 63-64; Slutzky & Powers, supra note 53, at 35.
62. See generally Ross J. Altman, Participants in the Design and Construction
Process, in FORUM TEXTBOOK, supra note 6, at 17, 32-33.
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control they exercise.63 Design professionals, therefore, may seek
contractual terms that objectively define deliverables, disclaim
involvement with construction means and methods, and preserve
the opportunity for additional compensation when unanticipated
complications arise.
The owner’s principal partner at the project site, which may
be a general contractor, design-build firm, or construction
manager, agrees to assume varying degrees of responsibility for
project quality, budget, and schedule, while shifting some of those
risks to trade contractors, suppliers, and others who manage more
or less distinct but overlapping scopes of work. All these frontline
participants, operating from varying levels of bargaining strength,
must worry about sequencing, payment security, supply chain
problems, weather, labor, insurance coverages, and more. They
often operate in highly competitive markets that may offer modest
profit margins.64 Construction lenders, insurers, and sureties,
each constrained by their own underwriting guidelines and
regulatory considerations, provide critical resources attended by
requirements and influences that impact the other project
participants in many different ways.65
Students learn how the industry’s continuously evolving
experimentation with alternative project delivery systems offers a
cafeteria of choices bearing on the competing risk profiles and
business objectives of the project participants. They also
eventually learn how different payment schemes, such as
stipulated-sum, cost-plus, and guaranteed maximum pricing,
interact with project delivery system choices.66 By working
through the advantages and disadvantages of these variations and
by learning how they can be modified for specific projects and
participants, students begin to see what it means to structure
contractual relationships, to negotiate a coherent network of
interrelated contracts, and to coordinate interdependent activities,
manage risks, and accommodate conflicting perspectives in
63. See generally Patterson & Hegarty, supra note 54, at 143, 145-46, 168, 186-87.
64. George Hedley, 9 Numbers You Need to Keep Your Company Profitable, CONSTR.
BUS. OWNER (Nov. 2, 2011), [https://perma.cc/TG66-36HJ].
65. See generally Altman, supra note 62, at 25-30.
66. See generally Stephen A. Hess, Pricing Construction Contracts, in FORUM
TEXTBOOK, supra note 6, at 255, 255-67.
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service of a common goal. Understanding project delivery
systems and payment arrangements, however, is just the
beginning of the process that introduces students to lawyering in
a complex commercial practice.
2. Contractual Risk Management Devices
In addition to studying these fundamental aspects of project
delivery systems and compensation conventions, construction
law students will also encounter a range of other critical
contractual risk allocation and management devices that help
bring to life such concepts as structuring and coordinating
complex legal relationships and managing those relationships
effectively and efficiently in circumstances in which multiple
participants must navigate through changing conditions over an
extended duration. Several common contract terms, and the
spectrum of available approaches to them, have special pedagogic
value.
Representations and warranties, for example, play important
roles. Beyond express warranties, which may be the product of
extended negotiations, contract law in the construction industry
has evolved to imply into contractual relationships certain
representations and duties based on industry circumstances, as
well as on customs and practices.67 As a result of this implication
process, lawyers for project participants must carefully craft
contracts, sometimes to confirm and to reinforce judicially
implied terms and sometimes to alter or reverse them to the extent
legally permissible.68
In addition to representations and
warranties, standard industry agreements allocate project risks in
different ways, and experienced construction lawyers negotiate
contract terms extensively and promulgate endless contractual
variations.69 Key provisions include indemnities, provisions that
anticipate differing site conditions and other changed
circumstances, regulated payment procedures and security,
67. See CONTRACT IN INDUSTRY CONTEXT, supra note 12, at 44-49.
68. See, e.g., Slutzky & Powers, supra note 53, at 47-51 (discussing the ability to
contractually limit the Spearin Doctrine).
69. See generally Bruce Merwin, Contracting for Construction Projects, in FORUM
TEXTBOOK, supra note 6, at 107.
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insurance requirements, labor and employment matters, safety,
environmental considerations, project financing, aspects of
contract administration, and intricate provisions concerning
disputes, defaults, and remedies.70 In this way, scores of
interconnected contracts ideally form an effective and efficient
risk allocation and risk management roadmap for project success.
By exploring construction industry contracting practices in
such detail, students learn how variations in negotiated terms can
impact that intricate network. By analyzing court opinions
addressing some of the recurring issues that these contractual
relationships generate, students see how courts have adapted
general principles from different areas of the law to apply in the
construction industry context. The educational impact should be
transformative, as students begin to see a convergence of law they
first encountered in the neat categories of contract, tort, property,
civil procedure, evidence, legislation and regulation, remedies,
dispute resolution, and more. All these characteristics illustrate
how a construction law course can introduce students to the
transferrable skills necessary to succeed in a complex commercial
practice.
3. Dispute Resolution Practices
If studying project delivery systems and compensation
schemes functions as the logical place to begin to explore
construction law as a complex commercial practice and covering
common contractual risk management devices works to
supplement with important discrete and interrelated details, then
teaching about industry dispute resolution practices can serve as
an especially suitable concluding step to the orientation process.
Difficult problems and conflicts inevitably arise when multiple
participants influenced by distinct perspectives and incentives
play interdependent roles in a complex and risky venture of long
duration. By delving into construction industry dispute resolution
practices, students learn about processes for early detection and
70. The textbook published by the American Bar Association’s Forum on
Construction, Construction Law, which is repeatedly cited throughout this Article, deals with
all of these issues in a range of circumstances and from the perspectives of various project
participants in multiple sections of several chapters. See FORUM TEXTBOOK, supra note 6.
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efficient management of problems. Drawing on what they have
already learned about the distinct perspectives and objectives of
project participants, students can readily appreciate the
advantages that privately selected neutrals with relevant industry
experience and legal expertise can have over generalist judges.
Students will explore a range of effective devices, both
informal and formal, for dealing with claims, disputes, and other
problems that might otherwise destroy working relationships and
derail projects. These include multi-step processes that may
begin with informal meetings between on-site representatives and
then gradually advance to higher-level decision makers within the
affected organizations, and move on to referrals to third-party
facilitators, often followed by mediation as a precondition to
binding arbitration or litigation.71 Variations include standing
neutrals, dispute resolution boards, minitrials, and other creative
procedures.72 Students may also study contractual arrangements
designed to incentivize collaboration in the best interests of the
project.73 With the benefit of experience over many decades, the
industry has developed advanced processes for managing and
resolving problems, claims, and disputes. Exposure to these
practices teaches students how structuring legal relationships and
crafting contractual processes for complex commercial
undertakings can help anticipate and efficiently manage many of
the problems that such transactions generate.
Depending on the instructor’s objectives, a construction law
course can take a variety of forms. Two leading textbooks offer
frameworks for teaching a comprehensive survey course
adaptable to different pedagogic formats.74 Instructors primarily
interested in introducing students to the full range of a
construction law practice may simply assign most or all chapters
for classroom review and discussion.75 Alternatively, practiceoriented courses can serve the special purposes of upper-level
71. See Groton et al., supra note 47, at 590-602; see supra note 49 and accompanying
text.
72. Id. at 592-602.
73. See id. at 592-94.
74. See FORUM TEXTBOOK, supra note 6, at iii-xx, xxix; SWEET & SCHNEIER, supra
note 6, at iv-xix.
75. See generally FORUM TEXTBOOK, supra note 6, iii-xx; SWEET & SCHNEIER, supra
note 6, at v-xvii.
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writing courses or can follow a simulation-based model of
experiential learning.76 In simulation courses, students can
engage in mock contract and settlement negotiations, undertake
drafting exercises at different levels of complexity, develop
advice for hypothetical clients deciding on the project delivery
system and compensation structure most appropriate to a specific
project, weigh options for assessing and settling claims and
disputes, and practice advocacy skills in trial and dispute
resolution exercises. A problem-based course can concentrate on
a range of litigation skills.77 Instructors who wish to create their
own courses can assemble excellent materials by drawing on
Bruner and O’Connor on Construction Law78 and the extensive
practice articles in the two leading journals for construction
lawyers: The Construction Lawyer, which is published by the
American Bar Association’s Forum on Construction Law;79 and
The American College of Construction Lawyers Journal.80
Additionally, experienced construction lawyers make excellent
class guests to work with students in many ways.81
Overall, a construction law course serves both to explore a
range of legal issues at an advanced level and to introduce
students to lawyering in complex commercial practices. On these
bases alone, more law schools should include construction law
courses among their regular elective offerings. As Part II
explains, another compelling reason supports investment in
construction law in the legal academy.
II. THE CASE FOR SCHOLARLY ENGAGEMENT
Phil Bruner’s outstanding contribution to this symposium
accurately—perhaps even charitably—characterizes the legal
academy’s approach to construction law as “benign neglect.”82
76. See, e.g., Melton, supra note 2, at 9.
77. See Melton, supra note 2, at 9.
78. BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 7.
79. CONSTR. LAW., [https://perma.cc/48A2-FFXW] (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
80. AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J., [https://perma.cc/M484-S3NC] (last visited Apr. 1,
2022).
81. I have invited many such guests to my construction law classes over the years, with
great success.
82. Bruner, supra note 1, at 233.
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That observation echoes a call he and a few others have raised for
years.83 In a thought-provoking overview of construction law
written in 1998, Professor Thomas Stipanowich argued
compellingly that the legal academy should recognize
construction law as an important field for scholarly
investigation.84 Two years later, Professor Jay Feinman lamented
that “there has been no sustained scholarly attention” given to
construction industry contracts.85 Not long after that, Professor
Justin Sweet, the pioneer of construction law in the U.S. legal
academy, complained of continuing scholarly neglect.86 Similar
circumstances exist within the legal academies in other
countries.87 During this symposium, however, Sir Vivian
Ramsey’s insightful account convincingly demonstrated how
much has been done to advance construction law in the
international academy and, by implication, how far U.S. law
faculties have to go.88 In 2012, a construction law forum in
Melbourne, Australia reflected that British and Australian
scholars and law faculties have done much to advance scholarly
interest in the field in their countries.89 Indeed, they are at least a
generation ahead of the U.S. legal academy.90 While U.S. legal
scholars occasionally give attention to the construction industry,
there is a shocking lack of any ongoing and coherent body of

83. See, e.g., 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at § 1:4; Philip L. Bruner,
Construction Law and the American College of Construction Lawyers—A History, 1 AM.
COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J. 1, 4-5 (2007).
84. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law: Reality and Reform in
a Transactional System, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 463, 493-97, 575-76 (1998).
85. Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737,
747 (2000).
86. Justin Sweet, Standard Construction Contracts: Academic Orphan, CONSTR.
LAW., Winter 2011, at 38, 39.
87. See Gerber, supra note 2, at 59, 61-63.
88. See generally Sir Vivian Ramsey, Construction Law: The English Route to Modern
Construction Law, 75 ARK. L. REV. 251 (2022) (discussing the history of construction law
in England, the impact of English caselaw, the benefits of England’s Technology and
Construction Court, and the development of more efficient dispute resolution procedures).
89. Matthew Bell & Paula Gerber, Passing on the Torch of Learning in the
“Primordial Soup” of Construction Law: Reflections from the Construction Law Academic
Forum, 2012, CONSTR. L. INT’L, Oct. 2012, at 26, 26-27.
90. See John Uff, Construction Law—the First 25 Years, CONSTR. L. INT’L, Jan. 2013,
at 40, 40-41.
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construction law scholarship.91 As even a casual review of the
resources cited in this Article suggests, publications authored and
edited by practicing lawyers, rather than traditional legal scholars,
dominate construction law literature.
This regrettable situation persists even while the
construction industry increasingly offers a rich array of legal
topics and policy issues ripe for academic study. My present
purpose is not to contribute substantively to construction law
scholarship, nor to offer a systematic catalog of construction law
topics for academic projects; rather, I merely aim to identify some
especially fertile areas for academic inquiry and, in that way,
perhaps to stimulate greater scholarly interest in construction law
and the construction industry. Not surprisingly, some of the
topics and principles of greatest academic interest correspond to
those emphasized in Part I as important from a pedagogic
perspective.
The construction industry presents relationships and
characteristics most obviously relevant to contract and tort law
scholars. Even a modest construction project creates the kind of
risks to persons, property, and fortunes that naturally implicate
legal duties and rights founded in contract and tort law.92
Likening a construction site to a battlefield, one judge observed
that construction often occurs in chaotic circumstances with
“limited certainty of present facts and future occurrences.”93 This
Part will consider contract and tort topics in some detail before
offering a much briefer note on other promising areas for research
and scholarly analysis.
The industry’s routine contractual characteristics, already
noted in Part I, produce some of the lowest hanging fruit for
scholarly investigation. Traditionally, most of the scores of
participants in a construction project interact with several others
while entering into formal contracts with only one other
91. Although the paucity of construction law scholarship furnishes the premise for Part
II, as citations to standard law review articles scattered throughout this Article attest, some
legal academics have made scholarly contributions to the field. See generally, e.g., Beh,
supra note 15; Stipanowich, supra note 84; Feinman, supra note 85; Thomas C. Galligan,
Jr., Extra Work in Construction Cases: Restitution, Relationship, and Revision, 63 TUL. L.
REV. 799 (1989). What has been written to date, however, barely scratches the surface.
92. See generally notes 11-37 and accompanying text.
93. Blake Constr. Co. v. C.J. Coakley Co., 431 A.2d 569, 575 (D.C. 1981).
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participant.94 Even the project owner, while usually party to
several contracts, typically has only one counterparty to each
contract involved.95 Within this network of bilateral agreements,
however, nearly every contracting party shares risks with several
others who provide work or services in connection with the
project under a separate contract.96 Not only does this create a
complex web of interdependent contracts, but each participant
provides services and performs work over an extended project
duration under constantly changing circumstances.97 The
challenge of rationally and efficiently structuring these
relationships provides much to pique the interest of contract
scholars.
In a fruitful coincidence, as U.S. contract law began to take
on its modern shape beginning in the nineteenth century, the
construction industry emerged as one of the most significant and
contractually complex segments of the economy.98 This
convergence fostered a reciprocal relationship in which emerging
principles of contract law influenced exchange relationships in
the construction industry, while evolving industry contracting
practices in turn stimulated further developments in the judicial
application of those principles.99 This pattern persists today as
industry customs and practices responding to developing contract
law prompt courts, and often legislatures as well, to continue

94. See Altman, supra note 59, at 70-71 (discussing the design-bid-build project
delivery system, which is the system most commonly used in the United States).
95. See id. at 31, 70-71. Under traditional structures, the owner contracts separately
with the lead design professional, with a general contractor or possibly with several prime
contractors for different scopes of work (or with a construction or project manager), and also
with the construction lender. See id. at 70-71; Altman, supra note 62, at 20-25.
96. See Altman, supra note 62, at 32; BRW, Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d 66,
72 (Colo. 2004); see also CONTRACT IN INDUSTRY CONTEXT, supra note 12, at 60-61
(discussing how the “acts and omissions of contracting parties often affect the interests of
those who are not parties to the underlying contractual relationship,” creating issues for thirdparty beneficiaries).
97. CONTRACT IN INDUSTRY CONTEXT, supra note 12, at 63-64 (noting that
“[u]nanticipated events . . . are particularly common and troublesome within the construction
industry, where contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, and manufacturers make
commitments to perform in a far-distant and uncertain future”).
98. See id. at 116.
99. See id.
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adapting contract law principles.100 Those who engage intimately
with construction disputes have frequently highlighted this
phenomenon.101 But, as one economic case study notes with
dismay, “scholars have devoted little attention to an industry—
construction—that seems to offer valuable lessons about the
organization of economic activity.”102
The interweaving of so many exchange relationships under
high-risk circumstances of long duration offers an especially rich
opportunity for putting alternative contract theories to the test. A
thorough study of construction contract practices and disputes
suggests a highly contextual notion of contract, one that, in
keeping with Professor Speidel’s conception, “focuses upon
particular types of contracts within a relevant business or social
setting rather than upon contracts in general.”103 In this way,
rather than “just contracts, there are contracts for the sale or lease
of personal and real property, construction, personal and
professional services, . . . and the settlement of disputes.”104 My
own recent work explores several theoretical lessons from
industry contracting practices.105 At the broadest level, I have
suggested how the case law connects contract practices and
disputes to such alternative theories as classical formalism, legal
realism, neoclassical principles, economic analysis, relational
theory, and neoformalism.106
100. See generally Stephen A. Hess, The Sanctity of Construction Contracts, 15 AM.
COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J. 1, 3-14 (2021); BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at §§ 2:1,
3:3.
101. See, e.g., Paul Hardeman, Inc. v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 380 F. Supp. 298, 317
(E.D. Ark. 1974) (characterizing industry contracts as “a separate breed of animal”); BRW,
Inc., 99 P.3d at 72 (noting the “networks of interrelated contracts” commonly involved in
construction projects).
102. William A. Klein & Mitu Gulati, Economic Organization in the Construction
Industry: A Case Study of Collaborative Production Under High Uncertainty, 1 BERKELEY
BUS. L. J. 137, 138 (2004).
103. Richard E. Speidel, An Essay on the Reported Death and Continued Vitality of
Contract, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1173 (1975).
104. Id.
105. See CONTRACT LAW IN INDUSTRY CONTEXT, supra note 12, at 8-9; Circo, supra
note 57, at 283-84; Carl J. Circo, The Evolving Role of Relational Contract in Construction
Law, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2012, at 16, 16; Carl J. Circo, Contract Theory and Contract
Practice: Allocating Design Responsibility in the Construction Industry, 58 FLA. L. REV.
561 (2006).
106. See CONTRACT IN INDUSTRY CONTEXT, supra note 12, at 115-58. Although I
have not observed influences of or implications for the critical legal theory school, it would
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While each of these theories finds some degree of support
among the industry cases and its contracting practices, I find the
implications for relational contract theory especially intriguing.107
In contrast to most other conceptions of contract law, which
promote an overarching framework of rules for recognizing,
effectuating, and regulating discrete transactions governed by
express agreements, relational contract takes into account the
complete circumstances in which the contracting parties
operate.108 Under relational contract theory, trade customs and
usage, along with a range of behavioral factors, call for the
adoption of legal principles far more flexible than the fixed rules
that both the classical and neoclassical frameworks seek to apply
more or less uniformly to all contractual dealings.109 With a focus
on preserving exchange interactions, some iterations of relational
contract notions encourage courts to fill gaps in incomplete
contracts and to derive the norms that govern the parties’
relationship from all relevant circumstances.110 Relational theory
promotes the kind of contextual approach that would have a court
be “responsive to the realities of the particular contract in
context.”111 Construction industry contracts often display highly
relational characteristics, such “as provisions anticipating
changed circumstances during the course of the performance
period, procedures for making equitable adjustments to the
project budget and schedule, and comprehensive claims and
dispute management procedures designed to maintain the
relationship in the face of disagreement between the parties.”112
Relational contract scholarship can benefit from further
investigation and assessment of both contract disputes and
contract practices in the construction industry.
be interesting to learn how that scholarly perspective would assess contract practices and
cases from the construction industry. Legal problems in residential construction and
affordable housing may suggest promising places to start because our legal and economic
systems can seem blind to consumer protection issues and related legislative policies tend to
promote and protect the status quo for business interests and the affluent.
107. Circo, supra note 57, at 873-874; Circo, supra note 105, at 16.
108. See CONTRACT IN INDUSTRY CONTEXT, supra note 12, at 119-20.
109. See id.; Galligan, supra note 91, at 810-16.
110. See, e.g., Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational
Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 823, 827, 827 n.23 (2000).
111. Speidel, supra note 103, at 1173.
112. CONTRACT IN INDUSTRY CONTEXT, supra note 12, at 120.
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Proponents of alternative schools of contract theory can also
find much in the construction industry cases, dispute patterns, and
contracting practices relevant to their perspectives. Limited
offerings in the law and economics literature demonstrate the
potential for economic analysis critiquing and explaining judicial
approaches to construction contract disputes and many industry
contracting practices.113
For example, Richard Posner’s
discussion of a nineteenth century case determining liability for
damage to a project under construction has been cited as a leading
example of the efficiency principle of economic analysis at work
in the courts.114 Competing contract theories, especially those
based on economic analysis and neoformalism, can also be
advanced to explain, justify, or question a range of holdings in
construction contract cases, including those regarding: the
enforceability of liquidated damages, no-damage-for-delay, and
conditional payment clauses; the recognition of the betterment
and economic waste doctrines; and the use of different
frameworks in contract interpretation.115 In any case, much
remains to be written both on how industry cases and practices
reflect or contradict competing contract theories and how those
cases and practices have or could inform contract theory.
In addition to their relevance to contract theory, industry
cases and contracting practices raise many discrete issues of
current interest to contract law scholars. Law review articles
occasionally note significant industry cases and developments on
these matters, although rarely in a way that acknowledges
construction law as embracing a subspecialty of contract law.116
The academic literature and casebooks, however, do implicitly
reflect the influence of industry cases in the evolution of several

113. See, e.g., Klein & Gulati, supra note 102, at 138-143.
114. See Jody S. Kraus, From Langdell to Law and Economics: Two Conceptions of
Stare Decisis in Contract Law and Theory, 94 VA. L. REV. 157, 191-93 (2008) (noting,
however, that Posner’s “efforts to explain how legal rules and principles based on various
notions of efficiency could justify the exercise of political coercion were entirely
unsuccessful”). The reference is to Posner’s analysis of Bentley v. State, 41 N.W. 338 (Wis.
1889) in RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 83 (3d ed. 1986).
115. See generally CONTRACT IN INDUSTRY CONTEXT, supra note 12, at 25-29, 54-58,
135-42.
116. See generally Stipanowich, supra note 84, at 493-97.
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contract principles.117 Industry cases have been instrumental in
expounding the law of substantial performance.118 Cases
stemming from industry bidding practices virtually define the
principle of reasonable reliance as a substitute for
consideration.119 Construction contract disputes also sent early
signals of the demise of the pre-existing duty rule.120 Similarly,
they set the stage for the acceptance of unilateral mistake as a
defense.121 Many construction cases figure prominently in
evolving judicial attitudes toward binding arbitration clauses.122
Other contract law issues, some already noted above for their
relevance to contract theory, that figure prominently in specific
topics of current academic interest extend to economic waste,
betterment, liquidated damages, conditional payment provisions,
termination for convenience rights, and the evolution of the
implication process and judicial attitudes toward incomplete
contracts.123
117. Many of the contract textbooks feature construction industry cases to demonstrate
leading principles. See, e.g., id. at 494 (noting that “[i]n the typical first-year contracts
course, construction cases are ubiquitous, and provide a rich source of doctrine and theory”
and finding that nearly one in five cases in a popular text on contracts involved construction
contracts); CONTRACT IN INDUSTRY CONTEXT, supra note 12, at 13 (discussing the influence
of industry cases on substantial performance, unilateral mistake, third-party dispute
resolution, and other contract law principles).
118. CONTRACT IN INDUSTRY CONTEXT, supra note 12, at 13; see, e.g., Clem Martone
Constr., LLC v. DePino, 77 A.3d 760, 771-72 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013); W.E. Erickson Constr.
Inc. v. Cong.-Kenilworth Corp., 503 N.E.2d 233, 237 (Ill. 1986); S. D. & D. L. Cota
Plastering Co. v. Moore, 77 N.W.2d 475, 477-78 (Iowa 1956); Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,
129 N.E. 889, 890-91 (N.Y. 1921).
119. See, e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 759-60 (Cal. 1958). See
generally CONTRACT IN INDUSTRY CONTEXT, supra note 12, at 34-37 (discussing the
importance of Drennan but noting its scarce application in areas beyond industry bidding).
120. See Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery Co., 15 S.W. 844, 848 (Mo. 1891); King
v. Duluth, M & N Ry. Co., 63 N.W. 1105, 1107 (Minn. 1895).
121. See Wil-Fred’s Inc. v. Metro. Sanitary Dist., 372 N.E.2d 946, 950-51 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1978); Rushlight Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. City of Portland, 219 P.2d 732, 751 (Or.
1950); Bd. of Regents v. Cole, 273 S.W. 508, 510-11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1925); Edwin W.
Patterson, Equitable Relief for Unilateral Mistake, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 859, 884-85 (1928).
122. See, e.g., C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla.,
532 U.S. 411, 418-20 (2001); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 474-76
(1989); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1983);
see also Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co, 393 U.S. 145, 147-50 (1968)
(discussing the importance of impartiality among arbitrators and the need for arbitrators to
disclose matters that could create the impression of bias).
123. See CONTRACT IN INDUSTRY CONTEXT, supra note 12, at 25-29, 54-59, 138-54;
Deborah S. Ballati & Marlo Cohen, Termination for Convenience Clauses: Are There
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In many instances, the practice-oriented literature eclipses
the legal scholarship in addressing significant issues of contract
law. For example, practicing lawyers have authored much of
what has been written about the special issues concerning
subcontracting relationships.124 They have also delved deeply
into applications of the law of evidence to contract disputes,
especially with reference to expert witnesses.125 Similarly, the
practice-oriented literature has dealt in great detail with the
problems construction industry disputes commonly present
relating to the measure and proof of damages, as well as on a
range of contractual limitations on recoverable damages.126
Practicing lawyers, more than legal academics, have documented
the interesting story of how cases and contracting practices have
addressed the differing site conditions problem that so frequently
impacts construction projects.127 Practice-oriented literature also
accounts for some of the most comprehensive analyses of
legislative and regulatory matters affecting construction
contracts.128 All of these topics are ripe for more scholarly
investigation.
Limitations on Using Them?, 14 AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J. 1, 1 (2020); Joseph D. West
& Michael B. Hissam, The Reasonableness of Liquidated Damages Provisions—Why Only
the Look Back Approach Can Prevent Windfalls, 4 AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J. 1, 1 (2010);
Julian F. Hoffar & Shelly L. Ewald, Liquidated Damages and the Freedom to Contract, 1
AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J. 1 (2007).
124. See, e.g., Anthony J. LaPlaca, On the Effective Use of Liquidating Agreements,
CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2019, at 20, 20; Wheatley & Neufeld, supra note 21, at 12; William
M. Hill & Mary-Beth McCormack, Pay-If-Paid Clauses: Freedom of Contract or Protecting
the Subcontractor from Itself?, CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2011, at 26, 26.
125. See, e.g., Laura B. Arrigo & Samantha L. Brutout, Defining the Schedule Expert’s
Role, Scope, and Approach: Key Considerations for Coordination Between Attorneys and
Experts, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2017, at 36; Heffernan et al., supra note 42, at 6; Fredric L.
Plotnick, Evidence Issues in Forensic Use of CPM Scheduling, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2011, at
25; Aiken, supra note 42, at 22.
126. See, e.g., Benton T. Wheatley & Randy A. Canché, Navigating the Labyrinth of
Consequential Damages in the Construction Industry: A History of and Legal Approaches
to Living with Them, CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2013, at 6; Dannecker et al., supra note 43, at
28.
127. See, e.g., Bailey & Hess, supra note 43, at 6; Kimberly A. Smith, Differing Site
Conditions and Metcalf: Judicial Shifting of the Risks, CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2014, at 35.
128. See, e.g., Dean B. Thomson & Colin Bruns, Indemnity Wars: Anti-Indemnity
Legislation Across the Fifty States, 8 AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J. 1, 1-2 (2014). See
generally 5 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at §16:1 (discussing the government’s
heavy regulation of construction in America at the federal, state, and local level, for safety,
financial, and other reasons).
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Beyond addressing such discrete contract law issues, legal
scholars should analyze how the risk management strategies of
construction industry participants and their lawyers impact
contract law in action. Contract law, as established and
proclaimed by legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies,
functions more as the background against which contracting
parties manage contractual relationships than as the rules that
determine those relationships.129 The practicing bar uses
innovative contract provisions and structures to adjust and
manipulate the rules of contract law.130 In a 2011 article (tellingly
published in the construction bar’s leading journal rather than a
traditional law review), Professor Sweet argued that legal
academics should study and assess standard construction
contracts.131 The ongoing evolution of project delivery systems
presents an even more fruitful area for scholarly investigation, but
contract scholars have given relatively little attention to these
systems.132 At a more granular level, construction lawyers
constantly craft innovative contract terms and practices that can
teach at least as much about how contract law functions as a social
instrument as can any case, statute, or abstract theory.133 In

129. See generally supra notes 8-23 and accompanying text (discussing how
construction cases have challenged the boundaries of contract principles and helped develop
and refine contract law doctrines).
130. See supra notes 8-23 and accompanying text; see also infra note 133 and
accompanying text.
131. Sweet, supra note 86, at 41.
132. However, the practice literature regularly reports on developments in project
delivery systems. See, e.g., Galloway, supra note 52, at 29; Justin L. Weisberg & Raymond
M. Krauze, Opening Communication Lines: Evolving Project Delivery Methods to Promote
Collaboration, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 2018, at 14; Howard W. Ashcraft Jr., The
Transformation of Project Delivery, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2014, at 35; Casey Halsey &
William Quatman, Design-Build Contracts: Revisited, 25 Years Later, CONSTR. LAW.,
Spring 2014, at 5; Joseph A. Cleves, Jr. & Richard G. Meyer, No-Fault Construction’s Time
Has Arrived, CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2011, at 6; Barbara R. Gadbois et al., Turning a
Battleship: Design-Build on Federal Construction Projects, CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2011, at
6; Peter C. Halls, Issues for Designers, Contractors, and Suppliers to Public Private
Partnership Projects, CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2010, at 22; Joel W. Darrington & William
A. Lichtig, Rethinking the “G” in GMP: Why Estimated Maximum Price Contracts Make
Sense on Collaborative Projects, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 2010, at 29.
133. See generally, e.g., Lauren P. McLaughlin & Shoshana E. Rothman, When
Spearin Won’t Work: How Contractual Risk Allocation Often Undermines This Landmark
Ruling, CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2015, at 39, 44; Alex Iliff et al., The Shifting Sands of
Contract Drafting, Interpretation, and Application, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 2012, at 31;
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summary, contracting practices in the construction industry offer
much that contract scholars should explore to shed light on the
relationship between law and practice and about how the law
interacts with human behavior in complex exchange
relationships.
The construction industry also offers much material for tort
scholars. Construction commonly involves risky activities
leading to claims for damages when death, personal injuries,
property damage, and economic losses result.134 Some recurring
circumstances peculiar to the construction industry merit the
special attention of the legal academy.
In addressing common negligence cases stemming from
construction activities, a leading construction law textbook notes
some special considerations.135 These include predictable
instances in which negligence during construction causes injury
or property damage.136 Most frequently, the victim is a worker or
a person on the site who has some connection with the project.137
There are, however, also many cases involving victims not
physically on the project site who are simply passing by when an
incident occurs, and others involving trespassers.138 Negligence
cases involving construction activity can present some interesting
features for professors to highlight either in a Torts class, for
example the trespasser cases,139 or in a Construction Law or
Ashcraft, supra note 52, at 17; Kurt L. Dettman et al., Resolving Megaproject Claims:
Lessons From Boston’s “Big Dig”, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 2010, at 5, 16.
134. See, e.g., Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778, 781-82 (Tex. 2001)
(wrongful death); see cases cited infra note 136; see also Allensworth & Ryan, supra note
37, at 393 (providing that “[t]he U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has cited its ‘fatal four’
leading causes of construction deaths as (1) falls, (2) struck by object, (3) electrocutions, and
(4) caught-in/between” and estimating that fourteen deaths occur within the construction
workforce per day).
135. See Allensworth & Ryan, supra note 37, at 393.
136. See id.; e.g., Jeffords v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 963 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2020);
Scott v. Matlack, Inc., 39 P.3d 1160, 1162-63 (Colo. 2002); Lee Lewis Constr., Inc., 70
S.W.3d at 782.
137. See cases cited supra note 136.
138. See, e.g., Price v. Turner Constr. Co., 190 A.D.3d 435, 435-36 (N.Y. App. Div.
2021) (contractor and subcontractor were not liable for injuries when pedestrian tripped over
protruding anchoring bolts on sidewalk); Coburn v. Whitaker Constr. Co., 445 P.3d 446,
448, 453 (Utah 2019) (contractor had no duty to warn pedestrian of danger presented by
orange netting strung across trail); see cases cited infra note 139.
139. Kessler v. Mortenson, 16 P.3d 1225, 1226, 1230 (Utah 2000) (applying attractive
nuisance doctrine when child fell through hole on residential construction site); Hayes v.
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Labor and Employment Law class, as when workers’
compensation law impacts the nature or extent of liability of
multiple defendants.140 For the most part, however, the cases do
not suggest a variation or adaptation of tort law specific to the
construction industry context.141 For purposes of construction
law, routine negligent injury and damage cases may hold
academic interest primarily for what they can show about
overlaps in related legal matters, including joint liability,
vicarious liability, contribution, indemnification, insurance
coverages, and safety statutes and regulations.142
More promising areas for scholarly attention emerge when
tort law intersects with contractual obligations in the construction
industry. Some of the most theoretically engaging situations
invoke the judicial gymnastics required to derive a tort duty of
care from a contractual obligation. The construction industry
presents some noteworthy examples of contractual terms creating
special relationships that impose a tort duty of care independent
from the contractual obligations.143 A contractual responsibility
to perform construction services or work may impose a duty on
the contracting party for the benefit of strangers to the contract.
For example, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that
a consultant retained by a project owner to provide safety
engineering services to the owner owed a tort duty of care to an
D.C.I. Props.-D KY, LLC, 563 S.W.3d 619, 621-22 (Ky. 2018) (holding that sixteen-yearold trespasser who operated equipment on construction site was not entitled to protection of
attractive nuisance doctrine); Lange v. Fisher Real Est. Dev. Corp., 832 N.E.2d 274, 276,
281-82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that taxi driver pursuing non-paying passenger onto
construction site was entitled only to the limited duty owed to a trespasser).
140. See generally Allensworth & Ryan, supra note 37, at 393.
141. See Kessler, 16 P.3d at 1230; Hayes, 563 S.W.3d at 621; Lange, 832 N.E.2d at
283.
142. See, e.g., Coleman v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 19 F.4th 720, 727 (5th Cir. 2021)
(applying principles of vicarious liability); Gables Constr., Inc. v. Red Coats, Inc., 228 A.3d
736, 739 (Md. 2020) (discussing principles of contribution and joint liability); W. C. Eng.,
Inc. v. Rummel, Klepper & Kahl, LLP, 934 F.3d 398, 399 (4th Cir. 2019) (distinguishing
concepts of contribution, implied indemnity, and express indemnity in contractor’s action
against subcontractor); Eng’g & Constr. Innovations, Inc. v. L.H. Bolduc Co., 825 N.W.2d
695, 698 (Minn. 2013) (applying Minnesota’s statute limiting enforceability of
indemnification agreements in construction contracts); see also Schenck & Goss, supra note
32, at 1 (discussing the challenges of apportioning fault and damages); John G. Cameron,
Jr., Construction Site Safety: Protecting the Worker/Protecting the Owner, 9 AM. COLL.
CONSTR. LAWS. J. 2, 31 (2015).
143. Circo, supra note 27, at 187-90.
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on-site worker who suffered from silicosis as a result of working
on the project.144 The court held that even though the worker’s
employer was directly responsible for the safety of its employees,
the consultant’s “superior skills and position” and its “ability to
foresee the harm that might reasonably be expected to befall” the
worker imposed a duty on the consultant “to take reasonable steps
to prevent harm to appellant from the hazardous conditions” of
the work site.145 Other cases impose on a project participant a
duty to warn others of potential dangers or risks the project
presents146 or to disclose to another information based on the
participant’s superior knowledge arising out of the performance
of contractual duties.147
Courts have been especially willing to derive a tort duty of
care from contractual undertakings of design professionals.148
Indeed, even when a client sues for damages allegedly caused by
errors or omissions in the performance of services expressly
covered by the contract between the client and the design
professional, the case is at least as likely to proceed on a theory
of professional negligence as on a breach of contract claim.149
When the plaintiff is not the design professional’s client, courts
often opt to impose a tort duty of care rather than to accept an
alternative theory recognizing the plaintiff as a third-party
beneficiary of the design services contract.150 While the thirdparty beneficiary argument too often requires a strained
interpretation of the contract, tort theory allows the court to
recognize a special relationship between the plaintiff and the
design professional on public policy grounds.151
As discussed in much greater detail in Marc Schneier’s
article, published as part of this symposium, injured workers have
often used the special-relationship analysis to assert claims
against architects and engineers with whom the workers have no

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Caldwell v. Bechtel, Inc., 631 F.2d 989, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Id. at 997, 1001, 1001 n.21.
See generally 3 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at § 9:102.
See generally id. at § 9:92.
See Circo, supra note 27, at 186-87.
See id. at 173, 177-79.
See id. at 185-87, 237-38.
See id.
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contractual privity.152 As his account also explains—to a
considerable extent—design professionals have reduced their
exposure to such claims through carefully narrowing the scope of
professional services included in their contracts, particularly by
excluding any responsibility for project safety or construction
means and methods and by disclaiming authority to order work
stoppages.153
Some close questions about the circumstances in which a
contract creates a special relationship under tort law involve
obligations concerning budget estimates, scheduling matters, and
other aspects of project management and administration.154
These cases often call on courts to scrutinize the precise scope of
the contractual responsibilities especially closely to determine
whether public policy requires the contractually obligated party
to observe a tort duty of care in favor of strangers to the
contract.155 To protect against expanding theories of liability
under design services contracts, lawyers representing design
professionals may aggressively negotiate for express contractual
limits on the client’s damage liability, limits that courts
sometimes hold to be unenforceable on policy grounds.156
The special-relationship theory may also be invoked in
support of tort claims other than professional malpractice and
negligence. Once again, some of the leading cases involve the
contractual obligations of design professionals.157 Design
professionals who provide faulty information in the course of
performing design services for a construction project may incur
liability both to clients and non-clients for negligent
misrepresentation when the design professional knows the
plaintiff will rely on the information in connection with the

152. See Marc M. Schneier, Design Professional Liability for Construction Worksite
Accidents—How Arkansas Led the Way to a National Consensus, 75 ARK. L. REV. 381
(2022).
153. Id. at 395-400.
154. See generally Circo, supra note 27, at 180-90.
155. See, e.g., Thompson v. Gordon, 948 N.E.2d 39, 45-48, 51-52 (Ill. 2011).
156. Buck S. Beltzer & Melissa A. Orien, Are Courts Limiting Design Professionals’
Ability to Limit Liability?, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 2010, at 17, 17-18.
157. See generally Circo, supra note 27, at 173-77.

4 CIRCO.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

354

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

6/6/22 6:59 PM

Vol. 75:2

project.158 In adopting the negligent misrepresentation doctrine,
the Restatement of Torts explicitly references construction
industry examples.159 Some courts have even imposed strict
liability for defective designs incorporated into a building,
especially when the defendant functioned in a design-build
capacity.160
A design professional’s involvement in a dispute between
the designer’s client and another participant may support a claim
for tortious interference with contract or with prospective
business advantage.161 A common arrangement for a project
architect’s role in contract administration amplifies this risk when
the architect’s duties under the owner’s contracts with the
architect and the general contractor require the architect’s
approval of, or other direct involvement with, the owner’s
decision to terminate the contractor for default.162 In addition to
design professionals, other industry players are also susceptible
to tortious interference claims.163 The tortious interference cases
receive some attention in practice-oriented journals.164 The
special construction industry circumstances involved should
appeal to the academic community.165 Moreover, the different

158. See id. at 182; e.g., Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Anderson LaRocca
Anderson, 539 N.E.2d 91, 95 (N.Y. 1989).
159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 5, illus. 4,
15 (AM. L. INST. 2020).
160. See Circo, supra note 27, at 182-83; e.g., Com. Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 689 S.W.2d 664, 669-70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
161. See SWEET & SCHNEIER, supra note 29, at 243-44.
162. Carl J. Circo, Architect’s Contract Administration, in FORUM TEXTBOOK, supra
note 6, at 197, 219-20.
163. See Kevin J. Gleeson & Mark L. McAlpine, Creative Collateral Claims Against
Public Entities and Their Agents, CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2020, at 33, 34-35, 38 (discussing
tortious interference claims brought by disappointed low bidders against owners and
competitors contributing to the rejection of their bid); Anna Oshiro & Peter W. Hahn, Private
Rights of Action for Procurement Violations, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2015, at 17, 19-24; e.g., J
& S Servs. v. Tomter, 139 P.3d 544, 545-46, 551 (Alaska 2006) (involving a disappointed
contractor’s suit against the state and a state procurement officer alleging intentional
misconduct in awarding a contract).
164. See, e.g., Mark J. Heley & Mark A. Bloomquist, The Design Professional’s Role
in Termination of the Contractor, CONSTR. LAW., Apr. 1997, at 3, 10; Schneier, supra note
27, at 3-4.
165. See generally Circo, supra note 27, at 165-67.
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frameworks courts use for assessing such claims invite greater
academic assessment of the theories and defenses advanced.166
As some of the theories of liability discussed above imply,
the judicial practice of imposing a tort duty of care based on
contractual obligations figures into a growing number of suits to
recover damages when the acts or omissions of a project
participant adversely affect the economic interests of others.167
Because the economic interests of dozens or scores of project
participants are intertwined with the responsibilities and activities
of those with whom no contractual privity exists, construction
projects present recurring circumstances of special relationships
arguably sufficient to impose a tort duty of care to prevent
economic harm. Not only do general contractors seek to recover
economic losses attributable to the acts and omissions of project
architects or engineers, but project owners seek to recover against
subcontractors, suppliers, and manufacturers, while any number
of subcontractors, suppliers, consultants, and end-users of the
project sue each other when delays, disruptions, errors, and other
problems adversely impact the project.168 A great many of these
cases implicate the economic loss rule of tort law, an especially
popular topic among construction lawyers.169
Turning then directly, but briefly, to the economic loss rule
as applied in construction industry contexts, we find an issue that
has not only received massive attention from practitioners, but
also one that has engendered considerable interest among legal
scholars.170 The economic loss rule has been frequently explained
166. Compare DiMaria Constr., Inc. v. Interarch, 799 A.2d 555, 560-64 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001), with Dehnert v. Arrow Sprinklers, Inc., 705 P.2d 846, 850-52 (Wyo.
1985).
167. See Circo, supra note 27, at 178.
168. See generally Patricia H. Thompson & Christine Dean, Continued Erosion of the
Economic Loss Rule in Construction Litigation by and Against Owners, CONSTR. LAW., Fall
2005, at 36; Jay M. Feinman, Economic Negligence in Construction Litigation, CONSTR.
LAW., Aug. 1995, at 34; Alvin M. Cohen & James W. Bain, Negligence Claims in
Construction Litigation, CONSTR. LAW., Apr. 1988, at 3, 30-31.
169. Twenty-five years ago, Professor Justin Sweet commented that he had vowed to
resist the temptation to write on the economic loss rule issue in construction industry cases
because of the extensive attention already devoted to the topic by that time in The
Construction Lawyer journal alone. Justin Sweet, A View from the Tower, CONSTR. LAW.,
Jan. 1997, at 47, 47.
170. See, e.g., Paul M. Hellegers, Making Sense of the Economic Loss Rule in
Construction Cases: Does the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts Help? Part Two, CONSTR.
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as a device used to establish or defend the boundary between
contract and tort and to guard against unlimited tort liability.171
Given the policy issues involved and the confusing and
conflicting judicial approaches appearing in the industry cases,
however, this popular topic begs for the kind of comprehensive
and coherent analysis best suited to extended scholarly debate.
The application of the economic loss rule to construction industry
cases frequently brings to light unique considerations sometimes
overlooked or inappropriately conflated by the courts.172 Despite
the extensive body of scholarly work on the economic loss rule,
the proper application of the rule specifically in the construction
industry context merits further academic analysis.
Tort law suggests many additional areas for scholarly
inquiry. A leading textbook for introducing construction law to
architects, engineers, and construction professionals provides a
good overview.173 Personal injury claims often invoke premises
liability theories to support actions brought against project owners
and general contractors on the basis of control over a project
site.174 Injuries and damages attributable to defects in equipment,
material, or components incorporated into a project sometimes
pose interesting questions under product liability law or strict
liability statutes.175 Several construction industry cases consider
LAW., Winter 2014, at 5; Paul M. Hellegers, Making Sense of the Economic Loss Rule in
Construction Cases: Does the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts Help? Part One, CONSTR.
LAW., Fall 2013, at 23; Anthony L. Meagher & Michael P. O’Day, Who Is Going to Pay for
My Impact? A Contractor’s Ability to Sue Third Parties for Purely Economic Loss, CONSTR.
LAW., Fall 2005, at 27; Feinman, supra note 168, at 34.
171. Sidney R. Barrett, Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss in Tort for Construction
Defects: A Critical Analysis, 40 S.C. L. REV. 891, 894-97 (1989); Robert L. Rabin,
Respecting Boundaries and the Economic Loss Rule in Tort, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 857, 858-61
(2006); Circo, supra, note 27, at 190-91, 245-46.
172. See Lawrence E. Leykam, The Viability of the Economic Loss Rule as a Defense
to Third Party Claims for Negligent Misrepresentation Against Design Professionals, 13
AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J. 1, 8 (2019); Carl J. Circo, Placing the Commercial and
Economic Loss Problem in the Construction Industry Context, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 39,
42-43 (2007).
173. SWEET & SCHNEIER, supra note 29, at 72-92.
174. See James Duffy O’Connor, Additional Insured Coverage: The Why, the What,
and the Wherefore, 11 AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J. 1, 3-4 (2017).
175. See Laurence S. Kirsch & Rebecca E. Rapp, Mold: An Evolving Issue in Design
and Construction Defect Litigation, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 2003, at 5, 7; William R. Joyce
& Patrick J. O’Connor, Curtain Wall Failures, CONSTR. LAW., Jan. 2000, at 22, 23; Golden,
supra note 29, at 11-12.

4 CIRCO.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

CONSTRUCTION LAW APOLOGETICS

6/6/22 6:59 PM

357

whether or how violations of federal and state laws and
regulations pertaining to safety and employment hazards,
including the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act, may
be evidence of negligence or may otherwise support liability in
tort.176 I leave it to tort scholars to assess whether any of these
topics, or others not mentioned here, may prove worthy of their
attention.
In cataloguing substantive construction law issues with
significant scholarly appeal, this review has so far dealt only with
contract and tort law, where the most obvious gaps exist between
the law in action and the legal academy. Many other construction
industry topics deserve further scholarly investigation. Green
building initiatives and other techniques for more sustainable
design and construction practices suggest especially timely
topics.177 More broadly, questions about the relationship of the
built environment as a whole to the challenges of climate change
and
sustainability
raise
significant
public
policy
considerations.178 A topic deserving the attention of alternative
dispute resolution scholars emerges from the practicing bar’s
reflections on the impact that the industry’s preference for
176. See generally 4A BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at § 13:15; Joseph
Zavoral, OSHA Liability in Tort and the Threat of the Multi-Employer Doctrine, 47 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 867, 879-82 (2020).
177. See, e.g., Stephen A. Hess & William J. McConnell, Assessing Liability for Green
Building Failures, Part II: How Claims of Green Building Failures Fare Under Common
Law Doctrines, 7 AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J. 1, 1-5 (2013); Edward B. Gentilcore,
Through the Green Looking Glass, Part II: Contractual Solutions to Avoid Falling into the
Rabbit Hole, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 2013, at 6, 14; Edward B. Gentilcore, Through the
Green Looking Glass, Part I: Pursuing Successful Green/Sustainable Construction Without
Falling into the Rabbit Hole, CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2013, at 39; William J. McConnell &
Stephen A. Hess, Assessing Liability for Green Building Failures, Part I: The History,
Development, and Status of Green Building Codes, 6 AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J. 1, 5
(2012); Circo, supra note 55, at 483-84.
178. See, e.g., Robert Denney, Contractor Liability Under CERCLA, CONSTR. LAW.,
Summer 2020, at 31, 35; Elena Mihaly et al., Legal Liability of Design Professionals for
Failure to Adapt to Climate Change, 12 AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J. 1 (2018); Brian J.
Mink, Trading CERCLA for Spearin in El Dorado County: Shifting the Risk of Unknown Site
Pollution to the Government in CERCLA Consent Decrees, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2015, at 26,
33; Jocelyn L. Knoll & Shannon L. Bjorklund, Force Majeure and Climate Change: What
is the New Normal?, 8 AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J. 1 (2014); Vyas & Gentilcore, supra
note 55, at 10; Carl J. Circo, Should Owners and Developers of Low-Performance Buildings
Pay Impact or Mitigation Fees to Finance Green Building Incentive Programs and Other
Sustainable Development Initiatives?, 34 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 55, 58-60
(2009); Circo, supra note 55, at 732-33.
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arbitration over litigation may have on the common law
development of construction law.179 Discrete aspects of dispute
resolution practices in the industry also hold promise for
academic consideration.180 Legal implications of technological
developments affecting design and construction pose many
interesting questions.181 Construction lending presents other
topics for academic attention,182 as does the interface between
construction financing and the Bankruptcy Code.183 Legal
scholars should delve more into questions of legislative and
regulatory policies affecting the industry, along with a range of
administrative law matters.184 Academics should engage more
regularly on international and comparative law topics involving

179. See, e.g., William Karl Wilburn & Robert Chistoffel, Whither Construction Law?
The Conversation Continued . . . auf Deutsch, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2012, at 25; Andrew D.
Ness, Whither Construction Law? How Can Construction Law Continue to Grow and Evolve
in the Era of “The Vanishing Trial”?, CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2010, at 5.
180. See, e.g., Bruner, supra note 51, at 7; Overcash, supra note 48, at 22; Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Managing Construction Conflict: Unfinished Revolution, Continuing
Evolution, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2014, at 13; Paul T. Milligan, supra note 51, at 23; Bruner,
supra note 48, at 6.
181. See, e.g., Nancy Wiegers Greenwald, BIM, Blockchain, and Smart Contracts,
CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2020, at 9; Hurtado, supra note 57, at 809-43; Vince Anewenter et al.,
Brave New Extruded World: Legal Issues Arising in the Construction Industry from Using
Additive 3D Printing Technology, 9 AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J. 1 (2015); Circo, supra
note 57, 873-74.
182. See, e.g., Carl J. Circo et al., The Role of Lender’s Counsel in the Design and
Construction Process: Contract Review, Conditional Assignments of Contracts, and Related
Due Diligence, 24 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 557 (1990). See generally 3 BRUNER &
O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at §§ 8:125-49.
183. See, e.g., Jason R. Kennedy, Selected Issues in Commercial Construction
Bankruptcies, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 2013, at 33; David C. Seitter et al., The Intersection of
Construction Law and Bankruptcy, CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2010, at 11; Deborah S. Griffin
et al., Intersections of Bankruptcy and Construction: Treatment of Executory Construction
Contracts and Mechanics’ Liens in Bankruptcy, 4 AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS. J. 1 (2010).
184. See, e.g., Suzanne Karbarz Rovner & Dennis J. Powers, ADA Compliance in the
Commercial Context: Whose Job is it Anyway?, CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2019, at 14; Phillip
B. Russell et al., An Overview of OSHA Investigations and Citations, CONSTR. LAW., Winter
2017, at 15; Lori Ann Lange, Navigating the Increasingly Complex Regulatory Environment
of Government Contracts, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 2016, at 28; Roger C. Haerr, When
Underbidding Below Cost to Win a Public or Government-Funded Contract May Violate the
False Claims Act, CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2013, at 17; Elspeth England, The Government
Upgrades the False Claims Act: Implications for Federal Construction Contracting,
CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2012, at 25; Deborah I. Hollander, New OSHA Safety Rules for Crane
and Derrick Operations, CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2011, at 30.
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the built environment.185 There is also a pressing need for
scholars to assess consumer protection in the construction
industry and to consider problems primarily associated with small
projects, where sophisticated structures and risk management
devices may be impractical.186 Attention from the legal academy
to consumer transactions and small projects may prove especially
meaningful to legal academics because members of the
construction bar have given less attention to these matters than to
commercial ones.
The practice-oriented literature identifies still other issues
that legal scholars might pursue. Only further investigation can
determine which of them may lead to significant academic
projects, but I will conclude this Part by briefly noting a few
possibilities. Labor and employment law frequently intersect
with the construction industry in ways that should interest
scholars in that field.187 Intellectual property aspects of design
and construction warrant ongoing attention.188
Scholarly
investigations might also be directed toward interdisciplinary
connections, including engineering, economics, and forensic

185. The practicing bar has already contributed a great deal to these topics. See, e.g.,
Angus N. McFadden & Gregory K. Smith, Issues and Solutions in International
Construction Contracting, CONSTR. LAW., Fall 2016, at 7; Stephen A. Hess, Studies in
European Construction Law, CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2016, at 46; Bailey & Hess, supra note
43, at 6; John Livengood, Comparison of English and US Law on Concurrent Delay,
CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2015, at 21; Jesse B. Grove & Richard Appuhn, Comparative
Experience with Dispute Boards in the United States and Abroad, CONSTR. LAW., Summer
2012, at 6.
186. See, e.g., Roger B. Coven, California Attempts to Resolve Residential
Construction Defect Claims Without Litigation, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 2003, at 35;
Stipanowich, supra note 84, at 502-05, 520-22; Golden, supra note 29, at 11.
187. See, e.g., Erin Ebeler Rolf & Andrea Woods, Labor and Employment Risk in the
Real World: A Practical Guide to Understanding Recent Trends and Laws Intersecting the
Construction Industry, CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2021, at 6; Ostroff, supra note 56, at 25; Y.
Lisa Colon Heron & Brian Anthony Williams, Government Contracting Preference
Programs After Schuette: What’s Next? Achieving Parity Through Race-Neutral Methods,
CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2015, at 29; Gerard P. Brady & Jared Hand, The Perils of Doing
Business with Disadvantaged Business Enterprises, CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2012, at 37.
188. See, e.g., Mary Jane Augustine & Christopher S. Dunn, Consequences of
Ownership or Licensing of the Project Drawings—If You Pay for It, Do You Own It?,
CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2008, at 35; David A. Roberts, There Goes My Baby: Buildings As
Intellectual Property Under the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, CONSTR.
LAW., Spring 2001, at 22.
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studies.189 Undoubtedly, scholars who specialize in other fields
could uncover additional research topics.
III. IN CONCLUSION: SEEKING A PARTNERSHIP
BETWEEN THE CONSTRUCTION BAR AND THE
LEGAL ACADEMY
Construction law exists not only as a specialty practice for
lawyers, but also as a significant body of law, legal relationships,
and policies relating to one of the most important segments of the
national and global economies. By failing to assign construction
law a meaningful place in the law school curriculum, law schools
forego a valuable pedagogic tool—one that can both integrate
learning in multiple legal fields at advanced levels and help to
introduce students to complex commercial practice. By failing to
promote scholarly interest in legal aspects of designing and
constructing the built environment, the legal academy misses an
important opportunity to explore, assess, and critique
construction law as an instrument of society. It also overlooks
promising opportunities for cross-disciplinary work with faculties
in engineering, architecture, and business, among others.
What will it take for the legal academy to embrace
construction law? Only a small number of fulltime law professors
currently devote substantial time and energy to construction law.
There apparently are still too few of us to establish a Section on
Construction Law within the Association of American Law
Schools (“AALS”), an idea that Professor Stipanowich proposed
more than two decades ago.190 The impetus must come from
those with intimate knowledge of the legal relationships
189. There has already been some contribution on lost labor productivity and forensic
scheduling issues. See, e.g., William Ibbs & Oskar Gentele, Usage and Acceptance Rates
for Loss of Productivity Damage Quantification Methods, CONSTR. LAW., at Spring 2021,
at 26; Stynchcomb et al., supra note 41, at 18; Joseph C. Kovars et al., Pros and Cons of
Using Industry Studies to Quantify Loss of Labor Productivity, CONSTR. LAW., Winter 2016,
at 6; Daniel E. Toomey et al., Calculating Lost Labor Productivity: Is There a Better Way?,
CONSTR. LAW., Spring 2015, at 27; Patrick M. Kelly & William E. Franczek, Clearing the
Smoke: Forensic Schedule Analysis Method Selection for Construction Attorneys, CONSTR.
LAW., Fall 2013, at 30; Plotnick, supra note 125, at 25; Kenji Hoshino & John Livengood,
A Defense of the AACE Recommended Practice for Forensic Schedule Analysis, CONSTR.
LAW., Winter 2010, at 32.
190. See Stipanowich, supra note 84, at 576.
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underlying design and construction of the built environment. The
leadership of the construction bar stands in the best position to
lead the way. Initiatives might come from the American Bar
Association’s Forum on Construction Law and the American
College of Construction Lawyers.
Members of these
organizations have long taught most courses relating to
construction law offered in U.S. law schools.
These practicing lawyers, mediators, and arbitrators who so
frequently serve as adjunct professors on a part-time basis, in
addition to continuing to teach, might band together to leverage
their law school relationships.
They could establish
collaborations with fulltime members of law faculties in allied
areas, such as contracts, commercial law, dispute resolution,
consumer protection, torts, property, administrative law, public
contracts, real estate transactions, and environmental policy,
among others. At some schools, they might collaborate with
fulltime faculty on joint teaching or research projects. They also
could lobby the law schools where they teach and other schools
where they have contacts to expand academic engagement with
the legal aspects of design and construction for the built
environment. They could encourage law deans and faculties to
schedule regular guest lectures and periodic symposia on
construction law and to invite construction lawyers to fill posts as
visiting professors of practice. Their support might even help
move toward creation of an AALS Section on Construction Law.
They can also seek affiliations with international professional
organizations and international academic programs devoted to
design and construction law that could eventually lead to one or
more academic centers of construction law in the United States.
After nearly half a century of construction law being
recognized as a practice specialty,191 the time is right for law
faculties to embrace construction law as a specialty in the law
school curriculum and in research agendas. My heartfelt hope is
that the law professors and construction lawyers who have
contributed to the Arkansas Law Review Symposium on

191. See Philip L. Bruner, The Historical Emergence of Construction Law, 34 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 22 (2007).
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Construction Law in the Legal Academy, along with others who
may hear this call, will respond.
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EQUITABLE, AFFORDABLE AND CLIMATECOGNIZANT HOUSING CONSTRUCTION
Shelby D. Green*
I. THE OMENS FROM CLIMATE CHANGE
The almost universal sentiment by a growing body of
physical and social scientists is that climate change—with its
floods, drought, heat, and cold—portend losses of life,
communities, property, and the rhythms of living.1 Some are
more vulnerable to these impacts than others: individuals and the
poor, who through official government policy and self-interest in
the housing markets, have been relegated to live in poorlyconstructed and poorly-placed structures—in the wake of ocean
surges; in the path of strong winds; near hazardous and noxious
facilities; stranded in urban heat islands.2 Failing to heed climate
change omens will lead to a world fundamentally different and
unsustainable for basic human values, for basic physical needs,
for how we stay warm, how we obtain food and water, how and
where we live, travel, and interact.
Our current land use policy and patterns are precariously out
of sync with the ecological trends of the natural world and the
evolving notions of equity and fairness. Wisely, we are
reassessing the effects of historic discriminatory land use policy
and embracing a new urban design concept—“one that if not

* Susan Taxin Baer ’85 Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School
of Law, White Plains, N.Y.
1. World Faces ‘Climate Apartheid’ Risk, 120 More Million in Poverty: UN Expert,
UN NEWS (June 25, 2019), [https://perma.cc/W78Y-HPJF].
2. Urban heat islands arise from urban micro-climates, when naturally vegetated
surfaces are replaced with impervious surfaces that absorb, retain, and reradiate energy,
sickening those trapped in their small living spaces. See EVYATAR ERELL ET AL., URBAN
MICROCLIMATE: DESIGNING THE SPACES BETWEEN BUILDINGS 67-68, 72-74 (2011);
Reduce Urban Heat Island Effect, EPA, [https://perma.cc/5NAN-JMV8] (last visited Mar.
18, 2022).
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climate-determinist, is climate-cognizant.”3 We are seeing that
safe and inviting communities are the claim of all, and land use
policy should not by intention or effect operate to exclude on
account of race, ethnicity, or socio-economic status. We are
seeing that the impacts from the built environment and the natural
environment can be reconciled in a way that shows regard for
climate and social equity.
In this Article, I recount some of the history of unwise and
improvident land use policy and practices that have led to gross
inequities and to the climate-exposed state, not only in terms of
where people were assigned spaces to live, but how. I go on to
suggest that communities should be designed with intent, with
regard for the threats of climate change as well as accessibility to
those historically excluded.
II. DISPARITIES IN ACCESS TO AND QUALITY OF
HOUSING
A. The State of Housing
Housing is not just a physical thing, but significantly, a
social, economic, and political construct. Good and ample
housing is essential to individual thriving and enrichment, family
cohesion, autonomy, and economic security.
Poor and
inaccessible housing means demoralization, bad health, wealth
barriers, and family dysfunction. The disparities between those
with good and ample housing and those who face poor or
inaccessible housing is quite stark. Society’s poorly housed have
been relegated, physically and metaphorically, to the bottom
strata of the socio-economic ladder. While the rates of
homeownership have been rising in recent years, the disparity in
rates between whites and people of color remains substantial, by
nearly 30%.4 The disparities in housing opportunities stem from
cost, supply, quality, and location of housing.
3. Shelby D. Green, Zoning Neighborhoods for Resilience: Drivers, Tools and
Impacts, 28 FORDHAM ENV’T. L. REV. 41, 43 (2016).
4. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING
3 (2021).
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1. Cost and Supply
Over 36 million households are housing-cost-burdened, that
is, paying more than 30% of income on shelter.5 The median
price of a home in the country is nearly $350,000, and mortgage
interest rates are rising, now just under 4%.6 There is a shortage
in the number of available housing units ranging from 2.5 to 3.3
million, and this shortage is persistent.7 This leaves a significant
cohort of households vulnerable to the impacts of economic
conditions and climate change.
2. Quality and Location
The housing shortage exists not only in terms of the number
of units relative to the number of households seeking housing but
also in terms of quality.8 By official government policy and
private practices, certain populations were relegated to the most
undesirable parts of communities. After Hurricane Sandy, it was
determined that many of the homes ravaged by the storm were
poorly constructed public housing units built on the cheapest land
and in the path of ocean surges.9 In New Orleans, during
Hurricane Katrina, those homes overwhelmed by the flooding
from the lake were those in the “bottoms,” an area below sea
level; they were built there because the land was cheap and the
area was segregated.10
5. 2020 State of the Nation’s Housing Report, HABITAT FOR HUMAN.,
[https://perma.cc/F7LG-BVZL] (last visited Mar. 17, 2022); JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD.
HARV. UNIV., supra note 4, at 4.
6. Ann Carrns, Rising Mortgage Rates Add to the Challenge of Buying a House, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2022), [https://perma.cc/4TKP-X3VT].
7. SAM KHATER ET AL., FREDDIE MAC, THE MAJOR CHALLENGE OF INADEQUATE
U.S. HOUSING SUPPLY 6 (2018), [https://perma.cc/2MAE-KTYF].
8. Id. at 7-8.
9. Shelby D. Green, Building Resilient Communities in the Wake of Climate Change
While Keeping Affordable Housing Safe from Sea Changes in Nature and Policy, 54
WASHBURN L.J. 527, 539 (2015); FURMAN CTR. & MOELIS INST., SANDY’S EFFECTS ON
HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY 4-5 (2013), [https://perma.cc/62TT-NBPR]; HURRICANE
SANDY REBUILDING TASK FORCE, HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING STRATEGY 89 (2013),
[https://perma.cc/YS3G-ZS4B].
10. See Green, supra note 9, at 533, 540; Juliette Landphair, “The Forgotten People of
New Orleans”: Community, Vulnerability, and the Lower Ninth Ward, 94 J. AM. HISTORY
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Low-income and minority populations are more likely to
live in deteriorating and unhealthy tumble-down housing,11 with
lead paint, asbestos, mold, and mildew.12 Poorer communities
are disproportionately located near industrial and waste-disposal
sites13 and disproportionately exposed to indirect contamination
risks from noxious air emissions, residual contaminated
sediments, and debris disposal, which is often associated with
flooding caused by extreme precipitation.14
Additionally, poorer communities are less likely to have
access to parks and green spaces.15 They have fewer trees than
wealthier communities,16 and they have more highways running
through them.17 As the poor more often live in housing without

837, 838-39 (2007); Emily Eisenhauer, Socio-ecological Vulnerability to Climate Change in
South Florida (Mar. 26, 2014) (Dissertation, Florida International University) (available at
[https://perma.cc/VFL4-VEJV]). Even as laudable philanthropic efforts emerged to right the
historic wrongs, residents of the Lower Ninth Ward were yet victims of their poverty when
new green housing was poorly constructed. See Judith Keller, How Brad Pitt’s Green
Housing Dream Became a Nightmare, GREEN BLDG. ADVISOR (Feb. 15, 2022),
[https://perma.cc/YG8Z-SCZU].
11. See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel Twp., 336 A.2d 713, 727-28 (N.J.
1975) (discussing the lack of affordable housing for low-income families in New Jersey).
12. See James Krieger & Donna Higgins, Housing and Health: Time Again for Public
Health Action, 92:5 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 758-68 (2002), [https://perma.cc/8VZY-JGL7].
13. ROBERT BULLARD ET AL., UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND
RACE AT TWENTY: 1987-2007 52-53 (2007); JAMES P. LESTER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
INJUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: MYTHS AND REALITIES 57-60 (2001) (finding that
exposure to environmental risk is correlated with race and class); NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB.
ADMIN., ADDRESSING COMMUNITY CONCERNS: HOW ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RELATES
TO LAND USE PLANNING AND ZONING 31-32 (2003) (concluding that undesirable land uses
are disproportionately located in minority neighborhoods); Jim Erickson, Targeting
Minority, Low-income Neighborhoods for Hazardous Waste Sites, MICH. NEWS: UNIV. OF
MICH. (Jan. 19, 2017), [https://perma.cc/4PSF-FSMA].
14. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RSCH PROGRAM, IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION
IN THE UNITED STATES: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, VOLUME II 451 (David
Reidmiller et al. eds., 2018).
15. See Emma Zehner, A Sustainable Recovery: How Green Strategies Can Help Small
Cities Confront Climate Change, COVID-19, and Systemic Racism, LAND LINES, Oct. 2021,
at 34, 35.
16. Ian Leahy & Yaryna Serkez, Since When Have Trees Existed Only for Rich
Americans?, N.Y. TIMES, [https://perma.cc/LS7Q-TF6M] (last visited Mar. 18, 2022).
17. See Kathleen McCormick, How Urban Highway Removal is Changing Our Cities,
LAND LINES, April 2020, at 22, 24.
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modern systems for heating and cooling, they suffer
disproportionately from the urban-heat-island effect.18
B. Creating and Destroying Communities by Design
Desolate, dangerous, and dilapidated housing did not just
happen. This design was created by government policy, racial
zoning, and private discriminatory practices.
1. Federal Roads That Severed Communities
In the middle of the last century, the federal government
began pouring billions of dollars into highway construction.19
Multi-lane highways ran through city neighborhoods, uprooted
thousands of individuals, and obliterated entire communities,
destroying much scenic beauty along the way, sometimes just to
save an extra five miles per hour of speed on a curve or smooth
the way for truck traffic.20 Only the Transportation Act of 196621
slowed, but could not halt, the steam rollers. There, Congress
declared as national policy “that special effort should be made to
preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and
recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic
sites,”22 and no funds for building roads could be appropriated
until their impacts had been evaluated. Despite the directive,
governments still tried to build highways in the most
inconceivable places, like right through the middle of urban
parks.23
2. Government Help for Homeowners, but not Renters

18. Michael Waters, Heat Waves Hurt Communities of Color the Most, OUTLINE (July
11, 2018, 3:30 PM), [https://perma.cc/F3W7-A3UY].
19. See Bruce Seely, A Republic Bound Together, WILSON Q., Winter 1993, at 19, 3235.
20. See id. at 37.
21. Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 4(f), 80 Stat. 931, 934
(1966) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 303).
22. 49 U.S.C. § 303.
23. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 406
(1971).
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Tax policies—the deduction of mortgage interest from gross
income and the exclusion of up to $500,000 in gains on the sale
of a home—have made it cheaper to buy a house in the suburbs
than to rent in a walk-up in the city.24 The federal government
spends more than $450 billion annually on tax expenditures and
loan commitments to subsidize single-family homeownership, an
achievement largely denied to people of color.25
3. Renewing by Removal
The Urban Renewal program promised to “renew” urban
communities by clearing blighted areas and building new
housing.26 But the erstwhile slums became luxury apartment
houses, government buildings, and office towers. In the end, the
poor lost more housing than they gained.27 Before the dust
settled, more than 700,000 families, primarily low-income and
minority, were displaced by urban renewal and highways.28 The
removal only stopped with the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, which substituted block grants to cities
to build communities other than by slum clearance.29 The areas
cleared, although cast as “blighted,” were home to many.
4. Discriminatory Lending Policy
Until it was outlawed by the Fair Housing Act of 1968,30
government-regulated lenders openly engaged in the practice of
“redlining”—actually drawing red lines around neighborhoods on
a map, beyond which they would not lend on account of the race
of the inhabitants, no matter how creditworthy the prospective
24. Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System: What are the Tax Benefits of
Homeownership?, TAX POL’Y CTR. (May 2020), [https://perma.cc/5WY4-96PR].
25. See SMART GROWTH AM., FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN REAL ESTATE: A CALL FOR
EXAMINATION, iii (2013), [https://perma.cc/2WCE-LE2Q].
26. See JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF PLACE 167 (1987).
27. See id. at 167-69.
28. BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC.: HOW AMERICA
REBUILDS CITIES 29 (rev. ed. 1991).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 5301.
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 3605.
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borrowers.31
These same banks took deposits from the
community outside their lending circle.32 It was a vicious cycle—
banks refusing to lend on the asserted ground that in default, the
collateral would be insufficient, the inability of homeowners to
obtain loans leading to deferred upkeep and repair, leading to
lower property values, and back to insufficient value to
collateralize a loan.
Private lenders were not the only ones mapping out the races.
In fact, the federal government, under the Home Owners Loan
Corporation (“HOLC”), a depression era agency created to rescue
defaulting property owners from default, drew its own race
maps.33 HOLC determined eligibility for government loans based
on what zone the prospective borrower lived in.34 Red zones
indicated “hazardous” neighborhoods where lending was
discouraged because the area had been “infiltrated” by black
people.35 At the other end of the spectrum were the green zones,
deemed the “best” places, because they were entirely
segregated.36 Yellow and blue were in between with varying
threats of “infiltration.”37 Tying property worth to the racial
composition of the neighborhood denied the wealth-generating
power of homeownership and would dictate health and economic
outcomes for decades. The Federal Housing Administration
(“FHA”), created to provide mortgage insurance for borrowers of
modest income, based official lending policy on HOLC maps and
required race-restrictive covenants in property it insured to keep
communities segregated.38
31. Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining, the Fair
Housing Act and Emerging Issues in Litigation Regarding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 164, 179 (2009).
32. See 12 U.S.C. § 2901.
33. Amy E. Hillier, Redlining and the Homeowners’ Loan Corporation, 29 J. URB.
HIST. 394, 394-95 (2003).
34. See Sarah L. Swan, Discriminatory Dualism, 54 GA. L. REV. 869, 879 (2020).
35. Id. at 880.
36. See id. at 879-80.
37. See id. at 880.
38. See Hillier, supra note 33, at 414; FED. HOUS. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL
para. 980(3)(g) (1938) (stating that restrictive covenants should prohibit “the occupancy of
properties except by the race for which they are intended”); Shelby D. Green, The Search for
a National Land Use Policy: For the Cities Sake, 26 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 69, 78, 85-86
(1998).
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5. Bleak Houses in the Projects
Federal government housing programs were not
administered in ways that were supportive of community and
thriving. So as not to compete with private developers, public
housing could not be elaborate,39 but just a basic structure—some
said they were designed to look like prisons.40 Originally, the
structures were three and four-story brick buildings with grassy
courts, then row houses during the war, then the monolithic highrise towers. High-rises were less expensive, and proponents
claimed they left more room on the ground for children to play.41
Poor construction and poor maintenance led to infamous
“projects” like Cabrini-Green Chicago.42
Public housing policy has undergone many permutations in
the last half century—from direct support for construction, to
destruction of high rises, to direct payments to would-be
tenants.43 Now, housing-choice vouchers are given to renters of
moderate income to enable them to go into the market to find
housing.44 There are persistent shortfalls in these budgets and the
holders are often met with anti-voucher policies.45
III. MOATS AND WALLS BY LOCAL ZONING
While now subject to challenge under the Fair Housing Act
of 1968,46 under both intentional discrimination and impact
theories,47 discriminatory government policies and exclusionary
39. Low Rent Housing Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a).
40. Gordon Cavanaugh, Public Housing: From Archaic to Dynamic to Endangered,
14 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 228, 228 (2005); see also OSCAR
NEWMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., CREATING DEFENSIBLE SPACE 20 (1996)
(criticizing the “highrise superblock” housing as not conducive to healthy living).
41. See OSCAR NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE 4 (1973).
42. See generally Emily Magnusen, The Fight to Stay at Cabrini-Green, 16 PUB. INT.
L. REP. 176, 177 (2011).
43. See Newman, supra note 40, at 9-12.
44. See Cavanaugh, supra note 40, at 233.
45. See Teresa Wiltz, Getting a Section 8 Voucher Is Hard. Finding a Landlord Willing
to Accept It Is Harder, STATELINE (Aug. 31, 2018), [https://perma.cc/9H9T-EZFT].
46. 42 U.S.C. § 3603.
47. Texas Dep’t of Housing & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Comtys., Inc., 576 U.S. 519,
545-46 (2015).
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zoning ordinances continue to determine where and how the poor
and vulnerable live. Before enactment of the Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act in 1922, a few states had enacted some
limits on land use, such as on height, but most governments relied
upon common law nuisance to address noxious and incompatible
uses in proximity of each other.48 But nuisance law, by definition,
was a reactive measure. The adoption of zoning ordinances
allowed local governments to proactively avoid land use harms
and create communities thought to be desirable.
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court
affirmed the general validity of zoning ordinances aimed at
segregating various land uses in a town plan.49 The result was
“Euclidean” zoning, under which local governments could
permissibly separate single-family and duplex developments
from multifamily apartment buildings.50 In hailing the high social
value in single-family homes, the Court also branded other forms
of housing—particularly, the apartment building and its residents,
as “parasite[s]” to be controlled.51 Chillingly, the Court accused
apartment houses of:
Sometimes . . . destroying the entire section for private house
purposes . . . monopolizing the rays of the sun which
otherwise would fall upon the smaller homes . . . . [T]he
apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order to
take advantage of the open spaces and attractive
surroundings created by the residential character of the
district.52

The Court went on to recount the many evils of multi-unit
developments—they brought noise and traffic; they destroyed
open space; they threatened the safety of children.53 Under this
conception, apartment living took on the character of a nuisance.

48. See Andrew Auchincloss Lundgren, Beyond Zoning: Dynamic Land Use Planning
in the Age of Sprawl, 11 BUFF. ENV’T. L.J. 101, 125 (2004).
49. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 375 (1926).
50. See id. at 394-95.
51. Id. at 394.
52. Id.
53. See id.
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A. The Forms of Local Land Use Controls
Even as apartment dwellers desired sun for their children
too, Euclidean zoning has kept a strong hold on access to that sun.
The control mechanisms are as varied and preclusive as the Great
Wall. They relegate those on the other side to blight and darkness.
1. Zoning Harms
a. Supply
Regulations that set minimum lot sizes, sometimes as much
as ten-acres, and floor area ratio limits, determine the volume of
housing construction that occurs.54 While few now would
complain about setting aside areas for forests or open-space, at
the same time, residential density caps, height restrictions, and the
relative allocation of developable space for single-family
detached homes relative to that for these and for other forms of
housing—including apartment buildings, and mobile and
manufactured homes—decrease housing supply, even in times of
great need.55 Minimum frontage setbacks, minimum street
widths, sidewalk requirements, and curb and gutter requirements
mean less land available for construction. With the requirements
of new infrastructure (roads, mass transit, minimum parking,
water supply and wastewater treatment facilities, schools, and
libraries), housing development can become all but impossible.56
Growth controls,57 which variously establish “urban
districts,” “growth-management” areas, and “urban growth
boundaries,”58 control housing supply by limiting the number of

54. Robert C. Ellickson, Zoning and the Cost of Housing: Evidence from Silicon
Valley, Greater New Haven, and Greater Austin, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. 1611, 1623-24
(2021).
55. The Mount Laurel saga best illustrates this. See id. at 1627 n.61.
56. Id. at 1614-17.
57. Green, supra note 3, at 80, 82.
58. See generally Gabor Zovanyi, The Role of Initial Smart Growth Legislation in
Advancing the Tenets of Smart Growth, 39 URB. LAW. 371, 372-73, 389 (2007) (discussing
the emergence of growth management laws to confront some of the pernicious effects of
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building permits that are issued over a particular period, although
they may also limit the extension of urban services and facilities
(roads, sewers, and water supply) outside of the boundaries.59
While smart growth is an effective technique for sustainability—
directing the rate, direction and location of development,
controlling sprawl, and protecting open and green spaces60—it
might be exposed as a pretext for excluding undesirable
populations.61
b. Cost
Not all land use control measures are required for health and
safety, but all result in higher housing costs.62 Some of the costs
are obvious—large lots and large homes cost more than smaller
ones. The imposition of street-width minima requirements for
more setbacks cause prices to increase by nearly 8%.63 Limits on
building height will increase the marginal cost of construction,
driving some builders out of the market.64 Some costs are more
hidden, but nonetheless impactful—prohibitions on types of
housing deemed inferior, however well-crafted or aesthetically
designed, such as mobile and manufactured homes and tiny
houses, 65 eliminate these forms as affordable choices.

unconstrained growth, the environmental degradation of sprawl, and loss of community
character).
59. See Robert L. Liberty, Rising to the Land Use Challenge: How Planners and
Regulators Can Help Sustain Our Civilization, 38 VT. L. REV. 251, 261 (2013).
60. Id. at 269-70. See also Associated Home Builders v. Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 489
(Cal. 1976) (upholding a growth control ordinance that contained specific milestones for
relief from the controls, rejecting assertions that growth control exceeded police powers);
Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 304-305 (Cal. 1972) (upholding phased growth as
a valid zoning purpose).
61. See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 410, 413,
418-19, 490 (N.J. 1983).
62. Ellickson, supra note 54, at 1614-15.
63. John M. Quigley & Larry A. Rosenthal, The Effects of Land Use Regulation on the
Price of Housing: What Do We Know? What Can We Learn?, 8 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV.
& RSCH. 69, 88 (2005).
64. Id. at 89.
65. Lisa T. Alexander, Community in Property: Lessons from Tiny Home Villages, 104
MINN. L. REV. 385, 452-454 (2019).
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c. Community
Zoning ordinances operate as monopoly power over local
development and local governments acting strategically. They
operate perniciously by excluding large sectors of the population
from the human and political amenities of society. That is to say
that town residents, through zoning legislation, exercise total
control over growth and reject projects they fear will bring losses
in utility, financial, or quality of life. By the seemingly absolute
preference for property values over inclusion,66 housing
developers and local government leaders create communities that
are segregated by race and income.67
IV. PROPOSALS FOR EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY IN
HOUSING CONSTRUCTION
The twin imperatives of climate change and social justice are
driving new initiatives for community design.
Building
communities that are inclusive must be premised upon equitable
development, of which housing construction is at the center.
Efficient and equitable communities, along with the houses that
define them, can be imagined and should be constructed.
Builders, planners, and residents must align to achieve desirable
quantity, quality, and affordability to meet the variety of housing
needs and support for all categories of people.
A. “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the [exclusionary
zoning].”68

66. See JESSICA TROUNSTINE, SEGREGATION BY DESIGN: LOCAL POLITICS AND
INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN CITIES 19, 34-36 (2018) (arguing that “white property owners
turned to suburbanization as their primary mechanism for protecting property values”).
67. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. Cnty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 588-90 (2d Cir.
2016); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935, 937 (2d Cir.
1988) (“[Facially neutral] rules bear no relation to discrimination upon passage, but develop
into powerful discriminatory mechanisms when applied . . . . The discriminatory effect of a
rule arises in two contexts: adverse impact on a particular minority group and harm to the
community generally by the perpetuation of segregation.”).
68. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY VI part 2, act 4, sc. 2, l, 77.
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A few jurisdictions, namely California, Oregon and the city
of Minneapolis, have already made the giant step of outlawing
single-family zoning.69 These moves must be supplemented by
improved inclusionary zoning, both with incentives (density
bonuses, variances, fee reductions, or waivers) and mandatory
requirements. Rather than the typical 10% set asides for new
developments,70 there should be one for affordability. A range of
housing styles, including tiny homes, and mobile and
manufactured homes, must be allowed for people of all income
levels, household sizes, and mobility constraints. Allowable
density must be increased through use of accessory dwelling
units, so long as there is minimum area, and infill development.
B. Building by Design
Housing construction now encompasses so much more than
the physical integrity of structures. Homes must be smart and
frugal. They must be oriented toward the sun, away from
flooding. They must be designed to resist the strongest of Mother
Nature’s ravages. They must be resilient. They must not cause
harm to the inhabitants or the environment.71 They are “robust
homes.” All manner of regulations and initiatives are being
adopted to create these “robust homes,” from greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) reduction targets to water conservation measures.72
Energy targets will hopefully be met through decreased reliance
on fossil fuels, greater exploitation of clean energy, and energy

69. Henry Graber, You Can Kill Single-Family Zoning, but You Can’t Kill the Suburbs,
SLATE (Sept. 17, 2021), [https://perma.cc/CJW5-4R5N]. California also now allows up to
ten dwelling units per parcel, provided the parcel is located in either a transit rich area or an
urban infill site. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65913.5 (West 2022). The ordinance, however, must
set a height limit. Id.
70. David L. Callies, Mandatory Set-Asides as Land Development Conditions, 43 URB.
LAW. 307, 320 (2011).
71. See Candace Jackson, Lessons from Ultimate Safe Houses, WASH. POST (Nov. 1,
2012), [https://perma.cc/CG9U-ZERQ].
72. See U.S. State Greenhouse Gas Emissions Targets, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOLS. (Mar. 2021), [https://perma.cc/BM9Y-6XH3]. See generally KARL S. COPLAN ET AL.,
CLIMATE CHANGE LAW (2021).
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conservation.73 Solar energy is supported through zoning
measures that allow the placement of solar panels in places
heretofore off-limits.74 Geothermal energy, which harnesses heat
from the ground to both heat and cool homes, is being urged.75
1. The Interplay Between Robustness, Affordability, and Equity
Not all types of structures are suitable for all areas, and not
all building inventions are essential for sustainability. Accessible
and affordable communities can be built to be green and
aesthetically eye-catching, to have low carbon impacts, and to be
productive. Constructing this “robust home” will come with
costs—costs of the design, its features, materials, mechanics, new
infrastructure, and new administrative teams. While I have
previously written about the direct and indirect costs of the
efficiency and resiliency inventions being employed by cities,76
building the “robust home” is not entirely antithetical to the
“affordable” home. Efficiency and resiliency inventions can be
incorporated within housing that is accessible. Existing structures
can be retrofitted to be energy passive and strong. The cost of a
high-performance home77 is estimated to be 3 to 20% higher than
the cost to build according to code,78 but the annual and lifetime
73. See generally Kelly Trumbull, et al., Progress Toward 100% Clean Energy: In
Cities & States Across the U.S., UCLA LUSKIN CTR. FOR INNOVATION (Nov. 2019),
[https://perma.cc/U47Q-PGJ8].
74. For example, the city of Hartford, Connecticut allows free-standing solar panels on
historic properties. City of Hartford: Guidelines for Solar on Historic Properties,
WORDPRESS (2017), [https://perma.cc/G74Z-ZMSB].
75. See Geothermal Energy Factsheet, CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SYSTEMS UNIV. OF
MICHIGAN (Sept. 2021), [https://perma.cc/8C8W-9ZRU]. For some resources on alternative
energy, see the Center for Sustainable Systems. U.S. Renewable Energy Factsheet, CTR.
FOR SUSTAINABLE SYSTEMS UNIV. OF MICHIGAN (Sept. 2021), [https://perma.cc/XL3NSPL6].
76. Green, supra note 9, at 554-56; Green, supra note 3, at 96-97.
77. The High-Performance Building Council adopted the following definition: “Highperformance buildings, which address human, environmental, economic and total societal
impact, are the result of the application of the highest level design, construction, operation
and maintenance principles—a paradigm change for the built environment.” NAT’L INST.
OF BLDG. SCIS., ASSESSMENT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
ON HIGH PERFORMANCE BUILDINGS 5 (2008), [https://perma.cc/L9JS-96UY].
78. Mike Beirne, Jim Nostedt on How High Performance Can Beat Code-Built Homes
on Price, PRO BUILDER (Jan. 7, 2021), [https://perma.cc/2JGM-69JV]. Yet, the Total Cost
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energy savings are enormous.79 The passive home may cost 5 to
10% more to build than the equivalent sized code-built home,80
but it can produce over 80% reduction in energy costs.81
Structural additions, such as green or cool roofs, can reduce
stormwater runoff by 50 to 90%82 while also reducing air
conditioning needs from 10 to 30%.83 However, they can add to
the cost of new construction, and adding them to existing
buildings may require fortifications.84 Solar rooftop installations
may result in an average annual savings of $1,000 in energy
costs.85
In addition, non-structural techniques can be employed to
keep the costs of construction down, including optimizing the use
of the building site to maximize solar gains in winter months—
with careful design, this could produce up to 50% savings in
energy costs, enabling the reduction in the thickness of insulation,
and thus reducing construction costs.86 Compact buildings reduce
the ratio of the exterior surface area to the floor area, thus
reducing energy consumption.87
2. Intentional Communities

of Building Ownership (“TCBO”) is estimated at 30 to 40% lower. Id. TCBO is an “analysis
builders and architects can use during the design phase of new construction or remodeling
projects to help clients compare the up-front cost of a high-performance home, and the
operating cash savings they can realize over the long term, with a minimum code-compliant
building.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
79. The ROI of a High-Performance Home, CLARUM HOMES (Apr. 1, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/H2Q5-C9NU].
80. Mike Beirne, Tessa Smith on Accessible Career Paths and Passive Home Building,
PRO BUILDER (Feb. 8, 2018), [https://perma.cc/BD4M-22ZW].
81. Beirne, supra note 78.
82. Urban Green Council & The Nature Conservancy, NYC’s Sustainable Roof Laws,
URBAN GREEN COUNCIL 1, 3 (Dec. 2019), [https://perma.cc/BW2Y-KEAD] [hereinafter
UGC Policy Brief].
83. Id.
84. Green, supra note 9, at 554-55.
85. UGC Policy Brief, supra note 82, at 3. See generally Multifamily Green Financing,
FANNIE MAE, [https://perma.cc/K24T-WEND] (last visited Mar. 31, 2022) (providing lower
interest rate, additional loan proceeds, and a free energy and water audit).
86. Natalie Leonard, Can Building a Passive House Cost the Same as a Code-Built
Home?, PRO BUILDER (Feb. 24, 2020), [https://perma.cc/624N-YGU3].
87. Id.
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Historically, builders have played an enormous role in
creating communities—from Levittown88 to the Tejon Ranch.89
The impetus for these communities is mixed, perhaps to meet a
perceived societal need (GI’s returning from the war in the case
of Levittown), or pursuant to some master plan of social
engineering—keeping the classes separate (the racial covenants
also in the case of Levittown). Whatever the reason, the result
was a state of affairs that had little regard for social and economic
equity or the environment.90
Green and affordable construction requires an integrated
design process, with a consideration of not only the structural
components, but also the social impacts. Builders of structures
and builders of society must embrace a shared vision about
common ends. Homebuilders create structures for living and city
administrators and planners build communities for living.
Housing and all kinds of developments must be preceded by
community health and well-being assessments. There must be
regard for displacement and gentrification. Physical orientation
of the community should encourage personal interaction between
neighbors, walks, and child play in open spaces.91
88. Witold Rybczynski, Why Can’t We Build an Affordable House?, WILSON Q.,
Summer 2008, at 16, [https://perma.cc/T7CZ-H5ZX].
89. Nina Agrawal, Supervisors OK 19,000-home development at Tejon Ranch, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 11, 2018), [https://perma.cc/597J-2C2D]; see also KENNETH T. JACKSON,
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 135 (Oxford U.
Press, 1985) (“[R]eal-estate specialists were more active in the city building process than
anyone else. The theory that early suburbs just grew, with owners ‘turning cowpaths and
natural avenues of traffic into streets,’ is erroneous. Subdividers lobbied with municipal
governments to extend city services, they pressured streetcar companies to send tracks into
developing sections, and they set the property lines for the individual homes.”).
90. See Erin Blakemore, How the GI Bill’s Promise was Denied to a Million Black
WWII Veterans, HISTORY (Apr. 20, 2021), [https://perma.cc/Z49T-RTQ9]; JACKSON, supra
note 89, at 208. As developers created subdivisions, they made them exclusive by racial
covenants. See Catherine Silva, Racial Restrictive Covenants History: Enforcing
Neighborhood Segregation in Seattle, SEATTLE CIVIL RTS. & LAB. HIST. PROJECT (2009),
[https://perma.cc/9457-FQHK].
91. “Green Beyond the Building, incorporates good neighborhood development
principles using LEED ND, Earth Craft Communities, [and] other community certification
programs . . . .” Carl Seville, “Blueprint for Greening Affordable Housing”, GREEN BLDG.
ADVISOR (Aug. 4, 2020) (citing WALKER WELLS & KIMBERLY VERMEER, BLUEPRINT FOR
GREENING AFFORDABLE HOUSING, REVISED EDITION (Island Press, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/U9BC-334Q]).
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a. Tools for the Conceived Community
Compact building design uses less land and resources and is
more efficient. It preserves open space and trees for their beauty
and carbon-absorbing effects. Infill development raises density
by using existing infrastructure and reduces construction costs.
Reductions in paved areas for streets, alleys, and parking (by for
example, 50%, with 15% of the land being developed as opposed
to the standard 22 to 27%)92 and using pervious materials will
save costs and reduce the heat-island effect. Narrower streets and
wider sidewalks on only one side of the street will be conducive
to walking and community interaction.
The orientation of homes should be calibrated to the
environment—views, the presence of mountains, the prevailing
direction of snowfall and drifts, the direction of wind in winter
and cooling breezes in summer, and the direction of water
drainage. During construction, builders should have in place
effective waste management programs—to guide the selection of
materials and for disposing of waste—both of which can result in
savings on the costs of homes.93
b. Adaptive Reuse
Adaptive reuse of abandoned industrial buildings is a good
prospect for resilient and affordable housing. Industrial buildings
have strong infrastructure and repurposing them saves the cost of
excavation and installing a new foundation.94 Retooling old
92. Community and Site Planning for Green Residential Design, WHOLE BLDG.
DESIGN GUIDE (Oct. 10, 2016) (citing SUSTAINABLE BLDGS. INDUS. COUNCIL, BEYOND
GREEN GUIDELINES FOR HIGH-PERFORMANCE HOMES (Ryan Colker ed., 6th ed. 2013),
[https://perma.cc/K6CT-D6DE]).
93. See Tom Napier, Construction Waste Management, WHOLE BLDG. DESIGN GUIDE
(Oct. 2016), [https://perma.cc/VA7P-YHYC].
94. Sophie Francesca Cantell, The Adaptive Reuse of Historic Industrial Buildings:
Regulation Barriers, Best Practices and Case Studies 18 (May 2005) (Master’s thesis,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University). Tax benefits include a 20% federal tax
credit taken over five years, along with comparable state credits. 26 I.R.C. § 47; see, e.g.,
ARK. CODE. ANN § 26-51-2204 (2021); LA. STAT. ANN. § 47:6019 (2020); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 40-63-06 (2020). This form of community building also generates economic
benefits as the rehabilitation of historic structures has created millions of jobs and generated
billions in private investment. The Greenest Building: Quantifying the Environmental Value
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structures opens the opportunity to bring a building up to current
code and to install efficient systems. Otherwise, building codes
should be revised so as not to trigger full code compliance with
every rehabilitation, so long as life safety is not at risk. Adaptive
reuse can incorporate universal design. Parking minimums
should be context-sensitive. By preserving facades and the
footprint, adaptive reuse preserves heritage and historic character.

V. CONCLUSION
Equitable development will require many components and
initiatives. It starts with integrating smart growth, environmental
justice, and equity in community design to build healthy,
sustainable, and inclusive neighborhoods. It requires regional and
local planners to engage low-income residents and communities
of color in decision-making to produce enduring development
that is better for people and the environment, toward the common
end of an inclusive community.

of Building Reuse, NAT’L TR. FOR HISTORIC PRES. (Mar. 10, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/XK9H-WMTJ]. “Studies show residential rehabilitation creates 50% more
jobs than new construction.” Id. (emphasis omitted).

6 SCHNEIER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX

6/6/22 6:58 PM

DESIGN PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY FOR
CONSTRUCTION WORKSITE ACCIDENTS—
HOW ARKANSAS LED THE WAY TO A
NATIONAL CONSENSUS
Marc M. Schneier*
Three major developments underlie the law of architect or
engineer (a/e) liability to construction workers, beginning in the
second half of the twentieth century: (1) a change from a no-duty
regime to a duty of care under a foreseeability test, (2) reactions
to that expanded liability by changes to standard form documents
by industry associations (in particular the American Institute of
Architects (AIA)), (3) currently culminating in a broad national
consensus. The Arkansas Supreme Court was instrumental in
framing the issues of this jurisprudence early in its development
and later contributed to its continued evolution.
I. EARLY CASELAW AND AIA RESPONSE
Why should an a/e, who has no direct control over the
actions of any construction worker, owe a duty of care to injured
workers or their estates? This was never an issue until the fall of
the privity doctrine in the first third of the twentieth century.1 Yet
even then, a nexus between the a/e’s role in a construction project
and liability to construction workers was, arguably, not
straightforward. Nonetheless, the replacement of a no-duty rule
*
Attorney Editor of Construction Litigation Reporter since 1983, author or co-author
of several books and numerous articles on construction law, previous adjunct professor of
construction law at the University of San Francisco School of Law, and consultant on various
construction law subjects. He is profiled in the 2021 Marquis Who’s Who list of construction
lawyers. His website is buildinglaw.org.
1. See e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1052-53 (N.Y. 1916)
(adopting the privity doctrine). The privity defense was applied to shield an architect from
liability in Geare v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 256, 256-57 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (theater patron killed in
theater collapse).
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under the auspices of the privity doctrine, with a test for
foreseeability to establish the existence of a duty, was more than
sufficient to bridge that gap.
Appreciating the effect of the fall of the privity defense
requires an understanding of the architect’s role in supervising a
contractor’s performance at the mid-point of the twentieth
century. This baseline understanding can be discerned through
an examination of the AIA’s 1951 standard form documents.2
Under the “Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and
Architect,” the architect provided “general supervision to guard
the Owner against defects and deficiencies in the work of
contractors.”3 Under the “General Conditions of the Contract for
the Construction of Buildings,” a section titled “Architect’s
Status,” combined the duty of supervision with the architect’s
authority to stop the work:
The Architect shall have general supervision and direction
of the work. He is the agent of the Owner only to the extent
provided in the Contract Documents and when in special
instances he is authorized by the Owner so to act, and in such
instances he shall, upon request, show the Contractor written
authority. He has authority to stop the work whenever such
stoppage may be necessary to insure the proper execution of
the Contract.4

In short, in addition to being the project designer, which
included review of shop drawings created by subcontractors, the
architect’s administrative duties involved supervision and
direction of the contractor’s performance, backed up by the

2. Of course, the AIA now competes with several other industry organizations which
have produced their own, competing standard form documents, including: the Associated
General Contractors of America (AGC) and associated entities, publishers of
ConsensusDocs; the National Society of Professionals Engineers (NSPE) and affiliated
organizations, which publish documents prepared by the Engineers Joint Contract
Documents Committee (EJCDC); the Design-Build Institute of America (DBIA); and the
Construction Management Association of America (CMAA). However, in the mid-twentieth
century, the AIA reigned supreme. See generally Justin Sweet, The American Institute of
Architects: Dominant Actor in the Construction Documents Market, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 317
(1991).
3. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. B102 art. 7 (1951).
4. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A2 art. 38 (1951) (emphasis added).
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authority to stop the work. How did the fall of privity affect this
industry understanding of the architect’s role?
Caselaw spanning a little more than a decade, from 1959 to
1970, in which Arkansas loomed large, upended this baseline
understanding, at least regarding worksite accidents.5 The first
decision was not in Arkansas but in Louisiana. Renovation of a
public hospital in Louisiana in the mid-1950s included
installation of a new boiler.6 The boiler exploded while being
tested, killing a subcontractor’s employee.7 The explosion was
caused by the boiler’s lack of a pressure relief valve (although
required by the specifications).8 The estate sued the project’s
architects and a consulting engineer (hired by the architects) for
negligence.9 After a lengthy trial, all defendants except the
architects and their insurer were exonerated.10
On appeal, the architects raised the privity defense.11 In a
1959 decision, Day v. Nat’l U.S. Radiator Corp., the Louisiana
Court of Appeals rejected that defense and ruled that the architect
owed a duty of care to foreseeable victims of the boiler
5. For an in-depth review of this caselaw, see generally Justin Sweet, Site Architects
and Construction Workers: Brothers and Keepers or Strangers?, 28 EMORY L.J. 291 (1979)
[hereinafter Site Architects]. For further discussion, see generally 5 PHILIP L. BRUNER &
PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW 663-688 §§
17:52-17:58 (2002, 2021 Supp.); DWIGHT G. CONGER et al., CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT
LITIGATION ch. 2 (2d ed. 2021); MARC M. SCHNEIER, CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT LAW: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO LEGAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE CLAIMS 252 (1999); Karen
S. Precella, Architect Liability: Should an Architect’s Status Create a Duty to Protect
Construction Workers from Job-Site Hazards?, 11 CONSTR. LAW. 11 (1991); Wyatt A.
Hoch, Architects’ Liability for Construction Site Accidents, 30 U. KAN. L. REV. 429 (1982);
Northwestern University School of Law, The Supervising Architect, His Liabilities and His
Remedies When a Worker Is Injured, 64 NW. U. L. REV. 535 (1969); Marc M. Schneier,
Architect’s or Engineer’s Liability for Injury or Death of Construction Worker on
Construction Site Project, 56 A.L.R.7th art. 7 (2020) [hereinafter Architect’s or Engineer’s
Liability]. Design professional liability under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, not
the topic of this article, is discussed in John E. Bulman et al., The Horns of a Dilemma: Too
Much Involvement in Worksite Safety Can Backfire on Design Professionals, 21 CONSTR.
LAW. 5 (2001).
6. See Day v. Nat’l U.S. Radiator Corp., 117 So. 2d 104, 107, 109 (La. Ct. App. 1959),
rev’d, 128 So. 2d 660 (La. 1961).
7. See id. at 107.
8. Id. at 122.
9. Id. at 107.
10. Id. at 130, 135.
11. See Day, 117 So. 2d at 118.
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subcontractor’s negligence in failing to include the pressure relief
valve.12 The court identified, as the source of that duty, a
provision in the design agreement which required the architects
to supervise the work.13 Professor Justin Sweet wrote that the
decision “shocked the AIA.”14 He continued:
It seemed to require that the architect be present, if not
continuously, at least at every crucial point in the
construction process, judged from a worker safety
standpoint. This, the AIA felt, went beyond the proper role
of the architect and his contract commitment. . . . Finally,
the AIA believed that by concluding the architects were
negligent in approving shop drawings which did not show
the pressure relief valve, the court revealed its
misunderstanding of the architects’ function in reviewing
shop drawings. To the AIA, review is made for design
purposes only and is not intended to be an approval of the
means by which design compliance will be achieved.15

While the Day decision was on appeal, attention shifted to
the Arkansas Supreme Court. A 1960 decision, Erhart v.
Hummonds, involved an excavation cave-in which killed or
injured several subcontractor employees.16 Here, unlike in the
Louisiana case, the architect knew of the danger and acted on that
knowledge—he demanded that the contractor replace the job
superintendent and threatened to order the work stopped, as he
had the contractual power to do.17 The trench collapsed before
any remediation of the safety violations occurred, and the
Arkansas Supreme Court deferred to the jury’s finding of
negligence by the architect.18 So, as of 1960, two appellate court

12. Id. at 119-20.
13. See id. at 124. The appellate court did not quote the contract language, but the
supreme court did, stating that the architect had agreed to provide “‘adequate supervision of
the execution of the work to reasonably insure strict conformity with the working drawings,
specifications and other contract documents’, and this supervision was to include ‘frequent
visits to the work site.’” Day v. Nat’l U.S. Radiator Corp., 128 So. 2d 660, 666 (La. 1961).
14. Site Architects, supra note 5, at 303.
15. Id.
16. 232 Ark. 133, 135, 334 S.W.2d 869, 871 (1960).
17. See id. at 135, 334 S.W.2d at 871.
18. Id. at 136, 138, 334 S.W.2d at 871-72.
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decisions had rejected the privity defense and found an architect
owed construction workers a duty of care.19
In 1961, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals and held the architect’s contractual duty of supervision
did not impose upon the architect a duty of care owed to
construction workers.20 In contrast to the court of appeals,21 the
supreme court interpreted the design agreement’s supervision
requirement as creating a duty owed only to the project owner,
that the work would comply with the design.22 The supreme court
continued:
[W]e do not think that under the contract in the instant case
the architects were charged with the duty or obligation to
inspect the methods employed by the contractor or the
subcontractor in fulfilling the contract or the subcontract.
Consequently we do not agree with the Court of Appeal that
the architects had a duty to the deceased Day, an employee
of [the plumbing subcontractor], to inspect the hot water
system during its installation, or that they were charged with
the duty of knowing that the boiler was being installed.23

Apparently even the possibility of increased liability stirred
the AIA into action. While the Louisiana Court of Appeals’ Day
decision was not released until 1959,24 in its 1958 design
agreement, the AIA deleted “supervision” from the standard
agreement and replaced it with language emphasizing observation
through periodic visits.25 The AIA also made clear in the 1958
document that the duty to inspect was not a guarantee or warranty
that the work was defect-free.26 Just three years later, in 1961, the
19. See id. at 136-37, 334 S.W.3d at 871-72; Day v. Nat’l U.S. Radiator Corp., 117 So.
2d 104, 119 (La. Ct. App. 1959), rev’d, 128 So. 2d 660 (La. 1961).
20. Day v. Nat’l U.S. Radiator Corp., 128 So. 2d 660, 666 (La. 1961).
21. Day, 117 So. 2d at 119-20.
22. Day, 128 So. 2d at 666.
23. Id.
24. Day, 117 So. 2d at 104.
25. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. B131 § C(I)(4)(b) (1958) (requiring the
architect to provide “periodic inspections at the site”). Note that the AIA renumbered the
owner/architect contract from Document B102 in 1951 to Document B131 in 1958.
Compare Id., with AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. B102.
26. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. B131, supra note 25, § C(I)(4)(c) (obligating
the architect only to “endeavor to guard the Owner against defects and deficiencies in the
work of the contractors”).
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AIA again revised its owner/architect agreement.27 It removed
the architect’s duty of inspection, instead providing that the
architect was to make “periodic visits to the site to familiarize
himself generally with the progress and quality of the work and
to determine in general if the work is proceeding in accordance
with the Contract Documents.”28
While the AIA removed the duty of supervision from the
owner/architect agreement in 1958, and from the General
Conditions in 1961,29 the General Conditions’ “Architect’s
Status” article continued to grant the architect “authority to stop
the work whenever such stoppage may be necessary in his
reasonable opinion to insure the proper execution of the
Contract.”30 Yet the AIA soon had cause to reexamine that
language.
In a 1967 decision, Miller v. De Witt, the Illinois Supreme
Court stated that the architect’s power to stop the work was
relevant in determining whether an architect had acted reasonably
under the Illinois Structural Work Act,31 after failing to prevent
the contractor from removing supporting columns, causing the
roof to collapse.32 The AIA’s response was the 1970 edition of
the General Conditions, which might be called the first “modern”
AIA document.33
First, this 1970 “General Conditions of the Contract for
Construction” eliminated the architect’s power to stop the work
and gave that authority solely to the owner.34 Second, it created
27. See generally AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. B131 (1961) (the new
standard form of agreement between owner and architect as of 1961).
28. Id. § C(I)(4)(c).
29. Compare AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A201 art. 38 (1958) (“The
Architect shall have general supervision and direction of the work.”), with AM. INST. OF
ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A201 art. 38 (1961) (“The Architect shall be the Owner’s
representative during the construction period and he shall observe the work in process on
behalf of the Owner.”).
30. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A201 (1961), supra note 29, art. 38; AM.
INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A201 (1958), supra note 29, art. 38.
31. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/0.01-9 (repealed 1995).
32. 226 N.E.2d 630 (Ill. 1967), superseded by statute, ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/301 (1979),
as recognized in Doyle v. Rhodes, 461 N.E.2d 382, 387-88 (Ill. 1984).
33. See generally AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A201 (1970); see also
American Institute of Architects, History, AIA (2022), [https://perma.cc/9C5U-AKH8].
34. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A201, supra note 33, ¶ 3.3.1.
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a new article exclusively devoted to imposing site safety
responsibility on the contractor.35 This language has remained
virtually unchanged in later editions of the General Conditions.36
Third, it disclaimed the architect’s responsibility for performance
of the construction work and for safety measures:
The Architect will not be responsible for construction means,
methods, techniques, sequences or procedures, or for safety
precautions and programs in connection with the Work, and
he will not be responsible for the Contractor’s failure to carry
out the Work in accordance with the Contract Documents.37

These changes have remained nearly verbatim with each
new edition of the AIA documents, and the risk-limiting strategies
they adopt for architects have been embraced by other industry
organizations’ standard form documents.38
II. ARKANSAS LAW: LIABILITY FOR SUPERVISION
AND DESIGN SERVICES
Two additional Arkansas Supreme Court decisions, issued
in 1966 and 1970, cemented evolution of the judicial approach to
worksite accident claims based upon the a/e’s duty to be present
at the construction site during performance by the contractor—an
35. Id. ¶ 10.
36. In the current General Conditions, contractor responsibility for site safety is found
in AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A201 ¶ ¶ 3.3.1, 3.7.2, 10.2 (2017).
37. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A201, supra note 33, § 2.2.4. In the current
General Conditions, this disclaimer by the architect, although somewhat differently phrased,
appears in AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. A201, supra note 36, § 4.2.2.
38. See, e.g., ENGINEERS JOINT CONTRACT DOCUMENTS COMMITTEE, EJCDC DOC.
E-500 ¶ 6 § 6.01(I) (2020) (“Engineer shall not at any time supervise, direct, control, or have
authority over any Constructor’s work, nor will Engineer have authority over or be
responsible for the means, methods, techniques, sequences, or procedures of construction
selected or used by any Constructor, or the safety precautions and programs incident thereto
. . . .”); ENGINEERS JOINT CONTRACT DOCUMENTS COMMITTEE, EJCDC DOC. C-700 ¶ 7 §
7.01(A) (2018) (“Contractor shall be solely responsible for the means, methods, techniques,
sequences, and procedures of construction”); CONSENSUSDOCS, DOC. 240 § 3.2.8.3 (2017)
(“Design Professional shall not be responsible for construction means, methods, techniques,
sequences, and procedures, unless they are specified by Design Professional . . . .”).
However, Doc. 240’s “Standard Agreement Between Owner and Design Professional,”
uniquely among industry standard form documents, imposes upon a design professional, who
“has actual knowledge of safety violations,” an affirmative duty to notify the owner. Id. §
3.2.8.4. No court has interpreted this language.
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evolution now reflecting the national consensus.39 The first case,
Walker v. Wittenberg, Delony & Davidson, Inc.,40 is particularly
instructive. On a commercial project, the architect was hired by
an oral agreement, but the City of Little Rock Building Code
Section 204 mandated the owner employ an architect and required
that architect to perform specific inspections of the work.41 The
parties also used the AIA General Conditions, AIA A201 (1958),
which in Article 38 stated that “[t]he Architect shall have general
supervision and direction of the work.”42
A contractor’s employee was injured when the wall he was
standing on collapsed under him when braces were removed.43
Plaintiff sued the architect for negligent supervision, and the trial
court entered a directed verdict in favor of the architect.44 Citing
its earlier decision in Erhart, the Arkansas Supreme Court
reversed, finding that the contractual duty of supervision (under
the General Conditions) created a jury question as to whether the
architect breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff.45 The court
rejected the architect’s argument—that its duty of supervision
was owed only to the owner and was for the limited purpose of
ensuring a completed building was in compliance with the
design—observing that the same argument had been rejected in
Erhart.46
Yet, after granting a rehearing, the court reversed.47 The
court held that, under the General Conditions, the architect’s duty
39. See Walker v. Wittenberg, Delony & Davidson, Inc., 242 Ark. 97, 108, 412 S.W.2d
621, 631 (1967) (Walker II); Heslep v. Forrest & Cotton, Inc., 247 Ark. 1066, 1067, 449
S.W.2d 18, 182 (1970).
40. Walker II, 242 Ark. 97, 412 S.W.2d 621.
41. Id. at 100-01, 412 S.W.2d at 627. The architect was required to inspect the
foundation, the framing, and to make a final inspection, per the full language of Section 204.
Id. at 101-03, 412 S.W.2d at 628.
42. See AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC 201 (1958), supra note 29, art. 38. The
court initially said that the parties used the 1952 edition of A201 (See Walker v. Wittenberg,
Delony & Davidson, Inc., 241 Ark. 525, 527, 412 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Walker I)) but corrected
itself in the opinion issued after a rehearing (See Walker II, 242 Ark. at 103-04, 412 S.W.2d
at 629).
43. Walker I, 241 Ark. at 526-27, 412 S.W.2d at 622-23.
44. Id. at 526-27, 412 S.W.2d at 623.
45. Id. at 529-30, 412 S.W.2d at 624.
46. Id. at 528-30, 412 S.W.2d at 624.
47. Walker II, 242 Ark. at 97-98, 412 S.W.2d at 626.
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of supervision did not require it to be “present continuously
during construction,” nor did the architect have the authority or a
“duty to prescribe safety precautions for the contractor or to
enforce performance of the safety provisions contained in the
contract between the owner and the contractor, to which he was
not a party.”48 Invoking the presumption that parties contract
only for themselves, the court concluded:
Before an architect can be said to have agreed with an owner
to exercise direct control over a contractor with respect to
day-to-day safety supervision of a building contract, such
agreement must clearly appear from the terms of the
agreement, the conduct of the parties, or the nature of the
work being performed.49

The court then distinguished Erhart on three grounds.50
First, the hazard in that case constituted a “special danger” within
the meaning of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427.51
Second, the architect in Erhart was expressly employed to
supervise the work.52 Third, the architect knew of the danger;53
by contrast, in Walker II, “the architect had no reason to
contemplate the contractor’s negligence when the contract was
made, i.e., the negligence here was collateral to the risk of doing
the work.”54 Limiting Erhart to the underlying circumstances, the

48. Id. at 98, 412 S.W.2d at 626.
49. Id. at 106, 412 S.W.2d at 630.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 106, 412 S.W.2d at 630 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427
(AM. L. INST. 1965)). Section 427, titled “Negligence as to Danger Inherent in the Work,”
is one of the numerous exceptions to the so-called independent contractor rule. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (AM. L. INST. 1965). Section 427 applies to
“[o]ne who employs an independent contractor to do work involving a special danger to
others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or normal to the
work . . . is subject to liability for physical harm caused to such others by the contractor’s
failure to take reasonable precautions against such danger.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 427.
52. Walker II, 242 Ark. at 106, 412 S.W.2d at 630.
53. Id. at 106, 412 S.W.2d at 630.
54. Id. at 98, 412 S.W.2d at 626 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 426(a)
(AM. L. INST. 1965)). The section cited provides that “an employer of an independent
contractor . . . is not liable for physical harm caused by any negligence of the contractor if
. . . the contractor’s negligence consists solely in the improper manner in which he does the
work . . . .” Of course, it should be noted that these Restatement provisions apply to
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court stated that the “correct rule” was stated in the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s Day decision.55
A final “supervision” case by the Arkansas Supreme Court
was issued three years later.56 In Heslep v. Forrest & Cotton, Inc.,
a contractor’s employee used a front-end loader with a mobile
crane to move a piece of pipe near a high-voltage power line (in
violation of a safety statute), rather than wait for a truck to move
the pipe.57 The crane created an arc with a power line. The
injured worker sued the resident engineer, hired to inspect the
work for compliance with the architect’s design, for permitting
use of the crane without requiring the general contractor to
insulate the boom or order the overhead line de-energized.58
In affirming a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor
of the engineer, the Arkansas Supreme Court reasoned that the
“engineers’ rights and powers are not to be confused with their
obligations and duties under their contracts.”59 Specifically,
“they do not have the right, power, obligation or the duty to
supervise [the contractor’s employees] in the performance of their
duties.”60 The contractor, not the engineer, had the obligation to
guarantee site safety under the contract and performance in
compliance with the safety statute.61
To recap, under Erhart, Walker II, and Heslep, a design
professional’s contractual duty of supervision, even under the
1950s-era AIA standard form documents, cannot establish a
safety duty of care owed to construction workers, at least where
the a/e did not know of the hazardous condition beforehand.62 A
designer’s rights or powers under its contract with the owner are
employers of independent contractors, not to a project architect, who did not hire the general
contractor or any subcontractor.
55. Walker II, 242 Ark. at 107, 412 S.W.2d at 630-31 (citing Day v. Nat’l U.S. Radiator
Corp., 128 So. 2d 660 (La. 1961)).
56. Heslep v. Forrest & Cotton, Inc., 247 Ark. 1066, 449 S.W.2d 181 (1970).
57. Id. at 1067-68, 1071, 449 S.W.2d at 181-83.
58. Id. at 1067, 449 S.W.2d at 182.
59. Id. at 1072, 449 S.W.2d at 184.
60. Id. at 1072, 449 S.W.2d at 184 (emphasis omitted).
61. Heslep, 247 Ark. at 1070-71, 1073, 449 S.W.2d at 183-84.
62. See Erhart v. Hummonds, 232 Ark. 133, 135, 334 S.W.2d 869, 870-71 (1960);
Walker II, 242 Ark. 97, 98, 412 S.W.2d 621, 626 (1967); Heslep, 247 Ark. at 1072, 449
S.W.2d at 184.
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presumptively only for the benefit of the owner.63 Absent clear
contract indications, these obligations do not accrue to the benefit
of construction workers injured by an unsafe manner of
performance, as responsibility for safe performance lies squarely
on the contractor.64 These conclusions were exactly the goals
sought by the AIA when it created the “modern” AIA standard
form documents starting in 1970.
Of course, before an architect’s or engineer’s on-site
activities (whether described as supervision or inspection) may
arise, the a/e must first create the project’s design, and injured
construction workers have alleged negligent design as a standalone basis for liability.65 Again, the Arkansas high court helped
establish a national jurisprudence.
In Hill Constr. Co. v. Bragg, a steel erection subcontractor’s
employee was injured by the fall of a column that was being
erected in a high wind.66 No guy wires or other bracing were used
to temporarily hold the column, and the plaintiff blamed both the
general contractor and the architect’s design for the accident.67 A
jury agreed, attributing 90% fault to the general contractor and
10% fault to the architect.68
The supreme court reversed and remanded, ruling that the
defendants’ proffered instruction on intervening cause (by the
subcontractor) should have been provided.69 The court noted that,
while the architect and engineer had specified the use of guy wires
and other bracings during the steel erection process, the
subcontractor had used only wooden wedges to temporarily brace
steel columns.70 Nonetheless, the court also rejected the
architect’s assertion that a directed verdict should have been
entered at the close of plaintiff’s evidence, stating:
While it is true there was sufficient evidence of the
subcontractor’s negligence to warrant an instruction on
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Walker II, 242 Ark. at 98, 412 S.W.2d at 626.
Heslep, 247 Ark. at 1072-73, 449 S.W.2d at 184.
See infra Part III.
291 Ark. 382, 384, 725 S.W.2d 538, 539 (1987).
Id. at 384, 725 S.W.2d at 540.
Id. at 384, 725 S.W.2d at 539.
Id. at 390, 725 S.W.2d at 543.
Id. at 384, 725 S.W.2d at 540.
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intervening proximate cause, there was also evidence that
there were problems with the design of the column’s anchor
bolts and that they were offset, and that the layout of
the portion of the building which had been constructed when
the column was erected was an “ironworker’s nightmare.”
There was sufficient evidence to send the question of [the
contractor’s] and [the architect’s] negligence to the jury.71

In the Arkansas Supreme Court’s only decision in the
twenty-first century on the issue of design professional liability
for a construction site accident, Clark v. Transcon. Ins. Co., a
worker was electrocuted while carrying a metal pole eight feet
from an overhead power line.72 He sued the architect for
negligent design arguing that, because the construction site was
located near the high-voltage overhead line, the architect had a
duty to delineate the proximity of the power line in a way that
would be readily determinable by looking at the plans, but had
not done so.73 The architect countered that it had no duty to
supervise the construction, advise the utility to de-energize the
power line, or specify any safety measures.74 The trial court
granted the architect’s motion for summary judgment.75
Declaring that “[a]n architect has the duty of exercising
reasonable care in the preparation of plans,”76 and pointing to
expert testimony submitted by plaintiff that the defendant had
violated that duty, the supreme court reversed.77 In the face of
that expert testimony, the defendant:
[F]ailed to provide evidence or authority to show that
architects are not responsible for accurately depicting the
location of power lines on plans. He also failed to provide
evidence or authority to show that architects are not

71. Hill Constr. Co., 291 Ark. at 387-88, 725 S.W.2d at 541. As revealed by a
subsequent appeal from the second trial (on an unrelated issue), the jury found the architect
was not liable. See Bragg v. Mayes, Sudderth & Etheredge, Inc., 297 Ark. 537-38, 764
S.W.2d 44, 45 (1989).
72. 359 Ark. 340, 344, 197 S.W.3d 449, 451 (2004).
73. Id. at 345, 197 S.W.3d at 452.
74. Id. at 352, 197 S.W.3d at 456.
75. Id. at 350, 197 S.W.3d at 455.
76. Id. at 352, 197 S.W.3d at 457.
77. Clark, 359 Ark. at 352-53, 197 S.W.3d at 457.
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responsible for providing warnings on the plans of the need
to avoid the hazard produced by the power line.78

The fundamental difference in the Arkansas Supreme
Court’s treatment of claims arising out of an a/e’s supervision or
inspection duties versus those involving allegations of negligent
design is clear. A design professional’s duty of supervision or
inspection is presumptively owed to the owner alone.79 Absent
an a/e’s knowledge of the hazardous condition, its contractual
power during inspections to possibly perceive dangerous
performance methods is insufficient to trigger a safety duty of
care owed to construction workers.80 By contrast, creation of a
design may well include responsibility to take into consideration
safety features of the project site and even the method of
performance.81
III. NATIONAL LAW—LIABILITY ARISING FROM
DESIGN
The Arkansas caselaw discussed above is both a historical
introduction to, and a mirror of contemporary national law.82 The
clear majority rule is that an architect may be liable for a worksite
accident caused at least in part by a defective design.83 Indeed,
even those states which have enacted statutes partially shielding
architects and engineers from liability claims by injured workers
or their estates consistently except negligent design claims.84
In light of that majority rule, an understanding of what
constitutes a design defect, for purposes of an injured worker’s
construction accident claim, is essential. Clearly, as each
construction site is unique, no definitive list of defects is possible,
and the following recounting is simply a sampling of claims that
have been made:

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 353, 197 S.W.3d at 457.
Walker II, 242 Ark. 97, 99-100, 106, 412 S.W.2d 621, 627, 630 (1967).
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.
See supra Part II.
Geer v. Bennett, 237 So. 2d 311, 316 (Fla. 1970).
See infra note 116.
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Failure to specify bracing for unsupported wall during
partial demolition;85
On a project to renovate a sewage treatment plant where
toxic gases escaped from an adjoining room killing
construction workers, the design’s inclusion of a window
between the area of the building containing the wet
sludge and the rest of the building violated a design
standard from an engineering association, adopted by
Iowa, which prohibited “‘interconnection between the
wet well and dry well ventilating systems’”;86
Where the engineer on site indicated to the contractor to
cut a pipe along its length, and when the contractor did
so the pipe rolled outward, causing its employee who
was standing on the pipe to fall and be crushed when the
pipe rolled on top of him, the court found the estate stated
a claim for negligent design, reasoning, “[w]e perceive
no appreciable distinction between providing the
specifications for pipe cutting through a professional
drawing or by physically marking on the pipe”;87
Collapse of steel frame during erection traced to
engineer’s incorrect calculation of the correct sizes of
steel members;88
Specification of a “double connection” method to
connect two horizontal steel beams, caused the beams to
bend and workers sitting on it to fall;89

85. Wagner v. Grannis, 287 F. Supp. 18, 25 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
86. Evans v. Howard R. Green Co., 231 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Iowa 1975) (jury finding of
liability upheld).
87. Edwards v. Anderson Eng’g, Inc., 166 P.3d 1047, 1055 (Kan. 2007) (rejecting a
statutory defense found in then KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501(f), now KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44501(d) (2006)).
88. See Mudgett v. Marshall, 574 A.2d 867, 871-72 (Me. 1990) (The engineer
calculated a rafter beam of 36’ by 150’, instead of 36’ by 230’; the longer rafter beam would
have had greater lateral stiffness and an increased resistance to buckling, while the shorter
beams would have required the addition of 16 permanent knee braces—the design specified
only two—for safe erection.).
89. Tiffany v. Christman Co., 287 N.W.2d 199, 202-03, 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979)
(jury verdict upheld; the engineer knew of a prior accident of the same nature six weeks
earlier but did not alter the design).
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Authorizing substitution of anchor bolts with expansion
bolts, which were insufficient to stop the steel beam from
falling over;90
The engineer directed city employees to undertake a
course of conduct without first conducting an
engineering analysis;91
Design of trench bracing system, which failed, causing
the trench to collapse onto a worker present in the
trench;92 and
Design omitting safety-related information as to the
project site.93

Defenses to a defective design claim include that:
• The architect or engineer is not responsible for the
•
•
•

inclusion of temporary safety measures during the
erection of the structural steel;94
The architect is not responsible for inclusion of bracing
methods for a trench excavation;95
Lack of or insufficient expert testimony to establish the
defendant’s professional negligence;96
No causal connection between the alleged design defect
and the accident;97

90. See Campbell v. Daimler Grp., Inc., 686 N.E.2d 337, 339-40, 344-45 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1996), appeal denied, 677 N.E.2d 816 (Ohio 1997).
91. See Michaels v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 257 P.3d 532, 536-37 (Wash. 2011).
92. See Bauer v. Howard S. Wright Constr., No. 44817-0-1, 2000 WL 987165 at *1
(Wash. Ct. App. July 17, 2000).
93. Mallow v. Tucker, Sadler & Bennett, Architects & Eng’rs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 174,
176 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) (design did not indicate underground high-voltage transmission
line).
94. Cady v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 437 F. Supp. 1030, 1033 (S.D. Tex. 1977);
Nicholson v. Turner/Cargile, 669 N.E.2d 529, 533 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
95. Jones v. James Reeves Contractors, Inc., 701 So. 2d 774, 784-86 (Miss. 1997);
McAninch v. Robinson, 942 S.W.2d 452, 456-58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
96. Paxton v. Alameda Cnty., 259 P.2d 934, 942-43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); Hobson v.
Waggoner Eng’g, Inc., 878 So. 2d 68, 77, 80 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003); Simon v. Drake Constr.
Co., 621 N.E.2d 837, 839 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher & Assocs.,
467 P.2d 610, 616-17 (Utah 1970).
97. Hutcheson v. E. Eng’g Co., 209 S.E.2d 680, 681 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (contractor
removed guardrails required by the specifications); Walters v. Kellam & Foley, 360 N.E.2d
199, 206-11 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); Demetro v. Dormitory Auth., 96 N.Y.S.3d 30, 33 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2019).
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Performance methods or safety measures are the domain
of the contractor and not the architect’s responsibility to
include in the design;98 and
Information not included in the design was not the
architect’s responsibility to include.99

Closely related to design liability is an architect’s liability
arising out of its review of shop drawings, and failure to detect a
defect in the drawings.100 Courts rejecting liability often do so to
enforce the disclaimer in the modern AIA documents, which
provide that the architect’s approval of shop drawings is “only for
the limited purpose of checking for conformance with
information given and the design concept expressed in the
Contract Documents.”101
IV. NATIONAL LAW—LIABILITY ARISING FROM
SITE SERVICES
Unlike claims for negligent design, courts faced with the
modern AIA standard form documents have, to a large degree,
enforced the disclaimers limiting the architect’s authority over the
contractor’s manner or method of performance, while imposing
98. Nat’l Found. Co. v. Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, Inc., 465 S.E.2d 726, 730
(Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (lack of temporary handrails on walkway); Burns v. Black & Veatch
Architects, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 450, 454-55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993), (unshored trench); Wells v.
Stanley J. Thill & Assocs., Inc., 452 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Mont. 1969) (unshored trench).
99. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Logansport, 436 N.E.2d 1138, 1144-45, 1150-51 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1982), reh’g denied, 439 N.E.2d 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (design specification did
not include overhead, uninsulated power line); Patin v. Indust. Enters. Inc., 421 So. 2d 362,
366 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (electric wires); Frampton v. Dauphin Distrib. Servs. Co., 648 A.2d
326, 327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (power lines); Alexander v. State, 347 So. 2d 1249, 1250,
1252 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (underground butane tank). See also Transp. Ins. Co., Inc. v.
Hunzinger Constr. Co., 507 N.W.2d 136, 140-41 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (design not required
to show method of performance); Kaltenbrun v. City of Port Washington, 457 N.W.2d 527,
531 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (no duty to test soil at the site’s ingress and egress routes to ensure
they were adequate to bear the weight of a dump truck coming to the site).
100. See Jaeger v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson, Inc., 714 F.2d 773, 775 (8th
Cir. 1983); Juno Indus., Inc. v. Heery Int’l, 646 So. 2d 818, 823-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
101. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOC. B101 § 3.6.4.2. (2017). Earlier versions of
the AIA documents contain slightly different wording. See, e.g., AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS,
AIA DOC. B101 § 3.6.4.2 (2007). Courts finding an architect not liable based on a theory of
negligent review of shop drawings include Case v. Midwest Mech. Contractors, Inc., 876
S.W.2d 51, 51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) and Waggoner v. W & W Steel Co., 657 P.2d 147, 148
(Okla. 1982).
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on the contractor responsibility for site safety.102 As noted, these
allocations of responsibility for site safety have been largely
adopted by other industry organizations which have also
published standard form documents.103
Of course, many (often commercial) projects use custom
design agreements, and the architect’s duties must be understood
in light of that contract’s specific wording. For example, where
an architect was hired only to create the design and not to provide
site services, there can be no liability arising out of a theory of
negligent supervision.104 At the other extreme, large project
owners may impose detailed supervision obligations upon the
architect.105 Contracts authorizing the architect to stop the work
may well convince a court that an architect has a duty to exercise
that power when necessary to protect construction workers.106
102. See, e.g., Black & Vernooy Architects v. Smith, 346 S.W.3d 877, 886-87 (Tex.
App. 2011) (holding that architect did not have power to control performance of construction
at site because several contract provisions explicitly restricted architect’s authority); Yow v.
Hussey, Gay, Bell & Deyoung Int’l, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 565, 567-68 (Ga. Ct. App 1991).
103. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
104. Rian v. Imperial Mun. Servs. Grp., Inc., 768 P.2d 1260, 1263-64 (Colo. App.
1988); Swartz v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Constr. Corp., 469 So. 2d 232, 233 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); Patin, 421 So. 2d at 366; Jones v. James Reeves Contractors, Inc., 701 So. 2d
774, 784-86 (Miss. 1997); McAninch v. Robinson, 942 S.W.2d 452, 458 (Mo. Ct. App.
1997); Frampton, 648 A.2d at 327.
105. See e.g., Associated Eng’rs, Inc. v. Job, 370 F.2d 633, 638, 643-45 (8th Cir. 1966)
(applying South Dakota law; the architect contractually agreed to see that construction was
“expeditious and economical”; could subject the “manner of construction” to “inspection,
tests and approval”; was required to perform “constant supervision” and take “all reasonable
safety precautions”; and could stop the work if the contractor failed to use reasonable safety
precautions) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, Troy Cannon Constr. Co. v. Job, 389
U.S. 823 (1967); Geer v. Bennett, 237 So. 2d 311, 317 (Fla. Ct. App. 1970); Phillips v.
Mazda Motor Mfg. (USA) Corp., 516 N.W.2d 502, 507-508 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994),
abrogated on other grounds by Ormsby v. Capital Welding, Inc., 684 N.W.2d 320, 327
(Mich. 2004); Jones, 701 So. 2d at 785 (“It would seem natural that the supervision of safety
is encompassed in the duty to supervise, and no separate agreement to supervise safety is
necessary where the architect is supervising the details of every other aspect of the project.”);
Simon v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 202 N.W.2d 157, 161, 168 (Neb. 1972); Amant v. Pac.
Power & Light Co., 520 P.2d 181, 185 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), aff’d per curiam, 529 P.2d
829 (Wash. 1975). But see Walker II, 242 Ark. 97, 105-06, 412 S.W.2d 621, 630 (1967).
The court in Jones disagreed with Walker II in dicta. Jones, 701 So. 2d at 785.
106. Associated Eng’rs, Inc., 370 F.2d at 644-45; Moore v. PRC Eng’g, Inc., 565 So.
2d 817, 820 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990). But see Parks v. Atkinson, 505 P.2d 279, 283 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1973) (holding summary judgment for architect was appropriate even though he had
stopped the work twice because the “interruptions were solely to insure that the work was
being done in accordance with the plan and specifications”); Wheeler & Lewis v. Slifer, 577
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Moreover, regardless of the contract language, an architect, by its
conduct, may assume a duty of care regarding project safety.107
However, those projects which use the “modern” (post 1970)
AIA standard form documents, or documents of other industry
organizations reflecting the AIA’s allocation of responsibility for
site safety, have overwhelmingly concluded that an architect with
site services roles owes no duty of care toward construction
workers, at least absent the architect’s actual knowledge of the
hazardous condition.108 However, where the architect or engineer
P.2d 1092, 1094-95 (Colo. 1978) (finding the architect had the right to stop the work, but no
contractual control over the contractor with respect to day-to-day safety); Graham v. Freese
& Nichols, Inc., 927 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (finding the engineer stopped
the work twice due to quality concerns, not safety concerns).
107. Hanna v. Huer, Johns, Neel, Rivers & Webb, 662 P.2d 243, 252-53 (Kan. 1983),
superseded by statute on other grounds, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (1985), as recognized
in Edwards v. Anderson Eng’g, Inc., 166 P.3d 1047, 1053 (Kan. 2007) (stating in dicta that
a design professional may by his conduct assume a duty of safety and listing several factors
by which to determine whether an expanded duty had been assumed); Simon, 202 N.W.2d at
168.
108. Baker v. Pidgeon Thomas Co., 422 F.2d 744, 746 (6th Cir. 1970) (applying
Arkansas law); Peck v. Horrocks Eng’rs, Inc., 106 F.3d 949, 955 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying
Utah law; AIA contract); Padgett v. CH2M Hill Se., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 563, 564-65 (M.D.
Ga. 1994); Poehmel v. Aqua Am. Penn., Inc., No. 3:10-cv-2372, 2013 WL 27493, at *7
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2013); Easter v. Percy, 810 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Reber
v. Chandler High Sch. Dist. No. 202, 474 P.2d 852, 854 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970); Seeney v.
Dover Cnty. Club Apartments, Inc., 318 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); Vorndran v.
Wright, 367 So. 2d 1070, 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Yow v. Hussey, Gay, Bell &
DeYoung Int’l, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 565, 567 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (AIA General Conditions);
Jones v. City of Logansport, 436 N.E.2d 1138, 1150-51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), reh’g denied,
439 N.E.2d 666, 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Hanna, 662 P.2d at 250, 254 (AIA General
Conditions); Young v. Hard Rock Constr., L.L.C., 292 So. 3d 178, 183 (La. Ct. App. 2020)
(modified AIA contract); Black v. Gorman-Rupp, 791 So. 2d 793, 795-96 (La. Ct. App.
2001); Krieger v. J. E. Greiner Co., Inc., 382 A.2d 1069, 1074, 1079 (Md. 1978); MacInnis
v. Walsh Bros., Inc., No. 044250, 2006 WL 1047134, at *4-*5 (Mass. Super. Ct. March 23,
2006); Eleria v. City of St. Paul, No. A10-1045, 2010 WL 5293742, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App.
Dec. 28, 2010); Dillard v. Shaughnessy, Fickel & Scott Architects, 864 S.W.2d 368, 370
(Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (Kansas law); Brown v. Gamble Constr. Co., Inc., 537 S.W.2d 685, 687
(Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Hobson v. Waggoner Eng’g, Inc., 878 So. 2d 68, 77, 80 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2003); Kemp v. Bechtel Constr. Co., 720 P.2d 270, 274 (Mont. 1986), overruled on
other grounds by Beckman v. Butte-Silver Bow Cnty., 1 P.3d 348, 350 (Mont. 2000);
Pfenninger v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg’l High Sch., 770 A.2d 1126, 1129, 1141-43 (N.J. 2001)
(a somewhat confusing opinion in which the majority adopted the position of Justice
Coleman’s dissent on the question of the architect’s liability); Torres v. CTE Eng’rs, Inc.,
786 N.Y.S.2d 101, 101 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); Welch v. Grant Dev. Co., Inc., 466 N.Y.S.2d
112, 114-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (thorough analysis of modern AIA contracts); Nicholson
v. Turner/Cargile, 669 N.E.2d 529, 534 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Marshall v. Port Auth. of
Allegheny Cnty., 568 A.2d 931, 935 (Pa. 1990); Johnson v. EMPE, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 62, 65
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knew of the hazardous conditions, there is a split of authority.109
Some courts continue to exonerate the a/e, pointing to the general
contractor as the party responsible for safety at the construction
site.110 Other courts, emphasizing the safety-promotion principle
underlying tort law, have held or at least expressed the possibility
of finding a duty of care, especially if the a/e had the power to
stop the work.111 One standard form document imposes upon an
architect or engineer with knowledge of a safety violation a duty
to warn the owner; however, that provision has not been
interpreted by the courts.112
V. NATIONAL LAW—DEFENSES TO A/E LIABILITY
As should be clear from the discussion above, an architect’s
or engineer’s primary defense to a construction worker’s personal
injury claim, particularly where the claim asserts negligence
regarding site services, is that the design contract disclaimed the
a/e’s duty of care regarding site safety.113 In addition, as with any
professional liability claim, the plaintiff must present expert
testimony as to the standard of care and its violation, unless the
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Graham, 927 S.W.2d at 295-96; Romero v. Parkhill, Smith &
Cooper, Inc., 881 S.W.2d 522, 526-27 (Tex. App. 1994) (AIA contract); Peterson v. Fowler,
493 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1972), overruled on other grounds by Stamper v. Johnson, 232 P.3d
514, 516-17 (Utah 2010); Porter v. Stevens, Thompson & Runyan, Inc., 602 P.2d 1192, 1193
(Wash. Ct. App. 1979); Baumeister v. Automated Prods., Inc., 690 N.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Wis.
2004); Makinen v. PM P.C., 893 P.2d 1149, 1154-55 (Wyo. 1995), overruled on other
grounds by Terex Corp. v. Hough, 50 P.3d 317, 321 (Wyo. 2002).
109. See Yow, 412 S.E.2d at 566-67.
110. Id. (stating in dicta that the architect’s knowledge of the hazardous condition
would not have given rise to a duty of care); Jones v. James Reeves Contractors, Inc., 701
So. 2d 774, 782-83 (Miss. 1997).
111. Balagna v. Shawnee Cnty., 668 P.2d 157, 163 (Kan. 1983), overruled by statute
on other grounds as stated in Edwards v. Anderson Eng’g, Inc., 166 P.3d 1047, 1053, 1056
(Kan. 2007) (summary judgment reversed; a factual question whether the engineer knew of
the hazardous condition); Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Devs., 675 A.2d 209, 214 (N.J. 1996)
(engineer knew of hazard and had power to stop the work); Duncan v. Pennington Cnty.
Hous. Auth., 283 N.W.2d 546, 548 (S.D. 1979) (architect’s duty of supervision included
visits to the site by its employee several times a day, and the employee knew the work site
had received an OSHA citation which indicated that 20% of the temporary railings were
inadequate); Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher & Assocs., 426 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 1967)
(knowledge of hazard coupled with authority to stop the work).
112. CONSENSUSDOCS, supra note 38, § 3.2.8.4.
113. See supra note 102.
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negligence is so clear as to not require such testimony.114
Furthermore, an a/e may assert any defense any defendant in a
personal injury lawsuit could raise, such as lack of causation.115
Finally, although this Article is devoted to common law
developments, it should be noted that a few states have amended
their workers’ compensation laws to extend immunity from tort
liability to design professionals, so long as the accident did not
arise out of the defendant’s design responsibilities.116
VI. CONCLUSION
The changes in construction accident law jurisprudence from
the mid-twentieth century to the present, and in particular a/e
liability for worksite accidents, may be viewed as a microcosm of
American tort law developments during the same period. The
most fundamental progression was from a no-duty regime to the
use of the foreseeability doctrine to determine the existence and
scope of a duty. However, the particular nature of construction
projects—they involve numerous unrelated parties who are on the
site only by virtue of a contract—has created something of a
“special case” in tort law, in which contractual risk allocations
and disclaimers become of paramount importance in the liability
landscape. In this regard, a focus on construction accident law,
and a/e liability in particular, may be a lens through which to
achieve insights into tort law more generally.117
114. See, e.g., Michael v. Huffman Oil Co., 661 S.E.2d 1, 11 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
115. McKean v. Yates Eng’g Corp., 200 So. 3d 431, 433 (Miss. 2016) (criticizing the
quality of the design, however, the court pointed out that the contractor had “ignored
essential features of [the engineer’s] scaffolding design,” thereby implying that any defect
in the design was not a causal factor in the scaffold’s collapse); Baumeister v. Automated
Prods., Inc., 690 N.W.2d 1, 9-10 (Wis. 2004) (holding plaintiffs did not establish causation,
as they did not follow the truss manufacturer’s instructions).
116. A compilation of these statutes is found at 1 JON L. GELMAN, MODERN WORKERS
COMPENSATION § 103:34 (2021). See also Architect’s or Engineer’s Liability, supra note
5, §§ 34-39.
117. Similarly, construction industry disputes may be a lens through which to examine
the development of American contract law. See generally CARL J. CIRCO, CONTRACT LAW
IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CONTEXT (2020); Carl J. Circo, The Construction
Industry in the U.S. Supreme Court: Part 1, Contract Law, 41 CONSTR. LAW. 6 (2021); Carl
J. Circo, The Construction Industry in the U.S. Supreme Court: Part 2, Beyond Contract
Law, 41 CONSTR. LAW. 5 (2021).
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CONSTRUCTION LIENS AND THE “SECRET
LIEN” PROBLEM
Dale Whitman*
Perhaps the most essential element of a modern scheme of
land ownership is a system of records that will allow an owner to
show to the world, and particularly to intended transferees, that
she or he owns the land in question. It is almost equally important
that an owner be able to create a lien or charge on land, putting it
up as security for an obligation or debt while retaining possession.
And as a concomitant principle, it is critical that an intended
transferee be able to detect, in a reliable system of records,
whether the land has already been charged with a security interest
by its present owner.
Note that the intended transferee might be a new owner, in
which case the transferee will, in effect, inherit and become
subject to the lien or charge of the preexisting security interest.1
Alternatively, the transferee might be taking another security
interest, in which case, if there is a preexisting security interest,
the new interest will be subordinate in priority to the old one
under the familiar common-law principal that “first in time is first
in right.”2 Either way, it is essential to fairness and justice that a
system of records exists that will disclose to the subsequent
transferee the existence of the prior security interest. If the system
cannot reliably inform the subsequent party of the existence of a
prior interest or lien, the subsequent party may be unfairly
surprised to its great detriment. This might be termed the “secret
lien” problem. It is obvious that a modern system of commerce
*
The author wishes to thank Professor Carl Circo and J. B. Cross of the Arkansas Bar
for their valuable comments during the preparation of this article. Errors and oversights are
those of the author alone, of course.
1. See Lawrence Berger, An Analysis of the Doctrine That “First in Time is First in
Right”, 64 NEB. L. REV. 349, 350 (1985).
2. Id.
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in land, or in credit secured by land, cannot function successfully
if it permits secret liens to any major extent.
I. SECRET LIENS AND THE INVENTION OF THE
RECORDING SYSTEM
In the United States, of course, the system upon which we
rely to perform the task of avoiding secret liens is the recording
system. Surprisingly, England had no recording or land title
registration system before the twentieth century.3 The early
English mortgage was typically a conveyance of a fee simple
subject to a condition subsequent.4 The condition, upon
occurrence of which the mortgagor could exercise and redeem the
land, was payment of the debt on “law day,” the date the debt fell
due.5 The equity courts introduced flexibility into this procedure
by allowing tardy payment up to a later foreclosure date set by the
court.6 But for our purposes, the salient feature of this system was
that there were no public records from which a subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee could learn of the existence of a prior
mortgage on the land.
If the mortgagee took possession of the land, that possession
would likely warn future transferees of the existence of the
mortgage. But it was usual for the mortgagor to retain possession,
either by virtue of language in the mortgage granting that right,
by a leaseback, or simply by custom.7 Because there was no
governmental system of land records, an innocent purchaser who
had no knowledge of the preexisting mortgage might buy the land
or take a subsequent mortgage on it, and do so subject to the first
mortgage, only to learn later of his or her mistake. In other words,
the law allowed the existence of secret liens. Such a system,
which could punish the innocent purchaser or subsequent
3. Francis R. Crane, The Law of Real Property in England and the United States: Some
Comparisons, 36 IND. L. J. 282, 290 (1961).
4. See GRANT S. NELSON, DALE A. WHITMAN, ANN M. BURKHART & R. WILSON
FREYERMUTH, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 1.2 (6th ed. 2015) [hereafter “REAL ESTATE
FINANCE LAW”].
5. Id.
6. Id. § 1.3.
7. Id. § 1.2.
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mortgagee, was unacceptable to the American colonists, and they
were determined to change it.
Our recording system was invented in the Massachusetts
Bay Colony.8 While some towns apparently had local recording
prior to this date, the first colony-wide act was adopted in 1640.9
It applied to both deeds and mortgages.10 Unlike modern
recording acts, which typically operate only in favor of bona fide
purchasers, it simply provided that conveyances were not
effective against any subsequent third party unless they were
recorded. For example, as to mortgages, the act said:
And that no such bargain, sale, or grant already made in way
of mortgage where the grantor remains in possession, shall
be of force against any other but the grantor or his heirs,
except the same shall be entered, as is hereafter expressed,
within one month after the end of this Court, if the party be
within this jurisdiction, or else within 3 months after he shall
return.11

In simple terms, the recording system the colonists invented
had two functions. One was to allow owners to demonstrate their
ownership. This was useful mainly when they desired to sell or
mortgage their land. The system gave purchasers and mortgagees
some confidence that the party with whom they were dealing
actually had title to the land. The other function, closely related,
was to assure such purchasers and mortgagees that the title on
which they were relying was not burdened by preexisting
mortgages, liens, or other encumbrances—again, to oversimplify
a bit, that there were no secret liens.
While the original Massachusetts Bay statute quoted above
protected all subsequent takers, nearly all of the recording acts
that subsequently evolved protected only subsequent parties who
took their interests in the land in good faith and paid value—that
is, they were “bona fide purchasers.”12 Moreover, the protection
8. See PHILIP J. NEXON, REAL ESTATE TITLE PRACTICE IN MASSACHUSETTS § 1.4
(Mass. Cont. L. Ed. 2020).
9. Id. § 1.4.2.
10. Id.
11. Id. (citing 1 Mass. Colonial Records 306 (1640) (spelling modernized)).
12. See DALE A. WHITMAN, ANN M. BURKHART, R. WILSON FREYERMUTH & TROY
A. RULE, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.9 (4th ed. 2019) [hereinafter “THE LAW OF
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afforded by the recording acts was and is in some respects weak,
partial, and inadequate,13 a fact that has led in the United States
to the rise of title insurance as additional protection to purchasers
and mortgagees.14 But defects in the recording systems are not
our focus in the present Article. It remains a fact that one
principal objective of those systems is to ensure that purchasers
and mortgagees not be entrapped by secret liens, and in that task
they are generally quite effective.
II. THE COURTS’ ANTIPATHY TO SECRET LIENS:
THE VENDOR’S LIEN AS AN ILLUSTRATION
The principal focus of this Article will be the operation of
construction liens. However, in this section we will examine, for
purposes of illustration, an analogous but much simpler concept:
the vendor’s lien. Assume that an owner of land sells it but does
not receive the full purchase price at the time legal title is passed
to the purchaser by deed. A wise seller would demand that the
purchaser give the seller a promissory note for the unpaid portion
of the price, secured by a purchase-money mortgage on the land.
But not all sellers are wise or sophisticated, so let us imagine a
case in which the seller does not retain any specific security
interest on the land when conveying away the title.
In this setting the courts of equity will find an implied lien
on the land in favor of the seller for the remaining purchase
price.15 This seems a fair result; if the purchaser were permitted
to keep the land’s title free and clear, the purchaser would
obviously be unjustly enriched. Even if the purchaser resells the
property to a new party, the lien will remain in effect if the new
party has notice of the fact that the original purchaser has not yet
fully paid for the land. But the courts are a bit suspicious of the

PROPERTY”]. Only three modern statutes (North Carolina, Louisiana, and Delaware) do not
require BFP status to protect the subsequent taker. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. § 11.14.
15. Id. § 10.6. If the seller does reserve an express purchase-money mortgage or other
documented express security interest, it is usually held that the vendor’s lien has been
waived. See, e.g., Russo v. Cedrone, 375 A.2d 906, 909 (R.I. 1977).
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lien,16 and if the land is resold to a bona fide purchaser (“BFP”)
who lacks notice of it, title will pass free of the lien.
One can explain this result in either of two ways. One
explanation is the recording act. The vendor’s lien is, of course,
unwritten, and therefore unrecorded. Hence, the subsequent
purchaser, being a BFP, will take free of the lien.17 The
alternative explanation is the long-standing equitable principle
that the legal interest acquired by a BFP will prevail over a prior
equitable right.18 Either way, the result is the same; the law’s
famous solicitude for BFPs will govern over the claim of the land
seller, who might have protected himself or herself by more
careful means—taking and recording a purchase-money
mortgage. As early as 1822 the U.S. Supreme Court adopted this
view, holding:
There is not perhaps a State in the Union, the laws of which
do not make all conveyances not recorded, and all secret
trusts, void as to creditors as well as subsequent purchasers
without notice. To support the secret lien of the vendor
against a creditor who is a mortgagee, would be to counteract
the spirit of these laws.19

The vendor’s lien thus provides us with a good example of
courts’ unwillingness to foist a secret lien on a BFP, frames the
issue nicely, and prepares us to begin our analysis of construction
liens.

16. See, e.g., Brooks v. Thorne, 222 N.W. 916, 917-18 (Minn. 1929).
17. See, e.g., Agri Bank FCB v. Maxfield, 316 Ark. 566, 570-71, 873 S.W.2d 514, 51617 (1994); Stump v. Swanson Dev. Co., 2014 IL App (3d) 110784, ¶ 95; Bolen v. Bolen,
169 S.W.3d 59, 63-64, 63 n.11 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005); Malco Realty Corp. v. Westchester
Condos, LLC, 982 N.Y.S.2d 64, 64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014). In half the states (those with “racenotice” statutes), this assumes that the subsequent purchaser records his or her own deed, but
that is nearly always the case. In the three pure “race” states (see THE LAW OF PROPERTY,
supra note 12, § 11.9) the subsequent purchaser need not even be a BFP to prevail over the
vendor’s lien. And at least one state has a special statute dealing with vendors’ liens: CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3048 (West 2022) states that a vendor’s lien is not valid against “a purchaser
or incumbrancer in good faith and for value.”
18. See generally 2 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 413 (Symons ed., 1941); see 4 id. § 1253; see also, Weaver v. Blake, 300
N.W.2d 52, 54 & n.4 (S.D. 1980); Radke v. Myers, 167 N.W. 360, 361 (Minn. 1918)
(apparently adopting both explanations).
19. Bayley v. Greenleaf, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 46, 57-58 (1822).
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III. THE STRUCTURE OF CONSTRUCTION LIENS
The concept of construction liens (traditionally termed
“mechanics’ liens”) is simple and attractive. If someone provides
labor or materials for a project of construction or improvement on
real estate and is not paid for the work or materials supplied, she
or he is entitled to a lien on the real property that can be foreclosed
to recover the money owed.20 This seems fair enough; the lien
claimant has obviously increased the value of the property, and
the owner would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to
retain it in its improved state without paying for the improvement.
There are at least three critical dates in the scheme under
which construction liens operate. One of them is the recording
date.21 On this date, usually measured at 60 to 180 days after the
claimant completes his or her work on the project, the claimant
must record a notice of the claim of lien in the public records,
usually mail a copy of the claim to the owner, and sometimes
publish a copy in a local newspaper.22 Within some additional
period of time after that, usually six months to a year, if the claim
has not been paid, the claimant must file a suit to foreclose the
lien, much like the judicial foreclosure of a mortgage or the
foreclosure of a judgment lien.23
The third critical date occurs long before the two mentioned
above. It is the lien priority date. The most common priority date,
used in nearly half of the states, is the date that work on the overall
project commenced.24 Under this approach, all lien claimants get
the same priority, and their liens share pro rata in the security
afforded by the real estate.25 This seems fair enough: why should
the happenstance of when a particular claimant did work or
provided materials during the course of construction have any
effect on the priority of his or her lien?

20. See REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW, supra note 4, §12.4. This source provides
citations for all of the general descriptions of construction lien statutes in this section.
21. See Id.
22. See Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW, supra note 4, § 12.4.
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The second most common approach to the lien priority date
is to give each claimant priority based on the date he or she
commenced work or first supplied materials on the project.26 This
gives an obvious advantage to those whose involvement was
earlier in the construction process. A few states use a variety of
other methods, including the date of the general contract, the date
of the lien claimant’s contract, or the date a notice of the contract
was recorded.27
All of these priority dates have one thing in common,
however: they are early in the construction period, while the lien
claim’s recording date is likely to be late in the construction
period or, in many cases, well after construction is completed.28
When the lien claim is recorded, it is nearly always said to “relate
back” to the priority date.29 Suppose that at some time between
the priority date and the recording date, someone buys the
property or lends money and accepts a mortgage or other
consensual lien on it. How can such a buyer or lender learn about
the impending filing of the lien claim? Obviously, the traditional
method of discovering the existence of prior liens—a title search
in the public records—will potentially be unavailing, since the
lien claimant may not yet have filed his or her claim in the
records.
How will a purchaser or lender learn of liens that are yet to
be filed? If they are aware that a construction project has recently
been completed, or is about to be completed, and if the owner and
general contractor are honest and well-organized, the answer is
simple. The owner will present the purchaser or lender with a list
of all subcontractors and suppliers, along with a set of final lien
waivers signed by those who have finished their work. The lien
waivers show that they have been fully paid and cannot file liens.
Prior to closing of the sale or loan, lien waivers for the remainder
of the subcontractors and suppliers will also be provided as they
receive final payment.

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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What can go wrong? As it turns out, a great deal. The
process of obtaining lien waivers is complicated, timeconsuming, and potentially error prone. Even a modest-sized
construction project may involve several dozen suppliers and
subcontractors. One or more of them may be unpaid but omitted
from the lien waiver process inadvertently by the owner or
general contractor, and it is easy enough for the buyer or lender
(or its title insurer) to fail to notice a missing contractor,
subcontractor, or supplier from the list provided by the owner.
Second, if cash is running short, the owner may well be tempted
to intentionally fail to pay a supplier or subcontractor, and to omit
that party from the list of lien waivers given to the buyer or lender.
Again, the omission may not be noticeable to the buyer or lender.
Third, will the fact of recent construction be apparent to the
buyer or lender? If it is a new building or major work, probably
so. But a more minor remodeling job, such as the replacement of
a roof, repaving of a parking lot, or replacement of an HVAC unit,
may not be obvious at all, and may fail to trigger any further
inquiry. At most, the owner may simply sign a (false) affidavit
stating that no construction work has occurred on the property
during the past X months. No question of lien waivers will ever
arise. Yet if a contractor or supplier on such a minor job is in fact
not paid, a lien may well be filed.
All in all, there is simply no assurance that a buyer or lender
will get notice of an impending, but as yet unrecorded, lien filing
on the property. If such a party acquires the property or a
mortgage on it after the lien priority date, but before a lien is
recorded, that party is at risk of being victimized by a secret lien.
Of course, if the courts followed the philosophy we outlined
earlier with regard to vendors’ liens and other secret liens, they
would step in and protect the BFP. But with construction liens,
things are not so simple, because construction liens are creatures
of statute. The statutes may not make any provision for protection
of BFPs, and courts may not feel at all comfortable creating
judicial exceptions to statutory language.30 Hence an innocent
30. Of course, a judicial recognition of such protection is possible. See Anderson v.
Streck, 378 S.E.2d 526, 528 (Ga. App. 1989); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-22-125
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buyer or lender may be subjected to a construction lien. Therein
lies the problem this Article intends to address.
At this point we propose to leave the general and examine
the specific. We will consider the construction lien statutes of
Arkansas and the eight states contiguous to Arkansas to see if the
scenario described above can realistically occur in each of them,
and whether in each there are any statutory or judicially created
protections for the innocent buyer or lender. The choice of these
nine states is admittedly arbitrary but will provide a snapshot of
the problem in this region of the nation. We will begin with
Arkansas.
IV. ARKANSAS CONSTRUCTION LIENS AS
ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE SECRET LIEN PROBLEM
Arkansas follows the general pattern for construction liens
outlined above. A contractor, subcontractor, or supplier is
entitled to file in the public records a lien for labor, goods, or
services incorporated into an improvement on real property.31
The filing, known as a “Statement of Account,” may be filed up
to 120 days after the last work or material delivery by the lien
claimant.32 At least ten days prior to filing, the lien claimant must
send a notice to the owner of the property of the claimant’s intent
to file the lien.33 If the claimant is not paid, she or he has fifteen
months after filing the lien to file a judicial complaint to foreclose
the lien.34
The key issue in this process is the priority of the lien. All
liens filed by all claimants receive the same priority date, which
is the date of commencement of work on the overall project.35
Commencement is defined by statute as “visible manifestation of
activity on real estate that would lead a reasonable person to
believe that construction or repair of an improvement to the real
(2021) (protecting BFPs against certain mechanics liens if filed more than two months after
completion of a one-family or two-family dwelling).
31. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-101(a) (2021).
32. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-117(a)(1) (2019).
33. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-114(a) (2009).
34. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-119 (2005).
35. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-110(a)(1) (1995).
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estate has begun or will soon begin.”36 As illustrations, the statute
mentions delivery of materials, grading or excavating, laying out
lines or grade stakes, and demolition of existing structures.37
Thus, the stage is set for the secret lien problem. One who
buys or takes a mortgage on the property after commencement of
the project, but before 120 days have expired after its completion,
will take his or her interest subordinate in priority to any
construction liens that may be filed. Yet there is no assurance
whatsoever that such buyers or mortgagees will have notice that
liens are pending. As noted above, they may not even be aware
of the construction work or completed repairs. For liens filed by
subcontractors and suppliers who participated late in the
construction process, there is a period of nearly four months after
construction is completed, but before any lien filing need take
place, when a buyer or mortgagee might acquire an interest in the
property despite no obvious evidence that any recent construction
has taken place.38
Even if buyers or mortgagees are aware of the recent
construction or repair project, and even if they are sophisticated
enough to understand the need for lien waivers, they may request
waivers but be negligently or intentionally misinformed by the
owner as to the identity of the relevant subcontractors and
suppliers. They have no practical means of protecting themselves
from this eventuality. If they can convince a title insurer to cover
them for this risk, which is unlikely, that merely passes any
potential loss to the title underwriter—which is no fairer than
leaving it with the buyer or mortgagee, although at least it spreads
the loss among a broader group.
Arkansas statutes require two specific notices in connection
with the eligibility of potential lien claimants to file their liens.
The first is required only in the case of construction of residential
property of four dwelling units or less.39 The notice must be sent
by the prime contractor to the owner before work on the project
commences. Only a single notice is required, and it is effective
36.
37.
38.
39.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-110(a)(2).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-110(a)(2).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-117(a)(1) (2019).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-115(b)(4) (2021).
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for all subcontractors and suppliers. If the prime contractor does
not give the notice, then any subcontractor, laborer, or supplier
may do so (even after the project commences),40 and such a notice
is effective for subcontractors and suppliers for work done
thereafter but is not effective for the prime contractor.
If no notice is given, no lien to assist in recovery on any
contract may be filed.41 However, there are two exceptions:42 (1)
if a payment bond is in place (a rare occurrence on small
residential projects), and (2) if claim of lien is for materials that
have been directly sold to the owner by a supplier.43 The notice
is not required to contain any listing of the subcontractors or
suppliers.44
The second “extra” notice applies only to properties that the
first notice, discussed above, does not apply to—that is,
nonresidential property and residential property with five
dwelling units or more.45 The notice is usually termed a “seventyfive day notice” because it requires that each subcontractor or
supplier, in order to be eligible to file a lien, must notify the owner
that it is unpaid within seventy-five days from the time that it
commenced supplying materials or labor to the project.46 The
notice must identify the project or job and the subcontractor or
supplier, briefly describe the work or materials, and state the
amount unpaid.47 In effect, this notice is a warning to the owner
that if she or he does not take appropriate measures to insure that
the claimant is paid, a lien may be filed. If a subcontractor or
supplier has not sent a seventy-five-day notice, no lien can be
filed.48

40. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-115(a)(5)(b)(i).
41. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-115(a)(4), (a)(5)(C).
42. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-115(a)(8).
43. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-115(8)(A).
44. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-115(b)(6).
45. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-115(b)(4).
46. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-115 (b)(5)(A). The class of persons who must file the
seventy-five-day notice is broadened to include “service providers,” defined as an architect,
an engineer, a surveyor, an appraiser, a landscaper, an abstractor, or a title insurance agent.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-115(b)(2)(B).
47. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-115(b)(6).
48. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-115(b)(4).
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Both notices may be useful to owners who are having
construction work done on their real estate. Unfortunately, they
have no value to prospective BFPs or creditors making loans on
that real estate. The primary reason is that they are not recorded
in the public records, so that there is no certain way for a BFP to
locate them. In the case of a seventy-five day notice, a purchaser
or lender can ask the owner for a copy of the notices received, but
there can be no way to ensure that the owner will provide them,
or all of them.49 Moreover, the owner may receive additional
seventy-five day notices after the request is received, and indeed,
even after the closing of the sale or loan.50 The residential precommencement notice does not even provide this much
assistance, since it does not list the names of potential lienors.51
All in all, it is apparent that the Arkansas General Assembly
has not considered the problem of the BFP and has provided no
practical means for such a party to be protected from secret
mechanics’ liens. There appears to be no Arkansas judicial
authority considering the issue.
V. A COMPARISON WITH THE CONSTRUCTION LIEN
STATUTES OF SURROUNDING STATES
In this section we propose to examine the construction lien
statutes of the states surrounding Arkansas to see to what extent
they too present the problem of secret liens in roughly the same
manner as Arkansas. Of course, construction lien statutes are
famously individualized, and no two states have identical statutes,
so we are looking for overall patterns rather than perfect matches.
Bear in mind, as well, that there are many subtle differences
among these statutes that have nothing to do with the problem of
secret liens and that are outside the scope of our treatment here.
A. Kansas

49. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
50. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-115(b)(5)(A).
51. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-115(a)(3), (a)(5)(B)(i).

7 WHITMAN.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

CONSTRUCTION LIENS

6/6/22 6:58 PM

413

At first glance, the Kansas construction lien statute’s
definitions seem quite different than Arkansas’s. The priority
date that the first lien attaches to the property is the date that the
first individual lien claimant commences work or supplies
materials,52 rather than the date work commences on the project
as a whole as in Arkansas.53 If there are multiple lien claimants,
all of them share pro rata in that same priority.54 However, if that
earliest lien claimant is paid off, the priority date for all remaining
claimants then shifts to the date of commencement of work or
supplying of materials of the next earliest claimant.55
The result of this somewhat bizarre system is that, until well
after construction is completed, it is impossible to tell what the
priority date for the construction liens will be. All that one can
say for certain is that it will be at some point during the
construction period.
When will a prospective mortgagee or buyer be able to tell
from an examination of the public records that a lien exists?
Unlike Arkansas, the time frame is determined on the basis of the
behavior of each individual claimant, rather than by virtue of
completion of the overall project. Each contractor or supplier
must file a claim of lien, with an itemized statement of the amount
owed, within four months after that particular claimant last
supplied materials or performed labor on the project.56
But despite the differences in definitions, the result in
Kansas is much the same as in Arkansas. There is a gap of several
months’ duration after construction is completed, during which a
purchaser or mortgagee may acquire an interest in the property,
and despite having performed a thorough title examination, be
unaware that title will be subject to one or more construction
liens. In Kansas, this is the gap between the date of lien priority,
when the earliest unpaid lien claimant commences work or begins
supplying materials, and the date when the lien is filed in the
52. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1101 (2005).
53. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-110(a)(1) (2021).
54. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1101 (2005).
55. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1101.
56. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1102 (2005). For subcontractors and materials delivered to
subcontractors, the period is reduced to three months. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1103 (2005).
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public records, which may be as long as three or four months after
the last lien claimant completes work or finishes supplying
materials. A BFP or mortgagee who buys or lends during this
period is left with no protection by the statute. There appears to
be no Kansas judicial decision addressing the rights of BFPs.
B. Kentucky
The rules for establishing and filing a construction lien in
Kentucky are similar to those in Kansas. Each claimant’s lien
relates back, for priority purposes, to the date that the particular
claimant began furnishing labor or materials to the job.57 The
claimant must file the claim of lien for record within six months
after she or he completes work on the job.58 Hence it appears that,
like Arkansas and Kansas, there is a “gap” during which any
buyer or mortgagee, even a good faith taker for value, may be
subject to a secret lien.59 However, the Kentucky statute contains
an extremely useful provision for prospective purchasers and
mortgagees. It states that:
The lien shall not take precedence over a mortgage or other
contract lien or bona fide conveyance for value without
notice, duly recorded . . . unless the person claiming the prior
lien shall, before the recording of the mortgage or other
contract lien or conveyance, file . . . a statement showing that
he has furnished or expects to furnish labor or materials, and
the amount in full thereof.60

A subsequent buyer or lender61 might at this point wonder:
am I protected by this statute as a bona fide taker for value without
notice? The meaning of the value part of this phrase seems
simple; I have paid or lent a substantial amount of consideration.

57. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.010(1) (West 2002).
58. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.080 (West 1990).
59. Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.010(1) (West 2002), with KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 376.080 (West 1990) (demonstrating the apparent gap between the date of priority
and the date when the lien is filed in the public records).
60. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.010(2).
61. Despite the somewhat ambiguous wording of the statute, it is clear in the cases that
the “without notice” phrase applies to takers of mortgages as well as grantees of deeds. See,
e.g., Grider v. Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 565 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

7 WHITMAN.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

CONSTRUCTION LIENS

6/6/22 6:58 PM

415

But do I have notice? What does notice mean? Is notice that there
was work done or materials supplied to the site sufficient? What
about notice that a contractor or supplier did work or supplied
materials, but has not yet been paid? Or suppose I have notice
that the contractor or materials supplier intends to file a notice of
lien? Which of these forms of notice, if any of them—all of which
are something short of the actual filing of a notice of lien, which
I can discover by means of a title examination—will deprive me
of my BFP status?
Fortunately, a Kentucky case provides a clear answer: the
grantee or mortgagee will be held to have enough notice to lose
BFP status only if she or he knows that there is a prospective
lienor who in fact intends to file a claim of lien, or if she or he
knows that there are delinquent amounts owed to a prospective
lienor and that the owner is unable to pay them.62 Where does
this leave a prospective buyer or mortgagee? Obviously, such a
party will perform a title examination in the ordinary course of
events. If no recorded statements from potential lienors are found
in this search, and if the buyer or mortgagee is not aware of any
contractor or supplier performing work or supplying materials to
the property within some reasonable prior period—say, eighteen
months63—the buyer or mortgagee can be reasonably sure of
being classified as a BFP and taking free of any liens that might
be subsequently filed. Note that only actual knowledge of the
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee is relevant; the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, at least, has taken the view that constructive
notice is not relevant in assessing whether the subsequent party is
a BFP.64

62. Id. at 649-50.
63. This figure is arrived at by taking the six-month period for filing of liens after
completion of the lienor’s work or final supplying of material and adding a generous estimate
of the time required for construction—say, twelve months. This last figure might be varied
depending on the type of property and construction.
64. Grider, 565 S.W.2d at 649. This view is not inevitable, however. The court could
have said that the subsequent party should be held to have inspected the property, detected
that some work had been done on it, and inquired how long ago and by whom the work was
done. In the actual case such a discussion would, however, have been dictum, since the
subsequent mortgagee was fully aware of the contractor’s work on the property, as the loan
in question was a construction loan. Id. at 648.
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If any recorded statements are found, or if the buyer or
mortgagee is aware from other information of the existence of any
contractors or suppliers, the only safe course of action is to insist
on lien waivers from them, showing that they have been paid in
full and hence will not file claims of lien. It would make little
sense for a subsequent party who knows about a contractor or
materials supplier to rely on the definitions of BFP discussed
above—that is, that the potential lien claimant is not planning on
filing a lien, or that the owner has sufficient funds to pay the
claimant’s unpaid bill—as a way of achieving priority; it is much
simpler and more certain to insist on a lien waiver.
In conclusion, how good is the Kentucky statute’s protection
of BFPs? Good, but not perfect. There is still some risk. A
subsequent buyer or mortgagee might honestly have no
knowledge of the existence of a lien claimant, but the lien
claimant might assert priority, claiming that the subsequent taker
had actual knowledge of the lien claimant’s existence and that the
claimant intended to file a lien or was unpaid and that the owner
lacked the funds to pay the claimant’s bill. Conceivably the trier
of fact could believe the lien claimant’s allegations and the lien
could be granted priority over the BFP. After all, lacking
subjective knowledge and convincing a court of that lack of
knowledge are two different things, potentially with different
outcomes. There is no way to prevent this risk, although it might
be passed to a title insurer, with a suitable affidavit provided by
the purchaser or mortgagee.
Nonetheless, the Kentucky statute provides much better
protection against construction liens for BFPs than any of the
other statutes we have discussed—provided, of course, that the
BFP is willing to go to the trouble of obtaining lien waivers from
every contractor and supplier who has filed a recorded notice as
provided by the Kentucky statute, as well as every contractor and
supplier of whom the BFP is actually aware.
C. Mississippi

7 WHITMAN.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

CONSTRUCTION LIENS

6/6/22 6:58 PM

417

The Mississippi legislature radically revised its construction
lien statutes in 2014.65 Under the new statute, liens have no
“relation back” priority. An individual lienor’s lien arises and
takes its priority only from the date that it is recorded.66 That
means that the grantee of any mortgage or deed to the property
that is recorded prior to a particular mechanics’ lien will take free
and clear of that lien.67 Likewise, the grantee of any mortgage or
deed recorded after a particular lien is filed will take subject and
subordinate to that lien.68 Each lien stands on its own and gets its
own priority date as of the date it is filed of record, so far as third
parties are concerned.69
No issue can arise with respect to a grantee or mortgagee
having notice (constructive, inquiry, or actual) of a lien that a
contractor, subcontractor, or materials supplier intends to file or
has the right to file but has not yet filed; the statute provides that
the lien simply does not exist until it is actually filed of record. In
effect, the statute is a pure “race” recording statute. Notice or
BFP status is of no consequence.70 From the viewpoint of
subsequent purchasers or mortgagees, this is the best of all
possible worlds; such a party who performs a “clean” title
examination can be absolutely certain to take free of construction
liens.
D. Missouri
The basic pattern of early priority and late filing of
construction liens which we have seen in Arkansas and Kansas is
65. See Clyde X. (“Trey”) Copeland, III & Robert P. Wise, Expansion of Mississippi’s
Construction Lien Laws to Include Mississippi Subcontractors, Materialmen, Consulting
Engineers, and Surveyors, 84 MISS. L.J. 905, 908 (2015).
66. MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-7-405(1)(b) (2014).
67. Copeland, supra note 65, at 952-53.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. As early as 1906, prior versions of the Mississippi mechanics lien statute protected
BFPs by providing that the lien would “take effect as to purchasers or incumbrancers for a
valuable consideration, without notice thereof, only from the time of commencing suit to
enforce the lien.” MISS. CODE ANN. § 3058 (1906). See McKenzie v. Fellows, 52 So. 628,
628 (Miss. 1910). The present version of the lien statute drops this language, presumably
because it would now be irrelevant, since BFP status is irrelevant in a pure “race” regime.
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also applicable in Missouri. The priority date for all liens “relates
back” to the date when work on the overall project commences—
often termed the “first spade” rule.71 The claim of lien must be
filed within six months after the claim accrues,72 a phrase that has
been construed to mean six months after the last work has been
performed or materials delivered.73 There is thus a wide gap
period within which a BFP might buy or take a mortgage (or in
Missouri, more likely a deed of trust) on the property, unaware
from a title examination or an inspection of the property that there
is an impending filing of a lien. How would such a case be
handled in Missouri?
There are indeed reported Missouri cases in which a
purchaser was held to be subject to a lien that was not yet filed of
record at the time of the purchase, but in each of these cases the
transferee was fully aware of the construction project, and indeed,
construction was still ongoing at the time of the sale.74 Thus, the
purchaser in these cases was emphatically not a BFP. By negative
inference, we might suspect that a BFP would take free of an
unfiled mechanics’ lien in Missouri, but there is no authority to
help us determine whether this is so, or if it is, how to define the
parameters of BFP status in Missouri.75 Unfortunately, there is
simply no express answer to our question in statutory or case law.
E. Oklahoma
In Oklahoma mechanics’ liens follow the “first spade” rule;
all liens take their priority from the date the building or project

71. MO. REV. STAT. § 429.060 (1939). Technically, this date establishes priority only
for a lien on the land. MO. REV. STAT. § 429.050 (1939) gives the properly perfected lienor
a lien on the buildings or improvements even as against preexisting mortgages and other
encumbrances. See Bob DeGeorge Assocs., Inc. v. Hawthorn Bank, 377 S.W.3d 592, 59899 (Mo. 2012).
72. MO. REV. STAT. § 429.080 (2007).
73. See United Petroleum Serv., Inc. v. Piatchek, 218 S.W.3d 477, 482-83 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2007).
74. Lee & Boutell Co. v. C. A. Brockett Cement Co., 106 S.W.2d 451, 459-61 (Mo.
1937); Williams v. Chi., S.F. & C. Ry. Co., 20 S.W. 631, 633, 642 (Mo. 1892); McAdow v.
Sturtevant, 41 Mo. App. 220, 224-25, 228, 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 1890).
75. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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commences.76 It has been said that the recording requirement of
the Oklahoma mechanics’ lien statute exists to protect BFPs.77
However, since recording need not occur until four months after
the last material or equipment used on said land was furnished or
the last labor was performed under the contract,78 recording is a
very ineffectual method of protecting BFPs. Like Arkansas,
Kansas, and probably Missouri, there is a wide time gap within
which a purchaser or mortgagee might acquire or take a security
interest in the property without any protection from the recording
system. No judicial decision seems to address protection for
BFPs.

F. Tennessee
Tennessee’s statutes contain an unusual provision allowing
a contractor to record an acknowledged form of the construction
contract in the records of the register of deeds in the county where
the real estate is located.79 If such a recording is made, it
immediately gives notice to any subsequent purchaser or
encumbrancer of a mechanics’ lien that may arise in favor of the
contractor.80 If the contract is not thus recorded, the contractor
must record a notice of lien within ninety days after the
improvement is completed or abandoned.81 If this time deadline
is met, the lien’s attachment dates back to the time of visible
commencement of operations on the improvement—the “first
spade” rule;82 if it is not met, there is no relation back, and the lien
attaches only when it is recorded.83
76. OKLA. STAT. tit. 42, § 141 (2013).
77. Davidson Oil Country Supply Co., Inc. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Equip. Co., 689 P.2d
1279, 1280 (Okla. 1984).
78. OKLA. STAT. tit. 42, § 142 (1980).
79. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-11-111 (2007).
80. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-11-111. The contract may be recorded at any time up to
ninety days after the improvement is completed or abandoned. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-11112(a) (2007).
81. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-11-112(a).
82. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-11-104(a) (2013).
83. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-11-112(a).
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Thus, Tennessee follows the pattern we have already seen in
Arkansas, Kansas, likely Missouri, and Oklahoma, with one
exception: the possibility that that the lienor will have recorded a
copy of the construction contract at an early stage, thus giving
notice of his or her potential lien rights to prospective purchasers
or lenders. Obviously, anyone considering buying or lending on
property and finding, in a title examination, a construction
contract recorded recently,84 will be well advised to obtain a lien
waiver from such a contractor.
Hence, if no contract is recorded, the “gap” period, during
which a BFP will be subject to a lien that relates back to the
commencement of the project, is fairly narrow: ninety days from
the time the lien claimant completes or abandons his or her work.
Nonetheless, the risk is present, and nothing in the Tennessee
statute or judicial decisions appears to protect BFPs against it.
G. Texas
Texas, rather oddly, recognizes two categories of
mechanics’ liens:
constitutional85 and statutory.86
A
constitutional lien, in principle, is self-executing and takes effect
without any filing by the lien claimant unless the property is a
homestead.87 A statutory lien88 requires compliance with specific
procedures, including the filing for record of an affidavit of claim
by the fifteenth day of either the third or fourth month after the
month the contractor or supplier has completed, terminated, or
abandoned work on the improvement, depending on the
circumstances.89
84. A prime contractor’s lien lasts for one year after completion or abandonment of the
improvement. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-11-106 (2007). Subcontractors’ and materials
suppliers’ liens last for only ninety days after completion of work or the furnishing of
materials. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-11-115(b) (2007).
85. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 37.
86. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.021 (West 2022).
87. See First Nat’l Bank v. Whirlpool Corp., 517 S.W.2d 262, 267 (Tex. 1974).
88. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.021.
89. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.052 (West 2022). The deadlines indicated in the text
take effect in 2022. Relevant circumstances include whether the claimant is a prime
contractor or a subcontractor or supplier and whether the real estate is residential. The details
are not significant for our purposes.
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The constitutional lien might seem preferable from the
viewpoint of lien claimants, since it takes effect automatically and
requires no filing.90 However, it is subject to several important
limitations. It operates only in favor of prime contractors—those
who deal directly with the owner of the property—and not for
subcontractors.91 It is available only for improvements to an
“article” or “building,” while the statutory mechanics’ lien can
also cover architects, engineers, surveyors, landscape providers
and installers, and demolition workers.92
Significantly for our purposes, constitutional mechanics’
liens are said not to be binding on BFPs.93 This rule is detrimental
to a lien claimant, and is viewed as a reason for a claimant not to
rely on a constitutional lien, or to file for record an affidavit of
lien in order to prevent BFPs from arising.94 From the viewpoint
of purchasers and lenders the rule seems beneficial, but it is not
quite the panacea that they might hope, in part because BFP is
narrowly defined. A purchaser or creditor who has seen the
construction in process of completion95 (or presumably, one who
has other actual knowledge of it) is deemed to be aware that
mechanics’ liens may be filed, and thus is not considered a BFP.
That seems fair enough. The cases all involve newly constructed
houses, and it is reasonable to expect someone who buys a new
90. However, if the property is a homestead, the contractor and owner must enter into
a written contract; both spouses must sign if the owner is married, and the contract must be
filed for record with the county clerk’s office. Additional requirements apply if the contract
is for remodeling. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.254 (2022); TEX. CONST. art. XVI, §
50; J. PAULO FLORES, TEXAS RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL § 6:7 (2021).
91. The latter are covered by the statutory lien. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.021.
92. FLORES, supra note 90, § 6:2; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.021.
93. See, e.g., Tex. Wood Mill Cabinets, Inc. v. Butter, 117 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Tex. App.
2003).
94. See FLORES, supra note 90, §§ 6:2, 6:12. The affidavit is the same form that is used
to perfect a statutory mechanics lien. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.054(a) (1997).
95. See FLORES, supra note 90, § 6:12. The other cases cited by Tex. Wood Mill
Cabinets, Inc. for this proposition probably all involve fact patterns in which the purchaser
actually saw the ongoing construction. See, e.g., Valdez v. Diamond Shamrock Refin. &
Mktg. Co., 842 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Tex. 1992); Inman v. Clark, 485 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1972). Wood v. Barnes does not expressly state that the purchaser saw the
construction, but the timing of the purchase, when compared with the date of recording of
the affidavit of claim of lien, strongly suggests that the purchasers either saw the construction
or were actually aware that it had just been completed. 420 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967)
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house to obtain a list of contractors and suppliers from the seller
and insist on lien waivers from them.96 It is not clear what a Texas
court would do with a case in which work has recently been
completed but the purchaser or creditor is unaware of it; a new
roof, a repaved parking lot, or a new HVAC system might provide
an example. Would the court hold that the purchaser or creditor
should have discovered the construction work, and hence is not a
BFP? The answer is uncertain.
If the lienor files for record an affidavit claiming a
constitutional lien, but does so after the property has been sold or
mortgaged by the owner, the situation becomes even murkier.
This is what occurred in Wood v. Barnes.97 Putting aside the
notice that the purchaser received from viewing the construction
itself, as discussed above, the court in that case seems to hold that
the filing of the affidavit gave the purchaser notice of the lien even
though it was filed after the purchaser bought the property. “The
[buyers] having purchased the property before the expiration of
the 120-day period [allowed for filing the affidavit] must take
constructive notice98 of [the lienor’s] existing right to file his
affidavits.”99 In other words, a purchaser has constructive notice
of an affidavit that might be recorded in the future!100 Placing
this conclusion on the ground of constructive notice seems to
make no sense at all; one might as well say that, if the lienor ever
files an affidavit of claim within the allowed statutory period, the
protection for BFPs is simply nonexistent.101
96. There remains, of course, the problem of the seller who dishonestly fails to disclose
a complete list of contractors and suppliers.
97. 420 S.W.2d at 427.
98. Id. at 428. It is unclear whether the discussion in the opinion about constructive
notice is mere dictum, in light of the fact that the buyers saw the ongoing construction and
hence arguably had actual knowledge of the construction contracts. See Inman, 485 S.W.2d
at 374.
99. Wood, 420 S.W.2d at 428.
100. Flores agrees with this interpretation of the case. See FLORES, supra note 90, §
6.14: “When a lien affidavit is filed after the property is sold by the owner who contracted
for the improvements, the purchaser is deemed to have constructive notice of a contractor’s
right to assert a lien for the statutory period, even where the filing period commenced prior
to the purchase.” Apparently contra, see Atkinson v. Swoboda, No. 01-94-00510-CV, 1997
WL 94358 at *6 (Tex. App. Mar. 6, 1997).
101. Incidentally, why the statutory time limit for filing the affidavit should be binding
in the case of a constitutional mechanics lien is a mystery that has not been satisfactorily
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One can only conclude that the apparent protection for BFPs
against constitutional mechanics’ liens in Texas is, to put it
mildly, confusing. For statutory mechanics’ liens on the other
hand, there is no confusion because there is no protection. For
priority purposes, both constitutional and statutory liens relate
back to the commencement of construction.102 Thus for statutory
liens, Texas is similar to the other “first spade” states we have
discussed, and there is ample opportunity for a BFP to suffer an
unwarranted loss of priority to a construction-lien claimant.
One additional factor can affect the rights of potential BFPs
in Texas. If the property in question is a homestead, a mechanics’
lien claimant must execute a written contract with the owner (and
if the owner is married, with his or her spouse) before
commencement of work or furnishing of materials.103 The
contract must be recorded in the county clerk’s records.104 While
the statute states no time deadline for the filing of the contract, it
is likely to be filed shortly after its execution.105 Once recorded,
the contract itself will, of course, give subsequent purchasers and
mortgage lenders notice of the contractor’s identity and the fact
of the construction project, and thus preclude them from
becoming BFPs as to that project if a constitutional mechanics’
lien is claimed.106 It will also warn them that they will need to
obtain a lien waiver from that contractor.107
To summarize, can a prospective BFP or mortgagee take free
of a mechanics’ lien in Texas? In theory the answer is probably
yes, but only if a set of conditions is met—conditions which, in
explained, but it is. See Detering Co. v. Green, 989 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Tex. App. 1999);
FLORES, supra note 90, § 6.14.
102. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.124 (West 2021) (statutory liens); Tex. Wood Mill
Cabinets, Inc. v. Butter, 117 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Tex. App. 2003) (discussing constitutional
liens).
103. FLORES, supra note 90, § 5.12.
104. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(5); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.254(a)-(c), (e)
(West 2022). See Cavazos v. Munoz for a comprehensive explanation. 305 B.R. 661, 666
(S.D. Tex. 2004). See also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.254(g) (discussing how, for
homesteads, additional language must also be included in the affidavit claiming a lien
discussed in the text); Morrell Masonry Supply, Inc. v. Loeb, 349 S.W.3d 664, 670 (Tex.
App. 2011) (holding a claimed lien invalid for failure to include the required language).
105. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(5).
106. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(5).
107. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(5).
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the aggregate, seem quite improbable. They are as follows: (1)
the lien claimant opts to claim a constitutional rather than a
statutory lien; (2) the property in question is not a homestead, or
if it is, the purchaser or mortgagee acquires its interest before the
lien claimant records the construction contract; (3) the purchaser
or mortgagee does not see the ongoing construction or otherwise
gain any actual knowledge of it before acquiring its interest; and
(4) the lien claimant does not record an affidavit of lien claim
within the time limit allowed by the statute. If these conditions
are met, the purchaser or lender will probably prevail unless a
Texas court holds that BFP status should be denied because the
purchaser or mortgagee should have been aware of the recent
construction on the property,108 even though she or he was not. In
sum, there is a high risk in Texas that a BFP will be held subject
to unrecorded mechanics’ liens.

VI. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
The survey of Arkansas and surrounding states in the
previous section is sufficient to illustrate that the “gap” problem
with mechanics’ liens is a real problem, and that situations can
and do arise in which purchasers and lenders who would
ordinarily be considered BFPs can and sometimes do unfairly lose
priority to mechanics’ liens. Indeed, it is widely assumed that if
visible construction is going on or has recently occurred, a
purchaser or mortgagee is bound to know about it and cannot be
considered a BFP at all.109 This assumption is simply unjust; it
108. Perhaps such a duty might exist because the purchaser or mortgagee should have
made a more careful or thorough inspection of the property. On this point there seems to be
no clear Texas case authority. See, e.g., Apex Fin. Corp. v. Brown, 7 S.W.3d 820, 832 (Tex.
App. 1999) (remanding this issue to the trial court for finding of fact).
109. This assumption is built into the lien statute in Minnesota. Like a great many
states, the Minnesota statute provides for a common priority date for all liens, but with
apparent protection for BFPs:
All liens, as against the owner of the land, shall attach and take effect from the
time the first item of material or labor is furnished upon the premises for the
beginning of the improvement, and shall be preferred to any mortgage or other
encumbrance not then of record, unless the lienholder had actual notice
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fails to consider whether the construction is sufficiently obvious,
and whether the subsequent purchaser or creditor can tell that it
has occurred recently enough that a legitimate lien can still be
filed by a contractor or supplier on account of it. A system that
relies on this sort of guesswork is sloppy and unfair to buyers and
lenders. To the extent that its risks can be passed on to title
insurers, it ends up imposing unnecessary costs on all title
insurance customers.
What are the alternatives for reform? There are three
possibilities available in existing state law, each of which has both
advantages and shortcomings.
A. Abrogate “Relation Back”
Since the fault with the existing system lies in the underlying
legal concept of “relation back” of mechanics’ liens, the simplest
approach is to do away with relation back. In such a regime, a
mechanics’ lien would take its priority only from the date it was
filed of record. In such a system, a purchaser or mortgage lender
would determine whether there were any existing liens by
performing (or having its title insurer perform) an ordinary title
examination. No special risk would be involved. From the
viewpoint of buyers and lenders, this sort of system would be
ideal.
One might say that moving to such a system would be
politically impossible, since the construction industry would
oppose it so vigorously. However, it is precisely the system
Mississippi adopted in 2014.110 One of its apparent faults is that
each subcontractor and supplier gets its own individual priority
date, determined by its recording date. That produces a result that
may seem arbitrary, as compared with most states that assign a
thereof. As against a [BFP], mortgagee, or encumbrancer without actual or
record notice, no lien shall attach prior to the actual and visible beginning of
the improvement on the ground . . . .
MINN. STAT. § 514.05(1) (2022). The protection for BFPs turns out to be relatively
meaningless, since once the beginning of actual and visible construction has occurred, no
one can be a BFP! See Richards v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 612 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).
110. MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-7-405(1)(b) (2014).
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common priority date to all lien claimants—commonly the date
of commencement of construction—and allow all claimants pro
rata claims against the property, an arguably more equitable
arrangement. In Mississippi, it was unnecessary to justify moving
away from such a pro rata system, since prior to the 2014
revamping of the statute, subcontractors had no lien rights at
all.111 In most states, a shift to a Mississippi-type system is
difficult to conceive politically.
B. Require Advance Recording of a Notice of Work by
Prospective Lienors
Under this concept, a mechanics’ lien could relate back to
some early, common lien date, such as the date of commencement
of construction, but only if the lien creditor had filed for record a
notice that she or he was providing labor or materials for the job
before a subsequent purchaser or creditor acquired an interest in
the property. The notice would not be a claim of lien, but only a
sort of placeholder, notifying the world that the party filing it
would have the right to claim a lien in the future. Application of
this rule would have the effect of allowing any purchaser or
lender, by performing a title examination, to compile a list of
contractors or suppliers from whom it would be necessary to
obtain lien waivers. The Kentucky statute adopts this rule with
respect to BFPs.112
Such a system would be much preferable, from the
subsequent purchaser or lender’s viewpoint, to attempting to get
a list of contractors and suppliers from the owner of the property
or general contractor. It would eliminate the risk that the owner
or general contractor might lie or forget to include someone who
should have been included on the list, as well as the risk that the
job itself might be unnoticeable, so that the subsequent purchaser
would not think to ask for a such a list. Instead, the title
examination would produce a definitive and reliable list of parties
from whom lien waivers needed to be obtained.

111. MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-7-405(1)(b).
112. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.010(1) (West 2002).
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Nonetheless, such a system is not as desirable from the BFP
viewpoint as the first solution mentioned above, the abrogation of
the “relation back” concept. The reason is that it would still force
the subsequent purchaser or lender to go through the
administrative burdens of the lien waiver process, which is
tedious and fraught with some potential for error. But it would be
a great improvement over the present system.
From the viewpoint of prospective lien claimants, the burden
of recording a notice of this sort is relatively slight, and one of
which they could hardly complain. A contractor or materials
supplier could accomplish the filing with a one-page printed form,
without the help of a lawyer, and with a minimal fee. This
approach would go a long way toward balancing the scales of
fairness between construction lien claimants and BFPs.
C. The Uniform Construction Lien Act’s Approach
In 1987 the Uniform Law Commission promulgated the
Uniform Construction Lien Act (“UCLA”). The act was not the
product of independent drafting, but was derived by splitting out
Article Five of the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers
Act,113 which had itself been promulgated in 1977 but which had
achieved only one adoption,114 and publishing it as a separate act.
That article in turn had been roughly based on the Florida
mechanics’ lien statute.
The UCLA takes a novel approach to establishing
construction lien priority while at the same time protecting the
rights of BFPs and lenders. As will be seen, its approach is
complex—indeed, its very complexity may explain its lack of
adoptions—but functional. While it seems highly unlikely that
the UCLA is going to gain any future adoptions at this point, it
provides a rather ingenious point of reference for our discussion

113. NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE L., AM. BAR ASS’N, UNIFORM
CONSTRUCTION LIEN ACT 5 (1987) [hereinafter UCLA]; see also Sara E. Dysart, USLTA:
Article 5 “Construction Liens” Analyzed in Light of Current Texas Law on Mechanics’ and
Materialmen’s Liens, 12 ST. MARY’S L.J. 113, 116-118 (1980).
114. Nebraska adopted the construction lien article of USLTA and adopted it as a freestanding act in 1981; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 52-125 to -159.
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here. It hinges on the concept of a recorded “notice of
commencement.”
Under the UCLA a notice of commencement may be
recorded either by the owner of the property (which would
ordinarily be the case) or by a prospective lien claimant. The
purpose of the notice is to let parties who acquire interests in the
property in the future know that there is construction on the real
estate which may give rise to lien claims. The notice itself,
however, is general, and does not purport to identify prospective
claimants. If the notice remains in effect, it provides a priority
date, and all lien claims will relate back to the notice’s recording
date. If no notice is recorded, the priority date is normally the
date of visible commencement of work on the project. Ordinarily
it is expected that a notice of commencement will be filed.115
If a lien claimant records a lien while a notice of
commencement is in effect,116 the lien’s priority relates back to
the date the notice of commencement was recorded. However, an
owner can terminate a notice of commencement by recording a
notice of termination to take effect at least thirty days in the
future, and by sending a notice to all prospective lien claimants
who have requested notification of termination.117
If a purchaser or lender decides to buy or take a mortgage on
the property, it will (if well advised) insist that the owner
terminate the notice of commencement as described above. When
lien claimants receive notice that termination is about to occur,
they are warned that they must act promptly to preserve their
liens. If they do not record their liens before the thirty-day period
expires, they will lose the relation-back benefit. Their priority
date instead will become thirty days after the termination date or
the date that they actually record, whichever is earlier.118 Thus,
115. UCLA, supra note 113, § 301; Id. at 8. If no notice of commencement is filed by
the owner, a lien claimant can file one later to have benefits described below. Id. at 70.
116. The notice of commencement is good for the time it states, but at least six months
and no more than three years (or one year in the case of a buyer of residential real estate); Id.
§ 301(b).
117. Id. § 302(a)(1)(iii)-(iv). The owner must also publish notice of the termination
and record an affidavit stating that the notice has been sent to all of the claimants who
requested it. UCLA, supra note 113, § 302(a)(4).
118. Id. § 208(c).
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they have a strong incentive to record immediately. At the same
time, the purchaser or lender who waits until thirty-one days after
the termination date of the notice of commencement to close the
loan or sale can be certain that its title examination will have
identified all construction liens that have any possibility of
gaining priority over the new deed or mortgage.
While this system seems complex, it embodies a strong set
of benefits:
(a) All lien claimants who request notice of termination of
notice of commencement, and who file their liens promptly,
get the benefit of equal relation-back lien priority.
(b) All purchasers and lenders can be assured of priority over
all construction liens, provided they insist on termination of
notice of commencement and are willing to wait at least
thirty-one days after the termination takes effect to close
their sale or loan.
(c) The priority of lenders and purchasers does not depend
on their going through the administrative burden of
obtaining lien waivers from potential lien claimants.

Despite these benefits, however, the UCLA’s overall
structure is daunting to explain. It represents a radical departure
from the existing mechanics’ lien systems of most states, and it
seems improbable that any groundswell of enthusiasm could be
generated for its adoption.
CONCLUSION
As these three alternatives illustrate, the secret lien problem
is not insoluble in the context of construction liens. Of the
solutions presented, the second is probably the most appealing
from a political viewpoint. It requires every subcontractor and
supplier who expects to have the benefit of relation-back priority
to record a public notice of work. The notice warns future lenders
and purchasers that, to be safe from unexpected liens, they must
obtain lien waivers from all those who have recorded such
notices.
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This solution is simple and easy to explain to a legislative
committee. Its burdens are not extreme to contractors and
suppliers, and it should be highly appealing to the title insurance
industry and to real estate investors, banks, and other lenders who
must pay title insurance premiums. It seems a much fairer
allocation of risks than the present system’s secret liens.

8 GELLER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

6/6/22 6:57 PM

A DOG’S BARK TO ACT AS A NARK
Bailey R. Geller*
I. INTRODUCTION
What does one do when life hands them lemons? That’s
right—make lemonade. Now, that is not to say that making
lemonade is always easy. Some may find the lemonade too bitter,
others too sweet, and nevertheless some might simply dislike the
taste of lemonade regardless of the process. Nevertheless, the
mere possibility of critique—the potential for objections—does
not mean that lemons should be wasted. Rather, it is an
admonition. The transformation of a sour fruit into a delectable
refreshment is not easy nor can it be done by just anyone; it
requires consistency, experience, and a precise recipe. But when
one closely adheres to that recipe, something astonishing
commences—a seemingly unappetizing lemon becomes
something more. It becomes something great.
The law is full of lemons, of sorts. Namely, dogs. Dogs are
often considered an unsavory element of criminal procedure;
tools of the criminal justice system purposed toward unjust ends.1
But what should our legal system do with creatures possessing an
inhuman, near-unearthly nose, capable of surpassing a human’s

*
J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law, 2023. Editor-in-Chief of the
Arkansas Law Review, 2022-2023. The author sincerely thanks Professor Alex Nunn for his
advice, support, and confidence throughout the writing process and her law school career.
The author would also like to express gratitude to her family and friends for their constant
encouragement. Additionally, the author gives a special thank you to her dog, Odie, for
inspiring this Comment. Lastly, the author especially thanks the Arkansas Law Review for
their commitment to diligent editing.
1. See William M. FitzGerald, The Constitutionality of the Canine Sniff Search: From
Katz to Dogs, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 57, 64-82 (1984) (discussing the long line of case law
involving the use of dogs in criminal procedure that has caused much controversy).
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sense of smell by a factor of 100,000 times?2 That’s right—use
their noses (veritable legal lemons) for good.
Put simply, dog scent lineups use a canine to match a scent
from a crime scene to the scent of a suspect in a lineup.3 Dog
scent lineups serve as an effective resource aimed at improving
identifications at trial, and they can yield immensely probative
and essential evidence.4
For example, consider a vignette about Maggie, a trained
bloodhound, which demonstrates the vast potential of a canine’s
sense of smell.5 Investigators following a crime scene sought to
link a crumpled manila envelope with a purported suspect.6 The
envelope was initially found on the suspect’s bed—preliminarily
connecting the evidence and the suspect—but, given the
importance of the identification, investigators sought to reinforce
that link.7 That is when Maggie was called in. With no prior
encounter between Maggie and the suspect, investigators
presented the envelope to Maggie at the entrance of a jail where
the suspect was being housed.8 Immediately thereafter, Maggie
tracked the envelope’s scent through the entirety of the jail, taking
the exact route walked by the suspect to the control room, until
she arrived at the very room where the suspect was being held and
alerted to him.9 During the legal proceedings that followed, the
Supreme Court of California upheld the admissibility of Maggie’s
scent identification, directly acknowledging its immense
probative value.10
2. 8 Dog Nose Facts You Probably Didn’t Know, PETMD (May 28, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/JVL4-ZZ5H].
3. See infra Section II.B.
4. See Sophie Marchal et al., Rigorous Training of Dogs Leads to High Accuracy in
Human Scent Matching-To-Sample Performance, PLOS ONE, Feb. 10, 2016, at 1, 10
(demonstrating that dog scent identifications helped the French Division of the Technical
and Scientific Police in judicial cases solve more than a quarter of criminal cases alone).
5. People v. Jackson, 376 P.3d 528, 551 (Cal. 2016).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Jackson, 376 P.3d at 572. Experts testified regarding the training of the
bloodhound, a reasonable time for scents to linger, and the ability of bloodhounds to
distinguish between different human scents, even on paper, thus laying a proper foundation
for the admission of the evidence. Id. at 561-65.

8 GELLER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

A DOG’S BARK TO ACT AS A NARK

6/6/22 6:57 PM

433

Despite their potential significance, however, dog scent
identifications have been categorized by many courts and
commentators as “junk science.”11 They are perceived to be, as
foreshadowed, a sour lemon for courts to avoid.
Often, the criticisms of dog scent identifications turn on
concerns about expert testimony. Scent identifications are
typically relayed to trial factfinders through expert witnesses, and
the admissibility of identifications therefore depends on the
evidentiary strictures surrounding expert testimony.12 However,
the admissibility standards of expert testimony are somewhat
vague.13 And, increasingly, judges rely on federal and state
evidentiary codes to simply exclude scent identifications entirely
as an insufficiently reliable form of expert testimony.14
But that exclusion is a miscalculation. Rather than excluding
scent lineups entirely, courts should permit factfinders to weigh
their importance.
Such a permissive approach, though a drastic change from
current practice, would be far from anomalous. Consider, for
instance, how eyewitness identifications by humans are routinely
used in court despite comparable reliability concerns.15
Eyewitness identifications carry an abundance of prospective
shortcomings, albeit flaws in human nature itself, including undue
influence from the observer’s cognitive biases.16 In fact, nearly
11. John J. Ensminger & Tadeusz Jezierski, Scent Lineups in Criminal Investigations
and Prosecutions, in POLICE AND MILITARY DOGS: CRIMINAL DETECTION, FORENSIC
EVIDENCE, AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIBILITY 101, 101 (John J. Ensminger ed., 2012) (“Scent
lineups are a significant forensic and evidentiary tool, though they are sometimes dismissed
as ‘junk science.’”).
12. See infra Section II.D.
13. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 750 (3rd Cir. 1994).
14. JoAnna Lou, Scent Lineups: Properly Harnessing the Power of the Canine Nose,
THE BARK, [https://perma.cc/69YS-7MA7] (June 2021) (Alaska, Florida, New York, and
Texas are some of the few states to currently use scent lineups; however, they are still deemed
problematic even in these states).
15. Stephen Raburn, Mistaken Eyewitness Identification Leads to Wrongful
Convictions, INTERROGATING JUST. (May 12, 2021), [https://perma.cc/JZT8-P3HG]; see
also Eyewitness Identification Reform, INNOCENCE PROJECT, [https://perma.cc/D4DE4DHD] (last visited Apr. 1, 2022) (a highly influential organization that argues against “junk
science,” and despite criticizing the method due to the influences, it sets out some approaches
to make eyewitness identifications more reliable in order to keep them in court).
16. Police
Lineups
and
Other
Identification
Situations,
FINDLAW,
[https://perma.cc/5VHS-MAEU] (Feb. 14, 2019).
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70% of wrongful convictions later overturned by DNA evidence
are due to inaccurate eyewitness identifications.17 Nonetheless,
eyewitness identifications are not deemed categorically
inadmissible despite these pervasive reliability concerns. Rather,
they remain a cornerstone of modern trials, with reliability
concerns affecting the evidence’s weight rather than its
admissibility.18
Our legal system’s treatment of eyewitness testimony paves
the path ahead for dog scent lineups. Dog scent lineups are used
solely for identification purposes, neither to determine guilt nor
innocence.19 Both forms of identification produce a similar
outcome—suspect elimination—and yet, in many regards, scent
identifications are more reliable than eyewitness testimony.
Canines do not suffer the same cognitive biases that humans do.
Furthermore, the perceptive ability of a dog’s nose often far
exceeds that of a human’s eyes.
This Comment therefore advocates for systemic
reconsideration of dog scent lineups at trial. It will not claim that
all dog scent lineups are flawless, particularly given the slipshod
manner in which many are performed.
But dog scent
identifications are increasingly more valuable than our legal
system currently acknowledges when they are properly
conducted. They should be admissible.
Directly after this Introduction, Part II of this Comment
offers background information on the various uses of canines in
the criminal justice system as well as an empirical survey of how
scent lineups are currently utilized by law enforcement across
numerous countries. Thereafter, Part III details best practices of

17. Raburn, supra note 15.
18. Weight of Evidence, JRANK, [https://perma.cc/ZE7R-EECJ] (last visited Apr. 1,
2022) (demonstrating the ability of the jury to weigh the evidence).
19. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Further, analogous
to a fingerprint expert not being qualified to conclude if a defendant was guilty but could
testify that the fingerprint on the murder weapon was the defendant’s, here testimony
regarding dog scent evidence is not, and cannot, be used to show legal conclusions such as
guilt. See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1353 (6th Cir. 1994). Rather, scent lineup
testimony demonstrates a relationship between the suspect and the crime scene itself, but a
legal conclusion made by the expert is not appropriate. Id.
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scent lineups before advocating in favor of their admissibility at
trial. A brief Conclusion provides the Comment’s parting note.

II. BACKGROUND
Scent lineups can hardly be categorized as “novel”
considering the various uses of canines in all fields. First, the
history and evolution of canine use in the legal field must be
analyzed. The various uses of scent identification are inevitably
tied with the Federal Rules of Evidence and application thereof.
A. Barkground on Canine Uses
Since Roman times, dogs have been utilized for security and
hunting.20 Soon after, the English first began using bloodhounds
starting in 1888.21 The use of dogs in law enforcement became
prevalent in America by the 1970s.22
Today, dogs take on many roles humans are incapable of
competing with, such as tracking criminals, sniffing out
contraband, or locating missing children.23 Dogs are actively
employed during national crises and rescue missions.24 The job
is not done by their (albeit cute) looks; rather, the nose controls.
A canine’s nose is superhuman like, capable of smelling in threedimensional and the passage of time, and even so, the nose
continues to evolve.25

20. History of Dogs, DOGS FOR L. ENF’T, [https://perma.cc/C8EG-EKUQ] (last visited
Oct. 24, 2021).
21. History of Police Canines Around the World, DOGS FOR L. ENF’T,
[https://perma.cc/44SS-HSXY] (last visited Apr. 13, 2022).
22. Id.
23. Ed Grabianowski, How Police Dogs Work, HOW STUFF WORKS,
[https://perma.cc/J2K9-Y84X] (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
24. See, e.g., Mara Bovsun, The Legacy of 9/11 Dogs, AM. KENNEL CLUB (Aug. 30,
2021), [https://perma.cc/3BEA-22HV] (describing the use of canines during the Oklahoma
City bombing and the terrorist attacks of 9/11).
25. PETMD, supra note 2.
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Not all dogs are alike.26 Bloodhounds and German
Shepherds are the “gunners” in terms of canine smelling, with
bloodhounds usually coming in first.27 After all, they are “a nose
with a dog” and often serve as more vital assistance to law
enforcement than the complex technology available today.28
Consider the ease with which a human can distinguish strong
scents—say pickles and popcorn—and then consider how much
easier it is for a dog to do the same. A dog can distinguish scents
better than a human due to “a large, ultrasensitive set of scent
membranes that allows the dog to distinguish smells[.]”29 The
first-place winner’s nose is comprised of approximately 230
million olfactory cells, forty times the amount in humans.30
Scent lineups were at last introduced into evidence in the
United States in 1982,31 but regrettably carried little weight, as
demonstrated by the quick disposal of their existence in many
states.32 Contrarily, European countries have regularly employed
scent lineups as far back as the beginning of the twentieth
century.33
Analogous to the many uses of a lemon, dogs—our legal
lemons—are often subjected to uses outside law enforcement.
Human companions and guide dogs serve unique roles.34 Canines
are able to smell heat signatures with their noses, as well as detect
cancer and COVID-19.35
26. Id.
27. For example, a pug is not known to have a good sense of smell as its scrunched
nose blocks passageways. Id.
28. The Bloodhound’s Amazing Sense of Smell, PBS (June 9, 2008),
[https://perma.cc/5M3V-ZJTZ].
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id.
31. John J. Ensminger, Development of Police and Military Dog Functions, in POLICE
AND MILITARY DOGS: CRIMINAL DETECTION, FORENSIC EVIDENCE, AND JUDICIAL
ADMISSIBILITY, supra note 11, at 3, 5 [hereinafter Ensminger, Development of Police and
Military Dog Functions].
32. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
33. Ensminger & Jezierski, supra note 11, at 101.
34. Grabianowski, supra note 23.
35. Dogs Can Detect Heat with ‘Infrared Sensor’ in Their Nose, Research Finds,
REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2020, 7:22 AM), [https://perma.cc/Y9XX-H3K6]; Mia Rozenbaum, The
Science of Sniffs: Disease Smelling Dogs, UNDERSTANDING ANIMAL RSCH. (June 19, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/K4KE-K39Q].
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B. Sniff What?
Despite the unwarranted, wide range of techniques involving
scent lineups, the general idea behind a scent lineup is to allow a
canine to smell the scent from a crime scene and then walk by
containers that have scent swabs from a group of individuals, one
being the suspect’s.36 If the canine matches the two scents, it
should alert with a trained signal.37 This signal is often a bark,
but not always.38 Alerts, though subject to variation, are largely
a “specific and simple behavior pattern by which the dog indicates
to the handler that a target odor is present.”39 Thus, if the dog
alerts, it implies that the two scents derived from the same
person.40 Despite optimism, alerts are not always clear, and in
return they should not be classified as such.41
C. Technique to Speak: Worldwide
To properly evaluate scent lineups, they must be compared
across the nations that use them. An empirical study was
conducted across eleven different countries demonstrating these
discrepancies.42 The key differences are noteworthy.
First up: the collection and handling of the scents.43 All of
the countries have a standard material that may hold the scents of
suspects and decoys, except the United States.44 Worldwide,
including the United States, there is nearly no required specific
time period on how long after the collection of the scent it could
be used or how long the scent of the suspect may be used; instead
36.
37.
38.
39.

Lou, supra note 14.
Id.
Id.
Ensminger, Development of Police and Military Dog Functions, supra note 31, at

7.
40. See Barbara Ferry et al., Scent Lineups Compared Across Eleven Countries:
Looking for the Future of a Controversial Forensic Technique, 302 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L,
July 2019, at 1, 1.
41. Ensminger, Development of Police and Military Dog Functions, supra note 31, at
8.
42. Ferry et al., supra note 40, at 2.
43. Id. at 3 tbl.1.
44. Id.
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they have “norms”.45 Despite this, most countries, not including
the United States, at least have a rule on the frequency of cleaning
the stations between trials.46
The characteristics of the decoy vary as well.47 Some
countries require the scent to be taken from suspects with similar
characteristics, usually gender; the United States has no
requirement, but race, ethnicity, and gender are sometimes
considered.48 Even with nearly all countries requiring a novel
decoy, the United States allows re-used decoys during judicial
trials.49 Not surprisingly, many other countries, the United States
not included, require a minimum number of control trials.50
Even the setup of the lineups among countries differs.51
Every country except one established a procedure or requirement
for the number of scent stations—the United States being the one
exception with variable numbers in case law.52 Likewise, the
United States has no minimum number of trials required before
scent lineups are admissible as evidence and has even allowed a
single run with an alert to be enough, notwithstanding many
countries strictly imposing a minimum number of trials.53
Ignorant to researchers’ advice urging a high degree of
blindness, meaning obliviousness to the actual location of the
scent, dog scent lineups often are performed without blindness.54
Common practice in the United States is to have the handler, but
not the technician, blind; however, there is a lack of consistency
among the states and across countries.55
Surprisingly, the United States is the only country to use
bloodhounds; however, there is no training or age requirement for

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Ferry et al., supra note 40, at 4 tbl.2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5 tbl.3.
Id. at 6 tbl.4.
Ferry et al., supra note 40, at 6 tbl.4.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 8 tbl.6, 12.
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the dog.56 Likewise, the United States has no specific
requirements for the qualifications of the handler and often allows
self-training, despite other countries requiring specific training,
certifications, and testing.57
Eight of these countries, including the United States,
reported that scent lineups are still allowed as evidence for courts,
one reported scent lineups are only used early in the investigation,
and two do not use them at all anymore.58
D. Let the Pros Use the Nose
In the United States, expert testimony must pass through
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 before being admissible in court
through an expert witness.59 This rule is triggered by all
“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge”
introduced—like dog scent lineups.60 To satisfy Rule 702, the
testimony must: (1) be provided by a witness qualified as an
expert; (2) help the trier of fact; (3) be based on sufficient facts or
data; (4) be the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(5) constitute a reliable application of those principles and
methods. The Rule provides in pertinent part:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1)
the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case.61

56. The ages range from two up to eleven years old in the United States, and training
is usually about one year, with some countries also requiring a certain number of successful
trials and time requirements as well. Id. at 9 tbl.8.
57. Ferry et al., supra note 40, at 10 tbl.9.
58. Although in the United States many states have not precluded the use of scent
lineups, they are seldomly used. Id. at 11 tbl.10.
59. FED. R. EVID. 702.
60. FED. R. EVID. 702(a).
61. LARRY E. COBEN, CRASHWORTHINESS LITIGATION § 24:7 (2d ed. 2021).
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In the simplest terminology, Rule 702 restricts the
admissibility of expert testimony in three ways: qualification,
reliability, and fit.62
The heart of this Comment boils down to the last two
factors—is this testimony reliable based on the principles and
methods used? There is no codified approach on examining
reliability,63 but it began with the Frye test, requiring a “general
acceptance” by the scientific community,64 and soon thereafter
shifted to the well-known principles established by Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.65 Under Daubert, the
reliability of the method is often examined by a non-exhaustive
list: (1) falsifiability; (2) peer-review; (3) known error rates; (4)
objective standards; and (5) general acceptance.66 All Daubert
factors need not be met for the testimony to be considered reliable
expert testimony.67 With courts functioning as “gatekeeper[s],”
there is wide judicial discretion in the admissibility of expert
testimony.68
Subsequently, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael expanded
Daubert’s gatekeeping function from scientific evidence to also
non-scientific evidence—but there is no clear line separating the
two.69 Consequently, some or all of the Daubert factors may be
applied to non-scientific evidence as relevant, or any other set of
“reasonable reliability criteria” may be used instead.70
E. A Ruff Balancing Approach
Notwithstanding passing the scrutiny of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, there is yet another hurdle: the balancing test of
62. Id.
63. The rules used will depend on which approach the jurisdiction has adopted. See
generally Anjelica Cappellino, Federal Rules of Evidence and Experts: The Ultimate Guide,
EXPERT INST., [https://perma.cc/WT35-8YU4] (Aug. 25, 2021).
64. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
65. See generally 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also COBEN, supra note 61; Cappellino,
supra note 63.
66. COBEN, supra note 61.
67. Cappellino, supra note 63.
68. Id.; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
69. 526 U.S. 137, 148 (1999).
70. Id. at 158.
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Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which controls admissibility of
evidence generally.71 Relevant evidence will be excluded if the
probative value—tendency to make a fact more or less likely
true—is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence, with the presumption
that one of the (many) exceptions does not apply.72
Probativeness is at the fate of the gatekeepers’ discretion
based on a non-exhaustive list: “(1) [t]he importance of the
evidence to the resolution of the case; (2) the remoteness of the
evidence; (3) the necessity of the evidence; and, (4) how logically
related the evidence is to the legal disputes in the case.”73 Further,
the gatekeepers must then balance that with the dangers faced by
admitting the evidence.74 Put simply, Federal Rule of Evidence
403 fails if the benefit of the evidence is substantially outweighed
by the interference with the jury’s ability to reach an impartial
verdict.75
III. ANALYSIS
When it comes to scent lineups, admissibility will likely turn
on the final two elements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
collectively reliable principles, methods, and application therein,
which fall under Daubert and form the basis for this Comment.76

71. For further clarity, the witness must (respectively) pass the prongs of Federal Rule
of Evidence 702: the topic must be “beyond the ken of jurors,” have an adequate factual
basis, be the product of reliable principals and methods, as well as survive a balancing test.
GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 748 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 3d ed. 2013); see also FED. R.
EVID. 403.
72. FED. R. EVID. 403; see also When Can You Exclude Relevant Evidence?, BIXON
LAW (July 12, 2019), [https://perma.cc/U3GV-C4BJ].
73. BIXON LAW, supra note 72.
74. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
75. BIXON LAW, supra note 72.
76. It will not be a challenge to show that there is a qualified expert by training and
careful selection; it can easily be shown how this will help the trier of fact when the defendant
has not been placed at the crime scene, and data from dog tracking in all regards has
historically been relied upon. Thus, the main issue turns on the final two elements. See State
v. Smith, 335 S.W.3d 706, 715-16 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011).
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Given the demands for general acceptance under Frye, dog scent
lineups are likely to fare better under Daubert.77
Despite the lack of a bright line rule distinguishing evidence
based upon training and experience rather than a scientific
method,78 scent lineups likely fall into the training and experience
field.79 However, the distinction is not ultimately crucial as the
end goal is the same—reliability.80 Thus, tests often apply to both
forms of evidence, albeit with some fitting better than others,
including the Nenno test later discussed.81
This Comment advocates the stance the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”) holds regarding the partial weight of the
admissibility—scent evidence should be used as corroborating
evidence only.82 Scent evidence is not “so foreign” that it
precludes jurors from forming independent analyses on how
strong the evidence is; it is easily comprehensible that even the
most “well-trained dog” can make mistakes, and in return scent
evidence is not, and should not, be weighed as a strict science.83
77. To be admissible under Frye, the method must be generally accepted in the
scientific community. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). This
“general acceptance” standard is only one of the relevant factors under Daubert. Id. Frye
has been replaced by the federal courts, as well as many state courts, with the Daubert
standard, as it gives judges greater authority to determine reliability of expert testimony.
Admissibility of Expert Testimony in All 50 States, MATTHIESEN, WICKERT, & LEHRER, S.C.,
[https://perma.cc/5TSD-WUT3] (Jan. 13, 2022); see also John Ensminger et al., Scent
Identification in Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions, SSRN ELEC. J., August 2010, at
1, 68, [https://perma.cc/S4HC-S39P] (agreeing that dog scent identifications likely do not
pass the Frye test alone but noting that states that apply the Frye standard often do not even
evaluate dog scent identification under it and often only require foundational requirements
for tracking).
78. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 138 (1999).
79. Winston v. State, 78 S.W.3d 522, 526 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).
80. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 148.
81. See generally Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
82. Rex A. Stockham et al., Specialized Use of Human Scent in Criminal
Investigations, FORENSIC SCI. COMMC’NS (July 2004), [https://perma.cc/V3AG-UR6R]; see
also 1 B.E. WITKIN, WITKIN CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 78(2) (5th ed. 2021) (discussing the
importance of canine evidence being corroborative); Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 770
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (holding that dog scent evidence raises a suspicion of appellant’s
guilt but is insufficient to convict alone).
83. People v. Jackson, 376 P.3d 528, 566 (Cal. 2016); see also United States v.
McNiece, 558 F. Supp. 612, 615 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding there is a “lesser potential
prejudicial impact” of dog identification evidence than “seemingly flawless” evidence and
courts “need not apply as strict a standard” in regard to dog scent identifications); State v.
Roscoe, 700 P.2d 1312, 1320 (Ariz. 1984) (“It was not the theories of Newton, Einstein or
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A. Whiff of Daubert
As a gatekeeper, a trial judge must have significant leeway
to determine whether or not evidence is admissible and thus must
only consider the appropriate Daubert factors.84 Despite Kumho
Tire permitting a trial judge to consider the Daubert factors, it
recognized that the factors were intended to be very flexible and
not a “definitive checklist or test.”85 Despite the flexibility, there
is value in briefly considering dog scent lineups under a pure
Daubert standard.
1. Falsifiability
Falsifiability under Daubert falls back on whether the
methodology used by the expert can be (or has been) tested.86
This factor can be difficult to assess under non-scientific
evidence.87 Regardless, dog scent lineups are likely “falsifiable.”
Consider a quick comparison. An effortless example of a nonfalsifiable method would be the following: a higher power
designed all anatomical structures to be a certain way.88 As
suggested, unless there is a magical test to demonstrate the
abilities of this so called higher power, simply evaluating
anatomical structures cannot count as evidence against this
theory.89 Comparatively, dog scent lineups and handler methods

Freud which gave the evidence weight . . . . It was, rather, [the expert’s] knowledge,
experience and integrity which would give the evidence weight . . . . His credentials, his
experience, his motives and his integrity were effectively probed and tested. Determination
of these issues does not depend on science; it is the exclusive province of the jury.”).
84. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152.
85. Id. at 150.
86. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
87. See id. (“[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or
refutability, or testability”) (emphasis added) (quoting KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND
REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)); see also
Kristina L. Needham, Questioning the Admissibility of Nonscientific Testimony After
Daubert: The Need for Increased Judicial Gatekeeping to Ensure the Reliability of All Expert
Testimony, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 541, 564 (1998) (“The first Daubert factor [falsifiability]
is perhaps the most inapplicable to nonscientific testimony.”).
88. D.H. Kaye, On “Falsification” and “Falsifiability”: The First Daubert Factor and
the Philosophy of Science, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 473, 476 (2005).
89. Id.
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are regularly tested in mock and control trials where accuracy can
be tested with control scents and suspects, and false positives can
be evaluated.90
2. Peer Review
Peer review or publication by other experts in the field of
expertise serves as another important consideration.91 Often,
well-grounded but innovative theories will not yet be published;
therefore, lack of publication is not dispositive, and the weight
tends to fall on being subjected to the community.92 Although
methodologies among scent lineup experts vary, the theories
supporting it are consistent with the understanding that, with the
right training and procedures, it is reliable.93 Several publications
exist regarding the theory behind dog scent lineups, as well as
how to conduct them.94
3. Known Error Rates
The potential or known error rates of a technique or
methodology are vital.95 Error rates ensure consistency in the
methodology, but “if a consistent methodology is not applied each
90. See e.g., infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
91. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
92. Id. (“Some propositions, moreover, are too particular, too new, or of too limited
interest to be published.”).
93. Scholars and spectators are mostly all in agreement that dog scent lineups are not
perfect and in order to be admissible, work needs to be done. One spectator explaining her
view on dog scent lineups stated, “I hate to see a potentially valuable tool be dismissed
because it wasn’t used properly. I think that with the right protocol and standard procedures,
scent lineups could find their place in law enforcement.” Lou, supra note 14; see also
Marchal et al., supra note 4, at 1 (“Human scent identification is based on a matching-tosample task in which trained dogs are required to compare a scent sample collected from an
object found at a crime scene to that of a suspect. Based on dogs’ greater olfactory ability
to detect and process odours, this method has been used in forensic investigations to identify
the odour of a suspect at a crime scene.”).
94. See, e.g., Law Enforcement Canine Use-of-Force Research, L.A.A.W. INT’L,
[https://perma.cc/P9Z5-LCWT] (last visited Feb. 5, 2022) (containing a list of publications
for “Dog Scent Lineups” under “Treatises Research”); Books by William D. Tolhurst, HOME
OF THE BIG T, [https://perma.cc/USN7-SJBM] (last visited Feb. 5, 2022) (demonstrating a
list of publications by author William Tolhurst regarding scent identifications). See
generally Ensminger & Jezierski, supra note 11, at 101.
95. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
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time the theory is proffered, there can be no evaluation of rate of
error.”96 Here, it can be difficult to assess the rate of error, as dog
scent lineups are not consistently conducted in the same way.97
However, if they were,98 the error rates could easily be
identified.99 With consistent methods and appropriate training, a
study showed 100% specificity and 85% sensitivity from the
dogs.100 Sensitivity refers to how often the dog detected the target
scent when it was present.101 If the dog failed to find the scent
when one was present, the sensitivity score decreased.102
Likewise, specificity refers to how often the dog correctly
matched the scent to the target.103 If the dog had any false alerts,
the specificity score decreased.104 Translated to this study, with
these conditions, there were zero false matches, and the dogs only
failed to detect 15% of the matches when there was a scent
present.105 Therefore, any “error” committed by the canine would
be for the defendant, not against.106 Each dog shall have specific
error rates.
4. Objective Standards
Knowledge within Rule 702 indicates more than just a
subjective belief or unsupported speculation.107 However, it
would be unreasonable to require the subject of the testimony be

96. Needham, supra note 87, at 565-66 (noting that this is one factor even a court that
does carefully evaluate under Daubert cannot apply to nonscientific expert testimony).
97. See supra Section II.C.
98. See infra Section III.B.1.
99. The FBI publicly shared its experience regarding a study involving dog scent
lineups, finding the results to be convincing: “[F]ive experienced bloodhound/handler teams
had a success rate of 96 percent with no false identifications.” Stockham et al., supra note
82.
100. Danielle Robertson, How Accurate are Search Dogs? – Part 2: Scent
Discrimination Dogs, LOST PET RSCH. & RECOVERY, [https://perma.cc/S44V-D64T] (last
visited Feb. 5, 2022).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Robertson, supra note 100.
106. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 403.
107. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993).
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“known” to a certainty, as rarely certainties truly exist.108 Despite
skepticism among scholars about a lack of subjectivity in
signals,109 the methods prove certainty when properly conducted.
As foreshadowed,110 the canines should have a trained signal to
use, require a degree of blindness, and have a second officer to
interpret the results, which mitigates the potential for the Clever
Hans effect111 and eliminates subjectivity.
The equation thus is straightforward with minimal
subjectivity: relentlessly teach the canine a signal to do upon
detection—if the dog does that signal, it is the sign of detection.112
In particular, with multiple officers and technicians, there is low
subjectivity when hearing or seeing a trained signal.113
Furthermore, requiring a minimum number of trials coupled with
a maximum allowance of false alerts and implementation of other
safeguards not only strengthens the reliability but also alleviates
the potential for subjectivity and claims of “guessing.”114
However, a lack of support thereof by the handler to the courts
can prove to be fatal for the admissibility of lineups.115
5. General Acceptance
Finally, the generally accepted standard from Frye is still
relevant in determining reliability under Daubert but is not

108. Id. at 590.
109. Andrew E. Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth of the Dog
Scent Lineup, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 15, 83-84 (1990).
110. See infra Sections III.B.1.c, III.B.1.d.
111. Ensminger & Jezierski, supra note 11, at 104 (demonstrating that an issue of
subjectivity arises when the handler cues the dog either consciously or in the alternative
unconsciously, also known as the Clever Hans effect).
112. See supra Section II.B.
113. See Ferry et al., supra note 40, at 16 (“Alerts should be visible to more than just
the handler, so the handler should be able to describe a unique alert for a dog to an
observer.”).
114. Experimental studies demonstrate that the identification accuracy rate far
“surpasses results produced merely by chance.” Id. This is further to the point “that scent
lineup identification of perpetrators can at least produce corroborative evidence so that
neither courts nor police should totally reject use of the procedure.” Id.
115. State v. Smith, 335 S.W.3d 706, 712 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011) (excluding dog scent
evidence because, although the expert claimed his dogs were reliable, he “failed to produce
or cite any evidence supporting his claims”).
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required.116 This element turns on acceptance by a relevant
scientific community.117 A known technique with only minimal
support within the community may be viewed skeptically.118
Although scent lineups often have low awareness or utilization
rates, the use of canines in the legal community is not novel.119
In regard to admissibility and a canine’s abilities and procedures,
there is little distinction between a scent lineup and a situation
where a dog is required to track an individual’s scent over an area
traversed by multiple persons.120
Relevant communities
generally accept canines in court settings.121 Because of this
miniscule distinction, it can be argued that dog scent lineups
should equally be considered accepted. However, it is not entirely
accurate to say the relevant community would completely agree.
As established, dog scent lineups will pass many of the
Daubert factors—some better than others.122 Daubert is a
flexible test, and every factor need not be perfect.123 However, as
a matter of first impression—where courts are not encumbered by
precedent—Daubert is not the best test.124
B. A Pawfect Alternative
Perhaps dog scent lineups do not fit perfectly under Daubert,
but Kumho Tire makes clear that some or none of the Daubert
116. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). See generally
United States v. Gates, 680 F.2d 1117, 1119 (6th Cir. 1982) (admitting dog scent
identification evidence without considering the Frye rule).
117. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
118. Id.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
120. Winston v. State, 78 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).
121. Id. (“Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia admit scent-tracking
evidence to prove the identity of the accused, provided a proper foundation is laid.”).
122. See supra Section III.A. See also State v. Smith, 335 S.W.3d 706, 709-10 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2011), for an example of a typically very qualified expert witness whose testimony
was excluded in the specific case when it lacked support of complying with the appropriate
reliability factors. It should be emphasized that this Comment is based on assumptions of
consistency and the utmost effort during dog scent lineups, but individual admissibility will
depend on the specific expert, case, facts, and circumstances, just as every other methodology
does.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
124. See Ensminger et al., supra note 77, at 67 (explaining that many courts carve out
an exception to Daubert for dog scent lineups specifically).
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factors may be used as well as any other reliable test.125 Many
states have opted to use their own standards or a combination
standard—there is no clear-cut consensus.126 But before
evaluation under a standard, lineups must be conducted properly.
1. Employ a Good Boy
For scent lineups to satisfy the Nenno test, or any other test
for that matter, they should be set up as in other countries that
have successfully utilized them historically or currently, as
assessed above in Part II.127 “Scent lineups . . . are a common part
of police practice in the Netherlands, Poland, Germany, Russia,
and other Eastern European countries.”128 A primary reason other
countries are reluctant to implement dog scent lineups is “a lack
of international standards for the way in which dogs are trained,
certified and used.”129
a. The Collection
First, the United States must adopt a standard material for
holding scents as other countries require.130 “All human scents
[should be] collected by a qualified technician, wearing a special
sterile paper suit and powder-free nitrile examination gloves.”131
While lacking “norms” at every step is a procedural failure, the
United States should at least consider implementing a normative
process for preserving the usability of scents from crime scenes
and suspects.132 Lithuania’s bright line rules, on the other hand,

125. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1999).
126. Several states have their own completely different standards of admissibility. See
Anjelica Cappellino, Daubert vs. Frye: Navigating the Standards of Admissibility for Expert
Testimony, EXPERT INST. (Sept. 7, 2021), [https://perma.cc/H74H-6T7M] (“Overall, the
evidentiary standard governing the admissibility of expert testimony is, in many respects, a
continuum opposed to a bright-line rule.”).
127. See supra Section II.C.
128. Ensminger & Jezierski, supra note 11, at 101.
129. Marchal et al., supra note 4, at 2.
130. See supra text accompanying note 44.
131. Marchal et al., supra note 4, at 3.
132. See supra text accompanying note 45.
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are admirable.133 Per Lithuania’s procedures in 2019, trace scents
from the crime scene could be used no sooner than twenty-four
hours after the collection,134 and body scents from the crime scene
could be stored for a maximum of one year.135 Further, body
scents could be used twenty-four hours after the collection, but
not before.136 Trace scents could be kept in the (proper) storage
for five years, and body scents could only be stored for one
year.137 As the name implies, body scents (“BS”) are taken
directly from the body of the suspect whereas trace scents (“TS”)
are taken from the object or clothes.138
Research indicates that trace scents can be kept for ten years
with higher success rates for the same type of scent used from the
crime scene and individuals; this tracks with research that
recommends using TS/TS.139 A lack of false alerts in studies
demonstrates human body odor uniqueness, and sensitivity scores
explain canines’ abilities to extract individual body information
with the best scores deriving from either BS/BS or TS/TS.140
However, consistency is the key here.
b. The Procedure
Common sense prevails, but international consistencies
speak for themselves. The United States should also follow suit
with other countries that have implemented rules prescribing a
proper cleaning procedure for the lineup stations between trials or
dogs.141 Lithuania, again, has a very cautious approach of
cleaning stations between each trial and replacing the jars
containing the scents.142 Considering the United States does not
have any procedure in place and often skips cleaning between
133. See Ferry et al., supra note 40, at 3 tbl.1 (comparing the United States’ scent
collection standards with Lithuania’s standards).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Marchal et al., supra note 4, at 3.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 10.
141. See supra text accompanying note 46.
142. See Ferry et al., supra note 40, at 3 tbl.1.
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trials, it should take the most cautious route to ensure the accuracy
of the trials.143 Likewise, the cautiousness of Lithuania’s
procedures, which also require decoy scents to be “as similar as
possible to the target” with a primary focus on the targets’ sex and
age, is commendable and should be retained by the United
States.144 The United States must follow international trends and
require that decoy scents be novel to the canine in judicial trials
before they can justifiably be used.145
With no requirement for disqualifying searches or negative
checks, the United States should adopt stricter, international
judicial requirements: (1) prior to each official test, the canine
must complete two control trials correctly; and (2) one negative
check should be inserted every three trials.146
The United States’ clearly lackadaisical consideration of the
admissibility of dog scent lineups cannot be tolerated. It is
unfathomable why every country requires a fixed number of
stations within each scent lineup except the United States, where
case law demonstrates a variation between two and seven
stations.147 It is a concept we are taught as children: the more
stations, the more work the canine must do, thus the more accurate
result. The United States must adopt a standard high enough to
be more than chance, with seven stations being the sweet spot.148
Further, dog scent lineup evidence should not even be considered
in a United States courtroom after only one trial despite the
current lack of a minimum judicial control-trial requirement.149
Plainly, the United States must set a minimum number of trials
before admitting the evidence, as well as require confirmation by
multiple canines. Consistency, accuracy, and precautions must
serve as safeguards.

143. See id.
144. Id. at 4 tbl.2 (comparing Lithuania with the United States); see also Joe Schwarcz,
Do Men’s and Women’s Armpits Smell Differently?, MCGILL (Mar. 20, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/GLV3-TATT] (demonstrating that scents from males and females differ).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
146. Ferry et al., supra note 40, at 5 tbl.3.
147. Id. at 6 tbl.4.
148. See id. at 6 tbl.4, 10.
149. Id. at 5 tbl.3.
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c. The Training
Praise for the canines is a step in the right direction,150 but
the lack of a training requirement for the dogs quickly forces that
step back.151 Studies have shown that extensive training is
essential for accurate results.152 With a lack of consensus among
other countries, the United States should imitate other successful
experiments and training procedures.153
In a famous study, canine training was divided into “initial
training” and “continuous training . . . .”154 The entirety of the
program was approximately twenty months long with several
steps within each division.155 The continuous training lasted the
entirety of the dog’s life,156 including a daily training routine that
involved a series of lineup trials and praise when the dog was
correct.157 Judicial case admissibility was exclusive to the dogs
in this study that completed over two hundred trials with no false
alarms—a perfect approach for the United States to adopt.158 To
maximize reliability, there should be a minimum standard within
United States courts that when dogs fail test lineups or fail to
correctly match the suspect’s scent in at least two successive
lineups, their scent lineup evidence is disqualified.159
Even after correctly training the dogs, the accuracy of a
single dog alone should not be solely relied on.160 In order to be
admissible in a judicial case, scent matching should be confirmed
by several dogs, ranging from a minimum of two dogs to the goal

150. Cesar Millan, How and When to Give Healthy Dog Treats, CESAR’S WAY (June
18, 2015), [https://perma.cc/74VY-LJ4M] (a famous dog handler demonstrating that the
appropriate usage for treats as praise is “a critical component in dog training and rewarding
[proper] behavior.”).
151. See Ferry et al., supra note 40, at 9 tbl.8.
152. See Marchal et al., supra note 4, at 2; see also Robertson, supra note 100.
153. See Marchal et al., supra note 4, at 2.
154. Id. at 2-4.
155. Id. at 4.
156. Id. at 3-4
157. Id. at 4.
158. Marchal et al., supra note 4, at 6.
159. See Robertson, supra note 100.
160. See id.
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of seven dogs.161 Each dog should do several lineups providing
evidence from at least fourteen lineups for a single case.162
The handlers themselves must also have extensive training
requirements such as certifications, specific training, and
discouragement of self-training; however, this is likely not the
component that will be turned on for scent lineups.163 Similarly,
the dog must be of a breed capable of correctly performing a scent
lineup, such as a German Shepard or bloodhound.164 However, it
is more important to look to the specific dog rather than just the
breed.165 Favorable characteristics include “a predisposition to
working with a handler, be[ing] eager to please, and hav[ing] a
strong play drive.”166
d. The Alerting
To ensure a lack of bias in the experiment, the United States
must adopt a similar approach to Poland, which requires alerts “to
be clear to anyone[.]”167 A video-recording should be required,
as there is not currently any such requirement.168 And of course,
the handler, or whomever is conducting the experiment, should
be blind, meaning the conductor of the experiment should be
unaware of the suspect’s scent placement.169 Further, the extra
step of “double blindness,” requiring the individual who does
know the placement of the scents to be secluded from both the
handler and the canine or anyone else in the room where the

161. See id.
162. Id.
163. See supra notes 76, 161-62 and accompanying text; see also infra note 164.
164. See supra text accompanying note 27. Although a great house pet, retrievers have
not lived up to the same standard of acute smelling abilities that bloodhounds and German
Shepherds have. See People v. Mitchell, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 49, 63-64 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
165. John J. Ensminger, History and Judicial Acceptance of Tracking and Trailing
Evidence, in POLICE AND MILITARY DOGS: CRIMINAL DETECTION, FORENSIC EVIDENCE,
AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIBILITY, supra note 11, at 32 [hereinafter Ensminger, History and
Judicial Acceptance of Tracking and Trailing Evidence].
166. See PBS, supra note 28.
167. Ferry et al., supra note 40, at 7 tbl.5.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 8 tbl.6.
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experiment is being conducted, is just another necessary
precaution to increase the reliability and accuracy of the trials.170
2. Time Fur the Nenno Test
Based off those standards that should be set, dog scent
evidence should be admissible, as the Nenno test sets out that “the
appropriate questions for assessing reliability are (1) whether the
field of expertise is a legitimate one; (2) whether the subject
matter of the expert’s testimony is within the scope of the field;
and (3) whether the expert’s testimony properly relies upon or
utilizes the principles involved in the field.”171 The Nenno test
was established by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, a state
leader for scent lineups,172 for “soft sciences[,]” but it is evaluated
here as it implements Daubert principles brilliantly, tailored for
scent lineups.173
a. Whether the Field of Expertise is Legitimate
The FBI does not undercut the value of dog scent lineups as
demonstrated by advising the use of “scent-discriminating dogs
in criminal investigations . . . to establish[] a scent relationship
between people and crime scene evidence.”174 Not only does the
FBI advise the use of scent lineups, but it also follows that advice
with its own use of scent lineups.175 Evidently, a “dog[’s] ability
to distinguish scents is valued and respected” in the real world.176
170. Id. at 8 tbl.6, 12 (Hungary and Poland conduct the double blindness by having the
expert observe through the use of a one-way mirror compared to how Russia allows them to
view through a video monitor).
171. Winston v. State, 78 S.W.3d 522, 526 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Nenno v. State,
970 S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)).
172. Id. at 525-26; see also supra text accompanying note 14.
173. José A. Berlanga, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal Rule 702 Analysis: Do
Criminal Litigants Utilize a Less Rigorous Standard?, 37 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 55, 55-56,
56 n.6, 80 (2011).
174. Stockham et al., supra note 82.
175. See, e.g., Winston, 78 S.W.3d at 526-27 (“In one notable case involving a serial
killer, the FBI noted in a letter to Deputy Pikett’s department that his work with the
bloodhounds and scent lineups ‘saved many investigation man hours that would have been
spent searching for the wrong person.’”).
176. Id. at 527.
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“[D]ogs’ superior senses have long been used to aid mankind
in a variety of contexts outside the courtroom, including ‘to track
by scent escaped criminals or lost persons and articles.’”177 States
across the country continuously use scent-tracking evidence for
identification purposes.178
With the lack of value in
differentiating reliability between scent lineups and other scent
tracking techniques, scent lineups should be considered a
legitimate field of expertise as well.179
b. Subject Matter Within Scope of the Field
Seldom will the scope be at issue—it will be dependent on
the specific expert testifying as well as the scope of expertise,
which appears to be a low bar.180 Comparable to the well-known
nexus requirement in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 generally, this
is a non-strict standard that simply requires a logical relationship
between the testimony and the expert’s field; it need not be a
perfect connection.181 Consider a traditional law school example:
an expert in corrupt business practices was not qualified to testify
specifically on Korean business practices due to a lack of a nexus
with the broader subject of Korean-specific business.182 Dog
scent experts do not follow this same ill-fated path. With
experience in scent lineups and testimony regarding scent lineups,
this prong will be easily surpassed. It can further be appropriate
for an expert to testify as to scent-matching techniques generally,
without experience in scent lineups specifically, as long as the
testimony is narrowed to such.

177. Id. at 526 (quoting People v. Price, 431 N.E.2d 267, 269 (N.Y. 1981)).
178. Id. at 527.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Coastal Tankships, U.S.A., Inc. v. Anderson, 87 S.W.3d 591, 604 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2002) (demonstrating how easily the court could “impliedly” find the expert’s
testimony was within the scope when he was a doctor specializing in diagnosing and treating
acute lung injuries and his testimony concerned the victim’s lung disease and was thus within
the scope of his field of expertise).
181. Jinro Am. Inc. v. Secure Invs., Inc., 266 F.3d 993, 1009 (9th Cir. 2001).
182. See id.
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c. Properly Relies Upon or Utilizes the Principles Involved in
the Field
The outcome of the Nenno test is most dependent on the final
prong—requiring a determination by the court that “the proffered
expert testimony properly relies upon or utilizes the principles
involved in the field of expertise.”183 Three factors are evaluated
to determine this reliability: “(1) the qualifications of the
particular trainer; (2) the qualifications of the particular dog; and
(3) the objectivity of the particular lineup.”184
i. Qualifications of the Trainer
The qualifications of the trainer are not the main concern at
issue and will not be discussed in depth as they are expert
dependent, but the trainer should be qualified specifically in scent
lineup procedures. Ideally, the trainer should have testified
previously, but this is not dispositive.185 Assuming that the
particular expert has performed scent lineups in the past, the
qualifications should likely be met. The trainer’s expertise and
experience must match up to the step in the lineup that is being
discussed in trial. For example, an expert who has properly
performed several lineups in the past may not be qualified to
testify about the genetic makeup of a canine’s scent membranes
but could testify about how the scent lineup was conducted.186
Experts’ qualifications merely have to surpass a low bar, as
demonstrated by the first prong of Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
requiring no actual degree.187 The same logic applies to scent
183. Winston, 78 S.W.3d at 527.
184. Id.
185. See generally FED. R. EVID. 702 (no former testimony as an expert is required—
rather some combination of “knowledge, skill, experience, training, [and] education”
collectively is what matters).
186. For example, if an expert is used to testify regarding the unique odor of every
human, then that expert should have some type of scientific background or evidence to back
that up, versus an expert testifying about the procedure that took place, then that expert
should have experience with the actual performance of the lineups. See Ensminger et al.,
supra note 77, at 67.
187. See generally FED. R. EVID. 702 (which has no degree requirement and provides
that expertise can be shown in other ways such as experience). The term “expert” does not
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lineups, but despite the leniency, it is recommended here that a
certification accompany the expert.188
ii. Qualifications of the Dog
The qualifications of a dog include factors such as whether:
(1) the dog is of a breed characterized by acuteness of scent
and power of discrimination; (2) the dog has been trained to
discriminate between human beings by their scent; (3) by
experience the [dog] has been found to be reliable; (4) the
dog was given a scent known to be that of the alleged
participant in the crime; and (5) the dog was given the scent
within the period of its efficiency.189

By utilizing the preconditions established above, all factors
of qualification are exceeded.190 Bloodhounds and German
Shepherds are undoubtedly qualified breeds, and canine training
will be extensive. By focusing specifically on scent lineups and
discrimination, no canine will be considered for judicial cases
without the required experience, thresholds, and rates of
performance as a prerequisite; when professionals gather and
place the scent, the efficiency period will be followed.191
There is no dispute that the current chaos revolving around
inconsistent standards of scent lineups is justified—but this is the
heart of this Comment. Once a clear, consistent, and reliable
method is utilized, scent lineups will pass standards they would
have the plain meaning that many people think of, but a good example to demonstrate the
lack of requirement for formal education is Marisa Tomei in the movie My Cousin Vinny.
Arthur McGibbons, Marisa Tomei From My Cousin Vinny Great Example of How an Expert
Witness Works, ILL. CASE L. (Feb. 1, 2014), [https://perma.cc/DB68-86FF].
188. See NAT’L POLICE CANINE ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR TRAINING &
CERTIFICATIONS MANUAL 3, 21 (2014), [https://perma.cc/Y4UK-6LEJ] (example of a
certification); see also Ensminger, History and Judicial Acceptance of Tracking and Trailing
Evidence, supra note 165, at 29 (commenting on proposals by the Scientific Working Group
on Dog and Orthogonal Detector Guidelines (“SWGDOG”), which recommend that handler
training is to involve human scent theory, relevant canine case law, and legal preparation,
including court testimony). See generally KENNETH FURTON ET AL., THE SCIENTIFIC
WORKING GROUP ON DOG AND ORTHOGONAL DETECTOR GUIDELINES 1, 87-89 (2010),
[https://perma.cc/3SK9-EB22] (SWGDOG guidelines including handler specifications).
189. Winston v. State, 78 S.W.3d 522, 527-28 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).
190. See supra Section III.B.1.
191. See supra Section III.B.1.c.
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not have before, as demonstrated. Transparency must be
established; the expert must provide support for any claimed
qualifications, including certification of the dog as well as (welltracked and mandatory) error rates for each specific dog.192
It should be noted that skepticism of dog scent evidence
often arises from a lack of full disclosure from handlers, as well
as from prosecutors, despite disclosure being required.193
Without consistent track records and full disclosure of error and
accuracy rates, this Comment too would not support dog scent
lineups—these safeguards are necessary and must be mandatory
in order to accurately portray the reliability of dog scent
lineups.194
iii. Objectivity of the Lineup
Support is key.195 The plain meaning of objectivity is
“[d]oing one’s best to get rid of biases, and other subjective
evaluations, by solely depending on objectifiable data.”196
Therefore, claims of perfection and trustworthiness will fail
largely when deprived of support. Reliance on manuals often
proves to be sufficient—yet there is still an overarching lack of
international standards and timely updates.197 The use of manuals
192. Winston, 78 S.W.3d at 527-28.
193. See e.g., Loaiza v. Pollard, No. LACV 16-5703-JWH (LAL), 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 159510, at *30-31, *40 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2021) (unpublished opinion
demonstrating the potential harm to the defendant was the fact that the dog made many past
false identifications which were not disclosed, and the court likely would have excluded the
scent evidence due to lack of reliability as well as the potential to impeach the government’s
witness); see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (requiring disclosure by the
prosecution of all evidence that might exonerate the defendant). See generally Bryan
Altman, Can’t We Just Talk About This First?: Making the Case for the Use of Discovery
Depositions in Arkansas Criminal Cases, 75 ARK. L. REV. 7, 8 (2022) (discussing the
consistent theme for the defense to be left “in the dark” by prosecution on a local level).
194. See Loazia, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159510, at *30.
195. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
196. What is Objectivity, L. DICTIONARY, [https://perma.cc/HD72-VE86] (last visited
Apr. 10, 2022).
197. See Winston, 78 S.W.3d at 528-29 (holding that testimony by Deputy Pickett
stating his procedure was “consistent with the National Police Bloodhound Association’s
manual on how to conduct a scent lineup” was sufficient to satisfy the objective standards);
see also Berlanga, supra note 173, at 69 (demonstrating that the main requirement to satisfy
the objective standard was being consistent with the manual).
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must be coupled with the standard protocols recommended above:
double blindness, trained signals, multiple confirmations, and
additional safeguards, namely videos and witnesses of the
lineup.198 These safeguards will help negate any indication of
scent contamination or biases by proactively eliminating
subjectivity.199 The typical misconception that trained canines
merely guess, and their handlers subjectively interpret those
guesses to be signals when they are not, is discredited when these
safeguards are in place.200 Moreover, the Nenno test will be
passed with the established protocol.
C. Compliance is Not Junk Science
Several passed prongs later, admissibility is finally
established, but Federal Rule of Evidence 403 still lurks in the
shadows. It must be shown that the danger of unfair prejudice
does not substantially outweigh the probative value to fully be
admissible.201
After surviving the scrutiny of the expert testimony analysis
itself, scent lineups plainly outstrip any risk of unfair prejudice.
A jury will not be partial due to scent lineups. It does not take
specialized skills or knowledge to comprehend that dogs are not
perfect—juries understand this—and they are capable of giving
proper weight to such evidence.202
Further, dog scent
198. See discussion supra Section III.B.1.
199. See Winston, 78 S.W.3d at 528-29 (illustrating a lineup with proper safeguards);
see also supra Section III.A.4. For an example of what not to do, consider when a dog scent
handler’s testimony was not allowed in court although he testified many times before; when,
in his current testimony, he “testified that there was a possible cross-contamination of the
scents in the lineup in question;” he “did not run a ‘blind’ scent lineup”; he did “not keep
complete records on the scent lineups that his dogs have participated in;” his training records
regarding the dog’s training were incomplete and the failure to maintain complete records
made it hard to determine accuracy; there was no peer-review of any records; he “failed to
follow up on the dispositions of” other cases his dogs participated in; he “failed to perform
validation testing on his dogs during scent lineups;” he testified no one reviews his work; his
dogs were not certified; no literature was offered in support of the procedure used; no other
evidence was put on regarding any error rates; and there was no evidence that the scent lineup
could have been “duplicated by others following the same methods.” See State v. Smith,
335 S.W.3d 706, 708-10 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011).
200. See supra text accompanying note 113.
201. See supra Section II.E.
202. United States v. McNiece, 558 F. Supp. 612, 615 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
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identifications do not plainly decide guilt or innocence; they
simply show that a suspect’s scent was at a particular place.203
Statistically, potential “errors” by the canine are more likely to
harm the government’s case rather than the defendant’s because
they are more likely to involve missing a scent than wrongfully
accusing the defendant.204 Lastly, despite the advancements scent
lineups will prove to show, they are still limited to serve as
corroborating evidence.205
Also, jury instructions, such as the following, play an
important role in mitigating any risk of unfair prejudice when they
limit the lineup’s permissible purposes:
Evidence of dog tracking has been received for the purpose
of showing, if it does, that the defendant is [the] perpetrator
of the crime of ___________. This evidence is not by itself
sufficient to permit an inference that the defendant is guilty
of the crime of ___________. Before guilt may be inferred,
there must be other evidence that supports the accuracy of
the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the
crime of ___________. The corroborating evidence need
not be evidence which independently links the defendant to
the crime. It is sufficient if it supports the accuracy of the
dog tracking. In determining the weight to give to dogtracking evidence, you should consider the training,
proficiency, experience, and proven ability, if any, of the
dog, its trainer, and its handler, together with all the
circumstances surrounding the tracking in question.206

203. See G. A. A. Schoon, Scent Identification Line-ups Using Trained Dogs in the
Netherlands, 47 PROBS. FORENSIC SCI. 175, 175 (2001), [https://perma.cc/UJX5-K4AH].
204. See supra text accompanying notes 105-06.
205. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
206. People v. Jackson, 376 P.3d 528, 578 (Cal. 2016) (emphasis added). The
defendant in Jackson appealed the jury instructions and suggested the following from the
Craig court:
[D]og-trailing [sic] evidence must be viewed with the utmost of caution and is
of slight probative value. Such evidence must be considered, if found reliable,
not separately, but in conjunction with all other testimony in this [sic] case,
and in the absence of some other direct evidence of guilt, dog trailing evidence
would not warrant conviction.
Id. (quoting People v. Craig, 150 Cal. Rptr. 676, 683 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)). The court did
not entertain this instruction, but for the purposes of this Comment it would be sufficient as
well. Id.
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The entirety of this Comment demonstrates the exceedingly
high probative value of scent evidence—establishing a suspect’s
presence at the crime scene.207 In this way, scent identifications
directly tend to prove, or disprove, whether a crime was
committed by a particular person.208 In summation: dog-scent
identifications contribute directly to the resolution of the case by
helping to establish identity;209 they serve a unique purpose when
the suspect cannot already be easily or confidently placed at the
crime scene. While a fairly short analysis, Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 is important, and is passed.210
IV. CONCLUSION
Once a sour lemon for courts to avoid, dog scent lineups
prove to be capable of transforming into a superb resource. When
followed, a precise recipe, representative of international tastes,

207. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
208. It is vital that the expert be able to put on information regarding the uniqueness of
each person’s body odor beyond experience from just one trainer and one dog. See People
v. Mitchell, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 49, 64, 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). This goes towards the relevancy
of the scent lineups: if it cannot be shown the scents are unique and the canine is able to
recognize differences between the scents, then scent lineups would just be a guessing game.
See id. The court in Mitchell found the dog scent evidence to be inadmissible because
relevancy could not be established when it was concerned with the absence of evidence
showing that every person’s scent is unique. Id. at 794-95. This type of evidence does exist.
See Marchal et al., supra note 4, at 1-2 (“Gas chromatography-mass spectrometry studies
showed that each human scent consists of a combination of volatile components produced
from the skin and differing in ratio from person to person, along with some compounds that
are unique to certain individuals. This combination, which has been shown to be constant
and reproducible over time, contributes to the individuality and uniqueness of human scent.
This finding likewise includes identical twins’ individual scents.”).
209. If it is not a question whether the suspect’s scent was at the crime scene, then dog
scent lineups will not do much good. See 1 DAVID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
OF FORFEITURE CASES ¶ 4.03 (2022) (discussing how the drug sniffing dog at best showed
the money had been exposed to narcotics and that this information was not very probative
because up to 80% of the money in circulation may carry narcotics residue). To further
illustrate, in a situation where the suspect is a family member and living in the crime scene
home, dog scent lineups would not have much probative value, as it is already known and
understood that the suspect’s scent would likely already be at the crime scene.
210. See generally FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing the judge to exclude relevant evidence
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence).
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can advance the legal field—whether change was asked for or
not.211
In an already flawed justice system, no harm commences by
dog scent lineups unpretentiously placing a scent at a crime scene
and allowing the lawyers, judges, and factfinders to determine the
rest.212
This Comment serves both to encourage the
transformation of dog scent lineups by demanding standards and
safeguards and to appreciate their value. Of course, there are
challenges with such a notable transformation. Namely,
resources.213 But once transformed, something shocking will
transpire—a seemingly unreliable method of identification will
become something more. It becomes something great.

211. See, e.g., PBS, supra note 28 (“One of the greatest sleuths in canine history was
a Kentucky bloodhound called Nick Carter. His dogged persistence led to the capture and
conviction of more than 600 criminals throughout his illustrious career.”).
212. See State v. Frederiksen, No. 15-0844, 2016 WL 4051655, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App.
July 27, 2016) (acknowledging that the defense pointed out weaknesses of the identification
and that the jury was free to assign appropriate weight however they saw fit).
213. It is recognized that the FBI and other large agencies may be one of the few
agencies with the resources available to currently conduct dog scent lineups properly, as
many local agencies lack funding, canines, handlers, and are already overworked. See
Ensminger & Jezierski, supra note 11, at 101.
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ARKANSAS INSURANCE DEP’T. FINAL RULE 126:
“INSURANCE BUSINESS TRANSFERS” 1
Pursuant to Act 1018 of 2021, “An Act to Establish the
Arkansas Business Transfer Act,” the Arkansas Insurance
Department has promulgated Final Rule 126 “to provide
standards and procedures for the transfer and novation of
insurance policies from a transferring insurer to an assuming
insurer through a transaction known as an ‘insurance business
transfer.’” The Rule requires that the applicant submit an
Insurance Business Transfer Plan—along with a nonrefundable
$10,000 fee—to the Department detailing the transaction. One
critical element of this Plan is the Independent Expert Opinion
Report. An independent expert will produce a written report to
be included in the Plan and will assist the court and the
Commissioner of the Insurance Department in their review of the
transaction. Under Final Rule 126, “The Commissioner shall
authorize the submission of the Plan to the court unless he or she
finds that the insurance business transfer would have an adverse
material impact on the interests of policyholders or claimants that
are part of the subject business.” Within thirty days of the
Commissioner’s approval of the Plan, the Rule requires the
applicant to petition the court for approval. Final Rule 126
became effective on January 1, 2022.
BENTONVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT V. SITTON 2
The parents of several Bentonville School District students
challenged the constitutionality of a mask mandate policy
1. 12 Ark. Reg. 8 (Dec. 2021).
2. Bentonville Sch. Dist. v. Sitton, 2022 Ark. 80, ___ S.W.3d ___.
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imposed by the District in August 2021 for the 2021-2022
academic year. The Benton County Circuit Court entered a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) on October 12, 2021,
enjoining the District’s enforcement of its policy, ruling that the
mandate violated the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and was
enacted without proper authority. Later the same month,
declining COVID-19 infection rates led the District to allow the
mask mandate to lapse.
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the grounds on which
the circuit court had granted the TRO had been rendered moot,
but that the case fell under the substantial-public-interest
mootness exception. Because a substantial public interest existed
in the issues being considered, and because the Court would likely
prevent future litigation by considering those issues, the Court
proceeded to the merits of the case. The Court held that the mask
mandate policy was a proper exercise of the District’s authority,
one which did not violate the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights;
therefore, the Plaintiffs had failed to show that irreparable harm
would result in the absence of a TRO.
Justice Womack concurred in the judgment but authored a
separate opinion, arguing that the District’s appeal was moot.
Special Justice Brill penned a concurrence, as well, contending
that the United States and Arkansas constitutions do not protect a
parent’s right to micromanage an elected school board; rather,
disgruntled parents may voice their grievances at the ballot box.
In her dissent, Justice Webb argued that the majority’s
consideration of the merits in this case overstepped the abuse-ofdiscretion standard of review that accompanies TRO appeals.
Even if consideration of the merits were proper, Justice Webb
continued, the majority wrongly held that the mask mandate was
within the District’s authority and did not violate the plaintiffs’
parental rights.
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PENNINGTON V. BHP BILLITON PETROLEUM
(FAYETTEVILLE), LLC 3
Oil-and-gas royalty holders sued their lessees for breach of
contract related to the lessees’ improper deduction of certain costs
from the monthly payments made to the royalty holders. Some of
these underpayments had occurred within the statutory five-year
period and some had occurred outside the period. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas certified
the following question to the Arkansas Supreme Court:
In the oil and gas leases at issues in this case, does the
five-year statute of limitations set forth in Arkansas Code
section 16-56-111(a) bar Plaintiffs from bringing a breach of
contract lawsuit for alleged underpayments of monthly
royalties that occurred within the statute of limitations period
because similar underpayments of monthly royalties took
place outside of the limitations period?

The Court held that the damage element of breach of contract
would have been established each month that lessees underpaid
the royalty holders, and that the existence of some underpayments
outside of the limitations period did not bar recovery for
underpayments within the limitations period.
SILAS HEFFLEY

3. Pennington v. BHP Billiton Petroleum (Fayetteville), LLC, 2021 Ark. 179, 631
S.W.3d 555.

